TB4-07173

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-07173 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 18, 2016 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Benjamin J Liston Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Ethiopia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to overturn the decision of the RPD and to find that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the matter be returned to the RPD for a new hearing under a differently constituted panel. [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she fears the government of Ethiopia and its agents because she is considered by the Government to be a political dissident and therefore would be targeted for arrest, abuse and perhaps death by the Government and its agents. Greater details may be found in the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BOC) form1 and in the audio recording of the hearing. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on August 30 and October 30, 2013 and February 4 and February 7, 2014. A negative decision was rendered in writing on July 15, 2014. The RPD found that the Appellant was unable to establish her claim on the basis of credible and trustworthy evidence. The RPD found that the Appellant lacked credibility. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility. [6] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's supporting documentary evidence, especially in regards to the political profile of the Appellant. ANALYSIS The Role of the RAD [7] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [8] In the Appellant's submission she argues two main points;2 a) Did the RPD err in its negative assessment of the Appellant's credibility? b) Did the RPD err in dismissing or ignoring much of the documentary evidence submitted by the Appellant in support of her claim? [9] Two other points which are standard questions in most appeals are; a) Is the Appellant a convention refugee or a person in need of protection pursuant to Section 96 or Section 97 of IRPA?; and b) Should the new evidence be admitted under Section 110(4)? [10] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.3 [11] The RAD is an Appellate body of a different kind, as is the appeal before it. The RAD's role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.4 Such an appeal: (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD; (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision; and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.5 [12] The Federal Court of Appeal in its decision clearly states that the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred in its decision. The RAD is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.6 [13] When the RAD is dealing with the findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.7 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to choose whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, then RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.8 [14] However, there are cases where the RPD enjoys an expressive advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, as such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.9 The Federal Court of Appeal, in deliberating the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: "The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case."10 [15] Though it is obvious from the reading of the Federal Court of Appeal decision that some level of deference is warranted, it is less evident how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.11 [16] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony from those individuals. Therefore, credibility findings which arise from that oral testimony are appropriate of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, so too are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [17] The RAD notes that not every finding relating to credibility, however, warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.12 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - here the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.13 [18] The question becomes how much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can "recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'."14 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Federal Court. [19] It is unfortunate that the Federal Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, as it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.15 This leads the RAD to believe that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [20] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome.16 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [21] Where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of an intelligible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and comprehend how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [22] Additionally, the outcome of that process must be a product that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. It is for this reason, that it is principally important that the RAD employ its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to conclude whether the RPD's outcome is supported by that evidence. [23] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [24] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from an intelligible reasoning process whose premises are embedded in such advantages. If either the process or the conclusion does not meet these requirements, the RAD may determine the findings to be in error. [25] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [26] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected17 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [27] It is for the Appellants to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4), and how that evidence relates to the Appellants.18 Application of Section 110(4) [28] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.19 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claims. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of Section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellants could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claims. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [29] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claims, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in Section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.20 [30] As the RAD understands it, Section 110(4) provides the Appellants with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD-either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellants could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [31] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for Appellants to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.21 [32] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.22 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [33] Where a document meets the test in Section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While Section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in Section 110(4). [34] In Singh,23 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason why the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza24 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of the IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the nearly-identical wording of Section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.25 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of Section 110(4).26 [35] Where evidence meets the test in Section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in Section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [36] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.27 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellant's Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to Section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [37] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into Section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in Section 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.28 [38] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in Section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. The Appellant's proposed new evidence submitted pursuant to Section 110(4), IRPA 1) Letter from the XXXX Association of the Greater Toronto Area29 2) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Organization30 3) Letter from the XXXX Satellite Television Service31 4) An affidavit from XXXX XXXX32, and assorted photos33 5) A further affidavit of the Appellant 6) Promotional poster and assorted photos from 2015 7) An updated letter from the XXXX Satellite Television service 8) Affidavit of XXXX XXXX 9) Letter from XXXX XXXX 10) Assorted articles on country conditions and protection of journalists [39] The RAD has assessed the Appellant's affidavit as to how the proposed evidence meets the criteria of Section 110(4). The RAD notes that the Appellant provides weak explanation why some of these documents were not available prior to the hearing, or what steps she had taken to obtain these documents prior to the hearing. The Appellant has complied with RAD Rule 3; Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3) (g)(iii), which states: (g) a memorandum that includes full and detailed submissions regarding (i) the errors that are the grounds of the appeal, ii) where the errors are located in the written reasons for the Refugee Protection Division's decision that the appellant is appealing or in the transcript or in any audio or other electronic recording of the Refugee Protection Division hearing, (iii) how any documentary evidence referred to in paragraph (e) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Act and how that evidence relates to the appellant. [40] The Appellant has fully complied with the above Rule 3; she has provided explanations why she is now submitting the proposed evidence. The Appellant clearly indicates that she is submitting these documents to refute the RPD findings, and that is the reason she obtained some of them at this time.34 The RAD finds the Appellant had had sufficient time before the RPD hearing to gather the some of the documents that she is now asking the RAD to accept as new evidence. As Federal Court noted in one of its recent decisions, "An appeal to the RAD should not be tantamount to another full-blown hearing."35 Further, in another Federal Court36 decision, the Court wrote that an appeal to the RAD is not an opportunity to adduce evidence which could have been or should have been produced at the RPD hearing. In that particular case, the Court wrote: I am satisfied that the RAD did not err in refusing to admit the applicant's proposed new evidence. The RPD's decision indicates that it was well aware of its role, that is that it assessed each piece of the proposed new evidence, including the applicant's submissions on the new evidence, in light of subsection 110(4) and, "within the context of the totality of the Appellant's evidence adduced at the RPD." The applicant's explanation for failing to place the proposed new evidence before the RPD was that he could not have foreseen that the RPD would make negative findings on: (1) his identity; and (2) the question of objective risk. This is simply not consistent with the record. I concur with the RAD's conclusion that the applicant had the onus to put forward his case to the RPD as to why he should be accepted as a convention refugee or person in need of protection. It was not open to him to wait to forward requisite and relevant evidence until the RPD rendered a negative determination. 37 [41] In this case, the RAD looked at the literal provisions of Section 110(4) of the Act in assessing the new evidence, asking itself two questions with respect to the new evidence; namely, (1) did the evidence arise after the rejection of the claim and was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection; and (2) was the evidence such that the Appellants could not reasonably have expected in the circumstances to have presented it at the time of rejection? 