MB6-01516

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB6-01516 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision April 11, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Me Marie-Louise Côté Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Meryam Haddad Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), which rejected his refugee protection claim by determining that he is not a "Convention refugee" or a "person in need of protection" under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). [2] The appellant presented new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. He is requesting that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) hold a hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. [3] The appellant is asking the RAD to set aside the RPD determination, allow his claim for refugee protection and give any other directions that it considers appropriate. [4] The Minister did not intervene on appeal. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [5] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD allows the appeal, sets aside the RPD determination and substitutes a determination that, in its opinion, should have been rendered, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA. [6] The appeal is allowed. BACKGROUND [7] The following facts were entered into evidence by the RPD. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan and is originally from Peshawar, in Punjab. As well as owning an XXXX XXXX in Dubai, in the United Arab Emirates, where he worked for many years, the appellant also owns an XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Pakistan that XXXX XXXX XXXX. As such, he signed a contract to XXXX XXXX from Pakistan to Afghanistan for XXXX. He hired his brother to XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. [8] In XXXX 2015, Taliban members of the Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) group accused the appellant of working against their political interests and of being an infidel because of his association with a XXXX contractor. They ordered him to end his XXXX contract and to pay them XXXX XXXX rupees. In XXXX 2015, they killed his brother and destroyed his XXXX because he refused to comply with their orders. They then demanded a monthly payment of XXXX XXXX rupees and threatened to kill him anywhere in Pakistan and Dubai. A few days later, they went to look for him at his home. In his absence, they told his mother that a fatwa had been declared against him, and they left a letter threatening him. [9] Police officers went to his home the next day and told his mother that they knew that the Taliban had been there the day before. They accused the appellant of getting into trouble with the Taliban, whom they could not stop ("messed with these people who they could not stop"). The appellant then decided to leave Pakistan, which he did on XXXX XXXX, 2015, to come to Canada. He claimed refugee protection on or around November 24, 2015. IMPUGNED DECISION [10] On January 25, 2016, the RPD rejected the appellant's refugee protection claim in an oral decision. First of all, regarding the issue of credibility, the RPD stated that it had no reason to doubt the appellant's testimony given under oath, which it found to be credible and which is corroborated by the documentary evidence that he submitted. The RPD accepted that the appellant is a person of interest for the Taliban in his hometown. However, the RPD concluded that the appellant's interpretation of some facts is speculative: in this case, the alleged instrumentalization of the police officers and the pressure exerted on them by the Taliban in order to find the appellant. [11] Second, the RPD accepted that the appellant's fear is based on a Convention ground, namely that, as a result of his association with a XXXX contractor, he was labelled by the Taliban as an infidel who is working against their political interests in Pakistan. [12] Third, the RPD concluded that there is an internal flight alternative (IFA) in Lahore or Faisalabad and that it would not be unreasonable for the appellant to relocate to these two proposed locations. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS [13] The appellant argues that the RPD erred in concluding that his interpretation of the facts regarding the police officers' collaboration with the Taliban is speculative. The appellant also maintains that the RPD's analysis regarding the IFA in Pakistan is erroneous. