VB6-01258

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB6-01258 / VB6-01259 / VB6-01260 VB6-01261 / VB6-01262 / VB6-01263 / VB6-01264 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal (Also Known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Appeal considered at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit à Date of decision June 28, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) Natasha Thompson Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal personne(s) en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) (Also Known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] Mr. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX also known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "associate appellant"), and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "minor appellants") are all citizens of Libya. The designative representative for the minor appellants is their father, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX They appeal the March 22, 2016 determination of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD"). The claim was heard by the RPD on March 8, 2016 with a Notice of Decision being sent on March 30, 2016. The RPD found that the appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act" or "IRPA").1 DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") confirms the determination of the RPD. BACKGROUND [3] Counsel for the appellants before the RAD is the same that they had at the RPD hearing. The Minister for Citizenship and Immigration Canada (the "Minister") has not intervened before the RPD nor the RAD. [4] The appellant does seek to present "new evidence"2 to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of IRPA. BASIS OF CLAIM [5] According to the allegations set out in the appellant's Basis of Claim form (BOC),3 the appellant is a citizen of Libya. The appellant alleges that he is an active supporter of the Transitional Government in Libya. After the Transitional Government lost in Libya, the appellant became a target for the militant group working for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The appellant alleges that his name in on the hit list and that he fears persecution if he returned to Libya. The appellant also fears his family is in danger due to his political opinion. [6] The appellant was able to secure a work permit and came to Canada with his family on XXXX XXXX, 2014. GROUNDS OF APPEAL [7] The appellant's submissions4 as to the grounds of this appeal can be summarized as follows: * Did the RPD member fail to acknowledge the supporting documentation from the National Documentation package for Libya dated November 30, 2015? * Did the RPD member fail to assess what injustices are placed on women and children in Libya? * Did the RPD member fail to give the appellant the opportunity to produce evidence to support his allegations that he has made Facebook posts relating to his political opinion? CONSIDERATION OF NEW EVIDENCE [8] Subsection 110(4) of the Act provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [9] The appellant is required to provide full and detailed submissions as part of his memorandum and provide explanations for how the proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), and how it relates to his claim.5 [10] Once the "new evidence" has been accepted by the RAD, the RAD is also guided by the recent Federal Court of Appeal (the "FCA") case, Singh.6 In Singh, the FCA has said: [64] In conclusion, I am of the view that there is no valid reason not to apply, for the most part, the implicit criteria established by this Court in Raza to subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The wording of that provision is almost identical to the wording of paragraph 113(a), and the context in which it was adopted as well as the underlying judicial policy considerations support an identical approach despite the fact that they apply to separate proceedings and different decision-makers. In any case, the issue seems rather academic to me, to the extent that the implicit criteria from Raza do not truly add to the wording of subsection 110(4) but are necessarily implied. Except for the materiality of evidence, which does not lend itself to the same analysis in an appeal and which subsection 110(6) already considers in determining whether a new hearing should be held, it is not necessary to interpret subsection 110(4) and paragraph 113(a) differently. It goes without saying that the RAD always has the freedom to apply the conditions of subsection 110(4) with more or less flexibility depending on the circumstances of the case. [11] In Singh,7 the FCA also said: [54] . . . The role of the RAD is not to provide the opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted before the RPD, but to allow for errors of fact, errors in law or mixed errors of fact and law to be corrected. [12] The RAD will assess the evidence on "newness" as outlined in subsection 110(4). If it passes this test, the RAD will go on to assess the "new evidence" on credibility and relevance before admittance of such evidence for the RAD appeal. [13] The appellants have submitted the following documents as new evidence at the time the appeal was perfected and after pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act. 1. Forensic Report of nephew who was killed in Libya.8 2. Facebook Posts.9 3. Article: The Price of a Child's Life, dated May 30, 2016.10 4. Article: Libya conflict keeps 279,000 children out of school: UN - not dated.11 [14] In regards to Document 1, counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant's nephew was killed in Libya and this information was only made available after the RPD hearing date and determination. The incident happened on XXXX XXXX, 2016 which was after the RPD hearing and determination date. Therefore, I accept this as new evidence for the RAD appeal. [15] In regards to Document 2, the appellant