MB5-05917

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-05917; MB5-05918 MB5-05919; MB5-05920 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subjects of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision August 15, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Roxane Cyr Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subjects of the appeal N/A Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; his wife, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; and their children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, all citizens of Venezuela, are appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting their refugee protection claim. [2] They are submitting new evidence and requesting a hearing before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). BACKGROUND [3] The RPD rendered a negative decision on October 6, 2014. [4] On May 8, 2015, the RAD allowed the appellants' appeal and referred the matter to the RPD for re-determination. [5] On December 8, 2015, the RPD rendered a negative decision in the appellants' case, and the appellants filed an appeal before the RAD. [6] The RAD is considering the appeal, which has come before a newly constituted panel. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [7] Under subsection 111(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the RPD's determination that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; his wife, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; and their children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, are not "Convention refugees" or "persons in need of protection" under section 97 of the IRPA. BACKGROUND [8] The male appellant was a XXXX in his country and worked for the government as a civil servant at XXXX. [9] In 2009, he allegedly obtained a position as a XXXX XXXX with XXXX (the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX). This was a XXXX. In 2011, an extension of this XXXX was allegedly denied by the section to which he belonged. He was to return to his civil service position. [10] The male appellant reportedly took legal action to ensure that he did not have to return there, and the male appellant's case allegedly went all the way to the XXXX XXXX, where the authorization to be heard was supposedly denied. [11] The male appellant allegedly refused to leave his workplace at XXXX, despite the court judgments. [12] His employer, XXXX, reportedly asked him to leave the workplace on several occasions, but the male appellant refused. The male appellant was allegedly relieved of his duties. On XXXX XXXX, 2011, as the male appellant did not want to comply, he apparently locked himself in his office. Once he left the premises, they allegedly changed the locks so that he could not get it. The male appellant thus reportedly lost his job. [13] His wife, the female appellant, also a civil servant, was allegedly harassed at work and received a pay cut. She apparently complained and was successful, but her employer allegedly did not comply with the conditions imposed by the tribunal before which she had filed the complaint. [14] Subsequently, the appellants thought they were followed by army and civilian vehicles. In XXXX 2013, they allegedly received death threats over the telephone. That same month, the female appellant was allegedly splashed in the face while in a shopping mall. The substance with which she was splashed apparently made her groggy. The assailants reportedly tried to kidnap her, but failed. [15] The authorities allegedly did not want to take the appellants' complaint because, according to the police, they lacked evidence. [16] On XXXX XXXX, 2014, the appellants were reportedly stopped by 14 soldiers from the National Guard while driving on a highway. They were allegedly asked to follow the soldiers in their vehicle. At a certain point, they supposedly managed to lose the military convoy with the help of the crowd, whom they had asked for assistance. [17] On XXXX XXXX, 2014, the appellants left Venezuela, went through Spain and landed in Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, where they claimed refugee protection. RPD DECISION [18] The RPD rendered a negative decision in the appellants' case, finding them to be not credible and determining that their behaviour was not consistent with their alleged fear that their lives were at risk. - The RPD drew a negative inference from the fact that the appellants did not state in their BOC Form (despite testifying) that the reason why they feared the soldiers was that the male appellant had been asked to authenticate false documents in order to authorize the illegal transfer of state property. As a result, the male appellant was now considered a political opponent; - The RPD drew a negative inference from the fact that the male appellant stated that the soldiers targeted him and his family because he knows a great deal about their activities and he could take his case before international tribunals, even though he did not include this information on his BOC Form; - The RPD determined that it was implausible that the Venezuelan military would still be after the male appellant and his family since they had lost their jobs in 2011, and especially since they had won their case before the XXXX XXXX; - The appellants contradicted themselves as to the time when the threats allegedly began: the BOC Form states that they began in XXXX 2013, while the appellants testified that it was in 2011. The RPD drew a negative inference from this; - The RPD was of the opinion that the appellants did not demonstrate that the incident of XXXX XXXX, 2014 was an attempted kidnapping by the military. According to the evidence and the male appellant's testimony, there are many mobile roadblocks in Venezuela intended to control the consumption of alcohol and drugs. According to the RPD, the appellants did not demonstrate that, in their case, being stopped was anything other than a check done at a roadblock (as the male appellant refused to get out of the vehicle). In the RPD's opinion, alleging that this was an attempted kidnapping is mere