1) The letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX38 speaks in support of the Appellant. However, the Appellant fails to explain why she was unable to produce this letter before the RPD decision was rendered other than to say "...because it specifically responds to information and findings contained in the RPD decision." As spoken to above when citing Cabdi, the Appellant has had her opportunity to put her best case forward. The RAD is not a forum for failed claimants to address the inadequacies of their original case by presenting evidence which they could have presented previously. This is not new evidence within the meaning of Section 110(4) of the IRPA. This document will not be accepted as new evidence. 2) The letter from the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Organization39 fails Section 110(4) for the same reason as the first. Consequently it will not be allowed. 3) The letter from the XXXX Satellite Television Service,40 fails and will not be allowed, for the same reason as above. 4) The affidavit from XXXX XXXX,41 is not allowed for the same reason as above. As well, the assorted photos are disallowed because, even though they passed the Section 110(4) test, they are not material to the claim. In order to be material, the photos would need to somehow show that the Appellant has the type of political profile which would make it likely that she would be in trouble upon to Ethiopia. These photos do not do that and are therefore disallowed.42 5) A further affidavit of the Appellant is also not allowed as it does not add anything new. It speaks to the various events and rallies attended to by the Appellant and by her uncle. Obviously, as these events occurred after the decision of XXXX 2014, they do meet the Section 110(4) rule, however, the photos accompanying the affidavit are just that, photos of the Appellant at different venues with little probative value. Because the photos have little probative value, they are not material to the claim; that is, on their own they would not change the decision of the panel, one way or another. 6) The promotional poster and assorted photos from 2015 have no probative value. There is no argument before the RAD to suggest that the Appellant is not the vocalist she claims to be. The only argument appears to be whether or not this vocalist has the political profile to put her at risk. These posters will not be allowed. 7) An updated letter from the XXXX Satellite Television service speaks to the Appellant's support of that service over the last three years. The RAD appreciates that many people support community broadcasters and those who may hold a special talent often do more, however, that support does not necessarily translate into a significant political profile for the individual supporter. This letter does not even allude to any risk factors the Appellant may have upon return to Ethiopia. As the original letter from this organization was not allowed, this letter too is disallowed as not being material to the appeal. 8) A letter from XXXX XXXX, apparently representing a banned political party of Ethiopia, in Toronto speaks to the Appellant's support of the banned party since 2014. It is obvious from photos presented at her hearing showing the Appellant with the leader of that banned political party, that the Appellant could have obtained such a letter prior to the decision of the RPD. Therefore, in accordance to Section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is not "new" and will not be allowed. 9) Assorted articles on country conditions and protection of journalists speak to the many facets of this appeal, however, most of this information is based on the premise of a high political profile which has yet to be shown to the RAD's satisfaction. As these country documents are new since the RPD decision, may prove to be material to this appeal, and are relevant and are from credible sources, these documents43 will be admitted. [42] The RAD after assessing the evidence in regards to the above questions, finds that the evidence, with the exception of the last, does not meet the requirements of Section 110(4). In her affidavit, the Appellant, in her own words, states that she is now submitting these documents as a result of the RPD impugning her credibility. But again, there is insufficient explanation as to why she did not submit these documents or attempt to get these documents prior to her hearing. However, as soon as she received a negative decision, she was able to get these documents which she now attempts to have the RAD accept as evidence. [43] In RAD's opinion, this clearly indicates that most of these documents were available to the Appellant prior to her RPD hearing, however, she chose not to get them until she received the RPD decision rejecting her claim due to credibility concerns. She is now attempting to submit these documents to negate the RPD findings. [44] The Appellant was represented by counsel before the RPD, and counsel is very conversant with claims and what requirements are necessary before the RPD. The Appellant could reasonably have been expected to know that identity (profile) and credibility would be issues, given the references to the issue in the Act, the Rules, and the BOC form. [45] The BOC form advises that the refugee claimant is "responsible for obtaining and providing to the IRB any documents that may support your claim."44 [46] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. That assessment will be based on the evidence which was before the RPD and the evidence which has been allowed as "new". The RPD's Findings [47] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its credibility findings when it took a microscopic approach to the evidence and made adverse finding on peripheral issues. The Appellant points out that the RPD concentrated on peripheral issues such as the actual dates of her brother's birthday and the actual date that the Appellant finished her education and began her career. The Appellant further argues that the panel ignored more important evidence of the popularity of the Appellant as a musician in Ethiopia who has written and performed a song protesting the current regime in Ethiopia. The Appellant argues that the panel ignored the fact that the Appellant has continued working with anti-Ethiopian government forces in Canada since her arrival in Canada. The Appellant argues that the dates which she confused, and for which the RPD assessed negative credibility, are immaterial to the claim. The RAD agrees with the Appellant. Determining the exact date of the