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE [14] The RPD determination was rendered orally at the conclusion of the hearing held on January 25, 2016. [15] The appellant is requesting that the RAD admit new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. It is an article that appeared in the newspaper Le Figaro on March 28, 2016. The article is entitled "Le Pakistan fait face à des islamistes qu'il ne contrôle plus" [Pakistan is dealing with Islamists whom it no longer controls].1 [16] The admissibility of new evidence before the RAD is based on subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and jurisprudential tests. [17] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present to the RAD only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [18] In Singh,2 the Federal Court of Appeal emphasizes the need to narrowly interpret subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. It indicates that the explicit conditions set out therein have to be met and leave no room for discretion on the part of the RAD. Moreover, the implied conditions of admissibility identified in Raza are also applicable, subject to certain adaptations, specifically credibility, relevance and newness.3 However, the Court adds that the RAD always has the freedom to apply the conditions of subsection 110(4) with more or less flexibility depending on the circumstances of the case.4 [19] In this case, the appellant argues in his memorandum of appeal that the article that appeared in the newspaper Le Figaro on March 28, 2016, indicates that the Taliban from Tehrik-e-Taliban from his region claimed responsibility for the deadly attack in Lahore on March 27, 2016. The appellant argues that this demonstrates that this group is also present in Punjab. [20] I am of the opinion that the newspaper article in Le Figaro is evidence that arose after the refugee protection claim was rejected, since the attack in question happened after January 25, 2016. [21] At first glance, the article appears to be credible since it comes from a well-known journalistic source, namely, the Le Figaro newspaper. It appears relevant, considering that the presence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban group in Lahore is a factor that the RPD considered in its assessment of an IFA in Lahore.5 This article also meets the criterion of newness. [22] For these reasons, the newspaper article from Le Figaro is admitted into evidence under A-1 since it meets the explicit conditions set out under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION HEARING [23] The appellant is requesting that a hearing be held under subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, but he does not present any argument to support his request.6 His memorandum of appeal does not meet the requirements of paragraph 3(3)(g)(v) of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules in that it does not include full and detailed submissions regarding why the Division should hold a hearing under subsection 110(6) of the Act. [24] Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA states that the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is new evidence that is admissible and meets the three conditions listed.7 The new evidence must: * raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; * be central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and * if accepted, justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [25] Furthermore, the RAD is not required to hold a hearing merely because it is admitting new evidence.8 [26] In this case, I find that there is no cause to hold a hearing because the article that appeared in Le Figaro deals with the presence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban group in Lahore, which does not raise a serious issue with respect to the appellant's credibility. [27] For these reasons, the request to hold a hearing before the RAD is rejected. SCOPE OF THE APPEAL [28] Subsection 111(1) of the IRPA sets out that the RAD may confirm the determination of the RPD, set it aside and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, or refer the matter to the RPD, giving the directions to the RPD that it considers appropriate. [29] The IRPA does not set out the standard of intervention that the RAD must apply when reviewing RPD decisions. [30] In his memorandum, the appellant submits that the standard of review that the RAD must apply is that of correctness, since his credibility was never an issue for the RPD. Consequently, the RAD must not show any deference to the RPD decision.9 The appellant argues that the RPD's analysis of the IFA is not correct. [31] In light of the Federal Court of Appeal's decision in Huruglica,10 I find that the RAD must truly act as an appeal tribunal and conduct its own analysis of the case in order to determine whether the RPD actually erred as alleged. It is a matter of conducting, in substance, a reasoned, thorough, comprehensive and independent review.11 [32] The RAD must apply the correctness standard when reviewing RPD decisions concerning findings of law, fact or mixed fact and law when the credibility of oral testimony is not at issue. [33] It must determine in each case the degree of deference owed to the findings of fact or mixed fact and law that are based on the credibility of the oral testimony by determining whether the RPD had a meaningful advantage. [34] In this case, I will show some deference to the RPD's findings if I find that it had a meaningful advantage in the assessment of the appellant's testimony. ANALYSIS [35] Like the RPD, I believe that the facts that form the basis of this refugee protection claim require an analysis under section 96 of the IRPA. I agree with the RPD that the appellant's fear is based on a Convention ground, namely, imputed political opinion, since as a result of his association with a XXXX contractor, the Taliban labelled him as an infidel who is working against their political interests in Pakistan. [36] Having reviewed the entire RPD record