submits that the RAD allow the additional Facebook entries to give the "the full view of the online profile with the range of submissions he has made on various profiles/sites".12 The appellant further submits that "these posts would not have been available to the Member in her short search".13 However, I do not find the appellant has provided reasonable arguments as to why this information was not before the RPD member at the time of the hearing or before the determination date. The reasons for my finding are that all of these documents contain information that were central to the appellants' claims at the RPD. The BOC states that the appellants are responsible for adding all that is relevant to their claims at the time the claims are made and up to the hearing date. The appellants have not provided any arguments as to what efforts they made to obtain these documents prior to the RPD hearing and determination. This is information that happened prior to the RPD hearing and determination. During the hearing the appellant was asked14 by the RPD member why he did not produce the Facebook messages as evidence to support his refugee claim. The appellant testified that he "did not think if it".15 I note that the appellant was represented by counsel. It is reasonable to expect someone in the appellant's position to provide supporting evidence to corroborate his allegations. The appellant has not adequately established that he made any efforts to so. Moreover, the RPD member offered the appellant the opportunity to access his Facebook page during the RPD hearing. At no time did the appellant find any information pertaining to his testimony that he posted comments on Facebook that would put him at risk. I find the RPD member gave the appellant ample opportunities to provide this information but the appellant did not do so. Thus, any such information now before the RAD is not "new evidence" as this evidence was reasonably available at the RPD hearing or before the RPD determination. I also note that such evidence which contradicts the findings of the RPD does not make it new evidence. I do not find that this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) as new evidence. Therefore, I decline to admit this evidence for this RAD appeal. [16] As for Document 3, the appellants submit that this article "demonstrates the fear that the appellant has for his family if they were to return to Libya". The appellants have not provided arguments as to how this article demonstrates the fear. The article states that Libya is dealing with organized crime and many children are subjected to kidnappings by gangs. The RPD member dealt with this in her decision and finds:16 [21] There is little evidence pertaining to whether children are targeted on account of their age. While there is some reference to abduction for ransom and child recruitment, I do not find that this sufficiently establishes that children face a serious possibility of persecution as minors. The evidence does not adequately demonstrate that it rises to this level. [17] The issue regarding the alleged fear for the children was before the RPD member and I do not find the appellants adequately established that this article presents information that is "new evidence" that was not before the RPD. I do not find that this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) as new evidence. Therefore, I decline to admit this evidence for this RAD appeal. [18] For Document 4, the appellants have not provided any submissions as to why this document should be accepted as "new evidence" for this RAD appeal. I note that the article is undated. I also note that the issue of the ongoing conflict in Libya was before the RPD member at the time of the RPD hearing and determination. In fact, Exhibits 4 and 517 of the RPDR record, which was submitted by the appellants, contained various articles on the situation in Libya as a result of the ongoing conflict. The appellants have not provided submissions as to how this article constitutes "new evidence" as it is not dated and it contains similar information that was before the RPD. I do not find that this evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) as new evidence. Therefore, I decline to admit this evidence for this RAD appeal. APPLICATION FOR AN ORAL HEARING [19] The appellant has requested an oral hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the Act. [20] Subsection 110(3) of the Act requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD Record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the appellant. [21] According to subsection 110(6), the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the appellant, that is central to the RPD decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [22] When read together, subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new evidence,18 in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the appellant, is central to the RPD decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [23] The RAD has not admitted the appellants' new evidence in support of the appeal. As such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the RPD's record, and the appellants' application for an oral hearing is denied. REMEDY SOUGHT [24] The appellant has only requested19 that the RAD give the appellants an "oral appeal". However, a hearing is only granted if "new evidence" is granted as mentioned earlier. Under paragraph 111(1)(b) of the Act, the RAD may set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that the appellant is a Convention refugee or person in need of protection. Under paragraph 111(1)(c) of the Act, allow the appeal and refer the matter to the RPD for redetermination by a differently constituted panel. The RAD may also, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, confirm the determination of the RPD. ROLE OF THE RAD [25] Although the Act sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [26] In