TB6-04953

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-04953 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision June 8, 2016 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Allison Rhoades Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) Susan Woolner Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (St. Vincent) appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to overturn the decision of the RPD and to find that he is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the matter be returned to the RPD for a new hearing under a differently constituted panel. [2] The Minister had intervened in the original hearing claiming that the Appellant should be excluded from protection due to there being serious reasons for considering that the Appellant had committed the crime of attempted murder outside of Canada. The RPD assessed the evidence presented by the Minister and found that there were no serious reasons for considering exclusion, therefore dismissing the Minister's allegations. [3] The Appellant had submitted a request to the RPD to be treated as a "Vulnerable Person".1 The request was granted and the original hearing was postponed pending a psychiatric assessment to be done. The Appellant requested and was granted a designated representative. No other accommodations were requested. DETERMINATION [4] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The RAD dismisses the appeal. BACKGROUND [5] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he fears a gang known as the Hungry Dogs and Pups (HDP) which is trying to kill him due to the gang's belief that the Appellant was an informer against some gang members. The Appellant also fears that he will be targeted and persecuted by the general population because of the Appellant's perceived sexual orientation. Lastly, the Appellant fears that he will be subject to elevated risk because the Appellant has unwanted auditory hallucinations as well as delusions. Mental illness is apparently not well received in St. Vincent. Greater details may be found in the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form2 and in the audio recording of the hearing. [6] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on December 16, 2015. A negative decision was rendered in writing on March 10, 2016. The RPD found that the Appellant was unable to establish his claim on the basis of credible and trustworthy evidence. Appellant's Issues [7] The Appellant submits the following issues: a) The RPD failed to assess one of the three independent grounds of risk identified by the Appellant. b) The RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility, including its drawing of a negative inference based on a lack of corroborating documentary evidence. c) The RPD erred in its analysis of state protection ANALYSIS The Role of the RAD [8] The RAD is an Appellate body governed by specific legislation3 and guided by the jurisprudence4 of the Federal Courts. The RAD's role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.5 Such an appeal "(i) is directed at the decision of the RPD; (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision; and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD." [9] The Federal Court of Appeal in its decision clearly states, that the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred in its decision. The RAD is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.6 [10] When the RAD is dealing with the findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness,7with no deference accorded to the RPD.8 [11] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings on credibility where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony from those individuals. [12] Where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of an intelligible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and comprehend how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [13] Additionally, the outcome of that process must be a product that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. It is for this reason, that it is principally important that the RAD employ its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to conclude whether the RPD's outcome is supported by that evidence. [14] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [15] However; the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from an intelligible reasoning process whose premises are embedded in such advantages. If either the process or the conclusion does not meet these requirements, the RAD may determine the findings to be in error. [16] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [17] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that the appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected9 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [18] It is for the appellants to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the appellants.10 Application of Section 110(4) [19] As I understand it, Section 110(4) provides the appellants with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the appellants could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [20] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for appellants to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.11In a recent Federal Court decision,12the Hon. Justice Annis wrote: "I agree with the RAD that the Applicant must put her best foot forward before the RPD, and present all the evidence that is available at the time, whether aware of it or not, unless there is an aspect of injustice arising from unexpected new facts, or old facts that no reasonable amount of due diligence could have turned up. It is not intended to be a tune-up procedure for the RAD that upon learning in (of) deficiencies in the Applicant's