TB7-12108

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-12108 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision April 19, 2018 Date de la décision Panel Pasquale Fiorino Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Razgar Hasan Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The Appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, is a citizen of Saudi Arabia, and appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated May 31, 2017, rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant is not requesting a new hearing but is submitting new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and find that the Appellant is either a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, or that the RAD refer the matter back to the RPD for reconsideration. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleges that he cannot return to Saudi Arabia due to his political opinion and membership in the Shia Muslim religion. He alleges that he participated in demonstrations against the government in XXXX and XXXX of 2011 and many of his friends and relatives who had participated in these demonstrations were either arrested or killed. He arrived in Canada in January of 2012 on a student visa, returned to Saudi Arabia in XXXX of 2014 and alleges that he was questioned and his passport was seized by the authorities. He returned to Canada in January of 2015 to resume his studies. In XXXX of 2016 he was notified by his mother that the authorities had raided their home in Saudi Arabia and he filed his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant also alleges persecution and discrimination on account of his Shia Religion. ROLE OF THE RAD [4] For questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law, the RAD has applied the standard of correctness as per Huruglica.1 In assessing issues involving credibility of oral testimony, the RAD may apply the RAD's modified standard of reasonableness in those situations where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in making credibility findings as per the decision in X (Re).2 [5] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own analysis of the Record to determine if the RPD erred. ANALYSIS ON THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [6] The RPD concluded that the Appellant was not a credible witness with respect to his allegations and that he lacked subjective fear due to his failure to claim in Canada, and his re-availment to Saudi Arabia. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its credibility assessment and in its conclusion on subjective fear. POLITICAL ACTIVITIES CREDIBILITY [7] The RPD found that there were three major areas where the Appellant's testimony was not consistent: the allegations... a) with respect to the XXXX 2011 protest; b) with respect to the XXXX 2011 protest; c) and their omission from his Basis of Claim (BOC); d) that his passport was seized on his return to Saudi Arabia. XXXX 2011 and XXXX 2011 Protests [8] The Appellant alleges that he participated in an anti-government protest in XXXX of 2011. In his written evidence he wrote that a number of his friends had been detained and that a few had also been killed during the protest.3 He also wrote that he himself had not been detained. However, in his oral testimony, the Appellant stated that no one with whom he had been acquainted had actually been harmed as a result of their participation in the protest. The RPD put this contradiction between his written and oral testimony to the Appellant and he replied that the individuals whom he was referring to in his written evidence had been detained after the protest. The RPD reject this explanation. [9] The Appellant also alleges that he participated in an anti-government demonstration in XXXX of 2011. In his written evidence he stated that, although he himself was not arrested as a result of the demonstration, many of his friends had been injured and arrested. In his oral testimony, however, he changed his evidence and stated that no one whom he knew had been arrested at the demonstration. The RPD put this contradiction to the Appellant and he stated that these were individuals who his cousin knew but not him personally. The RPD rejected this explanation. [10] With respect to both of these contradictions, the RAD agrees with the RPD in rejecting the explanation provided by the Appellant. This is not a question of the Appellant not recalling if any of the protestors had been arrested. But this is a question of the Appellant changing his evidence, providing conflicting testimony between his written and oral evidence as to when the arrest of demonstrators had taken place, and as to whether he knew the individual's arrested. It is reasonable to expect that an individual who alleges that he had participated in an anti-government demonstration would have been consistent in his testimony as to when the arrest of demonstrators had taken place. Omissions from his BOC [11] In his oral testimony, the Appellant provided evidence with respect to specific details concerning the demonstrations. In particular, he provided evidence as to where the demonstration had taken place, and the reasons for the protests, which included economic and political grievances of the Shia minority. The RPD pointed out that none of these details had been mentioned by the Appellant in his BOC and asked him to explain the omission. The Appellant replied that there had been too many details for him to include in his BOC. The RPD rejected this explanation. [12] The Appellant's allegations of his