the FCA decision for Huruglica Justice Gauthier states: [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable.20 [27] In Youkap,21 the Federal Court (the "Court") confirmed that the RAD may show a certain level of deference towards the RPD's finding when credibility issues are involved, and that the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence as a whole. Furthermore, the RAD has a duty of deference regarding the credibility findings of the RPD as the RPD has had the opportunity to hear the witness.22 This has also been stated by the FCA decision, Huruglica,23 where Justice Gauthier states: [11] [. . .] These respective roles suggest deference is owed to findings of fact, or findings of mixed fact and law, that can be traced back to evidence given at the RPD hearing. Where the RAD has new evidence before it, either through documents or from an oral hearing, less deference may be owed, as the RPD will not have considered this evidence. . . . [14] Turning to the expertise and advantageous position of the RPD versus that of the RAD, the RAD underlined that the RPD always has the advantage of seeing and questioning refugee claimants, while the RAD will unfrequently have this opportunity. This "suggests that the RAD show deference to the RPD on findings of fact and particularly in respect to credibility, other than in situations where the RAD holds an oral hearing and therefore has opportunity to consider evidence first hand:" . . .24 [28] In this appeal, and taking into consideration the recent FCA decision in Huruglica,25 with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law), which raise no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Otherwise, where an issue concerning credibility of oral evidence is evident, I will be applying the points set out in Huruglica26 which is to conduct an independent assessment of all the evidence to determine whether the appellants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, while giving certain deference to the RPD's findings regarding the appellants' credibility and any other issues where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage. As well, it is clear from the many recent Court cases that have been previously mentioned, all agree that the standard of correctness should be used for any error of law found in the RPD decision on appeal to the RAD. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [29] I have conducted an independent assessment of the appellants' claims for refugee protection as presented to the RPD. I have assessed the appellants' testimonies surrounding their allegations on who they fear and the events that have triggered their fear in Libya, and I have reviewed the totality of the evidence before me. I will now turn to the specific submissions by the appellants as to errors allegedly made by the RPD Member. [30] The appellant alleges that his family has been put on the hit list by the militants working for ISIS and thus, he will be likely subjected to persecution if he returned to Libya. The RPD member finds that the appellant is not credible in regards to these allegations. Specifically, the RPD finds the appellant did not establish credibility due to the following factors:27 1. The appellant did not provide credible, reliable, or trustworthy evidence to support that he was an active member of the Transitional Government in Libya or that he is associated with an organized group in Libya. 2. The appellant's Facebook page was void of politically based comments as he alleged. 3. The appellant was inconsistent in his testimony about what happened to others who had taken part in a sit-in with a few thousand others in the town square. 4. In relation to the National Documentation Package (NDP), the appellant has not provided sufficient evidence to establish that he fits any of the profiles listed in the NDP of people at risk in Libya. 5. The associate appellant and the minor appellants have not sufficiently established that they face any additional risk related to their gender or for being children. Supporting documentation [31] The appellant submits28 that the RPD member failed to acknowledge the supporting documentation from the NDP for Libya dated November 30, 2015. Specifically, the appellant submits that "many stated facts by the claimant and spouse about their own accounts and fears are supported by the evidence. The NDP clearly shows how injustices are placed on women and children and with the testimony the member made an error against s. 96 in support of being a member of a particular social group. Their testimony also suggests due to their political opinion has unfortunately put them in harm's way".29 [32] I do not find the appellants have provided clear arguments as to how the RPD member failed to acknowledge the NDP package. In fact, I note that RPD member did reference the NDP documents in her reasons. I find the appellant has not provided persuasive arguments that the RPD member erred in her assessment of the NDP package when making her findings. The RPD member finds:30 [16] According to Amnesty International, security officials, state employees, religious leaders, activists, judges, journalists and rights activists are among those targeted for killings.31 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) finds that human rights defenders, politicians, civil society activists, media professionals, religious leaders, government officials, as well as members of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies are deliberately singled out by various groups for intimidation, abduction, burning and looting of homes, and unlawful killings.32 The UNCHR further notes that the Islamic State targets regular citizens for perceived infractions of Islamic law. The United States Department of State and Human Rights Watch make similar conclusions.33 I do not find that the principal claimant matches the profile of any of these vulnerable groups. In