case, additional evidence that could have been presented to the RPD may be presented as new evidence before the RAD. In other words, responding to an inadequacy identified by the RPD in a party's case cannot be a legitimate foundation for the party to claim that had he known about the deficiency he could have presented better evidence that was always in existence or he could have had witness testimony before the RPD from persons that could have been called to support his claim. This would make the RPD process a monumental waste of time, which is surely not Parliament's intention in providing appeal rights. Additionally, the Singh decision bears no resemblance to the introduction of new evidence in this matter. Its ratio must not be extended to unrelated fact situations that undermine the ordinary finality of the RPD decision except on a proper basis of appeal under the Act. In Singh, the Applicant only discovered after the RPD decision that a key document, which related to the determinative issue of identity, had been retained by the Applicant's solicitor when he had reasonable grounds to believe that it was in the possession of the Citizenship and Immigration Canada, via his lawyer. The Court described a fairly liberal interpretation of what constitutes evidence that "was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented" in appeals before the RAD when it was found to be an honest mistake about who had possession of the key document. It is the sort of case where the interests of justice call for an exception in what is intended to be a flexible administrative process. The case did not involve calling a witness who was available before the hearing to testify on an issue vetted at length by the RPD, and on top of that, whose evidence could have been presented on the subject matter before the termination of the RPD process." [21] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.13 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [22] Where a document meets the test in Section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant or immaterial it would make little sense to admit such a document even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [23] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in Section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. The Appellant's Proposed New Evidence Submitted Pursuant to Section 110 (4), IRPA 1. Customer receipt of money transfer14 2. "Vincentian" article15 3. "Vincentian" article16 4. Internet article17 [24] In this case, the RAD looked at the literal provisions of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA in assessing the new evidence, asking itself two questions with respect to the new evidence; namely, (1) did the evidence arise after the rejection of the claim and was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and (2) was the evidence such that the Appellants could not reasonably have expected in the circumstances to have presented it at the time of rejection? [25] In regards to document (1), this is a receipt for a money transfer which pre-dates the RPD decision so it is not new. Further, aside from having the name of the sender and receiver on it, and the date of the transaction, it tells me nothing as to how much money was transferred and for what reason. Therefore, even if it was "new", it is immaterial. It is not new and therefore fails the test of section 110 (4). It is disallowed. [26] In regards to documents (2) and (3), these are both new as they were published well after the decision of the RPD however; the articles speak of the discovery, arrest, trial and conviction of the police officer (XXXX XXXX) to whom the Appellant transferred money. It is the Appellant's statement that this police officer was being "set up" by the gang or its police friends in retaliation for the police officer helping the Appellant. However, when one carefully reads the articles, it is clear that this is not likely the case. XXXX XXXX testified at his own trial that he found the bullets (the items he was charged with stealing) in an unsecure place and moved them to his locker himself. The articles provide no substantiation of any kind to the Appellant's allegations and in fact, I find that the only relevance is that the police officer involved was the recipient of some money for some reason from the Appellant. Although the articles do pass the test of section 110 (4), they provide no material evidence in regards to this appeal. I therefore do not accept these articles into evidence. [27] In regards to document (4), this item actually consists of two separate internet articles, both of which pass the test of section 110 (4) as they are in fact "new". However, as the items above, they are immaterial to this appeal. The internet articles speak to violence in St. Vincent, which is already known through previous documents such as the National Documentation Package (NDP). They are immaterial as they will not affect the outcome of this appeal either way. Articles, whether online or in print speaking to a random act of violence in the same community or nearby as that where the Appellant lived is not evidence of the Appellant's alleged persecution. As it is immaterial to the outcome of this appeal, this evidence will not be allowed. [28] In conclusion on the issue of evidence, I will not be admitting any of the documents presented because in one case (item 1) it fails the test of section 110 (4) and in the other cases, the items are immaterial even though they did pass the test of section 110 (4). [29] I will conduct my own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The Arguments Part I [30] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to assess one of the three independent grounds of risk identified by the