MB6-02302

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB6-02302 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision July 5, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Me Christina Harrison Baird Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Jeffrey Platt Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX1, a citizen of Haiti, appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant requests to submit new evidence and to have an oral hearing. The Appellant requests that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and substitute its own determination that she is a Convention refugee. The Minister did not intervene in the Appeal. DECISION [2] Pursuant to s. 111(1) (a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. The Appellant is neither a Convention refugee under s. 96 of IRPA nor a person in need of protection under s. 97 of IRPA. [3] The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [4] The Appellant alleges that if she is returned to Haiti she may be kidnapped, raped or even killed by bandits associated with the political party Parti Haitien Tèt Kale (PHTK). She states that she received threatening telephone calls from these bandits, who were attempting to dissuade her from her activities supporting their rivals in the party Pitit Dessalines (PD). Moreover, they allegedly went to her house, fired bullets, assaulted her brother and sacked the home when they found she was not present. [5] The RPD determined that the Appellant was not a credible witness. In particular, the RPD observed inconsistencies and contradictions in the Appellant's evidence about the violence at her home, contradictions in her testimony about the threatening telephone calls, and that the Appellant was unable to corroborate her alleged role within the PD. [6] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by conducting an overzealous search for contradictions in her testimony and that a refugee may naturally and reasonably forget details of her story. She argues that forgetting details should not be fatal to her refugee claim. [7] For these reasons, the Appellant requests that the RAD grant the appeal by setting aside the RPD decision and substituting its own decision that the Appellant is a Convention refugee. In the alternative, the Appellant submits that there should be a new hearing before a differently constituted panel. DECISION ON WHETHER TO ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE [8] The RPD reasons are dated 15 April 2016. In light of the RPD's negative credibility finding, the Appellant submitted as new evidence on appeal an Attestation from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX dated XXXX XXXX 2016. 2 [9] The test for admissibility of new evidence is provided in s. 110(4) of IRPA, which states that the person who is the subject of the appeal (here, the Appellant) may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. In addition, the jurisprudence requires the evidence to be new, credible and relevant. [10] Rule 3(g)(iii) of the RAD Rules requires the Appellant to include in her record "full and detailed submissions" regarding how any documentary evidence meets the requirements of s. 110(4) of IRPA. The Appellant submits a document titled Documentary Evidence Supporting the Appeal, which refers to the XXXX Attestation at item 8 and notes: "new proof which did not exist at the time of the hearing or when claim was rejected."3 With respect, this annotation falls far short of full and detailed submissions. Counsel submits in the Memorandum of Arguments that the XXXX Attestation is relevant because it confirms the facts alleged by the Appellant in her narrative and oral testimony.4 However, the Memorandum does not explain why this attestation was not obtained before the rejection of the Appellant's claim. Since these events were mentioned at the Appellant's refugee hearing on 11 March 2016, it is clear that they did not arise after the rejection of the claim. Moreover, it is clear that XXXX XXXX XXXX is writing what was reported to him, and not from personal knowledge. [11] I find that the additional document presented by the Appellant is not new evidence within the meaning of s. 110(4) of IRPA. Although it was created after the rejection of the Appellant's claim, it is based on information that was reasonably available to the Appellant and that was presented at the time of her hearing. The Federal Court repeatedly has found that evidence is not new simply because it is created after the rejection of a refugee claim.5 [12] Since the document does not meet the statutory criteria, it is not necessary for me to pursue a further analysis of the jurisprudential criteria6 that the additional evidence be new, credible and relevant.7 DECISION ON WHETHER TO HOLD AN ORAL HEARING [13] The general rule is that the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD.8 The RAD only has discretion to hold an oral hearing when there is additional documentary evidence and all of the conditions in s. 110(6) are met.9 I have held that the new document proposed by the Appellant does not meet the statutory criteria in s. 110(4), and therefore the RAD does not have discretion to hold an oral hearing in this case. [14] The Appellant's request for an oral hearing is denied. SCOPE OF THE RAD APPEAL [15] The RAD is required to consider carefully the decision of the RPD and to carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. The