TB5-02793

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-02793 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision June 03, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Lesley Mason Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Kingsley I Jesuorobo Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (Appellant), a citizen of Kenya, is appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant is requesting, pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the IRPA, that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside and substitute the negative determination with a positive determination or in the alternative, pursuant to s. 111(1)(c) of the IRPA, that the matter be referred back to a different member of the RPD for re-determination. The Appellant submits no new evidence nor does she request an oral hearing pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to ss. 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection and dismisses the appeal. Background [3] The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2008 to commence studies at the College of XXXX XXXX in British Colombia. She graduated in XXXX 2012 with a Diploma in Business Administration. Due to lack of finances to commence studies at university, the Appellant applied for a post-graduate work permit. [4] In XXXX 2014, the Appellant learned that her father had made arrangements for her to marry a man in Kenya. The Appellant informed her father that she was not practising her Muslim faith and that she was considering converting to the Christian faith. She informed her father further that her heart and faith lies in the place of freedom to worship and not to be forced to marry. The Appellant's father told her that she was a disgrace to her family and to the community. [5] The Appellant made a sur place claim on November 26, 2014. [6] The Appellant had a refugee determination hearing on February 10, 2015. In an oral decision issued the same day, the RPD rejected the claim. The RPD member found that the determinative issues were credibility and a viable internal flight alternative (IFA). [7] The Appellant in her appeal submits that the panel's decision is replete with errors of law and fact. Role of the RAD [8] The Federal Court decision in Huruglica1 has provided the RAD with guidance with respect to the role of the RAD. In this decision, Justice Phelan states: 54. Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. 55. In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error."2 [9] Accordingly, the RAD has applied the reasoning as set out in Huruglica3 in its decision. ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE [10] The RAD focused on one issue in assessing this Appeal: Was there sufficient evidence on the record to support the RPD's negative credibility findings? [11] The RAD found that it was not necessary to consider an internal flight alternative. The Appellant's testimony regarding the arranged marriage and her subsequent fears [12] The Appellant in her pleadings referred to a particular paragraph in the RPD member's decision and then argued that the member failed to satisfy its obligation to make a clear and unmistakable finding that the Appellant is or is not credible and to give real reasons for its finding. [13] In her decision the RPD member found that the Appellant failed to provide any specific details or documentary proof about the man the Appellant is alleged to have to marry and about any wedding plans. The RPD stated that the Appellant had testified that she did not know the man too well and did not know much about him. The RPD member found that there was no indication that the prospective groom had ever threatened the Appellant or her family. The member found it more important that the Appellant had acknowledged that she could refuse to marry this man and it was her personal choice whether to marry him. The RPD member also noted that the Appellant had testified that she had never had previous problems with her father and that her mother supports her. [14] The RAD is persuaded by the Appellant's argument. The RPD member, in this instance, has repeated some of the Appellant's testimony and also found that the Appellant failed to provide certain documentary evidence. However, the member provided no clear finding with respect to the Appellant's credibility. [15] With regards to the lack of documentary evidence of the prospective groom or wedding plans, the RAD notes that, during her hearing before the RPD, the Appellant was not asked about such evidence. In any case, the RAD believes that a Kenyan woman in a situation of a forced marriage might, in all probability, not be privy to such information. The independent documentary evidence provides sufficient information regarding the status of women in Kenya. For example, the latest Operational Guidance Note from the United Kingdom (UK) indicates that Kenyan law prohibits gender-based discrimination, and the new constitution strengthens requirements for gender equality. However, traditional practices continue to restrict women's rights.4 The latest Department of State (DOS) report indicates that discrimination against women continues to be one of numerous human rights abuses found in Kenya.5 Despite