Appellant's brother's birthday is irrelevant and immaterial to the claim. The Appellant testified that her brother was ten years older than she and that he was born in 1965 (Ethiopian calendar). It is true that the birthdate was confused and inconsistent when considering the application for a Temporary Residence Visa (TRV), the BOC and her oral testimony, however, this has nothing to do with the core of the claim. So too is the question of the exact date on which the Appellant stopped her education and began her music career. However, even though these date issues are not material to the core of the claim, they cannot simply be dismissed as they are but examples of the inconsistencies, contradictions and other incredible replies given in evidence by the Appellant. More important examples of a lack of credibility exist and include the Appellant's inability to show any reasonable degree of knowledge concerning the political parties that she claims she is or was a supporter of and claimed to be politically active in. The RAD has read the transcript of the multiple hearings and consequently concurs with the RPD that the Appellant was unable to explain much of what the political parties in which she claimed extensive involvement, "believed in". She was unable to explain in a clear and concise manner what the platforms of these parties were. She was unable to provide any demographics of what segment of the voting population may support these parties (ie: the rich, the poor, the middle class, business people, farmers, blue collar, white collar workers) and when asked what the political leaning of the parties was (left wing, right wing, centrist) the Appellant chose "right" because "...they think good thing, they want unity, they're thinking for the people is the right thing, the way they think about the people." This response indicates a lack of knowledge in regards to the political spectrum and where in that spectrum the parties the Appellant claims to have actively supported, fall. It is logical to presume that a person who is an active supporter of a political party would be able to enunciate some sort of platform of that party and would be able to provide some detail as to who might make up the base of support for that party. The Appellant was unable to do this and that inability undermines her credibility in regards to her political activism. [48] With the above credibility issue in mind, the more mundane and minor discrepancies noted regarding dates, etc., become more important and begin to support the overall credibility finding. Add to these issues the problems that the Appellant had recounting her personal life when asked by the panel, and the credibility issue becomes a major concern to the RAD. There were inconsistencies with her work history, her school history and with the history of her ownership of a XXXX. [49] Regarding her school history, the Appellant had written in her BOC that she had finished high school (grade 10) in 2001, however, she testified on August 30 that she finished high school in 2004. When given an opportunity to explain the inconsistency, the Appellant blamed it on interpretation issues. [50] Regarding her work history, the Appellant again wrote in her BOC that she began working in 2001 (after leaving school) but then testified that she began working in 2003 or 2004. Once again when the discrepancy was pointed out to the Appellant, she insisted that her oral testimony was correct and that the date in the BOC was the result of an interpretation error. [51] Regarding her ownership of the XXXX, when the Appellant applied for her TRV, she made no mention of her ownership of any XXXX but instead supplied an article with the application which indicated that the Appellant's sister was the owner of the XXXX. Yet in her BOC, the Appellant wrote that being a XXXX XXXX/proprietor was what she did for a living between 2008 and 2013. The article submitted with her TRV speaks about the Appellant as a XXXX at the XXXX, and refers to the Appellant as being 23 years old. Considering the Appellant's date of birth is XXXX of 1983 that would suggest that the article was written in 2006 (23 years after the Appellant was born). This matters because the Appellant testified that she opened the XXXX in 2008. As the Appellant is claiming that her risk factors in Ethiopia are high because she has XXXX XXXX of an anti-government nature, all things relative to her XXXX become more important to the claim/appeal. [52] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to consider what political profile the Appellant is perceived to have and dealt only with the profile she could substantiate. The Appellant argues that the RPD held her "...to an impossibly high standard of encyclopaedic knowledge about not only the UDJ, but also about the now-defunct CUD Party."45 This is not correct. The RPD asked questions of the Appellant regarding policies of the Party she claimed to be active in. None of the questions were very difficult or would be difficult for someone who is an active supporter. The Appellant is not claiming that she simply voted the "wrong" way but that she actively worked on behalf of the Party, distributing literature, performing at events and so on. It is reasonable to expect a person so involved to have some idea of what the general policies of that Party are and a general idea of what the Party demographics are. The Appellant had no idea of either. In regards to the political profile that the government may have perceived that the Appellant held, insufficient evidence was adduced to convince the RAD that there is or was such a perception. [53] With all of the credibility concerns listed above, the RAD finds that the RPD did not err in its overall assessment of the Appellant's credibility. [54] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in dismissing or ignoring much of the documentary evidence submitted by the Appellant in support of her claim. The Appellant argues, correctly, that even if the Board was to find her lacking in credibility, the Board must still consider whether the Appellant may be targeted should she return to Ethiopia. [55] The evidence disclosed included membership cards in both mentioned political parties, neither of