Appellant. Specifically, the RPD failed to assess the claim on the basis of the Appellant's "innate manifestation of his mental illness" and how that illness will be perceived in St Vincent. Having read the Decision of the RPD, I must agree with the Appellant here. Although the Appellant's mental condition is mentioned in the Reasons and Decision, there is insufficient mention to truly consider that the condition, in relation to risk was fully assessed. Therefore, I will do an independent assessment of that issue now. [31] The Appellant alleges that he suffers from both auditory and visual hallucinations which appear to cause some paranoia, manifesting itself in somewhat awkward behaviour at times. The Appellant, after attending at a psychiatrist's office and consequently submitting an official request to the Board, was declared a "vulnerable person" for the purposes of his hearing. The psychiatrist's report was disclosed. 18 That document, authored by an experienced registered psychologist (XXXX XXXX XXXX), concluded that the Appellant suffers from a "schizoaffective disorder, depressive type and posttraumatic stress disorder with dissociative symptoms19and requires psychiatric evaluation and treatment. [32] The problem I have with Dr. XXXX report is that he appears to go beyond the scope of his duty as a psychologist by advocating on behalf of his patient, the Appellant, to remain in Canada. Dr. XXXX says "If refused permission to remain in Canada, his condition will deteriorate...it will be impossible for Mr. XXXX to feel safe anywhere in St. Vincent...it is unlikely that he will be able to secure the medical treatment he requires in St. Vincent..." It is not Dr. XXXX place to advise this Board as to his opinion of healthcare in St. Vincent. He provides no evidence to substantiate his opinion in this regard. [33] I must accept the medical diagnosis (clinical impression) of a qualified person such as Dr. XXXX and that part of his report I do accept however, his advocacy on behalf of his patient is not acceptable and all of the text and information provided by Dr. XXXX is tainted by that advocacy. Therefore I find that the medical report which was placed in evidence at the RPD hearing has some merit, albeit limited to the actual clinical impression. [34] Even if Dr. XXXX is correct regarding healthcare in St. Vincent, a lack of healthcare does not provide a nexus to the Convention. It is only in section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that I can look to see if there is a risk to his life, a risk to cruel or unusual treatment or to torture, any of which may qualify the Appellant for protection. [35] In his arguments, the Appellant says that the RPD failed to make an assessment of this alleged risk. I have looked at the only documentary evidence available to me20which deals with health issues in St. Vincent. The document speaks briefly to the issue of persons with disabilities, in St. Vincent. In that regard, the document tells me that discrimination against persons with disabilities, including mental disabilities is prohibited by law and that the law is generally respected. [36] The Appellant argues that there is no cure for his condition and that his mental illness would go untreated in St. Vincent. Although I am sympathetic to the health conditions of any person, as previously stated, healthcare is not a valid reason for refugee protection. The Appellant alleges that he would be less likely to receive state protection and in fact would more likely face mistreatment on the basis of his mental illness however, there has been insufficient evidence adduced to support those allegations. I take note that the documents21 at the Board advise that St Vincent does have a health care program in which hospital beds are provided at a density rate of 5.2 beds per thousand population (by comparison, Australia has a hospital bed density of 3.9 beds per thousand population). Also, St Vincent spends 5.2% of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on healthcare. This amount is lower than many countries as a percentage of GDP however; it is far from the lowest on the healthcare scale. This information tells me that St. Vincent has at least an adequate healthcare system and as insufficient evidence has been adduced to rebut that information, I find that the healthcare system in St Vincent is adequate. [37] I have no illusions regarding the crime in St. Vincent. The documentary evidence on record confirms that violence is prevalent in St. Vincent however, that general violence, like the alleged lack of healthcare, is not a ground for refugee protection. As I have determined that there is no nexus based on being a victim of generalized crime, I am looking at section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act as an alternative for this Appellant. [38] Section 97 of the Act reads as follows: 97(1) A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally (a) to a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention Against Torture; or (b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if (i) the person is unable or, because of that risk, unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country, (ii) the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country, (iii) the risk is not inherent or incidental to lawful sanctions, unless imposed in disregard of accepted international standards, and (iv) the risk is not caused by the inability of that country to provide adequate health or medical care. [39] It has been argued in other cases that when an individual, such as the Appellant has been targeted by criminals in some way, that individual faces a risk to his life which is personal as opposed to general. [40] However, I must be able to distinguish between persecution and random or