process before the RAD is a "hybrid appeal," which differs from a judicial review. The Federal Court of Appeal has explicitly distinguished the RAD's review of the RPD from the high level of deference afforded by appellate courts to lower courts. The standard of review for questions of law is correctness. The standard of review for findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law is also correctness, where those findings raise no issue of credibility of oral evidence.10 [16] For findings that require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence, the RAD should determine whether the RPD benefited from a meaningful advantage over the RAD, and whether the RAD should therefore give deference to a particular finding. The amount of deference to be accorded will be determined based on the circumstances of each case.11, 12 In this case, I will address deference in the Analysis section. [17] Having made its own analysis of the record, the RAD may either confirm the decision of the RPD, or set it aside and substitute its own decision.13 The RAD must provide a final determination unless it cannot do so without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD. Only in cases where it cannot make a final determination, the RAD may refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination.14 ANALYSIS [18] I have listened to the recording of the hearing before the RPD and analyzed the entire RPD Record, including the oral and documentary evidence and the reasons for the RPD decision. I have considered all the arguments of the Appellant. The determinative issue at the RPD was credibility. Credibility [19] In this case, the RPD met the Appellant in person and heard her over the course of an afternoon. The RPD was able to benefit from visual cues in the hearing room, which gave it some advantage over the RAD. Indeed, the RPD referred to some of these visual cues in its decision.15 In the circumstances of this case, I find that the advantage enjoyed by the RPD is meaningful enough to require a measure of deference from the RAD. The deference to be accorded each RPD finding will be addressed below. [20] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in concluding that she was not credible on two determinative questions of fact, which I articulate as follows: i. Did the Appellant play a key role within the political party, Pitit Dessalines (PD)? ii. Was the Appellant harassed by associates of the rival political party, Parti Haitien Tèt Kale (PHTK)? [21] I will deal with each in turn, bearing in mind the principle that when a refugee claimant swears certain facts to be true, this creates a presumption that they are true unless there is valid reason to doubt their truthfulness.16 Did the Appellant play a key role within the political party Pitit Dessalines? [22] The Appellant alleges that she has been an active volunteer within her community and consequently she enjoys popularity and a high profile. She claims that political parties solicited her endorsement and asked for her help to organize political gatherings. She claims that she chose to support the political party Pitit Dessalines (PD), and played a key role in organizing gatherings and mobilizing the vote for the 2015 mayoral race in XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant alleges that the leading political party PHTK also wanted her support because she was a popular and visible figure in her community. She claims that her troubles stemmed from PHTK's bitterness with her refusal to support them, which gave rise to the subsequent violence against her, her family, and her home by bandits associated with PHTK. [23] The RPD found that the Appellant was not a member of the political party Pitit Dessalines (PD).17 The tribunal reasoned that the Appellant's credibility about her membership was undermined by contradictions between her statements about the length of that membership. In the IMM5669 form, she stated that she had been a member of the PD from 2014XXXX XXXX to 2015XXXX XXXX, that is, for three months.18 In her Basis of Claim (BOC) narrative, she stated that she had been a member of this party for about a year.19 In her oral testimony, she claimed her membership lasted from XXXX 2014 to XXXX 2015.20 When she was asked to explain these differences, the Appellant insisted that she had been a PD member for about a year, without explaining the contradiction. [24] The RPD examined the PD membership card adduced by the Appellant as exhibit P-8,21 but accorded it no weight, due to the Appellant's failure to establish her general credibility.22 Given that she claimed to have a key role in the PD party and to have had direct communications with its leader, the RPD also considered it reasonable to expect the Appellant to adduce corroborative evidence from the PD party. The RPD was not satisfied with the Appellant's explanation that she had attempted to do so by speaking to one person while she was still in Haiti, and had not tried again since her arrival in Canada.23 [25] Having conducted my own analysis, I uphold the finding of the RPD that the credibility of the Appellant was undermined with respect to her membership in the PD party. Examination of the IMM5669 form shows that the end date of the Appellant's membership in PD is clearly and unambiguously handwritten as 2015/XXXX, or XXXX 2015. The Appellant testified that she had completed the form herself, that she understood its contents, and that they