the law with provides for equal rights for men and women, women experienced a wide range of discrimination in matrimonial rights, property ownership, and inheritance rights.6 The RAD, therefore, draws no negative inference for the lack of documentary evidence regarding a prospective groom or wedding plans. [16] The RAD appreciates that the Appellant testified that she had a personal choice in her marriage, however, the RPD member did not ask the Appellant what the consequences of choosing to refuse an arrange marriage could be. It was counsel who asked the Appellant to explain the consequences of refusing to marry. The Appellant then testified that there would be frustration and she would be excluded from the community because of her religious conversion and because she had disobeyed her father. The RAD, therefore, draws no negative inference as a result of the Appellant testified that she could choose not to marry. [17] Having listened to the recording of the hearing, the RAD notes that the Appellant testified that her father had never abused her and that her mother supported her choice not to marry. However, a decision in a refugee claim is to be forward looking. The fact that a person has not been harmed by a particular person in the past does not preclude possible harm in the future at the hands of that person. In addition, given the status of women in Kenya, the fact that the Appellant's mother supports her is not evidence that the Appellant would be free of harm in her refusal to marry. The RAD, thus, draws no negative inference as a result of the Appellant's testimony in this instance. [18] The Appellant also referred to another specific paragraph in the RPD member's decision and argued that the panel had misconstrued and misunderstood the evidence when she inferred that the Appellant would come to no physical harm because the Appellant's sister has come to no physical harm. The Appellant argues that the significant omission in the panel's finding is that there is no evidence that the Appellant's sister converted to the Christian faith. [19] In her decision, the RPD member stated that the Appellant had testified that her siblings, who have had disputes with the Appellant's father, have moved on with no physical harm coming to them. The member stated that the Appellant had testified that her sister, who married a Christian, was not threatened or harmed. [20] Although the RPD member made no finding in this particular paragraph of her decision, the RAD agrees with the Appellant that there is the inference that the Appellant would, like her sister, not be harmed as a result of religious issues. The recording of the hearing indicates that the Appellant testified that her sister married a Christian but did not, herself, convert to the Christian faith. The Appellant also testified that her sister is estranged from her father and lives in Nairobi with her husband and has no problems as a result of her interfaith marriage. The RAD has considered the independent documentary evidence. According to the International Religious Freedom Report of 20137 there were reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief or practice. During the year some Muslims threatened with violence or death individuals, particularly ethnic Somalis, who converted from Islam.8 The RAD, therefore, finds while it is possible that a Muslim in an interfaith marriage might avoid problems; a person who converted from the Muslim faith is more at risk of harm. [21] In assessing the credibility of the evidence in this appeal, the RAD kept in mind the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Maldonado,9 wherein the Court stated, in part, that "when a claimant swears to the truth of certain allegations, this creates a presumption that those allegations are true unless there be reason to doubt their truthfulness." Although there were no obvious contradictions between the Appellant's oral testimony before the RPD regarding her arranged marriage and information found in her Basis of Claim (BOC) form narrative,10 the RAD finds that the Appellant failed to advance her claim with evidence that is credible. The RAD is aware that none of the credibility concerns raised below may be sufficient, each on its own, to negate this claim. However, the cumulative effect of all of them is that the RAD does not have sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence upon which to base a determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. As the court of appeal in Sheikh,11 MacGuigan, J.A. held: ... even without disbelieving every word [a claimant] has uttered, a ... panel may reasonably find him so lacking in credibility that it concludes that there is no credible evidence relevant to his claim ... In other words, a general finding of a lack of credibility on the part of the applicant may conceivably extend to all relevant information emanating from his testimony. The Appellant's religious conversion [22] The Appellant argues that the RPD member drew an unreasonable and overarching conclusion in determining that her testimony with regards to her religious conversion was vague. The Appellant argues further that during the hearing she clearly expressed her personal religious preference and that for the RPD