and appeal record, I agree with the RPD regarding the appellant's overall credibility. I adopt the RPD's findings because I find that there is no reason to doubt the truthfulness of the appellant's testimony, which he delivered under oath and which is corroborated by the documentary evidence. [37] This appeal raises the following two questions: * Did the RPD err in concluding that the appellant's interpretation of the facts is speculative regarding the police's collaboration with the Taliban? * Did the RPD err in concluding that there is an IFA in Pakistan? I. DID THE REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE APPELLANT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE FACTS IS SPECULATIVE REGARDING THE POLICE'S COLLABORATION WITH THE TALIBAN? [38] The RPD concluded that the appellant's interpretation of certain facts was speculative, namely, the alleged instrumentalization of the police officers and the pressure exerted on them by the Taliban in order to find him. Therefore, the RPD did not believe that the police officers' visit to his home on XXXX XXXX, 2015, was connected to any pressure exerted upon them by the Taliban in order to find the appellant. The RPD was of the opinion that it is reasonable to suppose that, if necessary, the police would take all the available measures required to find the appellant, such as issuing an arrest warrant or a "first information report." Since there is no arrest warrant or "first information report," and having noted that the appellant's name does not appear on a wanted persons list, the RPD found the police officers' behaviour to be inconsistent with the allegation that the Taliban is forcing them to collaborate with them in order to find the appellant. [39] The appellant argued that the XXXX XXXX, 2015, incident is why he left Pakistan and came to Canada to claim refugee protection. He alleged that four men visited the family home on XXXX XXXX, 2015, to look for him, and they left a threatening letter for him. The next day, the police officers came to the house and asked to see him. After his mother told them that the Taliban had been to the house the day before, the police officers told her that they were well aware of this and wanted to know why her son had "messed up with them. Now we cannot stop these people." This is also mentioned in his written account in his Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form). [40] Unlike the RPD, I am of the opinion that the appellant's explanation is not speculation. The fact that the police officers were aware that the Taliban had been to the appellant's home on XXXX XXXX, 2015, without having been alerted by anyone is pertinent in establishing that the police collaborated with the Taliban in one way or another. I also think that, instead of trying to protect the appellant, the police officers accused him of getting into trouble with the Taliban by stating that they were unable to stop them. This makes it possible to doubt the police officers' good faith, particularly since they never followed up on the "First information report" complaint that the appellant filed at the local police station on XXXX XXXX, 2015, after the Taliban threatened to kill him.12 [41] What is certain is that the evidence demonstrates that the police did not offer the appellant any protection. Furthermore, the fact that they continue to go to his home for no reason supports the appellant's fears about them, as is indicated in the letter from his lawyer in Pakistan, which the RPD did not take into account. The letter states that, on XXXX XXXX, 2015, the appellant mandated a lawyer to go to the police station to attempt to find out why the police kept going to his home.13 The lawyer writes the following: As mandated by my client I presented myself at the police station where I spoke to the officer on duty who informed me that there was no case registered against my client yet the police would like to investigate him in connection with a complaint. When I asked for the nature and details of the complaint he asked me to present my client at the station first. Upon my insistence he told me that the complaint was of religious nature, which is already known to the family of my client. Upon this I gathered that the police were in collusion with the complaint either through bribes of political influence, which is very common in our country. It is very unfortunate to say that the police in our country are non-co-operative and the practice of torture is rampant. In order to extract confession, the police subject detainees to torture and inhuman treatment where many of them die in police custody. [42] For those reasons, I believe that the RPD erred when it concluded that the appellant's interpretation of the facts is speculative regarding the police's collaboration with the Taliban because it failed to examine all the relevant evidence. II. DID THE REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS AN INTERNAL FLIGHT ALTERNATIVE IN PAKISTAN? [43] The case law indicates that the onus is on the appellant to demonstrate that it would be unreasonable for him to seek refuge in another part of his country before asking for protection from the international community.14 [44] The assessment of whether or not an IFA