my view, he is unlikely to be perceived as a human rights or political activist based on his level of political participation. I find insufficient credible evidence that the claimant would come to the attention of the various armed groups operating in Libya. [33] I find the appellants have failed to submit where or how the RPD member failed to address the NDP documentation in her reasons. It is clear that the RPD member did do this and I have no reason to disagree with her. Women and children [34] The appellants submit that the RPD member failed to acknowledge the conditions in Libya and "how they are currently is not an environment where children feel safe to be on the streets in their home town and where young girls feel the freedom to dream and strive for a positive future while making their own decisions and freedom of full education".34 [35] Furthermore, in relation to the associate appellant and the minor appellants, the RPD member finds:35 [19] In accordance with the Gender Guidelines,36 I considered whether the principal claimant's wife and female children have a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of their gender or would face a personalized risk. I also considered whether the male children would face similar issues. Both groups form a nexus with the Convention in terms of their membership in a particular social group. [20] The evidence indicates that women are subjected to societal discrimination, but it does not amount to persecution, though being of African descent, being a rape survivor or committing sexual misdemeanors may intensify discrimination.37 The Home Office has found that being female does not on its own establish a need for international protection.38 Women political and civil society activists, journalists and those not complying with strict interpretations of religious and societal gender norms are reportedly singled out by various actors for intimidation, assaults and assassination across the country.39 The principal claimant's wife and minor daughters do not fit these profiles. Lone women without the support and protection of a husband or a family are at significantly greater risk of gender-based ill-treatment.40 But again, this is not the case for the female claimants. [21] There is little evidence pertaining to whether children are targeted on account of their age. While there is some reference to abduction for ransom and child recruitment, I do not find that this sufficiently establishes that children face a serious possibility of persecution as minors. The evidence does not adequately demonstrate that it rises to this level. [36] I find the appellants submission as to where the RPD member erred in this regard is vague and unclear. The RPD member acknowledged the children and the associate appellant in her decision and assessed the risk using the NDP. Based on my re-assessment of the evidence and the appellants' submissions, I do not find the appellants have adequately established that the RPD member erred in her findings. Facebook [37] The appellant submits41 that he was given the opportunity to assist the RPD member to search his Facebook page for evidence to support his claim but he did not have the use of his own device or profile. However, the appellant has not provided further submissions on how the use of his own device would have brought forward information regarding his Facebook page that would differ from what the RPD member had before her at the RPD hearing. I also note that the appellant was given the opportunity to produce any evidence that would support his testimony regarding his Facebook posts. [38] The appellant is made clear when he makes a refugee claim to provide all corroborating evidence to support his refugee claim before the RPD. There is no evidence of the appellant making efforts to obtain or present evidence to the RPD during this time. Based on my own re-assessment, I find I agree with the RPD member that the appellant has not provided persuasive arguments as to why the corroborating evidence was not before the RPD to assess. I do recognize that corroborating evidence is not always required to substantiate a credible claim for refugee protection. However, considering the credibility issues addressed in this claim, as well as the central allegations surrounding the appellant's public political views, corroborating evidence would have been helpful to support the notion that the appellant's life would be at risk if he returned to Libya. [39] I also note the Federal Court case in Bhagat,42 which states: Corroborating evidence is not always necessary to establish the applicant's subjective fear. The Board, however, determined that in the particular circumstances of this case, corroborating evidence of persecution was expected. An absence of corroborating evidence, then, permitted it to make a negative inference against credibility of the applicant. The respondent relies on Sheik v. Canada (M.E.I.) (C.A.), 1990 CanLII 8017 (FCA), [1990] 3 F.C. 238, at page 244, for its argument that the Board did not err in law when making that conclusion: The concept of "credible evidence" is not, of course, the same as that of the credibility of the applicant, but it is obvious that where the only evidence before a tribunal linking the applicant to his claim is that of the applicant himself (in addition, perhaps, to "country reports" from which nothing about the applicant's claim can be directly deduced), a tribunal's perception that he is not a credible witness effectively amounts to a finding that there is no credible evidence on which the second-level tribunal could allow his claim. [40] It was apparent as discussed above that there were a number of important credibility concerns regarding the appellant's testimony, which leads the RAD to find no matter what the mitigating issues, in the circumstances surrounding this claim there would be an expectation that the appellant would provide sufficient