MB5-00741

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-00741; MB5-00742; MB5-00743; MB5-00744; MB5-00745 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered/heard at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision September 18, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Me Alain Bissonnette Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Salif Sangaré Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION I. INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, the principal appellant, and her children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, who are all citizens of Cameroon, are appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD). They submit that the RPD erred in mixed fact and law in the analysis of their credibility. [2] The principal appellant was previously designated to represent her two minor children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Under the Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules), the designated representative is deemed to have been designated by the Division.1 II. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [3] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) dismisses the appeal and confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and her children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, are neither "Convention refugees" under section 96 of the IRPA nor "persons in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. III. BACKGROUND A. Summary of alleged facts [4] In the Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form) that she signed on August 18, 2014, the principal appellant states that she and her family arrived in Canada a little over four years ago as temporary workers. She then presents the following facts: [translation] It is on this basis that we applied for immigration to Canada because, in agreeing to come to Canada, my and my husband's primary concern was our safety; in connection with my husband's job, our family had been receiving increasingly serious death threats. In 1997, my husband found a job with XXXX, a multinational company. In 2006, after so many years of loyal and dedicated service as XXXX XXXX XXXX, he was fired from this French company, without any compensation or severance pay, because he refused to be involved in some questionable capital transfers. To take care of his family of four children, he accepted the position as head of XXXX, a XXXX member firm. XXXX offers consulting, audit, support and training services in the areas of management, taxation and finance. It was within this context that he met with XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX, Canadian investors. They talked to him about an ambitious project to develop the Canadian model of river transport in Cameroon and the CEMAC sub-region. They brought up all the difficulties they were having in establishing this project in Cameroon. They therefore requested the firm's assistance. That is when the threats intensified: we received an anonymous threatening letter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2006, but my husband, who tends to be rational, remained calm and collected. On XXXX XXXX, 2007, a young girl named XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a family friend who lived with us, was sexually assaulted at the entrance to our home. On XXXX XXXX, 2007, the thugs sent us another anonymous letter to tell us that what happened with XXXX XXXX XXXX would happen to our little girl, who was only 5 years old at the time. My husband was scared this time and hired a security guard service. On XXXX XXXX, 2009, we received another anonymous letter threatening my husband's life. That same year, the Canadian investors offered him a temporary work contract to ensure project stability and a physical link between Canada and Cameroon, the focus of the project. He did not realize that he had just done something he should not have: managing a project with a business plan announcing hundreds of millions of dollars to be managed. He became the living target of an invisible and powerful force and corrupt officials. There was so much pressure that Mr. XXXX fled Cameroon and Mr. XXXX will never go back there. He accepted the temporary work contract. And since he was now going to spend more time hopping from airplane to airplane, my husband decided that the children and I would accompany him to his office in Canada. That is how I have come to be in Canada with the children since June 2010. In 2011 [which was then changed to 20122], some thugs were paid to break into the XXXX firm. They broke the doors and entered the firm's offices. They turned the offices upside down, and left with the firm's central server and important documents. To date, those thugs and their associates have never been identified, or investigated. On the night of XXXX XXXX to XXXX, 2013, he was the victim of a murder attempt while returning from the office in Cameroon. When he arrived at the entrance to his home, he was grabbed by four armed hit men. They hit him and undressed him. Then they shot at him, leaving him for dead on the road. To this day, we do not know who was behind it all. And if that was not enough, on XXXX XXXX, 2013, he was arbitrarily detained. Knowing that my return to Cameroon would pose a threat to my life and to the lives of my four children, my husband asked me not to consider this option as not only are his enemies still at large, but they could also follow through with some of the threats that have been made against our family, including physically attacking us as well. It is a proven fact that when you want to hurt a man, you attack his wife and family. Recently, the wife of the all-powerful XXXX XXXX, a powerful Cameroonian minister, was kidnapped; who am I and what can I do? We cannot return to Cameroon at this time; it is very dangerous for us. My husband's current problems are proof that our fear is indeed well founded. In addition, I have a minor daughter who has been the subject of threats of rape, etc. Cameroon is known for its