TB5-04823

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-04823 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Redetermination of the Appeal Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 18, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Roslyn Ahara Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Stella I Anaele Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), who is a citizen of Nigeria, is appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal and makes reference to an oral hearing. The Appellant is asking the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to substitute a positive determination, or in the alternative, to remit the matter to a newly-constituted panel of the RPD for re-determination. DETERMINATION: [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. This appeal is dismissed. Background: [3] The Appellant's claim is based on his sexual orientation, namely, bi-sexual. He is married with two children. He alleges that on XXXX XXXX, 2012, his former lover was attacked and then turned over to the police. Later, he received a visit from a policeman who informed him that his former lover had been tortured by the police to get information from him. The police officer asked the Appellant for money to secure his former lover's release from prison. [4] The Appellant raised the money for his former lover, however, he was duped by the police. The Appellant then became afraid that his former lover may tell the police about their relationship and that his secret life as a bisexual would be found out by his family and the community. As a result, the Appellant traveled to the United Kingdom, where he spent one month with his in-laws. From there, the Appellant went to the United States (US) in XXXX 2013, where he lived with a cousin until XXXX 2014. He arrived in Canada in XXXX 2014 and filed for refugee protection on 6 January 2015. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL EXPRESS STATUTORY CONDITIONS [5] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [6] The following new evidence has been submitted in support of this appeal: a) A psychological report from Dr. XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated June 8, 2015. [7] The Appellant submits that he had insufficient funds to afford the services of a psychologist prior to the rejection of the claim. The RAD admits this document, and it will consider its probative value, along with the entire record. However, the RAD finds that this evidence does not meet the criteria set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. (6) The Refugee Appeal Division may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3) (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. ROLE OF RAD: [8] The Appellant submits that the standard of correctness should be applied. The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court of Appeal decision, in Huruglica,1 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. The Appellant justices stated at paragraph 103. [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable. SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT: [9] Did the RPD err in its credibility assessment of the Appellant's claim? [10] Did the RPD err by ignoring or failing to take into consideration the Appellant's obvious confused state? [11] Did the RPD err by failing to consider the risk the Appellant would face as a failed claimant should he be returned to Nigeria? Subjective fear: [12] The RPD considered the Appellant's journeys to the UK and the US, in which at no time did he attempt to claim refugee protection, given that they are both Convention signatory countries. His reason for not doing so was that he did not want his family to be aware of his sexual orientation. Moreover, the Appellant explained that he was monitoring the situation in Nigeria with respect to the LGBT community. The RPD cited documentary evidence in which it indicates that the situation has continually worsened, and accordingly, the RPD drew a negative inference as it related to the Appellant's credibility and his subjective fear of persecution. [13] The Appellant submits that the RPD's conclusion regarding his failure to claim elsewhere is unreasonable because he provided a reasonable explanation, although he fails to identify this specific explanation in his memorandum. [14] As stated in Marcela Ximena Guarin Caicedo,2 a person fleeing persecution is expected to seek protection in the first safe place, which reaffirms the Bobic3 decision of the Federal Court, where the Honourable Judge wrote: If the applicant had truly feared for his life, he would have applied at the first available opportunity, rather than relying on what others told him. His actions were inconsistent with a subjective fear of persecution and it was reasonable for the Board to find that he did not have a subjective fear of persecution based on his delay in seeking refugee status. In the particular circumstances of this claim, the Appellant remained in the US for almost two years. He provided a number of responses as to why he had not sought asylum. He did not want his family to learn about his sexuality, he was monitoring the situation in Nigeria, and a friend had told him he would probably not be successful in the US. Yet, the Appellant remained without status, thus risking deportation to Nigeria. [15] This aspect of the Appellant's conduct is inconsistent with a person living in fear of persecution in their country. It is to be expected that genuine Convention refugees would seek protection as soon as is practical, once out of reach of their oppressors. The RAD is mindful, then, that one of the significant factors which speaks to subjective