were correct.24 Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between her written submission to the Canadian immigration authorities and her oral testimony. This contradiction is material because the Appellant claims to have held a key position in the PD party in XXXX 2015, months after the conclusion of her involvement, according to the IMM5669. Having listened to the evidence before the RPD, I agree that the Appellant did not explain the contradiction, despite being given the opportunity to do so. As a result, I find the presumption of truth about her year-long membership in PD has been rebutted and the Appellant was obliged to provide corroborative evidence of her membership in the PD party. [26] On the record before me, I might have been prepared to accord the benefit of the doubt to the Appellant about a brief 3-month membership in the PD, as well as some weight to the PD membership card. However, the RPD's credibility finding appears to fall squarely within the purview of those requiring deference from the RAD. The RAD received a black and white photocopy of only one side of the PD membership card. The RPD had the meaningful advantage of being able to view both sides of the original card. In addition, where there is an inconsistency between documentary and oral evidence, the RPD may well have a meaningful advantage for having seen the witness, heard the testimony, chosen the questions, and listened to the answers.25 I give deference to the RPD finding that the Appellant was not a member of the PD party. [27] Counsel submits that the RPD erred by doing what Kabongo26 prohibits: finding the Appellant's testimony not credible without consideration of relevant corroborative evidence, and then rejecting the supporting evidence because of the credibility finding. [28] I disagree. The RPD was considering a contradiction between the documentation and the Appellant's oral testimony. Unfortunately, the membership card did not provide any information as to when the Appellant might have been a member of the PD party. Moreover, the material point here was not whether the Appellant was a member of PD at all, but whether she played the key role that she claimed she did in XXXX 2015. I agree that the membership card carried little to no probative value in these circumstances. [29] RPD Rule 11 required the Appellant to bring documents to establish the elements of her claim. She failed to bring any document corroborating the importance of her role within the PD party, then gave the RPD a weak explanation this failure. Consequently, the RPD made a finding that the Appellant's credibility was undermined. The RPD did not err. I find that the Appellant did not play a key role in the PD party. In light of this conclusion, it appears less likely that she received threatening phone calls or suffered an attack on her family and home. However, I will consider these allegations together below. Was the Appellant harassed by associates of the rival political party, Parti Haitien Tèt Kale? [30] The Appellant alleges that in XXXX 2015 she began receiving threatening telephone calls from anonymous persons, urging her to drop her political activity in support of the PD party. In her BOC narrative, she states that they increased in frequency and became more threatening over a period of days. While she does not give the number of calls, she does refer to "several" and provides three phrases, allegedly quoted from the content of the calls. In support of this allegation, the Appellant adduces a police record of her complaint dated XXXX XXXX 2015, which describes a series of anonymous threatening telephone calls.27 The police record does not give the number or the dates of the calls, but situates the first call after a political meeting and also purports to paraphrase some of the content of the calls. The police record gives a strong impression about the frequency of the calls, which are described as occurring from morning until night, such that the Appellant felt overwhelmed and had to turn off her phone. The Appellant states in her BOC that her entire political party was aware of the death threats she was receiving, and that she spoke with both the party leader and the second member of their cartel about them. [31] At her refugee hearing, the RPD asked the Appellant how many calls she had received on XXXX XXXX. She first testified that she had received two calls on this date.28 Later, the RPD asked how many calls she had received on XXXX XXXX. The Appellant testified she had received three calls on this date.29 Then when asked how this number could coincide with her BOC or the police report, she gave a total of three calls for the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, which she later revised to a total of four calls.30 The RPD asked the Appellant why she had failed to bring any documentary evidence from the leaders of her party to corroborate her claim. The Appellant explained that she wished to detach herself from her political life in Haiti now that she is in Canada, and this is why she did not seek such corroboration. [32] The Appellant further alleges that on the night of XXXX XXXX 2015, armed bandits attacked her home and her brother within it when they found that she was not there. They allegedly fired guns at the house and broke the lock on the door, forced their way in, and beat her brother when he refused to give her whereabouts. Then she claims they sacked the house. The Appellant alleges