member to insinuate that she needed to say more or mandate a further explanation from her is a veiled imposition of a preference by the member. The Appellant submitted that the issue of faith and an individual's approach to it cannot be subjected to microscopic examination. The Appellant submits further that she provided objective evidence that undoubtedly establishes that she has become a Christian. [23] In her oral decision the RPD member found that the Appellant's vague testimony regarding why she changed religions added to the member's concerns regarding the credibility of the Appellant's allegations. The RPD member indicated in her decision that she had reviewed the evidence in its entirety. However, she made no specific findings with regards to the documentary evidence the Appellant provided to support her allegations of conversion to the Christian faith. [24] In reviewing all of the evidence, including the recording of the hearing, the RAD finds it is in agreement with the RPD member's findings. The RAD's reasons follow. [25] The recording of the hearing indicates that the Appellant testified that she converted to the Christian religion in XXXX 2014. The RAD found the Appellant's testimony appeared at times rehearsed and at other times unconvincing and vague. For example, the RAD finds the Appellant's first response, when asked why she had converted, to be lacking in any detail; the Appellant testified that she just found in her head that she needed to worship god in a different way and now she needed to be a Christian. The RPD member then prompted the Appellant by asking her why she chose the Christian religion. The Appellant testified that was just her faith. The RAD found the Appellant's further testimony appeared rehearsed. She testified that on a particular day she chose Jesus as her personal saviour after a man of god was preaching to her; she explained that she then said she needed a new life and decided to be a Christian. The RPD member then asked the Appellant what it was about the Muslim religion she needed to reject. The Appellant's various responses continued to be vague. The Appellant testified that there are different ways of worship and the way the Muslim community treats other religions. When the Appellant was asked to explain what she meant by the different ways of worship between Muslims and Christians, the Appellant repeated her testimony. She testified that the way Muslims and Christians worship is different and the Appellant then added that the way Muslims and Christians carry themselves is different. Given that the Appellant's first language is English and that she has a college diploma issued to her in Canada, the RAD believes that the Appellant is capable of expressing her views and beliefs in a coherent manner. In light of the Appellant's testimony, which the RAD found to be unconvincing and lacking in sufficient clarity, the RAD finds the Appellant's credibility undermined. [26] The RAD considered the various documents the Appellant provided as evidence of her Christian faith. [27] The Appellant provided a letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX XXXX, 2014, on letterhead of the XXXX XXXX XXXX, London, Ontario.12 The RAD gives this letter little evidentiary weight for the following reasons. The letter appears to be a form letter sent to persons who have attended the church on one occasion. In the letter, XXXX XXXX XXXX is thanking the Appellant for attending his church the Sunday prior to the date of the issuance of the letter and XXXX XXXX XXXX expresses the hope that the Appellant will return to worship at the church again. There is no information that the Appellant was attending the church on a regular basis. The letter provides no evidence of a conversion to the Christian faith on the part of the Appellant. [28] The Appellant provided two XXXX XXXX XXXX weekly service programmes, dated XXXX XXXX, 2015 and XXXX XXXX, 2014.13 The RAD gives these documents no evidentiary weight since they provide no evidence of the Appellant's membership in the Christian faith. [29] The Appellant provided a 21 page, six-part study package entitled Believer's Baptism.14 The RAD gives little evidentiary weight to this document for the reasons that follow. Each 'Study' has blank lines where, presumably, the person preparing for baptism completes the required information; none of this information has been filled in. The RAD appreciates that there is a signature on the final page which appears to be that of the Appellant, dated XXXX XXXX, 2014. The page following the document has a hand written note "6:15 bathing suit and towel, 6:30 p.m.