MB6-03487

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB6-03487 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered at Ottawa, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision October 30, 2017 Date de la décision Panel Me Christina Harrison Baird Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal Nicole Goulet Conseil(s) (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX1, a citizen of Libya, appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant requests to submit new evidence but not to have an oral hearing. The Appellant requests that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and remit this matter to a differently constituted panel of the RPD for re-determination. [2] The Minister did not intervene in the Appeal. DECISION [3] I find that the RPD made errors in its assessment of the Appellant's general credibility. I am unable to confirm or set aside the RPD decision without hearing evidence that was presented to the RPD. Pursuant to s. 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the decision of the RPD and refers the matter back to the RPD for re-determination by a differently constituted panel. [4] The appeal is allowed. BACKGROUND [5] The Appellant was a postsecondary student in Canada from 2014 to 2015. In May 2015, he obtained a work permit. In June 2015, he returned to his home in Tripoli, Libya for a visit. He alleges that the events giving rise to his refugee claim occurred there in July and August 2015. He claims that his younger brother XXXX secretly married a woman whose family had refused their consent to the marriage. The Appellant alleges that as retribution, her family - and in particular, her brothers - made a series of attacks and threats against his family. He states that if he is returned to Libya, he may be murdered by these brothers-in-law, who are also members of a militia. The Appellant claims that the woman's family rejected XXXX because his family belongs to the Amazigh ethnic community. [6] The RPD found that the Appellant was not credible. Due to contradictions, discrepancies and omissions that it perceived in the Appellant's testimony, the RPD did not believe that XXXX had disappeared, nor that the Appellant and his other brothers had gone into hiding from their brothers-in-law, who were members of a militia. The RPD was also of the view that the police complaints and the death certificate presented by the Appellant did not establish that his family was being threatened or attacked for the reasons that he alleged, and therefore accorded these documents no probative value. Finally, the RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's delay in claiming once he arrived safely back in Canada. [7] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its zeal to find discrepancies in his testimony, and drew improper conclusions based on an erroneous analysis of the facts. Moreover, the Appellant argues that the RPD Reasons do not demonstrate a rational connection between the discrepancies identified and a lack of credibility. [8] For these reasons, the Appellant requests that the RAD allow the appeal and send the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. DECISION ON WHETHER TO ADMIT NEW EVIDENCE [9] In light of the RPD's negative credibility finding, the Appellant submitted an Arabic to English translation of his Basis of Claim narrative, which was completed on 3 January 2016 by a certified translator.2 This document predates the Arabic to French translation, which was completed on 26 January 2016, and submitted to the RPD.3 The Appellant's RPD hearing took place on 12 May 2016, and the decision was dated 3 June 2016. [10] In an appeal before the RAD, the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim, or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection.4 In addition, the jurisprudence requires the evidence to be new, credible and relevant. 5 [11] Counsel for the Appellant argues that although the English translation does not meet the test set out in s. 110(4) of IRPA, the RAD should accept it. I disagree. If the evidence does not meet the statutory test, then I must not accept it.6 However, I find that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the English translation to the RPD. He submitted a translation into French that is substantially the same, but which differs in nuance. One such nuance became important to the assessment of the Appellant's credibility at his RPD hearing. The Appellant testified that he did not know the whereabouts of his brother XXXX XXXX after XXXX secretly married. The RPD asked the Appellant to explain this statement in light of his Basis of Claim narrative, which seemed to indicate that the appellant was being informed about XXXX whereabouts by XXXX friends.7 The Appellant stated that there must have been a translation error: he was looking for his brother but did not know where he was.8 In its reasons, the RPD did not accept this explanation.9 [12] For the Appellant to submit an English translation would have seemed duplicative and would not have respected the official language chosen for his claim. Only after the rejection of the claim did the importance of a nuance about the Appellant's interactions with XXXX friends become apparent. Therefore the English translation does meet the test in s. 110(4), in that it would not have been reasonable to have presented it before the rejection. With respect to the jurisprudential criteria that the additional evidence be new, credible and relevant, this