exists is a two-pronged test.15 First of all, one must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility that the appellant would be persecuted in the part of the country in which the RPD finds that an IFA exists, and that he would not be personally subjected to a risk to his life, to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to a danger of torture in the IFA. Then, the conditions in that part of the country must be such that it would be unreasonable for the appellant, in light of all the circumstances, to find refuge there. [45] In this case, the possibility of an IFA in Lahore or Faisalabad was raised at the hearing. These two cities are located in the province of Punjab. [46] As for the first prong of the IFA, the RPD concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Taliban has any interest in actively pursuing him in Lahore or Faisalabad, for the following reasons: * Given that he stopped working for XXXX, the appellant did not demonstrate that he presents a threat for the Taliban since, according to the documentary evidence, their objective is to overthrow the Pakistani government. * Given that the documentary evidence describes the Taliban as an alliance of extremist groups that do not constitute a unified force and is made up of more or less autonomous factions throughout the country, the appellant did not demonstrate that the Taliban in Peshawar have the interest or the means to mobilize forces throughout the country to track him down. This is a very unstructured, heterogeneous organization that is inclined to splinter. * The city of Lahore is not one of the areas where the Taliban are active since the documentary evidence indicates that they operate mostly in Peshawar, and in certain districts in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and in Balochistan. * There is not a very serious possibility that the Taliban would track the appellant across the country since he does not have the profile of their principal targets, namely political or tribal leaders, security forces, military personnel and members of religious minorities. * According to the documentary evidence, the Taliban does not track individuals across the country in order to kill them unless they are captured soldiers or people suspected of espionage, which is not the case for the appellant. [47] Furthermore, the RPD concluded that the appellant did not demonstrate that the police would use the tenant registration system in Lahore or Faisalabad, if applicable, to inform the Peshawar Taliban as to his whereabouts. [48] Having reviewed the entire record and considered the appeal memorandum, I am of the opinion that the appellant demonstrated that the RPD decision contains a number of serious errors. I will deal only with what I consider to be the most determinative errors in the analysis of the first prong of the IFA, which I consider sufficient to allow the appeal. The appellant's profile and threats from the Taliban [49] The appellant argues that the RPD erred in concluding that he is not a person of interest for the Taliban because, in its analysis of the IFA, the RPD failed to consider the threatening letter that identified him as a target for the Taliban, regardless of whether he is in Dubai or anywhere else that he might be living. This supporting documentation establishes that he is of interest to the Taliban throughout Pakistan and even as far as Dubai. [50] The appellant maintains that it is illogical for the RPD to accept the allegation that he is a person of interest for the Taliban in his hometown because his association with XXXX as a contractor marked him as an infidel who is working against the Taliban's political interests in Pakistan, and to conclude that he cannot be a target for them because he does not fit the profile. The threatening letter that was sent to him is evidence that he is of interest to the Taliban. [51] The appellant maintains that, according to the documentary evidence cited by the RPD, it is true that one of the Taliban's objectives is to overthrow the Pakistani government. However, another document in the National Documentation Package (NDP)on Pakistan, under Tab 7.8, also states that the Taliban's ultimate objective is to create an Islamic emirate governed by their fundamentalist interpretation of Shariah law. [52] In my opinion, the RPD erred when it concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that the Taliban has an interest in actively pursuing him, because this conclusion does not take into account all the relevant evidence related to the appellant's particular profile, the threats made against him, and the Taliban's objectives. I will explain. [53] The RPD acknowledged that the appellant owned a XXXX XXXX that was used to XXXX XXXX XXXX from Pakistan to Afghanistan for XXXX XXXX The RPD acknowledged that the Taliban killed the appellant's brother, who was XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and that they destroyed the XXXX after ordering the appellant to stop collaborating with XXXX. [54] The objective evidence indicates that the Taliban's objectives include fighting NATO forces in Afghanistan, which corroborates the appellant's allegations. The following is an excerpt from Tab 1.6 of the NDP:16 2.2.2 In December 