persuasive documentation to support these aspects of his claim. However, the appellant has not provided any arguments as to what efforts he had made prior to his RPD hearing in obtaining corroborating evidence. In fact, the RPD member asked the appellant why he did not print out his Facebook page and submit it into evidence. The appellant testified that "I didn't think of it".43 This is not a reasonable explanation. The appellant also failed to mention these Facebook comments in his BOC and when asked44 by the RPD member why he did not include this information in the BOC, the appellant testified45 that he has no reason for not doing so. The failure of the appellant to supply this key documentation detracts from the credibility of his allegations. [41] The RPD member also questioned the appellant on what could be found on his Facebook page after he testified that he wrote comments on his Facebook page that contributed to the risk of persecution he fears. The RPD member asked the appellant what were his comments to which he answered "Exactly I can't recall but generally speaking that this conference hasn't done anything useful for the country."46 However, his Facebook page was absent of such evidence that would corroborate his allegations. Moreover, the RPD member did allow the appellant an opportunity to seek such evidence from his Facebook. The RPD member asked the appellant "Can we check your Facebook page, print pages, and enter into evidence"47 to which the appellant agreed. The RPD member asked the appellant to refer48 her to comments he has posted on his Facebook page. The appellant later testified that "There's nothing here that I can print out. It could have been erased. I don't know."49 The RPD member then asked50 the appellant if he erased the comments to which he answered "Of course, nobody can erase it but me. This is my page but I can't recall."51 I find that if the appellant has posted comments on Facebook then it is reasonable to expect him to take the opportunity to present such evidence to the RPD member. However, the appellant did not do so. I do not find the appellant has provided persuasive evidence to rebut the RPD member's findings. [42] The RPD member finds:52 [9] The principal claimant also testified that he posted comments on his Facebook page that were against the extension of power by the ruling militia. When he was asked to describe these comments, he stated that his comments indicated that the militia had done nothing useful for the country and there is no reason to extend their mandate. In terms of how many comments he posted on his Facebook page, he estimated they numbered in the tens, or under one hundred. The principal claimant maintained that some replies he received to his comments were favourable and some were not. When asked why he had not submitted his Facebook comments into evidence, he testified that he had not considered it. The principal claimant agreed at the hearing that I could print his Facebook page and enter it into evidence.53 [10] There were no politically-based comments posted by the principal claimant around the time of the XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014 sit-in or his flight from the country; there were not many postings at all. The principal claimant was asked to point to any comments on his Facebook page that demonstrate his opposition to the mandate extension of the militia's hold on power. He stated there were none and that perhaps they were erased. When asked if he had erased them, the principal claimant maintained that he understood that no one could erase them other than him, but he could not recall doing so. [43] After my review of all the evidence before the RPD and now the RAD, I have no reason to disagree with the RPD member. The RPD member notes:54 [11] The principal claimant's representative highlighted three posts from 2011 that were noteworthy. The interpreter at the hearing was able to translate them into English. One dated November 22, 2011 is a lengthy poem from a well-known Arabic poet. Another comment, dated November 19, 2011 may be translated as 'Praise be to God, the son of Kaddafi has been arrested.' In an October 11, 2011 comment the principal claimant expresses solidarity with the people of Syria in their revolution. [12] I do not find that any of these posts from 2011 are relevant to the threats the principal claimant alleges he received in 2014. The principal claimant did not allege that he received any threats on that basis. Moreover, when the claimant was explaining why he did not make a refugee claim in Turkey when he, his wife and one son travelled there in March 2013, he testified that there was no particular reason to make a claim in 2013. If these 2011 comments were provocative, one would reasonably expect a threat to materialize sooner than three years later. Given that the principal claimant did not deem it necessary to flee from Libya and make a refugee claim in Turkey in 2013, and he alleges no threats on this basis, I do not accept that these comments put the claimants at risk. [13] No other Facebook comments demonstrate that the principal claimant opposed the February 7 mandate extension. The principal claimant himself could not identify any. I do not accept that comments were erased by the principal claimant because he does not recall erasing them. It is reasonable to expect that the principal claimant would likely recall deleting any comments that put his life at risk, especially if they number in the tens. I therefore do not find that any of the principal claimant's Facebook comments provoked a threat to him and his family. An email in evidence from an individual who states, "I believe you said something against Fager Libya at Facebook [sic]"55 does not overcome this problem as the evidence demonstrates they are absent. I do not accept as credible that the principal claimant wrote and deleted any political Facebook comments as alleged. [44] Thus, firstly, I