TB5-10832
Section 110(2)(d) of the IRPA removes the right to appeal to the RAD for claimants who came directly or indirectly to Canada from a designated safe third country (the United States) where the claim is eligible under s.101(1)(e); exemptions under Article 4 of the Safe Third Country Agreement, s.101(1)(e) and...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- TB5-10832
- Parties
- Appellant: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; Respondent: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
- Court
- Refugee Appeal Division
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 18 November 2015
- Procedural Posture
- Refugee Protection Appeal / Refugee Appeal Division Jurisdictional Decision
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under s.110(2)(d) IRPA
- Legal Topics
- Safe Third Country, Safe Third Country Agreement, Appealability, Jurisdiction, Eligibility Under IRPA, Port of Entry Exemptions, Interpretation of Statutes
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
More case intelligence is available
Unlock the full research layer for this judgment.
Parties
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Appellant
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Refugee Protection Appeal / Refugee Appeal Division Jurisdictional Decision
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether s.110(2)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) precludes RAD jurisdiction where the claimant came directly or indirectly to Canada from a designated safe third country (the United States)
- 2 Whether exemptions contained in Article 4 of the Safe Third Country Agreement, s.101(1)(e) of the IRPA and regulation 159.4 (which allow a claimant to file a claim with the RPD) also confer a right to appeal to the RAD
- 3 Whether the statutory conjunction in s.110(2)(d) requires both the coming-from-safe-third-country fact and that the claim be eligible under s.101(1)(e) for preclusion to apply
Ratio Decidendi
Section 110(2)(d) of the IRPA removes the right to appeal to the RAD for claimants who came directly or indirectly to Canada from a designated safe third country (the United States) where the claim is eligible under s.101(1)(e); exemptions under Article 4 of the Safe Third Country Agreement, s.101(1)(e) and Reg.159.4 that permit filing before the RPD do not extend to confer an appeal right to the RAD. Therefore the RAD lacked jurisdiction and the appeal was dismissed.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under s.110(2)(d) IRPA
Orders
- Appeal dismissed
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-10832 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX(a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision November 18, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Pasquale A. Fiorino Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Ali Yusuf (Barrister & Solicitor) Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The Appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX, is a citizen of Colombia, and appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated May 12, 2015, rejecting his claim for refugee protection. [2] The RPD hearing was held on April 28, 2015 with the RPD rendering its decision on May 12, 2015. The RPD found that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. [3] The RAD notes that the information provided by the Appellant indicates that in XXXX of 2014 he travelled from Colombia to the United States of America (U.S.) where he remained for about four months. In XXXX of 2014 the Appellant was detained by U.S. authorities as he was attempting to enter Canada. He was released in XXXX of 2014. He did not appear for his U.S. hearing and came to Canada where he made a refugee claim. [4] Section 110(2)(d) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provides that: 110. (2) No appeal may be made in respect of any of the following: (d) subject to the regulations, a decision of the Refugee Protection Division in respect of a claim for refugee protection if (i) the foreign national who makes the claim came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country that is, on the day on which their claim is made, designated by regulations made under subsection 102(1) and that is a party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 102(2)(d), and (ii) the claim - by virtue of regulations made under paragraph 102(1)(c) - is not ineligible under paragraph 101(1)(e) to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division; [5] The only country that is designated by regulation and party to an agreement under paragraph 102(2)(d) of the IRPA is the United States. [6] Article 4 of the Safe Third Party Agreement between Canada and the United States reads as follows: ARTICLE 4 1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, the Party of the country of last presence shall examine, in accordance with its refugee status determination system, the refugee status claim of any person who arrives at a land border port of entry on or after the effective date of this Agreement and makes a refugee status claim. 