fear and credibility is the element of delay and the failure to claim asylum in a Convention signatory country. Upon review of the audio recording, the RAD finds that the Appellant's credibility is seriously undermined, not only because he remained illegally in the US, but because his responses as to why he remained illegally were internally inconsistent. The RAD finds that the Appellant provided contradictory responses when he stated, on the one hand, that he was monitoring the situation in Nigeria, and on the other hand, that he didn't want his family to know of his sexual orientation, as well as being told that his chances of receiving a favourable decision in the US were not good. Relationships: [16] The RPD examined the Appellant's overall profile when assessing the risk that he would face if he returned to Nigeria. It noted that that the Appellant testified that over the years he has had several secret homosexual relationships, however his problems began when his former lover, Mr. XXXX, was attacked and handed to the police because he was caught with another male in a motel in Lagos on XXXX XXXX, 2012. The RPD noted that the Appellant testified that the police had extorted him to secure the release of his former lover and they informed him that they were torturing Mr. XXXX. Although the Appellant attempted to provide further information, the RPD found the following inconsistencies and omissions. Mr. XXXX: [17] The Appellant testified that he last saw Mr. XXXX the first week of XXXX 2012, however, earlier he stated that Mr. XXXX was incarcerated on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2012. The Appellant was asked to explain the discrepancy. He responded that he saw him that same morning on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2012 in a motel in Lagos. Given that this date corresponds with the date of the incarceration, the RPD found that it did not seem plausible or credible that the Appellant would forget that date, and accordingly, drew a negative inference with respect to his same-sex relationship with Mr. XXXX. [18] The RPD considered the affidavit from Mr. XXXX cousin, Mr. XXXX, in which it states that the Appellant contacted him from the US and Canada to find out about the situation of Mr. XXXX in Nigeria. However, given that the Appellant had stated that it was Mr. XXXX who had contacted him, the Appellant was asked to explain the contradiction, to which he responded that it was Mr. XXXX who had contacted him. Accordingly, the RPD accorded little weight to this affidavit as it contradicted the repeated testimony of the Appellant. [19] The Appellant submits that the RPD's reasons are erroneous when it states that the Appellant's former lover, Mr. XXXX, was arrested on XXXX XXXX, 2014. The RAD concurs that the year is incorrect, however, upon review of the audio recording and the BOC, it is obvious that the year is a typographical error. In fact, the RPD states XXXX XXXX, 2012 in an earlier paragraph. However, the Appellant submits that the Appellant testified that he was arrested on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2012. The RAD does not agree with this. Upon review of the audio recording and the BOC, the date is clear that the arrest took place on XXXX XXXX, 2012 and the police came to the Appellant's home on XXXX XXXX, 2012. The RAD concurs with the RPD that the Appellant ought to have remembered the last day he saw his former lover, particularly given that it was the same day of the arrest, namely XXXX XXXX, 2012, rather than saying the first week of XXXX. Upon review of the audio recording, the RAD finds that this inconsistency casts aspersions on the entire incident which led to the Appellant's departure from Nigeria, i.e. the arrest of his former lover. We recognize that this is not a large discrepancy, however, given the significance of this incident, we concur with the RPD's finding in this regard. [20] The RAD further finds that the affidavit from the Appellant's cousin, Mr. XXXX, contradicts the Appellant's testimony as to who contacted whom, but more importantly, although not mentioned in the RPD reasons, there was another inconsistency with respect to the communication between the Appellant and his cousin. Upon review of the audio recording, there were also inconsistencies as to when these contacts were made. Initially, the Appellant testified that he last spoke to him while in the UK in XXXX 2012, however, in the affidavit it states that he contacted the Appellant in the US and Canada, which would have been in 2013 and 2014. Accordingly, the RAD cannot ascribe any weight to this affidavit as the Appellant did not provide any explanation for the discrepancies. [21] In conclusion, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided any credible evidence that he would come to the attention of the police because his former lover is allegedly incarcerated. Moreover, we note from both the Appellant's testimony and the affidavit from Mr. XXXX, that the individual whom the Appellant fears might divulge his sexual orientation is also in a relationship with a Mr. XXXX, with whom he was arrested, thereby casting aspersions on any interest in harming the Appellant. The visit of the Policeman: [22] The RPD asked the Appellant if he was afraid of the policeman who asked him for money, to which he responded "no"; the policemen was nice so he did not have a reason to fear. Given that the Appellant is aware of the repercussions if the police become aware of same-sex behavior, the RPD drew a negative inference with respect to the Appellant's credibility and to his sexual orientation as a bisexual fearing persecution in Nigeria. [23] The RAD concurs that if the Appellant's fears