arbitrary acts of violence22and from suffering as a result of a criminal act or a personal vendetta. Although there has been judicial discussion on the possibility of a few cases where a claimant has been victimized by what may be characterized as a "common" crime, the discussion has questioned whether or not some of these cases may qualify as persecution. The Trial Division has said that most acts of persecution can be characterized as criminal, but that in an individual case the Refugee Division (now the RPD) may nevertheless distinguish between criminal acts and persecution.23 I believe that this is such a case in which the Appellant may have been a victim of a common crime. If I presume this to be the case, even though I have insufficient evidence before me to find that a crime was even committed against this Appellant, then this Appellant was not being persecuted but was simply an unfortunate victim of criminal acts. There is insufficient evidence adduced to convince me that the Appellant was persecuted by anyone prior to his coming to Canada or that he faces a risk to his life or to cruel and unusual treatment should he be returned to St Vincent. [41] I take special note of item (b) (iv) (risk caused by inability of the State to provide healthcare) above which clearly dismisses the Appellant's claim from section 97. In regards to item (b) (1), there has been no argument put forth to suggest that this Appellant is totally unable to avail himself of the protection of the state. I therefore find that the Appellant fails the test of section 97 of the Act. [42] In arriving at my decision, I considered the following: i. Was the harm claimed caused by a criminal act? ii. Was the harm caused, serious? iii. Is there a serious possibility of the harm occurring? iv. Would the harm, if inflicted would be for a Convention reason? v. Is state protection available? [43] In answer to my first question, according to the Appellant's evidence the answer is yes, the harm was committed by a criminal act. [44] The second question is interesting. Basically, all that has happened to the Appellant which he can positively relate to the gang is a series of threats; the most serious involved a knife being shown. There was a robbery of the Appellant however the perpetrators were all masked. The Appellant testified that he recognized a voice as belonging to a gang member however that is not a positive identification. I am not convinced that the robbery was anything more than a random act. The Appellant was unable to visually identify any of the robbers as they all wore masks. The Appellant's alleged recognition of the voice of one of the robbers is not substantial enough to positively identify the man therefore I must conclude that there is insufficient evidence adduced to convince me that the robbers, or at least one of them was one of the gang members feared by the Appellant. I find that the robbery was a random act perpetrated on a random target and I further find that the robbery is not related to the alleged persecutors. [45] In answer to the third question, I believe there is no more than a mere possibility that such harm would occur again. However, as the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act is forward looking, in answer to question #4, if the harm did occur again, that harm would not be for a Convention reason or ground, as it would be no more than a criminal act, which is not one of the five grounds listed in the Convention. As a random act of violence, it would be considered as a generalized risk which would exclude the Appellant from a section 97 claim under that circumstance. [46] The last question is one I will deal with a little later as it is also an issue brought up by the Appellant, that is, state protection. The Arguments Part II [47] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility, including its drawing of a negative inference based on a lack of corroborating documentary evidence in spite of the Appellant's and counsel's diligent efforts in this regard. [48] Both the Appellant and his counsel appear to have made good efforts to obtain a copy of the police report that the Appellant claims to have filed. Neither of them ever received any response to their requests which according to the documents24 would be unusual. The Consular representative of the St Vincent Consulate in Toronto explained to the Board's Research Directorate the procedures to obtain a police report while a Sergeant of police and a member of the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Human Rights Association also explained procedures as well as costs and timelines. [49] After reviewing the evidence (which consists primarily of the testimony of the Appellant) and considering that neither the Appellant nor his counsel ever received a reply from the Commissioner of Police to the multiple requests, I can only reasonably conclude that there simply is no report to be disclosed. I have read the documents available at the Board25which speak to obtaining police reports. This document is and has been available to the Appellant and his counsel and clearly explains procedures for obtaining police reports from St Vincent but also has a very strong recommendation that one obtain assistance from a human rights organization, such as the Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Human Rights Association (SVGHRA), which has been very successful in assisting many clients obtain their police records. I am not privy as to why the Appellant or his counsel did not seek help from such an organization. I am also not privy to the results which may have been had should they have done so. What I am privy to is the fact that there is no corroborating evidence before me to substantiate the story of an assault on this Appellant. I