2. Responsibility for determining the refugee status claim of any person referred to in paragraph 1 shall rest with the Party of the receiving country, and not the Party of the country of last presence, where the receiving Party determines that the person: a. Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family member who has had a refugee status claim granted or has been granted lawful status, other than as a visitor, in the receiving Party's territory; or b. Has in the territory of the receiving Party at least one family member who is at least 18 years of age and is not ineligible to pursue a refugee status claim in the receiving Party's refugee status determination system and has such a claim pending; or c. Is an unaccompanied minor; or d. Arrived in the territory of the receiving Party: i. With a validly issued visa or other valid admission document, other than for transit, issued by the receiving Party; or ii. Not being required to obtain a visa by only the receiving Party. 3. The Party of the country of last presence shall not be required to accept the return of a refugee status claimant until a final determination with respect to this Agreement is made by the receiving Party. 4. Neither Party shall reconsider any decision that an individual qualifies for an exception under Articles 4 and 6 of this Agreement. [7] The issue which this RAD needs to decide is whether the Appellant is precluded by virtue of S.102(2)(d) of the IRPA to appeal to the RAD. [8] Subparagraphs (i) and (ii) of S102(2)(d) set out the requirements which would preclude a refugee claimant to appeal to the RAD: (i) the foreign national who makes the claim came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country that is, on the day on which their claim is made, designated by regulations made under subsection 102(1) and that is a party to an agreement referred to in paragraph 102(2)(d) and (emphasis added) (ii) the claim - by virtue of regulations made under paragraph 102(1)(c) - is not ineligible under paragraph 101(1)(e) to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division; [9] S. 101(1)(e) reads as follows: (1) A claimant is ineligible to be referred to the Refugee Protection Division if: (e) the claimant came directly or indirectly to Canada from a country designed by the regulations, other than a country of their nationality or their former habitual residence [10] It is important to note that S. 101(1)(e) refers to ineligibility to file a claim with the Refugee Protection Division. [11] Regulation 159.4 (1) deals with the exemption under s.101(1)(e) and states; Paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act does not apply to a claimant who seeks to enter Canada at (a) A location that is not port of entry (b) a port of entry that is a harbour port, including a ferry landing; or (c) subject to subjection (2) a port of entry that is an airport. [12] The legal issue then is: do the exemptions to the Safe Third Party Agreement under Article 4, S. 101(1)(e) and regulation 159.4 which would allow a claimant to file a claim to the Refugee Protection Division also extend to permit an appeal to the RAD? Do the exemptions with respect to eligibility under the third safe country extend to the right to appeal to the RAD? The opinion of the present RAD is that the answer is in the negative. [13] The RAD is cognizant of a previous decision of the RAD which dealt with this issue under similar facts.1 After carrying out an exhaustive analysis of both the legislation and the regulations, the previous RAD panel reached the following conclusion: It is clear that the appellant never sought entry at a port of entry at the land border between the US and Canada. If he had done so he might well have been determined to be one who could be the beneficiary of one of the exemptions which would permit him to make a claim for protection to the RPD inasmuch as he had a sister living in Canada at the time he entered this country. Had he followed that course, he clearly would have been prohibited from appealing any negative RPD decision to the RAD by virtue of paragraph 110(2)(d) of IRPA. However, the facts of this case are that the appellant never did "seek entry" at a land border port of entry between the US and Canada but, rather, was discovered by CBSA after they visited his sister's residence some months after his arrival, following which he made an application for refugee protection through the Vancouver Canada Citizenship and Immigration (CIC) office, which is not a designated "port of entry" and is not on the border. His claim was thereafter referred to the RPD by a CIC officer. Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) Records indicate that the CIC officer determined that the appellant was eligible to make a claim for refugee protection and referred the matter to the RPD, both on January 20, 2014. Not surprisingly given the circumstances, the officer did not designate the appellant as one who has an exemption to the application of the STCA because he had a sister in Canada. This is because his application for refugee protection was not made at a land border port of entry. Based on the facts, it is clear to me that both the STCA and Regulations 159.1-159.7 only have application to refugee claims made at a land port of entry. They have no application to the appellant's case.2 [14] With all due respect to my RAD colleague, I must disagree with this conclusion. We must draw a distinction between an individual's eligibility to file a refugee claim and a claimant's right to appeal to the RAD. In my opinion, the analysis of the legislation and regulations of my colleague in the case cited deal only with the issue of eligibility. The issue in question is not a claimant's eligibility to file a refugee claim but whether the IRPA precludes the Appellant to appeal to the RAD by virtues of him having entered Canada via the United States. In the opinion of the RAD, such a preclusion does exist because S.102(2)(d) of the IRPA does not deal with a claimant's right to file a refugee claim. It deals only with a claimant's right to appeal an RPD decision to the RAD. [15] It is important to note that Article 4 of the Agreement, S. 101(1)(e) and the regulation that applies to that section, regulation 159.4, deal with exemptions that would allow an individual to file a refugee claim with the Refugee Protection Division notwithstanding the third safe country principle. Neither Article 4, nor S. 101(1)(e) nor regulation 159.4 discuss the issue of a claimant's right to appeal to RAD. That right of appeal is dealt with in S. 110(2)(d) of the IRPA. This, in the view of the present RAD is the legal crux of the issue. For the present RAD, the exemptions provided for in Article 4, S.101(1)(e) and regulation 159.4 do not negate the requirements of S.110(2)(d) and automatically confer a right to appeal to the RAD. These exemptions only confer a right to file a claim with the Refugee Protection Division notwithstanding the third safe country principle. [16] The view of the present RAD is that S.110(2)(d) precludes an appeal to the RAD to claimants who arrive to Canada from a safe third country. The reasons for this are as follows. [17] S.110 of IRPA provides a list of refugee claimants who do not have a right to appeal to the RAD. S. 110(2)(d) is merely part of the overall restrictive prescription of S.110. Therefore, it was the intent of Parliament to create a class of refugee claimants who do not have a right to appeal their RPD decisions to the RAD and this class would include claimants who are within the definition of S.110(2)(d). [18] A reading of S.110(2)(d) supports the argument that claimants who arrive to Canada from a safe third country cannot appeal their RPD decision to the RAD. Subparagraph (i) of S.110(2)(d) is quite direct as to who may not appeal to RAD: claimants who come to Canada directly or indirectly from a safe third country (emphasis added). However, the conjunction "and' at the end of subparagraph (i) indicates that the requirement listed in the next subparagraph (ii) must also be met. And the requirement is that the claim must not be ineligible (emphasis added) under 101(1)(e) or, from a positive interpretation, the claim must be eligible. [19] The present RAD interprets S. 110(2)(d) as follows. If the claimant is eligible to file a refugee claim with the Refugee Protection Division, (subparagraph (ii)), and the claimant has arrived to Canada from a safe third country (subparagraph (i)), then there is no appeal to the RAD of a decision of the RPD. [20] Finally, the RAD relies on the Federal Court decision which upheld the RAD when dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to s. 102(2)(d) of the Act.3 [21] As the recent decision of the Federal Court has stated: "...these are early days for the RAD and it is on a procedural learning curve.4" An argument could be made that officers from the Ministers' and the RAD's office may have been applying S. 110(2)(d) differently than what is being proposed in this decision. However, the application of S.110(2)(d) by different departments of the Federal Government are not a binding exercise on the RAD when interpreting the meaning of S. 110(2)(d). [22] The RAD also provided an opportunity to both the Appellant and the Minister for written submissions of the issue of whether the RAD, by virtue of S. 110(2)(d) of the Act has jurisdiction to hear this appeal. Neither party responded to the request of the RAD. [23] Therefore, under paragraph 110(2)(d) of the IRPA, no appeal may be made to the RAD in respect of the Appellant's RPD's decision. [24] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Pasquale A. Fiorino" Pasquale A. Fiorino November 18, 2015 Date 1 X(Re), 2015 Can LII 30384 (CA IRB). 2 Ibid. at paras. #35-37. 3 Castro v. M.C.I. 2015 FC 131. 4 Husain v. M.C.I. 2015 FC 684 at para. #11. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-10832