stem from this incident, his testimony surrounding the police officer's visit is lacking in credibility. This was allegedly the reason the Appellant left Nigeria and went to the UK. According to the Appellant, he believed that this interaction with the police would in turn lead to knowledge of his sexual orientation since the police officers were seeking a ransom for the alleged release of his former lover. [24] The RPD noted that he Appellant provided internally conflicting evidence with respect to who provided the money; initially, he said he and his wife each contributed 5,000 Naira, then later, he added that he got 1,000 Naira from a neighbor. When asked about the discrepancy, the Appellant changed his testimony to 5,000 Naira from him and his wife and 1,000 Naira from his neighbor. He became more confused, and changed it to 5,000 Naira from him, 4,000 Naira from his wife and 1,000 Naira from his neighbor. Accordingly, the RPD drew a negative inference with respect to the Appellant's credibility and his allegations that a policeman came to extort him. [25] The RAD finds that the RPD was microscopic in its findings with respect to the individual amounts of money and the individuals who paid. Upon review of the audio recording, the RAD finds that the testimony was not, in fact, contradictory. The Appellant had asked his wife for 5,000 Naira, however she gave him 4,000 Naira and the remainder, namely 1,000 Naira came from a neighbor. Accordingly, this finding by the RPD is unsustainable, but not fatal to the claim, because of the other credibility findings. Mr. XXXX XXXX: [26] The RPD asked about the relationship between the Appellant and Mr. XXXX, who had provided a letter in support of the Appellant. In the letter, it was noted by the RPD that their relationship lasted from 2003 until 2007, when the Appellant left to go to XXXX school and this ended their relationship. In his oral testimony, however, the Appellant stated that Mr. XXXX had left to attend school. When considering the testimony surrounding this relationship, the RPD noted that the Appellant's Schedule A form did not contain this information, however, he had attended the school for 6 months only for the purpose of training. [27] The letter also states that he and the Appellant met at a party, however, the Appellant stated in oral testimony that they met in a library before they went together to a party. This led to a further negative inference by the RPD. [28] The Appellant submits that the RPD was confused, and said so in its Reasons at paragraphs 13 and 14, with respect to when this relationship ended. However, upon review of the audio recording, the RAD finds that at the very least no weight can be assigned to the corroborative evidence submitted to support this relationship, given the conflicting evidence. Moreover, the Appellant insisted, when repeatedly questioned, that he went to this training program in 2003 and that is when the relationship ended, and yet he said the relationship took place between 2003 and 2007. The RAD finds that if, in fact, this training took place in 2003, the relationship would have ended that year. The RAD finds that the Appellant was unable to explain the discrepancy between the two dates, and it therefore detracts from the credibility of the relationship. [29] The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony with respect to when he met Mr. XXXX was contradictory. The letter indicates that they met at a party, whereas the Appellant's testimony states that they met at a library. There is quite a difference between a library and a party, however, the Appellant explained that they met at a library prior to attending the party. The RAD is not persuaded by this explanation. Moreover, if the Appellant attended training through his workplace, and that is what the audio recording reveals, then I would not expect this information to necessarily be included in the Schedule A form. Having said this, the RAD finds insufficient persuasive credible evidence that this relationship existed. In the absence of credible evidence of when this relationship started and ended, the RAD concurs with the finding that, on a balance of probabilities, this relationship never occurred. Documents from XXXX and the XXXX Church of Toronto: [30] The RPD accorded little weight to the foregoing documents, as the Appellant provided vague information with respect to both organizations. [31] The RAD finds that there is nothing in this evidence that establishes the Appellant's sexual identity, given that the authors do not attest to his sexual orientation and anyone can join this organization. Photographs: [32] The RPD found that that holding a rainbow flag in one of the rooms of the Church is not probative evidence of a person's sexual orientation. The RAD concurs with the RPD and finds that anyone could hold a rainbow flag; this does not establish the Appellant's sexual orientation. Psychological Assessment: [33] The Appellant submitted a psychological report from Dr. XXXX XXXX XXXX. It is argued that the Appellant's confusion was apparent during the hearing as cited by the RPD in paragraphs 13 and 14 of its Reasons. It is argued that this report indicates poor comprehensions skills or/and memory issues which were compounded by vigorous, intimidating and confusing questioning by the RPD. It is further submitted that the Appellant disclosed difficulties in remembering certain dates. The RAD has considered this report from the point of view of its probative value in establishing the Appellant's sexual orientation as well as the Appellant's cognitive behavior, which might have affected his credibility during the RPD hearing. [34] The RAD finds that the information with