cannot, in any good faith, find a reason that the Commissioner of Police would withhold such a report if it existed. Such a report would only contain information to which the Appellant is already privy, along with the results of any possible charges. All of that information regarding trial and convictions, etc., are in the public domain therefore there would be no reason for the Commissioner to withhold the report even if the Commissioner was somehow tied to the Hounds and Pups gang. The question should not be "did the RPD err by drawing a negative inference due to a lack of corroborating documents" but instead I must ask whether the entire story is credible or not, and that is why corroborating evidence in this particular case is important. [50] I have a serious issue with the Appellant's ability to relate what may or may not have actually happened to him. Dr. XXXX writes:26 Mr. XXXX reported symptoms indicative of major mental illness. He experiences auditory hallucinations in the form of voices that instruct him to harm himself (e.g. "They just be callin' my name and tellin' me to do stupid stuff...Suicide and stuff") He reported visual hallucinations in the form of fleeting visions of people... [51] If Mr. XXXX is suffering from schizoaffective disorder, depressive type, as Dr. XXXX has written as his clinical impression, then I am dealing with an Appellant who suffers both delusions and hallucinations as well as paranoid thoughts and ideas, as will be seen in the American Psychiatric Association's "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed. DSM-5) which is referenced by Dr. XXXX in his report. With all the sensitivity and empathy possible for the illness suffered by this Appellant, I must still assess the overall credibility of the allegations. The Appellant suffers delusions and hallucinations and some paranoia. Without some supporting documentary evidence, I am left with only his testimony as evidence that he was ever threatened and that he filed a police report. The fact that neither he nor his counsel has been able to obtain a report suggest to me that it likely does not exist and the reporting of the incident and incident itself may both be manifestations of the schizoaffective disorder that the Appellant suffers from. It is for this reason that the supporting documents are so important in this case. The major mental illness diagnosed by Dr. XXXX is sufficient cause for me to require supportive documentary evidence of the crime and the reporting of the crime. I have no such evidence before me. Consequently, I find that there is insufficient credible evidence to convince me that the crime and reporting of the crime ever happened. [52] The Appellant also spoke about the fact that someone began a rumour that the Appellant was gay. There was insufficient evidence to substantiate that such a rumour was being spread around and even if there was, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate any harm that the Appellant has or will suffer as a result of such a rumour. [53] For all of those reasons above, I find that the Appellant has failed to show a nexus to the Convention. [54] As the Appellant has no nexus to the Convention and also fails the test of section 97 of the Act, the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection due to the third risk which had not been fully assessed by the RPD. The Argument Regarding State Protection [55] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its analysis of state protection. [56] State protection becomes somewhat of a moot point in this case as I have found that the Appellant has no nexus to the Convention and is not a person in need of protection as envisioned by section 97 of the Act. Therefore, I will not do an analysis of state protection. Disposition [57] The RAD has found that the RPD decision will stand. CONCLUSION [58] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe June 8, 2016 Date 1 Chairperson's Guideline No. 8. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, pp. 13-38 3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) 4 Dhillon v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 321, at para. 14; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 46. 5 Dhillon , supra, footnote 4, at para 14-18 6 Huruglica: M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 103. 7 Ibid. 8 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 9 In the French version of IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 10 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 11 Singh, FCA, para. 54. 12 Abdullahi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-3447-15), March 3, 2016, 2016 FC 260. 13 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385, [2008] 1 F.C.R., para. 16. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, page 22 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, page 24 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's record, page 26 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, page 29-31 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record at page 134 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Page 138, Report of Dr. G. M.XXXXX. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP item 2.1. 21 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP item 1.2 (World Fact Book). 22 Abrego, Apolonio Paz v. M.E.I. (F.C.A.,no A-348-91), Hugessen, Linden, Holland, February 14, 1993. 23 Cortez, Delmy Isabel v. S.C.C. (FCTD no IMM-2482-93, McKeown, Dec 15, 1993 at 2. 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP Item 10.2. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, NDP Item 10.2 (Dec 2015). 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, page 136, para. 3. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-04953