corruption, its injustice, the settling of scores, the abuse of power, which exposes me and my children to all sorts of harm, even death.3 [5] The principal appellant's children based their own refugee protection claims on the facts she alleged.4 [6] In addition to their BOC Forms, the appellants, who were called the claimants at the time, submitted documents into evidence before the RPD.5 B. The RPD decision [7] The RPD hearing was held on November 4, 2014, and the decision to reject the claim for refugee protection was rendered on January 13, 2015.6 [8] In its reasons for decision, the RPD found that the principal claimant's credibility had been undermined by contradictions and implausibilities: [translation] [14] When the panel questioned her regarding the connection between the attempts on her husband's life and his being arrested and charged with embezzlement, the claimant provided only speculation that was not supported by any evidence. [15] The panel also finds unreasonable and implausible the claimant's statements that Cameroonian authorities, having failed in their attempt to murder her husband, arrested him and charged him with embezzlement to keep him quiet. The claimant also stated that this is what the authorities in her country do when they want to keep someone quiet or when they are out to get someone: they accuse them of embezzlement. No evidence was submitted to substantiate the claimant's statements. [16] Furthermore, the panel finds that document C-2,7 namely, the letter from the claimant's husband to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) providing his account and requesting protection for his family, which was written while he was detained and awaiting trial, contradicts the claimant's statements that the authorities want to keep her husband quiet. The credibility of the claimant's allegations is seriously undermined. [17] The panel also finds that despite the first alleged threats in 2006, the claimant's husband did not file a complaint with the police, despite their suspicions as to who had made those threats, nor did they take steps to leave or flee the country. [18] With respect to the sexual assault on an individual living in the claimant's home, the panel believes it could have happened, given the medical certificate submitted. However, the panel is of the opinion that a connection was not established between that assault and the allegations of threats against the claimant and her spouse.8 [9] Furthermore, the RPD attached little credibility to the threatening letters submitted as evidence (C-10) because of their format and because it found it implausible that the alleged agents of persecution felt obliged to explain in detail why they had failed.9 [10] With respect to the alleged attack on the principal claimant' husband in XXXX 2013, the RPD noted contradictions in the number of attackers, namely, 4, 5 or 6. Moreover, given the significance of the incident in question, it did not find reasonable the explanation that the principal claimant had made a mistake when writing her account.10 [11] Furthermore, the RPD found that the behaviour of the principal claimant and her spouse was not consistent with the behaviour of someone who fears for their life, when they both returned to Cameroon after having been the target of serious threats.11 [12] Lastly, the RPD noted a contradiction between the principal claimant's testimony and what she wrote in her BOC Form regarding the injuries sustained by her husband during the attack by the armed men.12 [13] This led to its overall finding: [translation] Given all of the above, the panel does not believe the claimant's account regarding the threats against her family. The panel finds the Cameroonian authorities' charges against her husband to be credible, given the documentary evidence on this matter. However, the principal claimant did not present any credible and trustworthy evidence or testimony to support the fear she claims for her and her children, and did not establish a connection with the embezzlement charges laid against her husband by the Cameroonian authorities.13 C. Grounds of appeal and remedy sought [14] In her memorandum, the principal appellant states that she and her children are claiming refugee status in Canada on the grounds of a reasonable fear of persecution by reason of a particular social group, that is, family, as well as imputed political reasons (husband's activities).14 She submits that the RPD decision indicating that she did not present any credible and trustworthy evidence or testimony to support her fear, and did not establish a connection with the charges against her husband, is not only an error in fact, but also an error in the application of the rule of law.15 [15] Firstly, because the RPD erred in finding overall that it had noted several contradictions and implausibilities, without explaining them. She adds that the contradictions and implausibilities must be significant and fundamental, and that the RPD must explain why it finds the explanations provided unsatisfactory.16 [16] Next, the principal appellant submits that she adequately explained, to her understanding, the connection between the murder attempts on her husband and his being arrested and charged with embezzlement. She adds that she submitted documents into evidence showing the relentlessness of the unidentified individuals going after her husband.17 [17] Furthermore, she submits that the RPD erred: - in finding that there was a contradiction between her testimony and her spouse's letter;18 - in finding that no complaint had been filed, while exhibits C-4 and C-6 show otherwise;19 - in failing to explain how there was no connection between a letter submitted into evidence and the sexual assault on an individual living in her home;20 - in applying rules of formality to the various anonymous threatening letters that her family received;21 - in focusing on the number of individuals who attacked her husband, mentioned in her account, when that is not a significant or fundamental contradiction;22 and - in faulting her for having