participation in two anti-government demonstrations are crucial to his refugee claim. This is not a question of the Appellant outlining the facts of the demonstrations in his BOC and then providing the details at the hearing. This is a question that the Appellant did not provide any details concerning the demonstrations in his BOC. It is reasonable to have expected the Appellant to state in his BOC some of details pertaining to the demonstrations, such as the location and the reasons and then elaborating on them in his oral testimony. This the Appellant did not do. The RAD agrees with the RPD in rejecting the Appellant's explanation. [13] Given the above credibility findings, the RAD concludes that the Appellant did not participate in demonstrations in XXXX of 2011 nor in XXXX of 2011. The seizure of the Appellant's Passport [14] The Appellant returned to Saudi Arabia in XXXX of 2014 and he alleges that he was questioned immediately upon his arrival and the authorities seized his passport. In his BOC, the Appellant wrote that he received his passport on XXXX XXXX, 2015, while in his oral testimony he stated that he received it nearly a month before, on XXXX XXXX, 2014. The RPD put this contradiction to the Appellant and he could not provide any explanation. During questioning by his counsel, the Appellant stated that he had in fact returned to the security office to retrieve his passport on XXXX XXXX, 2014 but that he had actually obtained it on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015. The RPD rejected these explanations. [15] This is not a question of the Appellant not been able to recall the exact date as to when the Passport was returned to him. This is a question of the Appellant changing his testimony as to when the passport was returned to him. The Appellant provided no explanation to the RPD for this contradiction, but then later, when questioned by his counsel, he stated that he had attended at the security office on XXXX XXXX but had actually received his passport on XXXX XXXX. If that explanation is true, it is reasonable to have expected him to provide it to the RPD when questioned about the contradiction. The RAD agrees with the RPD in rejecting the Appellant's explanations. The RAD concludes that the Appellant's passport was not seized by the authorities in XXXX of 2014. [16] As a result of these credibility concerns, the RPD concluded that the Appellant was not a credible witness with respect to his allegations of political involvement against the government. [17] The RAD notes that, in his submissions, the Appellant did not challenge any of the credibility findings of the RPD. The Appellant submits that the reasons for his contradictions and inconsistencies are that he: "... has a grade twelve educations and he took some courses here and there... The reason of the memory problem is lack of concentration."4 The RAD notes that no medical evidence was introduced to corroborate the allegation that the Appellant suffers from a lack of concentration. [18] Rule 3(3)(g) of the RAD states that the Appellant must submit: (g) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding (i) the errors that are the grounds of the appeal, (ii) where the errors are located in the written reasons for the Refugee Protection Division's decision that the appellant is appealing or in the transcript or in any audio or other electronic recording of the Refugee Protection Division hearing, [19] The RPD reached its conclusion by analyzing and referring to specific written and oral testimony of the Appellant, and by referring to documents provided by the Appellant. In his submissions, the Appellant does not challenge any of these findings by the RPD. He does not provide any explanation which might have clarified the testimony which he provided to the RPD. [20] The RAD therefore agrees with the RPD that the Appellant is not a credible witness with respect to his allegations concerning his alleged political involvement in Saudi Arabia. Documentary Evidence [21] In support of his allegations, the Appellant submitted to the RPD a number documents, in particular a text message from his brother and an email from his mother.5 The RPD did not assign any evidentiary weight to these two documents. In order to rectify the credibility issue with respect to the email from the Appellant's mother, the Appellant has submitted new evidence. NEW EVIDENCE [22] In support of appeal, the Appellant has filed new evidence in the form of:6 a) A document relating to the sentencing of his brother. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [23] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected7 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [24] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in his Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.8 Application of Section 110(4) [25] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.9 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in his circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of his claim. If he could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [26] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.10 [27] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [28] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for the Appellant to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.11 [29] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.12 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [30] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such a document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [31] In