document provides new and relevant information that the Appellant "was in contact with some friends in order to learn ... the whereabouts of [his] brother."10 This translation supports the credibility of the Appellant's claim that there was a translation error in the French version of his Basis of Claim narrative. I accept the Appellant's argument that the more accurate English translation eliminates the apparent contradiction between his oral testimony and his Basis of Claim.11 The Arabic to English translation is entered as Exhibit A-1. DECISION ON WHETHER TO HOLD AN ORAL HEARING [13] The general rule is that the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD.12 The Appellant has not requested an oral hearing and the RAD only has discretion to hold one when there is additional documentary evidence and all of the conditions in s. 110(6) are met.13 [14] While I have held that the new document proposed by the Appellant meets the statutory and jurisprudential criteria for admission, in my view, it is not necessary to hold a hearing. The evidence that I have accepted raises no issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant that is both serious and central to my decision, and which would require examination at an oral hearing pursuant to s. 110(6) of IRPA. Furthermore, as I will explain in the section Outstanding Issues below, the evidence I have accepted is not able to bring me to the point of accepting or rejecting this refugee claim. SCOPE OF THE RAD APPEAL [15] The RAD is required to consider carefully the decision of the RPD and to carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. The process before the RAD is a "hybrid appeal," which differs from a judicial review. The Federal Court of Appeal has explicitly distinguished the RAD's review of the RPD from the high level of deference afforded by appellate courts to lower courts. The standard of review for questions of law is correctness. The standard of review for findings of fact and findings of mixed fact and law is also correctness, where those findings raise no issue of credibility of oral evidence.14 [16] For findings that require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence, the RAD should determine whether the RPD benefited from a meaningful advantage over the RAD, and whether the RAD should therefore give deference to a particular finding. Whether deference should be accorded will be determined based on the circumstances of each case.15, 16 Where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage in making a particular finding, the RAD will use the reasonableness standard of review, modified to apply to the RAD context.17 [17] Having made its own analysis of the record, the RAD may either confirm the decision of the RPD, or set it aside and substitute its own decision.18 The RAD must provide a final determination unless it cannot do so without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD. Only in cases where it cannot make a final determination, the RAD may refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. 19 ANALYSIS [18] I have listened to the recording of the hearing before the RPD and analyzed the entire RPD Record. I have considered all the arguments of the Appellant. The determinative issue at the RPD was credibility. Credibility [19] Having made my own analysis of the record, I find that the RPD erred in its zeal to find weaknesses in the Appellant's testimony.20 Examples from the RPD's credibility findings follow. Attacks and threats against the Appellant [20] The Appellant testified that on 6 August 2015, his home and family were attacked by armed men who fired guns and lit the house on fire. The Appellant heard the attackers shouting his brother XXXX name and neighbours reported that the attackers said XXXX took their sister.21 XXXX was murdered on the 20 or 21 August 2015; and between 22 and 23 August, the Appellant claims he received about 5 threatening phone calls, where the caller stated they would kill the Appellant like his brother was killed. 22 As he was leaving XXXX funeral on 24 August 2015, the Appellant alleges shots were fired at the car he was driving. As corroboration, the Appellant presents three police reports, one of which names a brother-in-law as the owner of the telephone from which the death threats emanated.23 The Appellant testified that two brothers of XXXX bride are members of the militia in Tripoli's Souk Al Joemaa.24 [21] The RPD did not believe that the Appellant's brothers-in-law were targeting him.25 Nor did the tribunal believe that they were members of a militia, since the Appellant did not mention this explicitly in his Basis of Claim.26 The RPD was also of the view that the police complaints presented by the Appellant did not establish that he was being threatened or attacked for the reasons that he alleged, and accorded them no probative value.27 Characterizing the Appellant's testimony as difficult and evasive, the RPD was not satisfied with his explanations about his complaints to the police, his motivation for making them, and his failure to follow up afterward.28 [22] Having made an independent assessment of the evidence, I find that the RPD was incorrect in its analysis of the risks alleged by the Appellant at the hands of his brothers-in-law. Since there was no valid reason to doubt the truthfulness of the Appellant's sworn testimony, the presumption of truth stands.29 It was not a material omission in his narrative when the Appellant neglected to specify that two of