travelled to Cameroon before the incident of XXXX 2013, when there was a murder attempt on her husband, which was the element that triggered her fear.23 [18] Later in her memorandum, the principal appellant invokes a number of principles, including fairness, prudence in the assessment of the norms and practices of different cultures, the presumption of truthfulness of a refugee protection claim, the obligation to consider the explanations provided, the inability to exclude evidence submitted without presenting evidence to the contrary, the obligation not to ignore relevant evidence, and the standard applicable in cases involving fear of persecution. She also submits that the RPD did not respect these principles and thereby erred in mixed fact and law when it found that she was not credible.24 [19] The principal appellant is requesting that the RAD allow the appeal, set aside the RPD's determination, order a new hearing, or render any other decision it finds relevant given the errors in the assessment of the evidence.25 IV. ADMISSIBILITY OF DOCUMENTS PRESENTED ON APPEAL A. The principal appellant presented documents on appeal [20] In her written statement, the principal appellant states that her application includes evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim or that was not reasonably available, or that she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection.26 [21] The following documents can be found in the appeal record: - Cameroun : XXXX XXXX XXXX : Le Kafka, réfugié politique en France [Cameroon: XXXX XXXX XXXX: Kafka, political refugee in France];27 - Cameroun : la face cachée de l'opération épervier [Cameroon: the hidden face of Operation Sparrowhawk];28 and - Cameroun. Ces éperviables qui ont pris la fuite [Cameroon. The sparrowhawks who have fled];29 B. Test for admissibility [22] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present to the RAD only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not have reasonably been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. It should be pointed out that in terms of a time limit, subsection 110(4) refers to the rejection of the appellant's claim rather than the hearing before the RPD. After the hearing before the RPD, but before a decision takes effect, a party wishing to provide a document as evidence may make an application to that effect.30 [23] For the moment, Federal Court decisions regarding the interpretation of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA show at least two points of view that differ in some aspects.31 The Federal Court of Appeal must soon rule on this issue.32 [24] That being said, I am aware of the fundamental differences that exist between the pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) process and that of the appeal heard in this case. And I willingly accept the assertion that the reasons for strictly limiting the receipt of new evidence in the context of a PRRA are mostly absent from those that apply to an appeal before the RAD, particularly given the truncated timeline for completing the refugee determination proceeding before the RPD.33 [25] While accepting that a full appeal before the RAD requires that the criteria for the admissibility of evidence be sufficiently flexible to ensure that a proper appeal can occur and to afford some leeway in order to allow the claimant to respond to the deficiencies raised by the RPD,34 based on a recent Federal Court decision,35 I find that this evidence must nevertheless meet the admissibility requirements pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [26] Lastly, it should be noted that the RAD Rules provide that the appeal record must contain, among other things, a written statement indicating whether the appellant is relying on any evidence referred to in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, as well as a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding how the evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the appellant.36 C. The RAD's decision on the admissibility of the documents in question [27] In her memorandum, the principal appellant does not provide full and detailed submissions regarding how the evidence presented on appeal meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. a. Cameroun : XXXX XXXX XXXX : Le Kafka, réfugié politique en France [28] This document is dated December 30, 2014,37 while the RPD decision was rendered on January 13, 2015. That being said, the numbers 3/9/2015 can be seen in the left-hand corner of each page, which leads me to believe that the document was printed from an Internet site, undoubtedly on March 9, 2015, the same day that the memorandum of appeal was received at the Immigration and Refugee Board.38 [29] The document in question is signed by a certain XXXX XXXX XXXX. For my part, after reviewing the document in question, I have no specific information regarding the author of this document or when and how it was written. Its credibility may therefore be questioned.39 [30] In any case, this document is about a former Cameroonian minister and parliamentarian who has been in France, where he obtained refugee status, for four years and who, according to the author of the document, is the ideal target of a kangaroo court, and a trial against him for the embezzlement of public funds has been started in Yaoundé. The document reports that the individual in question denies all charges against him and denounces various procedural irregularities against him, while stating that he has no intention of going to face [translation] "target-seeking Cameroonian justice." [31] In short, this document was available a few days before the RPD rendered its decision. In her memorandum, the principal appellant does not provide full and detailed submissions regarding how the evidence presented on appeal meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. For my part, after carefully reviewing the document in question, it appears to me that it does not refer to any event that took place after 2010. Consequently, I find that this document does not meet either