speculation; - What is more, the male appellant testified that, during the incident of XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, the soldiers told him that they had to carry out the XXXX order. This information was not included in the BOC Form. The RPD drew a negative inference from this; - The RPD found that the appellants' behaviour was not consistent with their alleged fear for their lives given the fact that the threats allegedly began in 2011, and they did not leave Venezuela until XXXX 2014 and spent time in Spain (before coming to Canada) without applying for asylum there. [19] For these reasons, the RPD rendered a negative decision. APPELLANTS' MEMORANDUM [20] The appellants are representing themselves. They do not have counsel for this appeal. They have written their memorandum (pages 1 to 29, appellants' records) in broken French, such that it is difficult to decipher some paragraphs because the terms used are not appropriate, which makes comprehension difficult-as, for example, in the case of the following: [translation] "Legal syllogism, the illusions and sophisms of the RPD decision, the recycling of the same tricks and illusion, their motivations represent speculative errors, abusive burlista and attitude, the member has red stains, the largest number of negative decisions." [21] The RAD has managed to understand the following: [22] The appellants maintain that there was a breach of procedural fairness because they were treated in an unfair and abusive manner by the second RPD panel. They allege that the member at the hearing of September 22, 2014, mistreated them psychologically, slandered them, treated them like criminals, made fun of their faces because they are visible minorities, and literally kicked them out of the hearing room. The appellants requested her recusal (this request was denied in an oral decision rendered on October 1, 2015). [23] For these reasons, they are of the opinion that the RPD was not impartial toward the appellants and that its decision was biased against them and was ill founded in fact and law. [24] The appellants also maintain that the decision of the second RPD panel was copied from the first RPD decision. It does not comply with the RAD decision (May 8, 2015) which had set aside the first decision because [translation] "the principles of procedural fairness were not respected" (see paragraph 33 of the RAD decision of May 8, 2015). [25] The appellants also maintain that the RPD erred in its assessment of their credibility and did not understand (was ignorant of) the situation in Venezuela. ROLE OF THE RAD [26] The RAD is an appeal tribunal for RPD decisions. [27] Federal Court decisions have established that the RAD is "a specialized (if not overspecialized) tribunal" (see Alvarez)1 and a hybrid appeal, according to recent jurisprudence. The RAD "also has the authority to investigate, an authority the Federal Court judge...does not have." [28] The Federal Court of Appeal recently determined in Huruglica (2016 FCA 93) (paragraph 70) that the RPD, having heard the testimony, may have an advantage in matters of credibility. [70] This also recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In each case, the RAD ought to determine whether the RPD truly benefited from an advantageous position, and if so, whether the RAD can nevertheless make a final decision in respect of the refugee claim [29] It is incumbent upon the RAD to determine in its analysis whether the RPD enjoyed an advantage because it heard the testimony, and in doing so, to determine the degree of deference to be given to the RPD on this issue. [30] Paragraph 103 of Huruglica (2016 FCA 93) specifies the standard of review to be adopted by the RAD: [103] I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable. [31] Accordingly, the standard of review to be applied by the RAD is that of correctness, except when the finding under review deals with an issue of credibility, on which the RAD, in its opinion, must show deference. [32] In its analysis, the RAD will consider all the evidence, including the testimony. It will determine whether the RPD decision contains errors in fact, in law, or in mixed fact and law, and whether these are determinative to the outcome of the case and mean that the decision cannot be confirmed using the correctness standard of review. [33] The RAD will intervene by applying the correctness standard of review in accordance with subsections 111(1) and 111(2) of the IRPA. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE [34] The appellants are asking to admit as evidence before the RAD exhibits from page 9 to page 121, from 37 to 821, and from 11 to 195 (the last set of documents having previously been submitted on May 24, 2016). [35] These documents are press clippings and various reports and opinion pieces. The appellants do not explain the relevance of each document but present it in a general manner. [36] Most of them were published after the December 8, 2015, decision of the second RPD panel. [37] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA states: On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [38] The RAD is of the opinion that the new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) because it was published after the RPD decision dated December 8, 2015. HEARING BEFORE THE RAD [39] Subsection 110(6) specifies that: Hearing 110 (6) The Refugee Appeal Division may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in subsection (3): (a) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal; (b) that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim; and (c) that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [40] The appellants are requesting that a hearing be held before the RAD under subsection 110(6). [41] The RPD decision dated December 8, 2016, was based on credibility. However, all the documents submitted as evidence before the RAD in support of this appeal deal with the situation in the country and opinions on that subject. None of the documents submitted corroborate the personal facts alleged by the appellants. [42] For these reasons, the