find the appellant has not provided persuasive arguments as to why the Facebook information was not before the RPD. Furthermore, I find the RPD member has assessed the Facebook page, after she brought it forward as evidence, and gave the opportunity to the appellant to find evidence that supports his testimony. The appellant was not able to provide corroborating evidence to support his allegations during this time. Therefore, I do not find the RPD member has erred in her assessment of lack of information in the appellant's Facebook page in finding the appellant to be not credible. New evidence [45] The appellants submitted a forensic report56 of the appellant's nephew's death. The appellant submits57 that his nephew was killed in Libya, and that this murder happened after the RPD hearing date. The appellant also submits that "his family is very outspoken about political views and the claimant's [appellant's] brother has made various strong comments that denounce the current situation in Libya and requests immediate change."58 However, I note that the forensic report states that the nephew died of a gunshot wound. There is no credible or persuasive evidence put forth that the murder was connected to the nephew's father's political views. As well, I do not find the appellants have adequately established that this murder is related to the appellant's brother's political profile or the appellants' alleged fear. Furthermore, through my own independent assessment of the evidence, I do not find the appellants have provided sufficient, credible, or trustworthy evidence that they have a connection to the nephew's murder as there is no persuasive evidence of why he was killed. CONCLUSION [46] For all these reasons, I confirm the RPD member's determination that the appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. REMEDY [47] For all these reasons, I confirm the determination of the RPD that the appellant, the associate appellant, and the minor appellants are neither Convention refugees or persons in need of protection as per paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act. The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Rena Dhir" June 28, 2017 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act"), S.C., 2001, c. 27. 2 Exhibit 2 and 5. 3 Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR), Basis of Claim Form. 4 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR). 5 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257, subparagraph 3(3)(g)(iii). 6 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 7 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 8 Exhibit 2, AR, p. 9-12. 9 Exhibit 2, AR, p. 13, p. 20-30, and Exhibit 5. 10 Exhibit 2, AR, p. 14-16. 11 Exhibit 2, AR, p. 17-19. 12 Exhibit 2, AR. 13 Exhibit 2, AR. 14 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 00:51:08. 15 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 00:51:42. 16 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 17 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Exhibits 4 and 5. 18 Subsection 110(6) of the Act. 19 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 20 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 21 Youkap v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 249. 22 Koffi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 4. 23 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 24 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 25 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93. 26 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 27 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 28 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 29 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 30 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 31 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 4, National Documentation Package (NDP), Libya, November 30, 3015, Item 2.2. 32 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 5, NDP, Item 1.10. 33 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 6, NDP, Items 2.1 and 2.3. 34 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 35 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 36 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 9, IRB Chairperson's Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Ottawa, Canada, March 1993, updated November 1996. 37 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 10, Exhibit 3, NDP, Item 1.13. 38 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 11, Exhibit 3, NDP, Item 1.10. 39 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 12, Exhibit 3, NDP, Item 1.10. 40 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 13, Exhibit 3, NDP, Item 1.10. 41 Exhibit 2. 42 Bhagat v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1088. 43 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 00:51:42. 44 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 01:14:00. 45 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 01:14:20. 46 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 00:50:38. 47 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 00:56:25. 48 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 01:10:52. 49 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 01:13:30. 50 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 01:13:32. 51 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-RPD Oral Hearing, 01:13:58. 52 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 53 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 2, Exhibit 6 and Exhibit 7. 54 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 55 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision, footnote 3, Exhibit 4, p 1. 56 Exhibit 2, AR, p. 9-12. 57 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 58 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB6-01258 / VB6-01259 / VB6-01260 VB6-01261 / VB6-01262 / VB6-01263 / VB6-01264