of the two criteria specifically set out in the wording of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA.40 [32] Furthermore, the principal appellant does not provide any submissions as to how this document relates to her refugee protection claim. In other words, she does not indicate how the situation of this former Cameroonian minister and parliamentarian is comparable to that of her spouse; the relevance of this document may therefore be questioned.41 That being said, with respect to the analysis of the justice system in Cameroon, its independence from political powers, and its capacity or incapacity to protect the rights of citizens, the documentary evidence in the National Documentation Package on Cameroon42 already contains relevant information. As a result, I find that there is no need, in the circumstances, to admit this document.43 b. Cameroun : la face cachée de l'opération épervier [33] This document is not dated.44 That being said, the numbers 3/9/2015 can be seen in the left-hand corner of each page, which leads me to believe that this document was printed from an Internet site, no doubt on March 9, 2015. [34] The document in questions is signed by a certain XXXX XXXX. For my part, after reviewing the document in question, I have no specific information regarding the author of this document or when and how it was written. Its credibility may therefore be questioned.45 [35] In any case, this document provides a summary of a self-published book by Rémy MBA MIMFE'E that opposes the official discourse of Cameroonian authorities regarding the anti-corruption campaign entitled Opération Épervier [Operation Sparrowhawk], particularly with respect to the role of police and judges. According to the author, they both act in a way that is far from neutral. [36] For my part, after carefully reviewing the document in question, it appears to me that it does not refer to any recent event, and it is impossible for me to know if it existed before the RPD rendered its decision. In her memorandum, the principal appellant does not provide full and detailed submissions regarding how this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. As a result, I find that the principal appellant did not establish that this document meets either of the two criteria specifically set out in the wording of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [37] Furthermore, the principal appellant does not provide any submissions regarding how this document relates to her refugee protection claim. In other words, she does not indicate how the situation described in this document is similar to hers. The relevance of this document may therefore be questioned.46 That being said, with respect to the analysis of the justice system in Cameroon, its independence from political powers, and its ability or inability to protect the rights of citizens, the documentary evidence in the National Documentation Package on Cameroon already contains relevant information. As a result, I find that there is no need, in the circumstances, to admit this document. c. Cameroun. Ces éperviables qui ont pris la fuite [38] This document is dated December 18, 2012.47 It is therefore very clear that it existed before the RPD's rejection of the claims for refugee protection. That being said, the numbers 3/9/2015 can be seen in the left-hand corner of each page, which leads to me to believe that this document was printed from an Internet site, undoubtedly on March 9, 2015. [39] The document in question is signed by a certain XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, who appears to be a journalist working for Le Messager. This article is about former senior government officials and successful businessmen who were the focus of legal proceedings in Cameroon. The journalist does not report any events that occurred after 2012. [40] In her memorandum, the principal appellant does not provide full and detailed submissions regarding how this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. As a result, I find that the principal appellant did not establish that this document meets either of the two criteria specifically set out in the wording of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [41] Furthermore, the principal appellant does not provide any submissions regarding how this document relates to her refugee protection claim. In other words, she does not indicate how the situation described in this document is similar to hers. The relevance of this document may therefore be questioned.48 That being said, with respect to the analysis of the justice system in Cameroon, its independence from political powers, and its ability or inability to protect the rights of citizens, the documentary evidence in the National Documentation Package on Cameroon already contains relevant information. As a result, I find that there is no need, in the circumstances, to admit this document. V. HEARING BEFORE THE RAD A. The principal appellant did not request a hearing before the RAD [42] In her written statement and memorandum, I did not find any specific request by the principal appellant regarding a hearing before the RAD. B. Test under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA [43] The RAD Rules provide that the record of the person who is the subject of the appeal must contain, among other things, a written statement indicating whether the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, as well as a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding why the RAD should hold such a hearing, if the appellant is requesting that a hearing be held.49 [44] Under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, when evidence presented on appeal is found to be admissible, it should be determined whether it raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, whether it is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and whether it would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. If the answer is yes, the RAD may then hold a hearing. C. The RAD's decision with respect to holding a hearing [45] Although