2007, about 13 different militant groups joined together under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban. The group is predominantly Pashtun and represents membership from alls even agencies of the federally Administered Tribal Area's (FATA). The TTP has declared jihad against the Pakistani state, seeks to control territory, enforces sharia law, and fights NATO forces in Afghanistan. Its current leader is Mullah Fazlullah. There are no reliable estimates on the size of the Pakistani Taliban." (the RAD's emphasis) [55] Response to Information Request PAK104907.E under Tab 7.8 of the NDP, dated July 3, 2014, indicates that the TTP is also motivated by its anti-American sentiments and that it attacks foreign interests in Pakistan and outside of Pakistan because of its alliances with other countries.17 Furthermore, newspaper articles submitted by the appellant report frequent Taliban attacks against the trucks transporting oil for foreign armed forces in Afghanistan, prior to the withdrawal of NATO armed forces.18 [56] The RPD was of the opinion that the appellant is no longer a Taliban target because he stopped working for XXXX. I believe that this conclusion misinterprets the threats. The testimonial evidence and the documentary evidence found credible by the RPD demonstrates that the Taliban continued to threaten the appellant and to search for him after his XXXX XXXX was destroyed and he stopped working for XXXX, on or around XXXX XXXX, 2015. In fact, the RPD did not discount the appellant's allegations that the Taliban demanded that he pay them XXXX XXXX rupees a month and threatened to kill him anywhere in Pakistan or Dubai. They then went to his home to look for him. In his absence, they told his mother that a fatwa had been issued against him, and they left a threatening letter for him. [57] The threatening letter from the Taliban dated XXXX XXXX, 2015, was found credible by the RPD. It must be noted that it is dated after the XXXX XXXX was destroyed. This letter from the TTP orders all Muslims to kill the appellant in Dubai or anywhere else that he might be living.19 The TTP accuses the appellant of being an infidel who must be killed: It is to inform to all Muslims by this notice that any Muslims who being Muslim figure serves to infidels and offers his services to infidels must get death penalty. By doing so you will get the rewards of going into heaven from Allah. Amongst that kind of hypobaric Muslims there is such person namely XXXX XXXX from Pesahwar s/o XXXX. Therefore, by this notice it is informed to all True Muslims that they must kill this person where eve they find him either in Dubai or anywhere he lives or it is to curse him as well that he will be punished by God himself.20 [58] This evidence reveals that the appellant is still a Taliban target, despite the fact that he stopped working for XXXX. The threats and fatwa issued against him by the Taliban indicate that they threatened to kill him because he worked for XXXX. It is clear that the appellant is personally targeted. [59] In my opinion, the appellant demonstrated that he is facing a serious possibility of persecution by the Taliban because of his particular profile, despite the fact that he stopped working for XXXX. Unlike the RPD, I believe that he has demonstrated that the Taliban would be willing to actively pursue him outside of his hometown since his profile clearly makes him the target of threats.21 [60] The RPD's erroneous conclusion regarding the Taliban's interest in the appellant is determinative in the analysis of the IFA, since the assessment of the Taliban's ability to find the appellant in Lahore or Faisalabad must take into account his particular profile and the nature of the threats that were made against him. [61] I refer to the document under Tab 1.6 of the NDP:22 1.3.1. Simply living in an area occupied, either wholly or partly, by the Pakistani Taliban or other militant group does not give rise to a protection need. In general the risks from the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups will depend on the particular profile of the person, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend." (the RAD's emphasis) Standard of proof [62] The appellant argues that the RPD used the wrong burden of proof for the IFA, since the RPD mentions the term "very serious possibility" (the French translation for which is "très sérieuse possibilité"). He maintains that the claimant must actually demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that he would not face a serious risk of persecution in Lahore. Therefore, it is a serious possibility and not a very serious possibility. [63] I agree with the appellant. I am of the opinion that the RPD erred when it concluded that there was not a "very serious possibility" that the Taliban would pursue the appellant across the country. The member stated the following: ... That too leads me to conclude that it is not impossible that they will set out and look for you throughout the country, but it is not a very serious possibility. You are not typically someone who is their main focus.23 [64] The applicable standard of proof for refugee protection claims is that there is a "reasonable" possibility or a "serious possibility" that the