Singh,13 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza14 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.15 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).16 [32] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [33] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.17 RAD Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [34] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.18 [35] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [36] The document is dated May 23, 2017, which is after the RPD rendered its decision. The document states that the authorities confiscated the telephone and a computer belonging to the Appellant's brother. The RAD notes that the Appellant's mother's email simply states that the authorities raided the house but makes no mention of any confiscation of electronics. It would have been reasonable for the Appellant's mother to make mention of such a fact in order to demonstrate the severity of the search. [37] According the judgment, the Appellant's brother was convicted because of his affiliation with Hizb-Allah and with the Al-Manar television station. There is nothing in the document which indicates that the Appellant's brother was charged or convicted for any of the activities which the Appellant himself alleges to have been involved in. The Appellant has not made any allegation that the authorities in Saudi Arabia are looking for him because of any involvement with Hizb-Allah or the Al-Manar television station. [38] The Appellant submits that the new evidence is relevant because it demonstrates that the entire family is at risk, as the Appellant has alleged in his BOC. The RAD cannot agree with this submission. With respect to members of the Appellant's family who are still living in Saudi Arabia, the RAD notes that the Appellant has not provided any evidence that any other member of his immediate family has been arrested or interrogated by the authorities, nor have the authorities returned to the Appellant's home. With respect to the Appellant, if the authorities are looking for the Appellant, as the mother alleges in her email, they had an opportunity to arrest him when he was questioned upon his arrival in XXXX of 2014. And yet, according to the Appellant's mother, two years later they are waiting for him. [39] The RAD concludes that the New Evidence, although indicating that the Appellant's brother was arrested and convicted, has no relevance with respect to the allegations put forward by the Appellant and concludes that it is not relevant to this Appeal. SUBJECTIVE FEAR Re-Availment [40] The Appellant returned to Saudi Arabia in XXXX of 2014 and remained there for approximately one month. He stated that the reason for his return was to visit his mother who was suffering from asthma and had been hospitalized. The RAD notes that the RPD hearing was held over two sessions. At the first session, the RPD asked the Appellant if he had any documentary evidence to confirm his mother's illness and the Appellant provided no reply. It is reasonable to expect that, between the first and second session of the RPD hearing, the Appellant would have attempted to provide some form of documentary evidence of his mother's illness. This the Appellant did not do. The RPD rejected the Appellant's explanation as to why he returned to Saudi Arabia in XXXX of 2014. In his submissions,19 the Appellant states that the reason provided for his re-availment is reasonable as he was not a fugitive but only a person of interest in Saudi Arabia. The RAD cannot agree with this submission. [41] The Board has been upheld in its position that re-availment, unless for "pressing reasons", is generally fatal to a claim for refugee protection.20 The Appellant alleges that he is being sought by the government for his involvement in anti-government demonstrations. He also alleges that individuals who had also participated in these demonstrations had been arrested and some even killed by the government and that his brother disappeared and his family is under the radar of the government. Whether he is considered a fugitive or a person of interest is not the issue. The issue that the Appellant alleges is that he is being sought by the authorities. The RAD finds that, given the allegations of the Appellant, returning to Saudi Arabia was not a pressing reason. The RAD finds that the Appellant's re-availment is indicative of a lack of subjective fear. Delay in Claiming [42] The Appellant returned to Canada in January of 2015 and filed his claim for refugee protection eighteen months later. When asked why he had not filed a claim upon his return from Saudi Arabia, he stated that he was contemplating returning to Saudi Arabia. The RPD rejected this explanation. When the Appellant returned to Canada in January of 2015, he alleges that he had been questioned by the authorities and his passport had been seized. He also alleges that his cousins had been targeted by the police for their political activities. And yet he waits eighteen months to file a claim for refugee protection. In his submissions21 the Appellant states that his explanation that he intended to return to Saudi Arabia and that he had legal status in Canada was reasonable. The RAD cannot agree with these submission. [43] The purpose of a claim for a refugee is to seek protection from the host country. A refugee claim is not meant to be used as one of many and different applications which may be used by the claimant to remain legally in the host country. More importantly, a refugee claim is not meant to be