I did not find in her written statement and memorandum any specific request by the principal appellant regarding a RAD hearing, the absence of such a request cannot, on its own, prevent a hearing from being held, and it is the responsibility of the RAD to determine whether the criteria set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA have been met.50 [46] One of the determining factors is that one piece of evidence presented on appeal be found to be admissible.51 In this case, I found that the evidence presented on appeal was not admissible based on the requirements set out in subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Consequently, I cannot exercise any discretion, and a hearing cannot be held.52 VI. APPROACH TO BE TAKEN IN THIS APPEAL A. Principal appellant's position [47] In her memorandum, the principal appellant does not identify the standard of review or approach to be taken in her appeal. However, she submits that the RPD erred in mixed fact and law in assessing her credibility. B. A brief summary of some Federal Court decisions [48] In Akuffo, Justice Gagné finds that, when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings, although opinions diverge within the Federal Court as to the level of deference that is owed.53 [49] In Sajad and Bui, Justice Shore finds that the RAD owes a certain level of deference toward the RPD's findings when they primarily involve the credibility of the person claiming refugee protection.54 That being said, the RAD must undertake an independent examination of the appeal record, in other words, conduct its own analysis of the evidence, consider the parties' submissions, and then confirm or dismiss the RPD's findings regarding the credibility of the refugee protection claimant(s).55 [50] In Balde, Justice Mosley states that the different strands in the jurisprudence that have emerged to date from the Federal Court have all accepted the principle that the RAD must show deference to the RPD's findings with respect to credibility, since the RAD does not typically hold oral hearings and is therefore at a disadvantage in comparison to the RPD.56 C. Independent review with a certain level of deference regarding credibility [51] Basing myself as much as possible on the decisions rendered to date by the Federal Court, I am of the opinion that, in this case, while undertaking an independent examination of the record, I must show deference to the RPD's findings regarding the appellants' credibility based on their testimony;57 however, such deference does not apply to a question of law. VII. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [52] In matters of credibility, a certain amount of deference must be shown to the RPD's findings, specifically with respect to the refugee protection claimant's testimony. It should be noted that "in determining an application for refugee status, it was up to the female applicant to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the facts on which she based her application."58 For its part, the RPD is entitled to make findings based on implausibility, common sense and rationality.59 A lack of credibility on an important aspect of the claim can amount to a finding that there is no credible evidence on which the claim can be based.60 [53] For my part, after conducting an independent review of the record, I have come to the conclusion that the RPD did not, in its assessment of credibility, err in such a way as to call into question the merits of it decision. Here is why. A. Assessment of testimony and documentary evidence [54] The fact that the appellants do not agree with the RPD's findings does not mean that the RPD erred in its assessment of their credibility. [55] The argument that the RPD found, in general, that there were contradictions and implausibilities, without explaining them, must be rejected. Simply reading the RPD reasons for decision is sufficient to find that this argument is without merit. In fact, the RPD explains that it based its overall finding on the testimony of the principal appellant, an analysis of the documents presented as evidence, and the behaviour of the principal appellant and her spouse. [56] The argument that the principal appellant adequately explained, to her understanding, the connection between the murder attempts on her husband and his being arrested and charged with embezzlement does not mean that the RPD erred in finding that she was not credible on this point. This argument is merely a way of repeating what the principal appellant had already stated before the RPD, but does not show that the RPD erred. [57] The argument that the RPD erred in finding that there was a contradiction between her testimony and the letter from her spouse must be rejected. In fact, the contradiction that was identified by the RPD involves the statement that Cameroonian authorities wanted to keep her husband quiet, whereas, in the letter in question, he could not have expressed himself more openly regarding the various incidents he allegedly suffered.61 For my part, I find that there is indeed a contradiction there. [58] The argument that the RPD erred in finding that no complaint had been filed, while exhibits C-4 and C-6 show otherwise, must be rejected. In its reasons for decision, the RPD writes that, despite the alleged threats against him in 2006, the principal appellant's spouse did not file a complaint with the police.62 In my opinion, it must be understood that the RPD is referring to the period of time immediately following the events in question that took place in 2006. The documents presented as exhibits C-4 and C-6 are dated 2013 and do not refer to the events that took place in 2006. Consequently, I find that the RPD was justified in finding that no complaint was made to the police in 2006. [59] The argument that the RPD erred in not explaining how there was no connection between the letter submitted as evidence and the sexual assault on a person living in the principal appellant's home must be rejected. In fact, it was not a letter, but rather a medical report,63 which