which speaks to her profile. Anyone can buy a membership in any political party so the cards only prove that she was a member, perhaps like thousands of others. Similarly, the case receipts for payment for those cards is of no probative value. [56] The Appellant had disclosed a document from the XXXX XXXX Police Commission from 2013, requiring her to attend the police station for questioning. The document does not indicate that the Appellant would be arrested but that the police wished to question her, about what is unknown. There could be many reasons unrelated to politics for the police to want to question a XXXX owner or a XXXX or any other citizen. The RAD is not satisfied that this document has any bearing on the Appellant's political profile. [57] There were a number of letters of support disclosed as evidence at the hearing. These letters were not sworn statements nor were the authors available for questioning. Regardless of the content of the letters they cannot be afforded much in the way of probative value for those reasons. [58] Disclosed were two affidavits, one from the Appellant's mother, and the other from the Appellant's uncle. Both of these supported the Appellant's story including that she had been twice arrested and that she was a well-known musician. Again, although more substantial than unsworn letters, the authors were not available for questioning and both authors have personal stakes in the outcome of the hearings, being close relatives and consequently not independent witnesses of the Appellant. The RAD would give more weight to these affidavits if there was any documentary evidence of the alleged arrests presented in evidence. If the Appellant held such a high profile professionally as she claims to have held, it would be reasonable to expect that her arrest and detention may have been reported in some news media, even if only at the local level. Such an article, speaking to the arrest of this somewhat well-known artist, would be a substantial piece of evidence in support of her allegation of arrest. Further, the affidavit from the Appellant's mother contradicted testimony by the Appellant. The affidavit referred to the Appellant and her boyfriend being arrested in 2013 for composing an anti-government song, however, the Appellant testified that she was arrested with her boyfriend in 2010 (not 2013) for distributing political flyers. According to the Appellant's testimony, her boyfriend moved to Kenya right after the 2010 elections. The RAD finds that the affidavit from the Appellant's mother does not agree with the Appellant's own testimony and as the affidavit was not tested before the tribunal, it is of no probative value. [59] All in all, the evidence disclosed at the hearings failed to convince the RAD that the Appellant has such a political profile as to make her a person of interest to the Ethiopian government should she return there. [60] The RAD finds that there is a lack of objective evidence before it which corroborates the Appellant's claim of arrest and future risk. The RAD therefore concurs with the RPD's decision. Disposition [61] The RAD has found that the RPD decision will stand. CONCLUSION [62] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe May 18, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 2. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, at p. 245, para. 24. 3 See, for example, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 4 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 5 Dhillon, supra, footnote 4, paras. 14-18. 6 Huruglica, supra, footnote 4, para. 103. 7 Ibid. 8 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, para. 50. 9 Huruglica, supra, footnote 4, para. 70. 10 Huruglica, supra, footnote 4, para. 74. 11 Akuffo,supra, footnote 3, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233, at para. 11. 12 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also Huruglica, supra, footnote 4, para. 72. 13 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.) 14 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 15 See Yin, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Akuffo, Allalou, and Sajad; also Bui. 16 Dunsmuir, supra, footnote 8, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 17 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 18 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 19 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 20 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, 2016-03-29, para. 63. 21 Singh, Ibid., para. 54. 22 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 23 Singh, supra, footnote 20, para. 64. 24 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 25 Ibid, paras. 13-15. 26 Singh, supra, footnote 20, para. 64. 27 Singh, supra, footnote 20, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 28 Singh, supra, footnote 20, para. 48. 29 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 174-175. 30 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 176. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, exhibit F. 32 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 192. 33 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, exhibits E and G. 34 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 154 at para. 7. 35 Zhong, Zhihui et al v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3438-15), Boswell, March 23, 2016; 2016 FC 346. 36 Cabdi,Mahad Cali v. M.C.I., (F.C., no. IMM-1365-15, January 8, 2016), Gleeson, 2016 FC 26 37 Cabdi,Mahad Cali v. M.C.I., (F.C., no. IMM-1365-15, January 8, 2016), Gleeson, 2016 FC 26. 38 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 174-175. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 176. 40 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, exhibit F. 41 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 192. 42 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, exhibits E and G. 43 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Application to Provide Further Evidence, p. 9, paras. 32-36. 44 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, exhibit 2, Basis of Claim Form, p. 24. 45 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, para. 61. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-07173