RAD is of the opinion that none of these documents raise an issue with respect to credibility, as required by paragraph 110(6)(a) of the IRPA, and that they are not central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim and would not, if accepted, justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim, pursuant to paragraphs 110(6)(b) and (c). [43] Consequently, the request for a hearing is denied. ANALYSIS [44] In its analysis, the RAD took into consideration all the evidence, including the appellants' testimony. [45] It seems to the RAD that, in matters of credibility, it owes a certain measures of deference to the RPD because it saw and heard the appellants. [46] In the light of the evidence, namely the appellants' testimony and their BOC Form, the RAD is of the opinion that the RPD did not err and that its decision is well founded. [47] The RAD has listened carefully to the recording of September 22, 2015. [48] The RAD did not note any abuse, contempt or discrimination on the part of the RPD. It was a de novo hearing, and four claimants were supposed to appear before the RPD for this hearing. However, they appeared without their children (the appellants). No communication to the contrary had been sent to the appellants, and they did not ask the RPD to excuse their minor children from appearing before the RPD, as was required in the notice to appear. In accordance with procedure, the RPD asked to see the children. The appellants became angry and raised their voices, interrupting the member when she tried to explain to them that seeing the appellants was normal procedure. Nothing in the RPD's behaviour during this hearing would lead to the conclusion that it acted in a way that was not in accordance with the Rules of Practice and the IRPA. Nothing in the recording would lead to the conclusion that the RPD acted in a discriminatory manner and did not show respect for the appellants in some way. The RPD had to call security because the appellants continued to shout, did not listen to what the member tried to explain to them, and talked over her while she asked them to wait for her to finish. The appellants were not forcibly removed from the hearing room, as they state on page 17, paragraph 17, of their memorandum: [translation] "called several times for security officers, who kicked us out by force from the hearing room." Rather, the security officer came to calm the appellants down, as it appears on the recording, and explained to them that everything that was happening was usual practice. This entire situation ended when the hearing was adjourned. During the second hearing, the member rejected the recusal application filed by the appellants. She applied the test in Committee for Justice and Liberty [1978] 15.C.R. 369. The RAD is in agreement with this decision, in the light of the previously supported submissions on this issue. [49] The recording of the hearing of December 8, 2015, before the RPD shows that the member was attentive and respectful. The RAD did not notice any behaviour that could indicate that she was biased against them. The decision rendered by the member was not biased, prejudiced or discriminatory. The RAD is of the opinion that the appellants were treated fairly and that they benefited from procedural fairness, as any other refugee protection claimant would. [50] As regards the claim that the second RPD decision was copied from the first, there are indeed references on the part of the second RPD panel to the first decision of the same tribunal, which was composed of a different member. [51] However, it seems to the RAD that the second RPD panel simply referred to statements made by the first panel, which were similar to its own findings. [52] The RAD did not see this as a decision copied from the first one. The second RPD panel asked questions and conducted a full hearing, and its reasoning reflects what happened at the hearing and the answers that it was given. [53] In this case, the RAD finds that the credibility problems did not change from one hearing to the other, as the alleged facts remained the same. The identified gaps in credibility also remained the same, and the RAD made the same finding with regard to the credibility problems at issue. [54] Although it was unnecessary to refer to the first decision, this does not constitute an error that could modify the final decision. The RPD did not err. [55] The appellants submitted their BOC Forms to the RPD on July 2, 2014, signed and translated on July 1, 2014. [56] On August 18, 2014, they had their first hearing before the RPD, which was adjourned after the case began and the RPD asked the appellants many questions, confronting them in particular about the omissions and contradictions between their testimony and the BOC Form. It was after this first hearing that, on September 4, 2014, the appellants submitted new documents into evidence, including an amendment to their story, submitted as C-18 (see RPD record, first binder, pages 551 to 600). Their second session before the RPD took place on September 11, 2014. [57] The story in the BOC Form (excluding the amendment of September 4, 2014) is that which is summarized in the "Background" section. [58] This account does not mention that the male appellant experienced any attempts at corruption from XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX when he was XXXX to XXXX and they were still at XXXX. As stated in the amendment of September 4, 2014, they allegedly asked the male appellant to illegally certify or authenticate documents indicating that XXXX and XXXX belonging to the state had been transferred to them. These requests allegedly began in 2011, according to the male appellant's testimony of October 1, 2015 (during his hearing before the second RPD panel, following the first RAD decision). [59] The BOC Form does not mention (as the male appellant testified at the hearing of October 1, 2015) the constant threats by telephone and text which allegedly began in 2011. (On his BOC Form, the male appellant indicates that the threats allegedly began in XXXX 2013). [60] The male appellant's BOC