I carefully reviewed. This report does not contain any information to establish a connection between this assault and the allegations of threats weighing against the principal appellant and her spouse.64 That is exactly the conclusion that the RPD came to, and I therefore find that it did not commit any error. [60] The argument that the RPD erred in applying rules demonstrating inappropriate formality in the anonymous threatening letters must also be rejected. To weigh evidence is to assess its reliability and probative value. It is well established that all evidence must be weighed in light of all the evidence and the issues to be decided. The RPD attached little credibility to the letters for two reasons: because of their appearance and because it found it implausible that the alleged agents of persecution felt obliged to explain in detail the reasons they had failed.65 I carefully reviewed the documents in question.66 From their appearance, it is clear that these letters could have been produced by a computer, and there is no evidence that the date that appears on each of them truly corresponds to when they were produced. The RPD could have just as easily not attached any probative value to these threatening letters, as it is permissible to attach no probative value to evidence submitted by a claimant to the RPD that merely repeats a version of the facts considered to be implausible or not very credible.67 For my part, I find that the RPD was justified in attaching little weight or reliability to these letters and that it did not commit any error. [61] That being said, I agree with the principal appellant when she submits that the contradiction in the exact number of people who attacked her spouse (4, 5, or 6) is not a significant contradiction. However, even though I rejected this finding by the RPD regarding the credibility of the allegations in this case, the fact remains that the RPD made several other findings that, in my opinion, clearly undermine the principal appellant's overall credibility. [62] I add that the fact that the RPD did not mention in its decision all the evidence that, in the opinion of the appellants, could support their claims does not mean that it ignored it or did not consider it. In fact, it is well established that in writing its reasons for decision, the RPD, like the RAD,68 does not have to refer to every piece of evidence and it is assumed that it took it into consideration.69 For my part, having reviewed the evidence in the record and the RPD reasons for decision, I find that it was justified in not believing the essential elements of these refugee protection claims. B. Behaviour showing a lack of subjective fear [63] Now, the principal appellant also submits that the RPD erred in faulting her for having travelled to Cameroon before the January 2013 incident, when there was a murder attempt on her husband, which was the element that triggered her fear. [64] Staying longer than necessary in a country where a person fears persecution, voluntarily returning to that country, passing through other countries without claiming refugee protection and not immediately claiming refugee protection upon arriving in Canada are behaviours that show a lack of subjective fear.70 [65] In reading the principal appellant's BOC Form, I note that she refers to events that took place well before XXXX 2013 and fed her, her husband's and the entire family's fears. I am thinking in particular of the anonymous letter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2007, in which some individuals threatened to hurt their little girl, who was five years old at the time, and rape her like they had XXXX XXXX XXXX. I am also thinking of the other anonymous letter, this time dated XXXX XXXX, 2009, in which her husband's life was threatened. Lastly, I am thinking of the ransacking of the XXXX firm, which allegedly took place the night of XXXX XXXX to XXXX, 2012.71. In reading the information in the principal appellant's passport, I note that she entered Cameroon several times in 2012, namely on XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX.72 [66] Consequently, I find that the RPD was justified in finding that the principal appellant's behaviour was not consistent with that of someone who fears for their life, when she went back to Cameroon after serious threats had been made against her family well before XXXX 2013. In my opinion, the RPD did not err in reaching this conclusion. C. The RPD was justified in finding as it did [67] In this case, the RPD's findings with respect to the lack of credibility of the allegations are clearly motivated. These findings are based on a detailed analysis of the testimony and documentary evidence. [68] As the RPD held a hearing, I am therefore at a disadvantage in comparison to the RPD on these specific points, and I must show a certain amount of deference to it. [69] I have carefully considered all the principal appellant's arguments that the RPD had made a decision based on erroneous findings of fact or law. As I explained, with the exception of one of those arguments, I am satisfied that they are without merit. After conducting an independent review of the record, I find, on the contrary, that the RPD was clearly justified in finding that these refugee protection claims lack credibility. VIII. CONCLUSION [70] For these reasons, I confirm the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and her children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, are neither "Convention refugees" under section 96 of the IRPA nor "persons in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [71] The appeal is dismissed. Alain Bissonnette Me Alain Bissonnette September 18, 2015 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Refugee Appeal Division Rules (RAD Rules), SOR/2012-257, subrule 23(1). 2 C-1, pages 295 and 296 of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record. 3 Principal appellant's Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form), pages 11 to 22 of the RPD record; the excerpt quoted here is found on pages 18 and 19. 