that her parents were away from home at that time but returned the following morning. From that date, the Appellant states, her family has been in hiding and has not resided at the family home. Rather, they have stayed with friends in another neighbourhood. The Appellant alleges that neighbours have seen the bandits return to the family home. In support of her allegations about the night of XXXX XXXX, the Appellant adduces a report from a Justice of the Peace dated XXXX XXXX 2015.31 This document records damage above the main door of her home: XXXX holes made by unidentified projectiles. In addition, it records the declaration of the Appellant's father that at XXXX XXXX XXXX on XXXX XXXX 2015, he heard gunshots fired at his house by bandits from a political party, and that the life of his daughter is in danger. [33] The RPD found that the Appellant's credibility about the death threats was undermined by contradictions between her BOC narrative, the police record of her complaint, and her oral testimony. Moreover, the RPD gave no weight to the police record, given the inconsistencies and contradictions about the number and timing of the threatening telephone calls. The RPD did not accept the Appellant's explanation for failing to seek corroboration from the leaders of her political party (i.e. that she wished to detach from political life). [34] The RPD also found that the Appellant's credibility was undermined by contradictions and inconsistencies with respect to the alleged home invasion. In particular, the report from the Justice of the Peace does not contain very much detail. It is silent about the assault and injuries suffered by the Appellant's brother, who is named therein as one of the residents of the affected household who requested the report. Moreover, the damage noted does not include any mention of the broken door lock, which was reportedly how the bandits gained entry to the house. The RPD noted that upon being asked to explain these inconsistencies, the Appellant was visibly put off balance and simply reiterated her previous testimony, before opining that police and judges in Haiti are under the influence of the PHTK. The RPD did not accept this explanation and noted additional contradictions about when the Appellant's brother went to see the Justice of the Peace and when the Appellant learned of that visit. The RPD found that the Appellant's credibility was undermined. [35] On appeal, Counsel submits that the RPD made an error in referring to the evidence, which could cause prejudice to the Appellant. Specifically, the RPD referred to P-6 but gave the name of exhibit P-5. Furthermore, counsel submits that the number of threatening phone calls received by the Appellant may have been naturally and reasonably forgotten, and that her claim should not fail based on a memory test. [36] Having made my own analysis of the Appellant's evidence about harassment that she allegedly experienced from persons associated with the PHTK, I confirm the findings of the RPD. The Appellant has failed to show, on a balance of probabilities, that she received threatening telephone calls, or that her home was invaded, and therefore her credibility is further impugned. These are my reasons. [37] The Appellant's oral evidence about the threatening phone calls was internally inconsistent. Moreover, that oral evidence differed so much from the documents she submitted, including the police record and her Basis of Claim, that I find it more likely than not that she did not receive threatening phone calls. Within her oral testimony, the Appellant gave contradictory answers to the clear questions posed by the RPD. She revised her testimony about the number of calls she had received twice. [38] Moreover, none of her answers in that oral testimony was consistent with the allegation in the police report that she was receiving these calls in overwhelming numbers from morning to night. In my view, the police record of her complaint does not carry much probative value because it is imprecise about the date and number of calls. The RPD remarked that the police record was written less than 24 hours after the alleged threatening call on XXXX XXXX, and therefore cannot possibly contain information about a subsequent call 24 hours later. While I do not agree with the RPD that the police record contains a temporal impossibility, it is the very lack of a date for the call about which the Appellant was complaining, that makes it less probative. In any event, there is no indication that the police officer verified the content of the Appellant's declaration to him. [39] Lastly, I acknowledge the RPD made a clerical error in using the name of Exhibit P-5 when referring to P-6. However, the RPD showed clearly that it was using the correct document in its reasons. There was no prejudice caused to the Appellant. The RPD was correct not to accept the Appellant's explanation for failing to seek corroboration from a leader or member of her political party about the telephone harassment. It is the Appellant's burden to prove on a balance of probabilities her allegation that she received threats. She has failed to do so. [40] The RPD's reasoning can be distinguished from the decision impugned in Sheik,32 to which Counsel refers the RAD. While the exact number of calls the Appellant allegedly received may not be important, the magnitude and persistence of the harassment alleged is a material fact. The fact that the Appellant