TB5-11378

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-11378 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision November 18, 2015 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Michael Sherritt Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Ethiopia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant requests that a hearing be held by the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) in accordance to section 110(6) of the IRPA. If the RAD determines such a hearing is unwarranted, then the Appellant further asks the RAD to overturn the decision of the RPD and to find that this Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the matter be returned to the RPD for a new hearing under a differently constituted panel. The Minister had intervened in writing at the RPD hearing, however has not made further submissions in regards to this appeal. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD refers the matter to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she fears returning to Ethiopia because she will be persecuted by government security forces due to her political involvement in opposing the government of Ethiopia. Greater details may be found in the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form1 and in the audio recording of the hearing. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on August 14, 2015. A negative decision was rendered in writing on September 3, 2015. The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness, resulting in a lack of reliable information on which the RPD could make a positive finding. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD's decision must be overturned due to serious errors in interpretation at the hearing. [6] The Appellant submits that the RPD committed a reviewable error in finding that the Appellant's evidence in her BOC form was inconsistent with her oral evidence. [7] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred again in finding a contradiction between the Appellant's testimony regarding her manner of dress and the rural norms of dress in Ethiopia. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [8] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [9] It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.3 Application of Section 110(4) [10] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.4 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellant could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claim. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [11] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claim, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.5 [12] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellant with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellant could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [13] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.6 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [14] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness", these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, or is immaterial to the issues to be considered by the RAD, it would make little sense to admit such document, even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [15] The RAD has, in many appeals to date, applied the factors set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Raza.7 While Raza predates the introduction of IRPA section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of section 113(a). The Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.8 The RAD presumes that Parliament, in creating section 110(4), was well aware that this provision is almost identical in wording to section 113(a)-which provides a strong indication that Parliament intended the test from Raza to be used by the RAD.9 [16] In Iyamuremye,10 the Federal Court accepted the RAD's application of the factors in Raza to new evidence submitted on an appeal under the IRPA. Subsequently, in Ghannadi,11 the Court held that the RAD should consider the factors in Raza, but noted that these are merely considerations to be taken into account and not necessarily determinative of admissibility. In Singh,12 the Court found that the factors in Raza are based specifically in the language of section 113(a) and are not transferable in the context of an appeal before the RAD. The Court found that it was unreasonable for the RAD to strictly apply the Raza factors without distinguishing its own role from that of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) Officer who is bound by section 113(a).13 [17] In Singh, the Court wrote that: ...in order for there to be a 'full fact-based appeal' before the RAD, the criteria for the admissibility of evidence must be sufficiently flexible to ensure it can occur. Often, the evidence at stake will be essential for proving the factual basis of the errors the claimant alleges were made by the RPD. This consideration becomes all the more pertinent in light of the strict timelines a claimant now faces for initially submitting evidence before the RPD. A claimant now has 50 days to present all documents from the date he or she made the claim; the previous legislative scheme required the documents 20 days prior to a hearing, which, on average, took much longer to take place. When the RPD confronts a claimant on the weakness of his evidentiary record, the RAD should, in subsequent review of the decision, have some leeway in order to allow the claimant to respond to the deficiencies raised.14 [18] The Court also held that the "...main issue is whether the evidence 'was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably (or normally according to the French version) have been expected in the circumstances to have presented.'"15 [19] The Court did not discuss Iyamuremye or Ghannadi in its analysis of sections 110(4) and 113(a). It did, however, certify the following question: In considering the role of a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment officer and that of the Refugee Appeal Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, sitting in appeal of a decision of the Refugee Protection Division, does