4 Children's BOC Form, pages 23 to 70 of the RPD record. 5 The list of these documents is reproduced on page 294 of the RPD record. The documents themselves are reproduced on pages 295 to 419 of the RPD record. 6 RPD reasons and decision, pages 3 to 9 of the RPD record. 7 Exhibit C-2: Letter from J.E. Konguep Tchale to Citizenship and Immigration Canada for protection for his family, dated June 28, 2014. 8 Idem, paragraphs 14 to 18, page 6 of the RPD record. 9 Idem, paragraph 19, page 7 of the RPD record. 10 Idem, paragraphs 20 and 21, page 7 of the RPD record. 11 Idem, paragraphs 22, 23 and 24, page 8 of the RPD record. 12 Idem, paragraph 25, page 8 of the RPD record. 13 Idem, paragraph 26, page 8 of the RPD record. 14 Appellants' memorandum, March 6, 2015, paragraph 4, pages 77 and 78 of the appeal record. 15 Idem, paragraphs 5 and 6, page 78 of the appeal record. 16 Idem, paragraphs 10 to 14, page 78 of the appeal record. 17 Idem, paragraphs 15 to 21, page 79 of the appeal record. 18 Idem, paragraph 23, page 79 of the appeal record. 19 Idem, paragraph 24, page 79 of the appeal record. 20 Idem, paragraphs 26 and 27, page 79 of the appeal record. 21 Idem, paragraphs 28 to 31, page 80 of the appeal record. 22 Idem, paragraphs 32, 33 and 34, page 80 of the appeal record. 23 Idem, paragraphs 35 and 36, page 80 of the appeal record. 24 Idem, paragraphs 37 to 55, pages 80, 81 and 82 of the appeal record. 25 Idem, page 83. 26 Principal appellant's written statement, March 6, 2015, pages 9, 10 and 11 of the appeal record. 27 The document in question is reproduced at pages 12 to 16 of the appeal record. 28 The document in question is reproduced at pages 17 to 23 of the appeal record. 29 The document in question is reproduced at pages 24 and 25 of the appeal record. 30 Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, rule 43. 31 In this regard, please see Shukurov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6058-14, Fothergill, August 6, 2015; 2015 FC 949, at paragraph 24, and Abdi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5580-14, Boswell, July 24, 2015; 2015 FC 906, at paragraph 13. 32 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Parminder Singh, No. A-512-14, the hearing for which should be held on October 8. 33 Olowolaiyemo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7767-14, Gascon, July 22, 2015; 2015 FC 895, at paragraph 27. See also: Sow v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1011-14, Barnes, March 9, 2015; 2015 FC 295, at paragraph 16. 34 Olowolaiyemo, at paragraph 28. See also: Ajaj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5604-14, Gascon, July 28, 2015; 2015 FC 928, at paragraph 61. 35 Deri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7050-14, Strickland, September 2, 2015; 2015 FC 1042, at paragraphs 48, 51, 55 and 60. 36 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, subrule 3(3). 37 The document in question is reproduced at pages 12 to 16 of the appeal record. 38 As appears on the cover page of the appellants' memorandum. 39 Ismailov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6839-14, Strickland, August 13, 2015; 2015 FC 967, at paragraph 62: "In my view, the RAD reasonably found this evidence did not meet the credibility factor in Raza because its only source is an unnamed employee of an unnamed Uzbek travel agency." 40 Olowolaiyemo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7767-14, Gascon, July 22, 2015; 2015 FC 895, at paragraph 17, 18 and 19. 41 Ismailov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6839-14, Strickland, August 13, 2015; 2015 FC 967, at paragraph 61: "In my view, the RAD reasonably concluded that this evidence was not new in the sense that it did not meet the test for relevance." 42 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, National Documentation Package on Cameroon, April 30, 2014, the index of which is reproduced at pages 243 to 267 of the RPD record. 43 Deri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7050-14, Strickland, September 2, 2015; 2015 FC 1042, at paragraph 69: "...nothing in the new evidence is substantially different than the information received before the RPD. In these circumstances, even if the RAD did have discretion to consider the new evidence that was technically inadmissible, in my view, it was reseanoble for the RAD not to exercise that discretion." 44 The document in question is reproduced at pages 17 to 23 of the appeal record. 45 Ismailov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration Canada), No. IMM-6839-14, Strickland, August 13, 2015; 2015 FC 967, at paragraph 62: "In my view, the RAD reasonably found this evidence did not meet the credibility factor in Raza because its only source is an unnamed employee of an unnamed Uzbek travel agency." 46 Ismailov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6839-14, Strickland, August 13, 2015; 2015 FC 967, at paragraph 61: "In my view, the RAD reasonably concluded that this evidence was not new in the sense that it did not meet the test for relevance." 47 The document in question is reproduced at pages 24 and 25 of the appeal record. 48 Ismailov v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6839-14, Strickland, August 13, 2015; 2015 FC 967, at paragraph 61: "In my view, the RAD reasonably concluded that this evidence was not new in the sense that it did not meet the test for relevance." 49 RAD Rules, SOR/2012-257, subrule 3(3). 50 Zhuo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-2693-14, O'Reilly, July 27, 2015; 2015 FC 911, at paragraph 11: "...Where the conditions for holding an oral hearing are present, the RAD should generally be required to convene one. Obviously, the RAD retains a discretion on this question but that discretion must be exercised reasonably in the circumstances. In particular, the mere fact that a party has not requested a hearing will generally not be sufficient reason to justify a refusal to convene one when the circumstances appear to require it. While the RAD rules allow an appellant to request a hearing, IRPA does not actually impose a burden either to request, or to satisfy the RAD that the circumstances merit, an oral hearing (see Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, Rule 5(2)(d)(iii). The onus rests with the RAD to consider and apply the statutory criteria reasonably." 