-service".15 However, other documentation involving baptism is noticeably absent. The RAD expects a programme of the baptismal service would have been available given that the church provides a multiple-page programme for each Sunday service. The Appellant did not provide a baptismal certificate. [30] The Appellant provided a letter from XXXX XXXX, dated XXXX 2015.16 For the following reasons the RAD gives the letter little evidentiary weight. The letter is not affirmed and identification of the letter's author is not provided. Ms. XXXX states that the Appellant became a member of the XXXX XXXX XXXX since she met her in XXXX 2014. Ms. XXXX states that the Appellant was baptized on XXXX XXXX, 2014. As stated in the previous paragraph, the Appellant provided no persuasive evidence that she was baptized. The letter from Ms. XXXX can only attest to the Appellant's participation in church activities in Canada; the letter does not attest to the motivations of the Appellant. Letters from the Appellant's family members [31] The Appellant argues that the letters from her sister and mother were unreasonably impugned by the RPD member. [32] The RPD member had credibility concerns with these documents. The member noted that neither letter named the Appellant; neither of the two authors of the letters was named in full nor were their identity documents provided. The RPD member did not find the Appellant's explanation as to why there letters were sent to be plausible. [33] The RAD has considered the original two letters17 provided as evidence as well as the Appellant's testimony regarding why the letters were sent to her. As a result, the RAD agrees with the RPD's findings in this regard. [34] The RAD gives little evidentiary weight to the letter from the Appellant's sister18 for the following reasons. As the RPD member noted, the letter is not affirmed, the letter writer's identity is not provided and the Appellant is not identified in the letter. Although the letter is informal, the RAD has concerns with the format. For example, the salutation of the letter is "Dearest siz". However, "Dearest" is written on one line and the word "siz" is written on the line below, indented, and in a different ink. The RAD also notes that the signature of the author is "Your loving sis", [unreadable signature]. The RAD finds it unreasonable that the author of the letter referred to her sister as "siz" and then later herself as "sis". [35] The recording of the hearing indicates that the Appellant testified that her sister informed her in a letter about the man her father has arranged for her to marry. She testified further that she then called her sister and her sister explained everything. Later in the hearing, the RPD member asked the Appellant why her sister had sent the letter with information about the man to whom she is to be wed. The Appellant testified that she and her sister had talked on Facebook but her sister decided for security reasons to send the information via the postal service. The Appellant explained that her sister feared that someone might hack into her account on the internet. The RAD finds this explanation unsatisfactory. While the independent documentary evidence indicates that the authorities monitor websites, it appears this is done due to hate speech.19 The RAD does not believe this extends to private family information regarding an arranged marriage. In any event, the RAD notes that the Appellant's alleged fear is of her father and her community, not the authorities. [36] The RAD gives little evidentiary weight to the letter from the Appellant's mother for the following reasons. The letter is not dated and it is not affirmed. No identity document was provided from the author of the letter. The Appellant is not identified in the letter. The signature of the author of the letter is "mum". While not a handwriting expert, the RAD observes that the printing of the word "mum" is considerably different than the printing in the body of the letter. The salutation reads "Dearest Daughter". The words "Daughter", in the salutation, and "mum", in the signature, appear to be in different ink than the remainder of the letter. Delay in claiming [37] The Appellant argues that the RPD member unreasonably failed to accept her true explanation that she made her claim for refugee protection as soon as she became aware of the possibility. The Appellant argues further that her education at the Canadian college would not necessarily teach her about the refugee process nor would her fluency in the English language. [38] The RPD member found that, while not determinative, the Appellant's delay of many months in making her claim, added to her concerns about the Appellant's credibility. The member noted that the Appellant is fluent in the English language, she has earned a post-secondary diploma in Canada and has had experience with the Canadian authorities since 2008 in her various immigration related applications and extensions. [39] The RAD finds the RPD's findings have merit. The RAD's reasons are as follows. According to information contained in her Basis of Claim (BOC) form, the Appellant alleges that she learned in XXXX 2014 that her father had arranged a marriage for her. At that time she informed him that she was not practising her Muslim faith and was considering converting to the Christian religion. Her father told her that she was a disgrace to the family and the community. According to the recording of the hearing, she provided similar testimony at her hearing before the RPD. As stated above, the Appellant testified that she converted to the Christian religion in XXXX 2014. The Appellant testified after she received the letter from her sister in XXXX 2014 she called her father to inform him of her conversion and when she tried to explain her motives, he hung up. The RPD member then asked the Appellant why she did not make