Form does not mention the fact that Mr. XXXX and Mr. XXXX still held a grudge against him and could kill him despite the fact that he lost his job on XXXX XXXX, 2011. They fear that the male appellant knows too much and could report them and testify about this matter before the international community. [61] Because they are at the root of the RPD finding of lack of credibility rendered by the second panel of this tribunal on December 8, 2015, it is important to emphasize that the amendment with these new facts was only presented after the first session of the first RPD panel, which was adjourned. It was only following this session-when the male appellant verbally added these facts and was confronted with the fact that they did not form part of his written account (BOC Form)-that the male appellant, between this session and the second session of the first RPD panel, submitted into evidence the amendment including these new facts. [62] These are very important as they modify the grounds of the appellants' fear. Where the fear was initially associated with problems related to the male appellant's work, as stated in the BOC Form, it now becomes motivated by the male appellant's refusal, dating back to 2011, to participate in corruption that would have enabled Mr. XXXX and Mr. XXXX to fraudulently obtain property belonging to the state by illegally transferring it in their names. [63] The RPD (second panel) drew a negative inference from the fact that the appellants did not mention these grounds of attempted corruption in their BOC Form, just as they did not mention the fact that Mr. XXXX and Mr. XXXX could still come after him and his family because he knows too much and could report them to the international community. [64] The RPD (second panel) did not accept the appellants' explanations that it was the fault of the interpreter and his counsel, who was appointed when the BOC Form was being drafted. These people allegedly advised the appellants incorrectly: the first told them to make it short and the second ignored the appellants' request when they told her that information was missing from the file. [65] The RPD (second panel) found that it was inconsistent, in a context where the BOC Form clearly states to indicate the grounds on which they could be harmed, that the appellants, who are educated people, did not take the trouble to indicate the missing information in this document, all the more so since the appellants signed the document and confirmed that the information was complete and correct. [66] The RAD is in agreement with this analysis. [67] The RAD carefully listened to the recording of the appellants' hearing before the RPD. They are educated people. The male appellant is a XXXX. Many times during his testimony, he listed all the steps he took in Venezuela (he represented himself and his wife), up to and including XXXX XXXX XXXX. He drafted many documents to this effect, which have been submitted into evidence. [68] In the RAD's opinion, the male appellant has the profile of an educated person who knows his rights and has a higher than average knowledge of legal documents and how these are drafted. [69] In the circumstances, the RAD does not find the appellants' explanation satisfactory, and rejects it. [70] The RAD is of the opinion that the information omitted from the BOC Form is fundamental since, according to the evidence on the record, it transforms the basis of the appellants' fear. Where initially the fear was related to work problems resulting in termination, it now relates to a refusal to collaborate in corruption which led to a more personalized danger involving constant death threats from 2011 until the appellants' departure. If the events related to attempted corruption did indeed take place, the RAD is of the opinion that this would have appeared in the appellants' BOC Form and that they would have found space to include it. The RPD did not err. [71] The RPD drew a negative inference regarding credibility concerning the fact that the appellants indicated in their BOC Form that threats began in 2013, even though they had indicated in their testimony that these threats (related to the male appellant's refusal to take part in corruption) began in 2011, with constant calls and texts that only got worse. [72] The RPD rejected the appellants' explanations. The appellants stated that this was indicated in the BOC Form, but did not give any details. It must be noted that this is not the case. The answers provided by the appellants do not explain anything about the significant omission of constant calls between 2011 and 2012. The appellants are not credible, and the RAD is of the opinion that, it they had really received calls containing death threats, they would have been able to state when this began, and there would be no contradiction between their BOC Form, their testimony and the amendment. [73] The RPD did not err. [74] As regards the incident alleged in the BOC Form, which allegedly took place on XXXX XXXX, 2014, the RAD is in agreement with the analysis carried out by the RPD on this issue. In their BOC Form, the appellants indicated that they refused to comply with the soldiers' orders when they encountered a roadblock erected by them. Regarding this matter, the male appellant testified that, in Venezuela, the military could erect ad-hoc roadblocks in order to control the consumption of drugs and alcohol. Finally, as crime is rampant in Venezuela, there could have been many reasons why the military erected such a roadblock. In the RAD's opinion, in light of the evidence, the appellants did not demonstrate that this incident was related to their alleged problems. As they refused to obey the soldiers' orders and did not exit their vehicle when asked, what happened as a result, namely that the soldiers asked them to follow them, is simply the logical outcome of their refusal to comply. [75] The RAD does not see this as an attempted kidnapping on the part of the military, as the appellants allege in their BOC Form. The RPD did not err. [76] The RAD would also like to add that, on a balance of probabilities, the