51 Deri v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7050-14, Strickland, September 2, 2015; 2015 FC 1042, at paragraph 51: "...Section 110(6) permits the RAD to hold a hearing if it is of the opinion that there is new documentary evidence, as referenced in s 110(3), that meets the requirements of s 110(4), in which case the RAD will then consider whether that evidence raises serious credibility issues, is central to the claim and, if accepted, it would justify allowing or rejecting the claim. This suggests that the new evidence must first be found to be admissible." 52 Balde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3724-14, Mosley, May 12, 2015; 2015 FC 625, at paragraph 32: "Subsection 110(6) uses the permissive word 'may' because the RAD can either hold a hearing or not hold a hearing when those preconditions exist. If they are absent, as they were in this case, the RAD has no choice to make. It cannot hold a hearing." 53 Akuffo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6640-13, Gagné, November 12, 2014; 2014 FC 1063, at paragraphs 34 to 39. 54 Sajad v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-926-14, Shore, November 21, 2014; 2014 FC 1107, at paragraph 22. Bui v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-1654-14, Shore, November 28, 2014; 2014 FC 1145, at paragraph 25. See also: Malambu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7972-14, Noël, June 17, 2015; 2015 FC 763, at paragraph 42. 55 Hamidi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5049-14, Shore, February 26, 2015; 2015 FC 243, at paragraphs 1, 22, 23, 24 and 30. Brodrick v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5986-13, Diner, April 17, 2015; 2015 FC 491, at paragraphs 34, 35 and 36. Abdul Fasit Fida v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5921-14, Zinn, June 24, 2015; 2015 FC 784, at paragraph 10: "The RAD examined the various findings of the RPD upon which it based the finding that the applicant was not credible. It is clear from the decision that it conducted its own independent analysis of that evidence." 56 Balde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3724-14, Mosley, May 12, 2015; 2015 FC 625, at paragraph 25. See also: Palden v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4907-14, Locke, June 25, 2015; 2015 FC 787, at paragraphs 10 and 11. 57 Dowansingh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-6581-14, Diner, July 30, 2015; 2015 FC 933, at paragraph 21: "This Court has repeatedly held that RPD's conclusions on issues of credibility based on testimony clearly warrant some measure of deference." (citations omitted) 58 Arreaga v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-996-13, Noël, September 25, 2013; 2013 FC 977, at paragraph 45. 59 Laszlo v. Canada (Department of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3507-04, Von Finckenstein, April 6, 2005; 2005 FC 456, at paragraph 10. 60 Hernandez Cortes v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4645-08, Teitelbaum, June 4, 2009; 2009 FC 583, at paragraph 30. 61 The letter in question, marked as C-2, is reproduced at pages 297 to 308 of the RPD record. 62 RPD reasons and decision, paragraph 17, page 6 of the RPD record. 63 The report in question, marked as C-8, is reproduced at page 329 of the RPD record. 64 RPD reasons and decision, paragraph 18, page 6 of the RPD record. 65 Idem, paragraph 19, page 7 of the RPD record. 66 Marked as C-10, the letters in question are reproduced at pages 334, 335 and 334 of the RPD record. 67 Nijjer v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-340-09, de Montigny, December 9, 2009; 2009 FC 1259, at paragraph 26: "Despite the RPD's duty to consider all of the evidence, the finding that a claimant has no credibility may extend to all of the evidence he or she submits. This is what the Court of Appeal recognized in Sheikh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 238, and Rahaman v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 FCA 89, [2002] F.C.J. No. 302. In dismissing evidence that merely repeated a version of the facts considered to be not very credible and improbable, the RPD did not err or breach the general rule that all evidence must be considered before ruling on the credibility of an applicant's account. In this case, the RPD was entitled to consider that the sarpanch's documentary evidence was not sufficient to make an account that otherwise appeared in many respects to be implausible credible." 68 Malambu v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-7972-14, Noël, June 17, 2015; 2015 FC 763, at paragraph 45. 69 Cuna Ballesteros v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3979-08, Lagacé, April 7, 2009; 2009 FC 352, at paragraph 22: "Let us recall that the panel is presumed to have considered all of the evidence that it is responsible for analyzing and weighing (Florea v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1993] F.C.J. No. 598 (F.C.A). The applicants forget that when a panel finds that a refugee claimant is not credible, as in this proceeding, it is not obligated to explain all of the material supporting the allegations contrary to those it accepts. It is sufficient for the panel, as in this proceeding, to properly explain the reasons that lead it to question the credibility of the applicants." 70 Rivera v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-5826-02, Beaudry, November 5, 2003; 2003 FC 1292, at paragraphs 29 and 30. 71 This information is contained in the letter marked as C-2, at page 303 of the RPD record. 72 The passport is reproduced at pages 129 to 136 of the RPD record. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 1 RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-00741; MB5-00742; MB5-00743; MB5-00744; MB5-00745 2