the test set out in Raza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 for the interpretation of paragraph 113(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 apply to its subsection 110(4)? [20] The question of whether the Raza factors are applicable to evidence that passes the test in section 110(4) is still unsettled.16 It has been found that the application of the Raza criteria by the RAD is reasonable;17 it has also been held that the application of those factors without modification is an error.18 The Raza factors have also been described by the Court as "useful guidance".19 [21] While trusting that the matter will eventually be resolved by the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD must nevertheless continue to consider new evidence, such as that which has been submitted in support of this appeal. Although it may be inappropriate to strictly apply the factors in Raza, given that they are not specific to section 110(4) and were not crafted for use in an appellate process, the RAD's consideration of new evidence cannot end with the application of the test in section 110(4). To limit its analysis to that provision would be to ignore other provisions of the IRPA-such as sections 162(2) and 171(a.3). Such a restricted analysis would also require the RAD to accept "new" evidence even if it is irrelevant, immaterial, or lacking in credibility. [22] In Denbel, the Federal Court held that:20 When interpreting legislative intent, the Court must give priority to the written text in the absence of any lexical ambiguity. The Court's opinions on best policy cannot supplant the text of the law; nor can select passages from the Hansard. In my view, Parliament intended these two provisions to enshrine the same legal test. If Parliament had intended to establish more flexible admissibility rules in RAD appeals, it would not have replicated the restrictive language which governs PRRAs. [23] The RAD will therefore undertake an analysis of any proposed new evidence, not only for its timeliness, which is largely the focus of section 110(4), but also to consider whether it has evidentiary value and, if so, how much. While the factors in Raza are indeed helpful guidance, the RAD would undertake a very similar analysis even if it would completely disregard that decision. [24] Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances". This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [25] While the IRPA makes specific reference to the credibility of evidence received by the RAD, there is no corresponding provision which addresses relevance. However, in the RAD's view, it is obvious that evidence must be assessed for its relevance.21 Apart from the support from the case law, it would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [26] It is therefore appropriate for the RAD to consider whether new evidence is relevant, even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [27] The RAD will also consider whether the proposed new evidence is material. In Raza, the Federal Court of Appeal described this factor: "Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been made available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered." This factor may, in the RAD's view, set an inappropriately high standard in the context of a RAD appeal. [28] An officer determining a PRRA application must not engage in a review of the applicant's negative RPD decision. The PRRA process exists to determine whether a risk to the applicant has arisen between the date of issue of the RPD's decision and the date of the applicant's pending removal from Canada,22 and the officer has no power to reconsider or set aside the RPD's decision. A PRRA will, in most cases, take place a year or more after the RPD's decision.23 In this context, the definition of materiality set out in Raza makes good sense: the new evidence must be so significant that it would have led to a different outcome before the RPD. [29] However, as the Court noted in Singh, the RAD context is considerably different. The RAD is not restricted to making a new assessment of the risk faced by the Appellant, though this could occur as a result of new evidence presented upon appeal. The RAD appeal is meant to be decided within four or five months of the RPD's decision. The Appellant may challenge the decision of the RPD, and the RAD has broad powers to review that decision for errors of fact or law, or mixed fact and law, to confirm the decision, to confirm on other grounds, to set aside the decision and substitute another, or to set aside the determination and refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. It is of paramount importance that the RAD may look only to admissible new evidence when considering whether to hold a hearing under section 110(6).24 [30] The Court's definition of materiality, which is appropriate for evidence presented in support of a PRRA application, seems overly restrictive when applied to evidence submitted in an appeal to the RAD. If the RAD were to apply the materiality factor as defined in Raza, it could lead to the rejection of evidence that is capable of showing that the RPD's decision was in error, only because that evidence is not so strong that it would have resulted in the acceptance of the refugee claim had the evidence been before the RPD. Further, the RAD is not asking-as the PRRA officer is under Raza-whether the RPD's decision would have been different. The RAD is considering whether the RAD thinks the determination should have been different or whether the RPD decision was in error. [31] For example, it is not uncommon for the RPD to reject a refugee claim on the basis that the claimant has not established his or her identity, and in such situations, the RPD is not required to go further to consider the evidence of persecution.25 A claimant rejected by the RPD on the basis of identity-perhaps because identity documents were still in transit from the country of origin at the time of the refugee hearing-might appeal to the RAD and present, as new evidence, such recently-received documents. However, those documents might be rejected by the RAD if it