respect to the Appellant's bisexuality was self-reported when he described his time as an adolescent and young adult hiding his true identity. The information with respect to the Appellant's former lover and the extortion that ensued was provided by the Appellant to Dr. XXXX. It is interesting to note that Dr. XXXX states that the Appellant was unaware of the proper channels for making an immigration claim in the US, and therefore, he did not seek asylum. [35] Dr. XXXX states that the Appellant himself advised Dr. XXXX that he had experienced grave cognitive deficits during his RPD hearing, yet at no time did he raise this with the RPD or with his counsel before or after the break. [36] The RAD is guided by the Federal court, wherein Justice Annis in Czesak4 has cautioned decision makers regarding the reliance upon forensic expert evidence obtained for the purpose of the litigation, unless it is subject to some form of validation, and without the opportunity of the decision-maker to assess the reliability of expert opinions under cross examination. Justice Annis concludes by stating; "In my view therefore, unless there is some means to corroborate either the neutrality or the lack of self-interest of the expert in relation to the litigation process, they generally should be accorded little weight." [37] As stated in Rokni,5 a psychiatric report submitted as evidence "cannot possibly serve as a cure-all for any and all deficiencies in a claimant's testimony". The Court reiterated its position in Danailov,6 with respect to the assessment of a physician's evidence and the question of the assessment of credibility, wherein it stated "that opinion evidence in only as valid as the truth of the facts on which it is based". [38] The RAD does acknowledge that the psychological report indicates memory problems, and this report was not before the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. However, the RAD not only read the transcript provided by the Appellant (which is not totally accurate), but also listened to the entire audio recording of the proceedings. The RAD takes issue with Dr. XXXX comments with respect to "vigorous, intimidating and confusing questioning", in the absence of having the benefit of an official transcript of the proceedings, and therefore not being in a position to make this statement. Moreover, the RAD finds that the credibility findings were not as a result of memory problems, but inconsistent evidence. [39] The RAD found that the Appellant was forthcoming and only began to hesitate or become somewhat confused just prior to the RPD suggesting a break in the proceedings. Moreover, the RAD finds that the RPD made every effort to repeat the questions in an attempt to clarify any conflicting or confusing testimony. Furthermore, both the RPD and the Appellant's counsel cautioned the Appellant not to guess the answers, but rather to say he didn't know the answer. Counsel was not stopped by the Member when he interjected in an attempt to clarify, which occurred on just a few occasions. At no time did counsel object to the line of questioning by the Member, and yet he alleges now that the Member intimidated, harassed, and confused the Appellant. [40] Upon a thorough review of the record, the RAD finds that there is no merit in the Appellant's argument that had the RPD had this report in front of it, the outcome would have been different. BIAS [41] Counsel for the Appellant argues that the RPD Member was biased. The RAD has, therefore, considered the issue of reasonable apprehension of bias. [42] The principles of natural justice require that the procedures of the RPD be fair. In other words, the RPD must ensure that the procedures used before, during and after a hearing are fair in all the circumstances. Natural justice ensures that the refugee claimant has a chance to be heard and an opportunity to answer to the case being made against him or her. The refugee claimant must also have an independent and impartial decision-maker decide his or her case. The decision-maker must not have formed a preconceived decision and must not have a personal interest in the outcome of the case. Credibility cannot be prejudged; it must be determined based on the particular circumstances of the case. [43] The rule against bias is one of the main rules of natural justice, which provides that the refugee claimant is entitled to have an independent and impartial decision-maker decide the case. [44] The rule against bias is a common law rule that expresses the fundamental principle of natural justice that 'no man ought to be a judge in his own cause'. The rule against bias disqualifies a decision-maker from determining any case in which there is actual bias or an appearance of bias, also described as a reasonable apprehension of bias. [45] The test for "reasonable apprehension of bias" was formulated in the Supreme Court of Canada case, Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board,7 as follows: What would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and having thought the matter through-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. [46] In Newfoundland Telephone Co., the Supreme Court restated this test as follows: "whether a reasonably informed bystander could reasonably perceive bias on the part of an adjudicator".8 [47] The Federal Court of Appeal stated the following in Satiacum:9 The opinion of de Grandpré J., dissenting, in Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369 has been accepted in this country as expressing the modern test for determining the existence of a reasonable apprehension of bias. Adopting the formulation proposed by this Court, he said (at pages 394-395): [48] Thus, the