described it so differently at different times and to different audiences, and her inability to explain this, leads a decision maker to the conclusion that she is not credible. I agree with the negative credibility finding of the RPD. [41] I share the RPD's concerns about the probative value of the report from the Justice of the Peace to corroborate the Appellant's allegations. In addition, I note that the complaint lodged is in the voice of the Appellant's father, since it says the life of his daughter is in danger. This creates a further contradiction between the report and the Appellant's testimony, both oral and written. The Appellant alleges that her brother was alone at the time of the home invasion, yet the Justice of the Peace records her father as saying that at XXXX XXXX XXXX he heard gunfire outside the house. The Appellant's credibility is further undermined. The RAD concludes that she has not faced harassment in the form of death threats or home invasion by bandits associated with the PHTK. The Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution for her political opinion or her gender by associates of the PHTK. [42] The Appellant has failed to establish her general credibility. Considering all of the contradictions and inconsistencies in her evidence, and considering that the documentary evidence does not overcome her lack of credibility, I find the RPD's credibility assessment was correct. Risk of Rape [43] The Appellant submits that she faces an additional risk, that of rape in Haiti, which would entitle her to protection - either as a Convention refugee on the grounds of her gender, or as a 'person in need of protection' due to a risk to her life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. Given that she has failed to establish her general credibility, I give no further consideration to her allegation that she is at risk of rape related to her political opinion. [44] Counsel submits that the RPD failed to explain adequately its conclusion that since the Appellant was university educated with parents in good position in Haiti, therefore she did not fit the profile of a refugee or a person in need of protection. This is a valid observation. However, I agree with the RPD's conclusion that the Appellant is neither a refugee nor a person in need of protection on account of the risk of rape. Here are my reasons. [45] The US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015 and 2016 for Haiti note that rape does occur and that sexual and gender based violence is a chronic problem in Haiti.33 Women of certain profiles have been noted to be at elevated risk of rape amounting to gender-based persecution. For example, women who have been displaced from their homes by natural disaster and who live in camps, or who work in factories or domestic labour. Perhaps these are the profiles that the RPD wished to distinguish from that of the Appellant, who lives with family and not in a camp for displaced persons, and who does not work in the at-risk occupations. [46] The Appellant is a young woman. The RAD has examined the documentation for evidence that youth and gender together are sufficient to constitute a risk profile for a serious possibility of persecution in Haiti. In Dezameau, cited by Counsel, Justice Pinard cautioned: "This is not to say that membership in a particular social group is sufficient to result in a finding of persecution. The evidence provided by the applicant must still satisfy the Board that there is a risk of harm that is sufficiently serious and whose occurrence is 'more than a mere possibility'."34 Despite the acknowledgement that rape occurs in Haiti, there is insufficient evidence on this record to establish an objective basis for the Appellant's alleged fear. I cannot conclude that young women in Haiti face a serious possibility of persecution by rape simply due to their gender, as Counsel argues.35 Similar conclusions have been previously upheld by the RAD.36 [47] I understand the Appellant also to be submitting that her social position and her time in Canada may lead to the perception that she is wealthy, and that she may be at heightened risk of rape as a result. Therefore I considered whether there was evidence in the record that women returning from North America were at particular risk of rape in Haiti. The Appellant submitted the unfortunate story of Lencie Mirville, which was reported in Haitian newspapers.37 Ms. Mirville was about to depart Haiti for studies in North America and was kidnapped, raped and killed by someone with information about her savings to pay for her studies abroad. I understand the Appellant to be arguing that as a woman returning from Canada, she would be a member of a particular social group that might make her the target of a similarly heinous crime. In my view, the facts in the case of Ms. Mirville are not analogous to those alleged in this case. The Appellant fears to be targeted by people who impute wealth to her, while Ms. Mirville was targeted by someone known and trusted by her family, who knew her actual financial circumstances. In my view, such a threat would be more properly assessed in a s. 97 analysis. I find that the Appellant has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to show that she is a part of a particular social group that faces a risk of rape amounting to 'more than a mere possibility' of persecution. [48] On the record before me, the case of Ms. Mirville appears to be an isolated