considers their materiality as defined in Raza: whether the refugee claim would probably have succeeded if the documents were made available to the RPD. In many cases, the establishment of identity does not in and of itself warrant the acceptance of a refugee claim, and therefore the Appellant's newly-obtained identity documents could be rejected by the RAD as lacking materiality, even though they could be the basis for a successful appeal. [32] In the RAD's view, this restrictive approach to materiality is not consistent with the broad powers given to the RAD. While the PRRA officer is required to focus on a single issue-risk to the applicant-the RAD is required to consider both whether the RPD decision is in error and, after having reviewed all of the evidence, whether the Appellant is a protected person. An approach that focuses on whether the evidence is material enough to affect the outcome of the RAD appeal rather than the RPD's decision is therefore preferred. [33] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to evidence that passes the test in section 110(4): (a) The RAD will consider whether the proposed new evidence is credible or trustworthy. (b) The RAD will assess the relevance of the evidence-whether it is capable, together with the other evidence in the record (including other admissible new evidence) of proving or disproving a fact at issue in either the refugee claim or the appeal.26 (c) The RAD will determine whether the evidence is material, in the sense that it could be capable of justifying, with or without the benefit of an oral hearing, as the case may be, a disposition under section 111 of the IRPA. [34] If the proposed new evidence does not meet each of the factors above, the RAD may choose not to admit it. These factors, however, are not exhaustive, as the RAD may consider other factors as appropriate in the circumstances. [35] The Appellant has submitted the following documents for consideration by the RAD. [36] The first is a document27 is alleged to be from the XXXX XXXX XXXX of XXXX City Administration, Police Department, XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This document has been translated by a person named XXXX XXXX XXXX of Edmonton, Alberta and sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths. The RAD has difficulty with this document for at least two reasons. First, there is insufficient evidence provided to convince the RAD that the translator is qualified in any way to present such a translation. The translator does not claim to be a certified translator but only that she/he has a "good knowledge of the Oromo and English languages". As such, the RAD cannot accept the accuracy of this document. Secondly, the translated document is awkward in its syntax which tells the RAD that either the translation is not well done or the document is not true. For example, the last sentence reads "Failure to appear at the stated place and date will result in taking any intended further action whenever and wherever we traced you after the specified date since we couldn't also find you when we came to your home." If this is a correct and true translation of what is actually on the document presented, then the document would be suspect due to such wording; however, it is more probable than not that the translation of the document was poorly done as it appears not to have been translated by a professional. Either way, the RAD cannot accept this document as being a credible document and consequently will not allow it into evidence. [37] A second document28 submitted allegedly from the "XXXX of XXXX XXXX District Women and Children Affairs", as with the above document, is translated by XXXX XXXX XXXX who has provided no credentials to substantiate her ability to properly and correctly translate between the Oromo and the English languages. As the credibility of this document is questionable in the same manner as the above document, the RAD will not allow it into evidence. [38] The third document29 is a letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX, a successful refugee claimant from Ethiopia who swears to have known the Appellant from 2009 until present. The letter supports the Appellant's allegations. The letter was not reasonable available pre-decision because the Appellant was unaware that her friend was in Canada until, after receiving a negative decision, the Appellant began using social media to find someone who could attest to her claim. The Appellant located the witness just two weeks before submitting her Memorandum.30 [39] The RAD has considered this document carefully. It appears not to have been translated, but written in English by the witness. The witness is a successful refugee claimant and therefore should be given the benefit of the doubt in regards to credibility. The content of the letter is not new in the truest sense of the definition, however, as pointed out by the Appellant, such a letter was not reasonably accessible to her prior to the decision of the RPD being rendered. The content of the letter is relevant. For these reasons, the RAD will admit this document into evidence and will weigh its probative value along with the other evidence before the RAD. Role of the RAD [40] Counsel has made some submissions in regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision. The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,31 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error". [41] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RAD will recognize and respect the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. The RPD's Findings [42] The Appellant argues that the RPD's decision must be overturned due to serious errors in interpretation at the hearing. [43] The RAD notes that the interpreter at the RPD hearing is a Board certified interpreter who has been through a process at the Board to ensure that he is fluent in all languages for which he interprets. Once certified by the Board, the interpreter is deemed to have interpreted correctly unless a claimant or Appellant produces a contradictory interpretation provided by a different certified interpreter. That interpreter