a claim for protection in XXXX 2014. The Appellant testified that she didn't know she could do so and also she had a valid work visa. The Appellant testified that she later spoke to a friend in XXXX 2014 and learned she could make a refugee claim. She testified further that this was at the same time that she spoke to the pastor of her church about her problems. The RAD notes that the Appellant did not explain why she delayed making her claim until November 26, 2014. [40] The RAD finds the Appellant's reasons for not making a claim for XXXX months to be unsatisfactory. The Appellant is a well-educated woman, fluent in English. The RAD thus infers that she is capable of making inquiries of Canadian authorities or others, such as her pastor. The RAD finds that the Appellant's behaviour is not that of a person on temporary status in Canada and fearing for her life if she were to return to Kenya. [41] The RAD has considered the jurisprudence. Delay has been recognized by the Federal Court as an important factor in assessing a claimant's credibility and subjective fear. It is reasonable to assume a person with a well-founded fear of persecution will attempt to apply for refugee protection without unreasonable delay.20 The RAD finds the delay of XXXX months to be substantial and undermines the Appellant's allegation that she faces serious harm in Kenya if she were to return. As the RPD member stated in her oral decision, delay in making a refugee claim is not in itself decisive, it is a relevant factor to be considered when assessing the overall viability of the claim.21 [42] On the issue of delay of claim in Canada, in the Singh decision, Mr. Justice Shore declared in part: There is a well-established principle to the effect that any person having a well-founded fear of persecution should claim refugee protection in Canada, as soon as he or she arrives in the country, if that is his or her intent. On this point, the Federal Court of appeal has already concluded that delay in claiming refugee protection is an important factor which the Board may take into consideration in its analysis. Such a delay indicates a lack of subjective fear of persecution, since there is a presumption to the effect that a person having a well-founded fear of persecution will claim refugee protection at the first opportunity. Accordingly, in conducting its assessment, the Board is entitled to take into consideration the applicant's delay in claiming refugee protection.22 [43] Similarly, in the Case of Assadi, Nasser-Eddin v MCI, the Court held: "Failure to immediately seek protection can impugn the claimant's credibility, including his or her testimony about events in his country of origin."23 [44] As mentioned above and noted by counsel in his oral submissions before the RPD, the Appellant testified that she still enjoys valid status as a work permit holder in Canada. However, in the Nijjer decision, Mr. Justice de Montigny declared: It is trite law that a delay in submitting a refugee protection claim, while not decisive, remains a relevant element that the tribunal may take into account in assessing both the statements and the actions and deeds of a claimant. The claimant knew upon his arrival that he was only authorized to stay in Canada for a specific and limited period of time. Under these circumstances it was reasonable to expect that he would regularize his status as soon as possible if he truly feared for his life and physical integrity in India.24 [45] In the Geron decision, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Ward,25 the court held that the lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim was a "fatal flaw".26 More recently, in the Ahoua decision, the Court held: The Minister properly pointed out that a negative finding regarding subjective fear may render the assessment of the objective aspect of the complaint superfluous and may in itself warrant the dismissal of the claim.27 [46] The RAD, thus, determines that the claimant's evidence and behaviour does not establish a subjective fear of persecution in Kenya. The lack of subjective fear adds further support to a finding that the Appellant's alelgations of risk are not credible. Thus, the lack of subjective fear also under mines her claim under section 97. Coincidence [47] Although not mentioned in the Appeal pleadings or in the RPD member's decision, the RAD notes that during the oral hearing the Appellant was asked to comment on the coincidence of the timing of the events that led to her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant asked the RPD member to rephrase the question. The member then recounted the situation: the Appellant lived in Canada since 2008 with no problems and, while her study permit had expired, the expiration of her worker visa status was not imminent when she made her claim. The member then pointed out to the Appellant that a lot of things happened in 2014 that led the Appellant to fear returning to Kenya. The Appellant responded by repeating some of her earlier testimony. She testified that she completed her education in Canada in 2012. She testified that her father could not afford for her further education so she obtained a work permit and found employment. She testified that her father continued