appellants did not demonstrate that the incident which took place in a shopping mall on XXXX XXXX, 2013, when they were three hours away from their home, was related to the problems they alleged in support of their refugee protection claim. Nothing in the evidence on the record makes it possible to connect this incident. It may well have been criminals, given the high crime rate in the country. [77] As regards the issue of their waiting to apply for asylum and not doing so when they left Venezuela for Spain, where they stayed from early XXXX 2014 until mid-XXXX of the same year, the RAD is of the opinion that, although this is not central and could not in and of itself be determinative in the consideration of a refugee protection claim, the fact remains that, in combination with the other factors set out above and given the allegations, it highlights the inconsistency of the appellants' behaviour with their alleged fears of death, torture and mistreatment. [78] The appellants' explanations that they did not apply for asylum in Spain (a signatory to the Geneva Convention) because political and economic ties link the two countries, as Venezuelan civil servants have assets and property in Spain, seems speculative. [79] In the RAD's opinion, nothing in the evidence would suggest that this situation is problematic in Spain and that Venezuelans carry out acts of vengeance or reprisals against their Venezuelan compatriots there. Spain is a sovereign country and the evidence does not show that Venezuelans exercise powers there or take action abroad against their exiled compatriots. [80] In the circumstances, the RAD is of the opinion that the behaviour of the appellants, who did not apply for asylum in Spain, is inconsistent with that of people who are afraid for their lives. The RPD did not err. [81] As regards the issue of the delay in leaving Venezuela between the time the appellants had their problems and their departure in XXXX 2014, the RPD also indicated that this behaviour was not consistent with that of people fearing for their lives. The RAD listened to the appellants' explanations. It is true that they left after the judgment of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, for which they waited. However, the documents submitted by the appellants regarding all the legal action taken in relation to their jobs do not contain any complaints or legal action relating to the threats. These documents, up to and including the findings of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, refer strictly to the complaint made by the appellants regarding their employment. [82] In the RAD's opinion, in the circumstances, the appellants cannot justify their failure to leave before 2014 because they were waiting for the final decision of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX as, in and of itself, this was not an application for the protection of their physical safety. [83] The RPD did not err. [84] For all these reasons, the RAD is of the opinion that the appellants are not credible as regards: - Attempted corruption on the part of XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX and the resulting problems - Threatening calls - The alleged fear associated with these problems [85] The appellants may have had troubles related to their work, and may have taken legal action in that respect, as the RPD indicates, but they did not demonstrate that all this action led to the problems alleged in support of their refugee protection claims. [86] The RPD emphasized that the appellants continued to go about their lives after the male appellant's dismissal in 2011 and that they did not live in hiding. The male appellant worked as a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX at a XXXX and for a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. [87] In light of the evidence, the RAD is of the opinion that the appellants did not demonstrate that their legal troubles related to their respective jobs led to problems as alleged in support of their refugee protection claims. [88] Moreover, the RAD is of the opinion that the appellants did not demonstrate that their losing their jobs was related to political opinion or was a result of retribution, vengeance or discrimination. [89] The judgment of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (see RPD record, pages 525 and 526) shows that the male appellant did not want to return to his position at XXXX because this would result in a pay cut. He asserted his rights as regards the fact that he was the father of a young child whom he wanted to take care of and argued that the law made security of employment tenure provisions during this period. He finally exhausted his remedies and the Court rejected his application. [90] As regards his wife, she resigned from XXXX in 2011 and went to work for the XXXX XXXX XXXX, then stopped working owing to her pregnancy, as the evidence shows. The RAD is of the opinion that these are the problems that the appellants experienced. These are problems related to work, and the RAD is of the opinion that, as the appellants continued to work in their fields and go about their business, they did not demonstrate prospective risk under sections 96 or 97 of the IRPA. [91] In the opinion of the RAD, the RPD did not err and rendered the correct decision. REMEDY [92] For these reasons, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; his wife, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; and their children, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, are neither "Convention refugees" under section 96 of the IRPA nor "persons in need of protection" under section 97 of the IRPA. [93] Their appeal is dismissed. Roxane Cyr Roxane Cyr August 15, 2016 Date IRB translation: Original language: French 1 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, para. 28. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ N° de dossier de la SAR / RAD File No.:MB5-05917 MB5-05918 MB5-05919 MB5-05920 1 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB5-05917; MB5-05918 MB5-05919; MB5-05920 16 SAR.25.02 (2014.09.11) Available in English