refugee protection claimant would be persecuted if he were to return to his country of origin.24 Presence of Taliban in Lahore and Faisalabad [65] The appellant argues that, according to the document under Tab 7.8 of the NDP, the TTP has expanded into other areas of the country and has forged alliances with factions that operate as far away as Punjab province. Since Lahore is the capital of Punjab, this evidence contradicts the RPD's conclusion that the city is not an area that is at risk from the Taliban. [66] I am of the opinion that the RPD did not take into account all the documentary evidence that demonstrates that the Taliban is present in numerous cities in the province of Punjab, including Lahore and Faisalabad. [67] According to the document under Tab 1.6 of the NDP, which is cited by the RPD, the Taliban also operate outside of the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan. In particular, it talks about an attack that took place in June 2014 in Karachi, which is situated in the province of Sindh.25 [68] According to the document under Tab 7.8 of the NDP, the TTP has already conducted an attack in Faisalabad, one of the two cities identified as an IFA for the appellant.26 [69] The press articles submitted to the RPD by the appellant state that the Taliban set off bombs in the district of Shikarpur and in Karachi in Sindh province, as well as in Lahore and Islamabad.27 [70] Furthermore, the article that appeared in Le Figaro on March 28, 2016, and that was admitted under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA notes that the TTP claimed responsibility for the deadly attack in Lahore on March 27, 2016.28 The appellant maintains that this demonstrates that the group is also active in Punjab. [71] Consequently, I am of the opinion that the RPD did not consider all the objective documentary evidence regarding the presence of the TTP in Lahore and Faisalabad. [72] For all these reasons, I consider that the RPD's decision is erroneous. SUBSTITUTION OF THE DETERMINATION [73] In this case, I am able to substitute a determination that, in my opinion, should have been made by the RPD for the following reasons. Having reviewed the entire record and listened to the appellant's testimony on the audio recording of the RPD hearing, I find that the appellant's credibility has been established. Contrary to the RPD, I find that his testimony delivered under oath and his written account in the BOC Form are credible and are corroborated by the documents that he submitted. [74] The appellant demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that he faces a serious possibility of persecution by the TTP Taliban because of his membership in a particular social group, namely, people who have XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Afghanistan. As previously mentioned, the appellant demonstrated that he is personally targeted by the Taliban, even though he is no longer able to use his XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX for XXXX since they destroyed it. [75] The appellant rebutted the presumption of state protection since the police did not follow up in any way on the complaint that he filed as a result of the threats from the Taliban.29 Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that the police went to his home on a number of occasions to look for him-for no apparent reason, other than in response to orders from the Taliban. This evidence supports his contention that the police are obliged to collaborate with the Taliban in helping them find the appellant. [76] As for the possibility of an IFA, it appears from the documentary evidence that the Taliban have a strong presence in cities such as Lahore and Faisalabad in Punjab. In addition to the documentary evidence that I referred to in paragraphs 65 to 70 of this decision, there is the most recent objective evidence that I consulted in the NDP of March 31, 2017. For example, the Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, under Tab 2.1 of the NDP, states in particular that there are reports of TTP activities throughout Pakistan, including a number of suicide and bomb attacks, as demonstrated in the following excerpt: Militant and terrorist activity continued, and there were numerous suicide and bomb attacks in all four provinces and FATA. Militant and terrorist groups, including the TTP, targeted civilians, journalists, community leaders, security forces, law enforcement agents, and schools, killing hundreds and injuring thousands with bombs, suicide attacks, and other forms of violence. Militant and terrorist groups often attacked religious minorities....30 [77] I am of the opinion that the appellant has demonstrated that there is a serious possibility that the Taliban might be able to find him in Lahore or Faisalabad for the following reasons. Since the existence of an IFA is largely dependent on the facts, I took into account the appellant's particular profile and the nature of the threats made against him by the Taliban. [78] I retain from the evidence that the appellant is a Taliban target and that they are motivated to pursue him outside of his hometown of Peshawar. The threatening letter from the Taliban, which was submitted as evidence, is very probative in this