impartiality of decision-makers is not judged from the decision-maker's perspective, but from that of a reasonable bystander, fully informed of all relevant facts. For example, certain activities and associations of a Member may seem quite inconsequential from the Member's perspective, and yet still appear highly suspect from an observer's point of view. [49] As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, "The test for apprehension of bias takes into account the presumption of impartiality. A real likelihood of bias must be demonstrated."10 The Supreme Court reiterated this principle in Wewaykum: "The standard refers to an apprehension of bias that rests on serious grounds, in light of the strong presumption of judicial impartiality."11 [50] The principles and considerations noted above are equally applicable to administrative tribunals, which are presumed to be impartial in their decision-making.12 [51] Nevertheless, if there is an allegation that the member displayed bias, for example, because he or she prejudged the claim, the Court will require clear evidence that a predetermination had in fact occurred. The Federal Court reiterated in Ali13 that: [4] ... the Court of Appeal in Arthur v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] F.C.J. No. 1091 [(F.C.A., no. A-991-90), MacGuigan, Linden, Gray, November 2, 1992, reported: 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 22 (F.C.A.)], has emphasized that an allegation of bias cannot be done lightly. It cannot rest on mere suspicion, pure conjecture or mere impressions of an applicant. It must be supported by material evidence. [52] Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in R. v. S. (R.D.):14 True impartiality does not require that the judge have no sympathies or opinions; it requires that the judge nevertheless be free to entertain and act upon different points of view with an open mind. The Court noted that "a mere suspicion is not enough" to support an allegation of bias. [53] Considering the case law, it is clear that a reasonable apprehension of bias is sufficient to disqualify a member from deciding a case. Regardless of whether a member is consciously or unconsciously biased, or even unbiased, what matters is whether a reasonable, informed person looking fairly at all of the facts, would conclude that the member would not decide fairly. A reasonable apprehension of bias is sufficient to disqualify a panel from deciding a case even if the panel member is confident that he or she can act impartially. However, this must be supported by material evidence. [54] Upon review of the audio recording, the RAD is satisfied that the RPD Member's behaviour was not inappropriate, nor would it be perceived to be biased. The RAD agrees that the Member asked many questions in an attempt to clarify certain dates, however, that was her role to ensure that the rules of natural justice were followed. I am further satisfied that the RPD examined all of the facts fairly and impartially prior to reaching its conclusion. Upon review of the audio recording, I found no instances where I could conclude that the RPD prejudged this claim. RAD'S FINDINGS: [55] Although the RPD made some microscopic findings, the RAD finds that the outcome of this claim is absent of any error. It comes to this conclusion based on the following: a) Failure to claim in either the UK or the US, particularly the US where the Appellant spent almost two years, and risked deportation for much of this time. b) Conflicting evidence with respect to an alleged same-sex relationship between 2003 and 2007. c) Lack of credible or persuasive evidence of the relationship which allegedly led to his departure from Nigeria, which includes his evidence surrounding his interaction with the police officer. [56] The RAD concurs with the RPD that the Appellant has not established his sexual identity. In reaching this conclusion, we have considered any possible cognitive deficits. However, we find insufficient credible evidence that the Appellant is a bi-sexual as alleged. [57] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Roslyn Ahara" Roslyn Ahara "May 18, 2016" Date 1 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 2 Caicedo, Marcela Ximena Guarin v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-722-10), Near, November 4, 2010, 2010 FC 1092. 3 Bobic, Petru v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2225-04), Pinard, November 5, 2004, 2004 FC 1488. 4 Czesak, Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-09539-12), Annis, November 4, 2013, 2013 FC 1149. 5 Rokni, Mohammad Mehdi v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6068-93), Muldoon, January 27, 1995, at 10-11. 6 Danailov (Danailoff), Vasco (Vassil) Valdimirov v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-273-93), Reed, October 6, 1993, at 2. 7 Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., [1978] 1S.C.R. 369, at 394. 8 Newfoundland Telephone Co. v. Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 623. at 636. 9 Satiacum v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 2 F.C. 430 (C.A.), at 436. 10 Arsenault-Cameron v. Prince Edward Island, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 851 at para. 2. 11 Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259, at para. 76. 12 Fehr v. Canada (National Parole Board) (1995), 93 F.T.R. 161, at para. 22; R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484 at para. 92. 13 Ali, Sulaman v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5653-01), Tremblay-Lamer, October 2, 2002. 14 R. v. S. (R.D.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 484, at paras 534 and 113. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-04823