incident. With respect to the s. 97 IRPA analysis, even an existing pattern of human rights abuses is not, in itself, sufficient to show that the Appellant herself is at risk. The fact that rape or kidnapping occurs in Haiti does not prove that the Appellant is 'more likely than not' to be the victim of either crime. The Appellant brought neither sufficient evidence nor sufficient argument to prove she faces a risk of rape in Haiti on a balance of probabilities. [49] It is incumbent on members of both the RPD and the RAD to consider the Guideline on Women Refugee Claimants fearing Gender Related Persecution38 in appropriate cases. We must exhibit the knowledge required, and apply it in an understanding and sensitive manner when deciding issues of violence against women.39 Although members must be particularly sensitive to the difficulty some women face when testifying, if they fear to become victims of violence, the gender Guideline is not intended to serve as a cure for all deficiencies in the refugee protection claim or the documents submitted as evidence.40 In my view, the RPD reached the correct conclusion after a thoughtful analysis, with due sensitivity to the Appellant's gender. Having considered this Guideline carefully as I proceeded through my own analysis, and re-examined my reasons through this lens afterward, my conclusions are unchanged. Nothing in this record indicates that the testimony of the Appellant was impugned due to gender-based or cross-cultural misunderstanding. [50] The Appellant has neither established her credibility nor shown that she fits the profile of someone who would face a serious risk of persecution in Haiti for her political opinion or her gender. Moreover, she has not shown, on a balance of probabilities, that she faces a risk to her life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Haiti. For all of the foregoing reasons, the Appellant has failed to show that a risk to her in Haiti meets the threshold for refugee protection in Canada, under either s. 96 or s. 97 of IRPA. CONCLUSION [51] Pursuant to s. 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD. The Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is not a Convention refugee under s. 96 of IRPA because she has not demonstrated a serious possibility of persecution if she returns to Haiti. Neither is she a person in need of protection under s. 97 of IRPA because she has not established that it is more likely than not she faces a risk to her life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Haiti. [52] The appeal is dismissed. Christina Harrison Baird Me Christina Harrison Baird July 5, 2017 Date /ag 1 Hereinafter "the Appellant". 2 Appellant's Record, page 45, hereinafter " GARR Attestation ". 3 Appellant's Memorandum, page 15. 4 Ibidem, page 26. 5 Jadallah v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1240, at para. 34. 6 Idem. 7 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96 (CanLII) at paras. 38 and 44 to 49. 8 Section 110(3) of IRPA. 9 Balde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3724-14, Mosley, May 12, 2015, 2015 FC 624 at para. 32. 10 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, at paras. 37, 48, 78 and 103. 11 Ibidem at para. 70. 12 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/h41zf. 13 Section 111(1)(a) and 111(1)(b) of IRPA. 14 Section 111(1)(c) and 111(2) of IRPA; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 at para. 103. 15 RPD Reasons at paras. 15 and 30. 16 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.). 17 RPD Reasons, para. 44. 18 RPD Record, page 37. 19 Ibidem, page 25. 20 Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing on 11 March 2016, hereinafter "Hearing" at minute 1:55:11. 21 Appellant Record, page 36. 22 RPD Reasons, paras. 41, 44. 23 Ibidem, para. 37. 24 Hearing at minute 1:53:40. 25 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/h41zf, para. 50. 26 Kabongo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 313), para. 11. 27 Exhibit P-5, RPD Record, pages 129-30. 28 Hearing at minute 1:08:38. 29 Ibidem, at minute 1:17:07. 30 Hearing at minutes 1:23:03 and 1:27:05. 31 Exhibit P-6, RPD Record, page 131. 32 Sheikh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 15200 (FC), http://canlii.ca/t/44md, paras. 23-25. 33 United States Department of State, Haiti: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015, at page 22. Haiti National Documentation Package dated 30 June 2015, Tab 2.1. United States Department of State, Haiti: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016, at pages 1 and 27. Haiti National Documentation Package dated 31 March 2017, Tab 2.1. 34 Dezameau v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 559, para. 29. 35 Appellant's Memorandum, page 23. 36 X (Re), 2016 CanLII 102055 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/h2s2t, paras. 3 and 13; and X (Re), 2015 CanLII 72158 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/gm0hq, paras. 25 and 26. 37 Exhibit P-9, RPD Record, page 134. 38 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Chairperson Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution. 39 Aziza Mahamat Nour v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 805, para. 37. 40 Manege v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 374, paras. 29 to 32. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : MB6-02302 16 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français