to ask her what she was doing. When asked, the Appellant testified that she asked her father again to finance her further education and in XXXX 2012 she even asked her mother. She testified further that given the kind of employment she has she could not afford to go back to school. [48] The RAD finds that the Appellant did not address the RPD's question regarding the coincidence of the timing of events in 2014. The RAD has, therefore, considered the timing of events. During the hearing the Appellant testified that she came to Canada on a scholarship in 2008 and when she had earned her diploma in 2012 she wished to continue on to university. She testified that when she discussed this matter with her father, he informed her he could not afford the fees. The RAD notes that the Appellant did not return home to Kenya when she completed her studies in 2012 and her student visa had expired. According to her testimony she chose to remain in Canada and work in positions that would not provide her with the finances to continue her education. The port-of-entry (POE) notes indicate that the Appellant was a worker at XXXX XXXX and also XXXX XXXX between 2012 and 2014.28 According to the Appellant's testimony, she learned in XXXX 2014 that her father had arranged a marriage for her to an older Muslim man with three wives. She testified that at that time she informed her father that she was considering converting to the Christian religion. She also testified that she converted to the Christian religion in XXXX 2014 and now fears harm at the hands of the community and family members who will not accept such a conversion. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's conversion to the Christian religion occurring at the time her father was arranging her marriage to be extraordinary coincidences and this raises a significant doubt regarding the timing with the Appellant's temporary status in Canada. The RAD is guided by the Federal Court decision in Ankrah,29 where J. Noel stated: "The Applicant's story does otherwise reveal a series of events of chance, and it was open to the tribunal to conclude therefrom that the Applicant's testimony was too fortuitous in nature to be believed."30 The RAD, thus, finds the Appellant's credibility seriously undermined. Summary [49] The RAD is aware that none of the concerns raised above may be sufficient, each on its own, to negate the claim. However, the cumulative effect of all of them is that the RAD does not have sufficient credible, plausible and trustworthy evidence upon which to base a determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. DISPOSITION [50] Based on the analysis above, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection, as per s. 111(1)(a) of IRPA. [51] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Lesley Mason" Lesley Mason June 03, 2015 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13, Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799). 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, pgs. 64-79, NDP: Kenya, 23 December 2014, at item 1.4, Operational Guidance Note: Kenya, UK Home Office, December 2013. 5 Ibid., at item 2.1, Kenya: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, United Stated DOS, 27 February 2014. 6 Ibid. 7 Ibid., at item 12.1, Kenya. International Religious Freedom Report for 2013. US DOS, 28 July 2014. 8 Ibid. 9 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.). 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, page 18. 11 Sheikh, Abdulhakim Ali v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-521-89), MacGuigan, Iacobucci, Desjardins, July 4, 1990. Reported: Sheikh v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1990] 3 F.C. 238 (C.A.); 11 Imm. L.R. (2d) 81 (F.C.A.), at 244, per MacGuigan, J.A. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record. page 123. 13 Ibid., pages 91-99 14 Ibid., pages 102-121. 15 Ibid., page 122. 16 Ibid., page 101. 17 Ibid., pages 89-90. 18 Ibid., page 89. 19 Ibid., pages 64-79, National Documentary Package (NDP): Kenya, 23 December 2014, at items 2.1, United States Department of State Report, 27 February 2014; 2.3, Freedom House, 2014. 20 Heer, Karnail Singh v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-474-87), Heald, Marceau, Lacombe, April 13, 1988; Huerta v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1993], 157 N.R. 225 (F.C.A.). 21Huerta v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 157 N.R. 225 (F.C.A.). 22 Singh, Pritam v. MCI, 2007 FC 62, Shore J, January 25, 2007, at para 24. 23 Assadi, Nasser-Eddin v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2683-96), Teitelbaum, March 25, 1997. 24 Nijjer, Yadwhinder Singh v. MCI (2009 FC 1259), de Montigny J, December 9, 2009, at para 24. 25 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689. 26 Geron, Fernando Bilos v. MCI (FCTD IMM-4951-01), Blanchard J, November 22 2002, 2002 FCT 1204. 27 Ahoua, Wadjams Jean-Marie v. MCI (FC IMM-1757-07), Blais J., November 27 2008, 2007 FC 1239. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, page 27, question 8. 29 Ankrah, Bismark, v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1986-92), Noel, March 16, 1993. 30 Ibid. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-02793