respect as it calls on all Muslims to kill the appellant wherever he might be living, including Dubai.31 The fact that the appellant's brother, who XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, was himself killed in Afghanistan supports the conclusion that the Taliban can carry out their threats beyond where the appellant lives. [79] In this case, it is plausible that the Taliban could find the appellant in Lahore or Faisalabad through the process by which landlords register their tenants with the police. In fact, it is probable that the police in his new area of residence could be informed of the appellant's presence by the owner of the building where he might want to live. The local police would, in turn, have to communicate his whereabouts to the police in Peshawar. At first glance, it could be assumed that the appellant would not be of any interest to the police in his hometown since he is neither a criminal nor a terrorist. However, the appellant explained during his testimony that he could be of interest to the police in Peshawar because he previously filed a complaint against the Taliban32 and they are forcing the police to help them find him. [80] In the circumstances, this explanation appears reasonable to me since the evidence demonstrates that police officers came to get the appellant at his home on a number of occasions, although no charge had been laid against him.33 Furthermore, the fact that, on XXXX XXXX, 2015, the police knew that the Taliban had been there the day before, and even reproached him for it, leads me to believe that the police are collaborating with the Taliban. [81] For all these reasons, I am of the opinion that the appellant has discharged his burden regarding the first prong of the IFA since he demonstrated that he faces a serious possibility of persecution in Lahore and Faisalabad. CONCLUSION [82] For these reasons, I set aside the RPD's determination and substitute the determination that, in my opinion, should have been made, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA. [83] The appeal is allowed. Marie-Louise Côté Me Marie-Louise Côté April 11, 2017 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Appellant's record, page 19. 2 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Parminder Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 3 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385. 4 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Parminder Singh, 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 64. 5 Refugee Protection Division (RPD) reasons and decision, page 9 of the RPD record, paragraph 2 of the reasons. 6 Appellant's record, pages 18 and 23 to 36. 7 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Parminder Singh, 2016 FCA 96, paragraph 51. 8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Parminder Singh, 2016 FCA 96. 9 Appellant's memorandum, paragraphs 2.2 to 2.6. 10 Minister of Citizenship and Immigration v. Huruglica, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93. 11 Ahi v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, F.C., 2016 FC 1028. Gabila v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2016 FC 574. 12 RPD record, page 253. 13 Ibidem, page 262. 14 Momodu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 1365, par. 6. 15 Thirunavukkarasu v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1993] F.C.J. 1172, [1994] 1 FC 589 (F.C.A.); Rasaratnam v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1991] F.C.J. 1256, [1992] 1 FC 706, 140 N.R. 138 (F.C.A.). 16 National Documentation Package on Pakistan, July 17, 2015, Tab 1.6: United Kingdom. Home Office. Country Information and Guidance. Pakistan: Fear of the Taliban and Other Militant Groups. July 16, 2014. 17 Ibidem, Tab 7.8: PAK104907.E, dated July 3, 2014. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). 18 RPD record, pages 219 to 236. 19 RPD record, pages 256 and 257. 20 Idem. 21 Qaddafi v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2016 FC 629. 22 National Documentation Package on Pakistan, July 17, 2015, Tab 1.6: United Kingdom. Home Office. Country Information and Guidance. Pakistan: Fear of the Taliban and Other Militant Groups. July 16, 2014. 23 RPD reasons and decision, page 9 of the RPD record, paragraph 3. 24 Adjei v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] 2 F.C. 680 (C.A.), at 683. 25 National Documentation Package on Pakistan, July 17, 2015, Tab 1.6: United Kingdom. Home Office. Country Information and Guidance. Pakistan: Fear of the Taliban and Other Militant Groups. July 16, 2014, paragraphs 1.3.2 and 2.2.5. 26 Ibidem, Tab 7.8: PAK104907.E, dated July 3, 2014. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), page 6. 27 RPD record, pages 227, 291 and 299. 28 Appellant's record, page 19. 29 RPD record, page 253. 30 National Documentation Package on Pakistan, March 31, 2017, Tab 2.1: Pakistan. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016. United States. Department of State. March 3, 2017, pages 19 and 20. 31 RPD record, pages 256 and 257. 32 Ibidem, page 253. 33 RPD record, page 262, letter from his lawyer in Pakistan. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB6-01516 19 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français