may be certified by an agency other that the Board and will have credentials to prove his or her qualifications. In this particular case, the Appellant presents the opinion of a friend who speaks both Oromo and English. This person has not presented any credentials to prove to the RAD that she is qualified to interpret between the two languages. It is for this reason that the RAD has not admitted translated documents into evidence, as listed above. However, there is, in this case, a consideration regarding a breach of natural justice and consequently, the RAD is going to be much more lenient in its application of the standard of interpretation, not in regards to evidence, but in regards to the overall interpretation of the audio record. [44] The alleged translation errors are summarized by the witness.32 The RAD, having perused this document is concerned that there may have been interpretation errors which may have impacted on the RPD's decision. The RAD, while listening to the audio recording of the hearing got the general impression that there was a communication issue between the Appellant and the Board interpreter. The RAD, after listening to the audio recording cannot tell whether the allegations of misinterpretation are true and correct, or not. However, given what is at stake here for the Appellant, the RAD will give the benefit of the doubt in this case to the Appellant and presume that there are translation errors, which may or may not have impacted on the decision of the RPD. The RAD therefore finds that there were interpretation errors which are substantial enough to warrant a new hearing, in the interest of fairness and natural justice. Consequently, the RAD will not consider the remaining issues presented by the Appellant. [45] As the RAD has decided to send this claim back to the RPD for a new hearing, an oral hearing before the RAD will not occur as requested by the Appellant. Disposition [46] The RAD has found that the RPD's decision cannot stand. CONCLUSION [47] Pursuant to section 111(1)(c) of the IRPA, the RAD refers the matter to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe November 18, 2015 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record of Appeal, pp. 16-28. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected"; see Singh, Parminder v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para. 51. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, July 22, 2015, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 5 Deri, Samuel v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55. 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 7 Raza, Syed Masood v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 8 Ibid, Raza, paras. 13-15. 9 The presumption of consistent expression holds that "it is presumed that the legislature uses language carefully and consistently so that within a statute or other legislative instrument the same words have the same meaning and different words have different meanings." Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 5th ed. (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2008), at pp. 214-15. 10 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014, 2014 FC 494, para. 45. 11 Ghannadi, Vahid v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, paras. 17-18. 12 Singh, para 56. 13 See also Khachatourian, Robert v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-4928-14), Noel, February 13, 2015, 2015 FC 182, para. 37. 14 Singh, para. 55. 15 Singh, para. 58. 16 Deri, para. 56. 17 For example, Oluwole, John v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-6525-14), Southcott, August 14, 2015, 2015 FC 953, paras. 10 and 39; Ismailov, Dilshod v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-6839-14), Strickland, August 13, 2015, 2015 FC 967, para. 59; Denbel, Bekelech v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-3827-14), Mosley, May 13, 2015, 2015 FC 629, paras. 40- 44. 18 For example, Shukurov, Sharof v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-6058-14), Fothergill, August 6, 2015, 2015 FC 949, para. 26; Ajaj, Firas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-5604-14), Gascon, July 28, 2015, 2015 FC 928, paras. 61-63; Ching, Wai Kheong v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-1272-14), Kane, June 9, 2015, 2015 FC 725, para. 56; Khachatourian, Robert v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-4928-14), Noel, February 13, 2015, 2015 FC 182, para. 37. 19 Niyas, Mohamed Zayan v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-6829-14), Locke, July 17, 2015, 2015 FC 878, para. 27. 20 Denbel, Bekelech v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-3827-14), Mosley, May 13, 2015, 2015 FC 629, para. 43. 21 There is a great deal of support for this view. "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence": Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolotti and Ministry of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33, at para. 64. 22 Cupid, Keturah Laverne v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-1737-06), Snider, February 16, 2007, 2007 FC 176, paras. 4, 25, and 26. 23 IRPA, s. 112(b.1). 24 Singh, para. 53. 25 Liu, Yanfen v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-4384-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007, 2007 FC 831, para. 18. 26 See Raza at para. 13.4; also David Paciocco & Lee Stuesser, The Law of Evidence, 3d ed. (Irwin Law, 2002) at 24: "Evidence is relevant where it has some tendency as a matter of logic and human experience to make the proposition for which it is advanced more likely than that proposition would appear to be in the absence of that evidence." 27 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record of Appeal, p. 31. 28 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record of Appeal, p. 38. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record of Appeal, p. 40. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record of Appeal, Memorandum, p. 63. 31 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record of Appeal, pp. 44-46 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-11378