used as a means of last resort after every other application to remain in the host country has failed. This is precisely what the Appellant has done. The Federal Court has repeatedly upheld that "... a refugee claim should not be looked at simply as one of many choices as to how to best seek status in Canada."22 [44] If the Appellant truly feared returning to Saudi Arabia due to his political activities, it is reasonable that he would have made every effort to seek refugee status when he returned to Canada in January of 2015.This he did not do. [45] The RAD finds that the Appellant made no effort to file a claim for refugee protection upon his arrival in Canada in January of 2015. The RAD finds that the Appellant did not file his claim for refugee protection because he feared for his life if he were to return to the Saudi Arabia. [46] The RAD finds this lack of effort on the part of the Appellant to inquire about and file a claim for asylum troubling and not demonstrative of the existence of his fear. It is a reasonable expectation that a person with genuine fear of persecution or harm in his home country will, absent a good reason, seek refugee protection immediately upon arrival in a safe country.23 The fact that he did not take this step soon upon arrival in Canada in January of 2015 puts into question the genuineness of his fear. From the RAD's view, the apparent lack of urgency in his actions belies his claim of fear. [47] For all of the above reasons the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant has failed to provide any satisfactory explanation for his delay in filing a claim for refugee protection. [48] Delay has been recognized by the Federal Court as an important factor in assessing a claimant's credibility and their subjective fear. It is reasonable to assume that persons with a well-founded fear of persecution will attempt to apply for refugee protection without unreasonable delay. The Appellant delayed for eighteen months and it undermines his credibility and the Appellant's allegation that he faces a serious harm in the Saudi Arabia if he were to return. [49] In Mesidor, the Federal Court pointed out that: ...the courts have consistently held that a claimant's delay in filing a refugee claim can justify the rejection of a refugee claim in a case where this delay was not satisfactorily explained.24 [50] In the case of Williams, the claimant took two years to file a claim for refugee protection after her arrival in Canada. The court stated: The court recognized that, according to the case law, while delay in making a claim is an important factor to consider, it is not decisive; nonetheless, delay may, in circumstances such as in this case, suffice to warrant the dismissal of a claim, even though this is unfortunate for the applicant. The explanations of the applicant, viewed in the context of her uncorroborated evidence in its entirety, warranted the dismissal of her claim by the Board.25 [51] The RAD does not accept the explanation provided by the Appellant as to why it took him eighteen months to apply for refugee protection after his arrival in Canada in January of 2015 and agrees with the RPD that the delay in claim is indicative of a lack of subjective fear. [52] These were the only issues raised by the Appellant with respect to his allegations of political activity. SHIA MUSLIM [53] The Appellant also alleges that, as a member of the minority Shia religion, he will face discrimination and persecution in Saudi Arabia. The Appellant submitted documentary evidence to the RPD which indicates that he is a practicing Shia Muslim. After analyzing the documentary evidence, the RPD concluded that members of the Shia community do face discrimination in Saudi Arabia. In his submissions, the Appellant referred the RAD to documentary evidence which he submits demonstrates that there is lack of religious freedom in Saudi Arabia.26 The RAD has had an opportunity to examine the documentary evidence on the treatment of members of the Shia religion in Saudi Arabia. The documents do indicate the practice of the Shia religion is restricted, and there is also evidence of discrimination in areas such as employment. However, there is also evidence that the government has taken steps to improve the situation of members of the Shia community. In the areas of the country where there is a predominant Shia population, the documents indicate that members of the Shia community had a high representation in areas such as police, municipal and school bureaucracies.27 The government has initiated anti-discriminatory training in Ministries of the Interior, and Defense, and in the National Guard.28 Although the documentary package indicates that the militant group Da'esh has "...conducted at least five attacks against Shia targets in the country during the year. The government condemned and investigated the attacks, and increased security at Shia places of worship."29 [54] However, as the Federal Court has indicated,30 membership in a group which faces discrimination, does not automatically grant refugee status. Although the cases cited by the RAD refer to members of the Roma community, the general legal principal still applies. A refugee claim must be specific to the experience of the Appellant. Simply being a member of the Shia community does not, in and of itself, establish that the Appellant would face persecution if he were to return to Saudi Arabia. The only incident of discrimination which the Appellant alleges is that he was not admitted to the Saudi Air Force due to his religion. However, the RAD notes that his father had the rank of Captain in the Saudi Marines and that the Appellant was educated and employed in Saudi Arabia without experiencing any discrimination. The Appellant has also not produced any evidence that members of his family have been discriminated due their religion. [55] The RAD agrees with the RPD that what the Appellant experienced did not amount to persecution for it was not of a severity that entitles him to refugee protection. The event experienced by the Appellant do not constitute persecution in itself.31 [56] The RAD agrees with the RPD that the Appellant would not face persecution nor a risk to his life due to his religion if he were to return to Saudi Arabia. [57] Furthermore, the RAD notes that the Appellant arrived in Canada in 2012 and did not file a refugee claim based on his membership in the Shia community. It is reasonable to expect that, if the Appellant feared returning to Saudi Arabia because of his religious affiliation, he would have filed a refugee claim on that ground when he first arrived. [58] This particular issue was not raised by the RPD. The RAD asked the Appellant to provide written submissions explaining his reason for not applying for refugee protection when he first arrived in Canada in 2012 on religious grounds. The written submissions were received by the Board on March 19, 2018. In these submissions the Appellant states that he did not file for refugee protection in 2012 because he had not been personally targeted but that there is always a risk for young Shia men in Saudi Arabia. If that is true, then it is reasonable that the Appellant would have applied for refugee protection in 2012 when he first arrived in Canada. This he did not do. [59] With respect to the Appellant's failure to file for refugee protection when he first arrived in Canada in 2012 on religious affiliation, the RAD does not accept the explanation provided by the Appellant and relies on the legal analysis provided above in paragraphs 47-51. CONCLUSION [60] The RAD agrees with the RPD that the Appellant is not credible with respect to his allegations that he is sought by the authorities in Saudi Arabia due to his political activities and that he would not be persecuted nor face a risk to life due to his religious affiliation. DECISION [61] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [62] The Appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Pasquale Fiorino" Pasquale Fiorino April 19, 2018 Date 1 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93. 2 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB). 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 28, para. 5. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 119. 5 Ibid., pp. 95-101. 6 Ibid., pp. 111-114. 7 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 8 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 9 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, July 22, 2015, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 10 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 11 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 54. 12 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 13 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 14 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 15 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 16 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 17 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 18 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 119. 20 Caballero, Fausto Ramon Reyes v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-266-91), Marceau, (dissenting) Desjardins, Létourneau, May 13, 1993; Servillion Rodriguez, Carlos Alberto et al. v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., No. IMM-2815-01), Beaudry, March 20, 2002; 2002 FCT 292 . 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 120. 22 Stojmenovic, Danica (née Randjelovic) v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6718-09), Hughes, September 2, 2010, 2010 FC 873; Garzon, Omar Yovani Ortiz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-925-10), O'Keefe, March 11, 2011, 2011 FC 299. 23 Hurt v. Canada (Minister of Manpower and Immigration), [1978] 2 F.C. 340 (C.A.), at 342. 24 Josue Peterlee Mesidor v. M.C.I. 2009 FC-1245, par. 12. 25 Williams, Jacitha Jasette v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-18-09), Lagacé, July 31, 2009; 2009 FC 793, par. 26. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 120. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Saudi Arabia (30 November 2016), item 12.1. 28 Ibid., item 2.1. 29 Ibid., item 12.1, p. 1. 30 Balog, Andrej v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5543-10), Phelan, April 1, 2015, 2015 FC 414, at para. 18; see also Csonka, Zoltan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1144-12), Shore, September 7, 2012, 2012 FC 1056; Ahmad, Hasib v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9188-03), Rouleau, June 4, 2004, 2004 FC 808 at para. 22; Prophète, Ralph v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3077-07), Tremblay-Lamer, March 12, 2008, 2008 FC 331, at para. 17; Jarada, Alaa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4638-04), de Montigny, March 24, 2005, 2005 FC 409, at para. 28; Kanto, Gyula v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6481-11), de Montigny, September 5, 2012, 2012 FC 1049. 31 Blalzs, Jozsef v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5241-12), Noël, January 23, 2013, 2013 FC 62. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB7-12108