his brothers-in-law are militia members in their district of Tripoli. He states that he does not know why he did not include this precision. However Counsel submits that the Basis of Claim describes the attack on the Appellant's home, "par un groupe de personnes avec des armes à feu." 30 In addition, the French translation of his narrative refers to the Appellant's fear of "groupes armés" while the English refers to "armed criminal gangs". The RPD generally does not enjoy a meaningful advantage over the RAD in drawing inferences.31 Since this negative inference was based on a non-existent omission, the RAD does not owe any deference to the RPD on this finding. [23] The documentary evidence that was before the RPD provided objective support for the Appellant's allegations about discrimination against Amazighs, the attack on his family home and the membership of his brothers-in-law in a militia. Numerous sources document discrimination against Amazigh people under the Qaddafi regime.32 In addition, civil society and media reports document human rights abuses in the western part of the country, including indiscriminate attacks on civilians, torture and burning of houses based on political belief, family or tribal affiliation. Armed groups destroy private property with impunity. The government's lack of control led to impunity for armed groups on all sides of the conflict across the country.33 It is reported that: In Tripoli, following the capital's fall, 17 military councils and a large number of neighbourhood vigilante groups formed. ... the number of armed groups exploded in the chaos that ensued after the Qaddafi regime's demise. The prospect of material benefits from the new government spurred the formation of local military councils. ....Such armed groups mostly recruited from among local or tribal constituencies. Many revolutionary groups expanded significantly through new recruitment among civilians. For others, the revolutionary label was little more than a front for criminal activities. 34 In light of this expert evidence, I find that any ambiguity in the Appellant's nomenclature for the armed group to which his brothers-in-law belonged is quite justified. [24] I find that the RPD accorded no probative value to three police reports that were relevant, without giving clear and comprehensible reasons for so doing. It is one thing to point out the limitations of circumstantial evidence, as the RPD did: for example, the RPD noted that the police complaint admitted as Exhibit D-6 does not establish the brother-in-law's motivation for making telephone calls to the Appellant. It is quite another thing to dismiss outright independent and relevant documentary evidence without explaining why it is not credible or trustworthy. In this instance, the police report does establish that a particular brother-in-law was telephoning the Appellant, and that there was a conflict between the two. I am persuaded by the arguments of the Appellant on this point.35 The RPD was incorrect to ignore the corroborative value of the police reports. [25] Finally, having listened to the audio recording of the RPD hearing, I do not agree with the RPD that the Appellant was evasive. The RPD gives an example at paragraph 16 of its reasons, which - Counsel submits and I agree - illustrates the point. The RPD asked why the Appellant did not make the police complaint about the attack on his house in person. The Appellant replied that he was ensuring the safety of his family. Asked why he did not go to the police after having taken care of the family, the Appellant replied that he was afraid. Asked what he was afraid of, the Appellant replied he was afraid of the people who set fire to his home. Asked why he did not follow up with the police in the days following the attack, the Appellant replied that the police would do nothing more than take notes of what happened. Asked why he had bothered to lodge a police complaint at all then, the Appellant replied that he wanted to document the occurrence for potential legal use in the future.36 While the RPD may not have received the answers it expected or desired, I find that the Appellant did answer the questions in a direct and logical fashion. If the RPD made additional observations, for example with respect to the Appellant's demeanour, that the RAD was not equally well-placed to make, it did not state them in its reasons. Therefore I conclude that the RPD did not have a meaningful advantage and is not entitled to any deference with respect to this finding. Fate of the Appellant's brothers [26] The Appellant testified that the last time he saw his brother XXXX alive was at his own wedding on 20 July 2015. Soon after that, XXXX eloped with his girlfriend of three years, and the next time the Appellant saw him was at the morgue on 21 August 2015.37 He presents his brother's death certificate - which lists the cause of death as a gunshot wound to the chest - as corroboration.38 Between 20 July and 21 August 2015, the Appellant states that he was looking for XXXX without success.39 After their home was burned on 6 August 2015, the Appellant alleges he and his family took refuge with his maternal uncle for three days. He states that his uncle could not shelter them all for an extended period, so the Appellant and his two brothers left on 10 August 2015, each to find his own safe place. [27] The Appellant initially testified that he had not heard from his brothers since August 2015, and stated that he did not know the exact date. Pressed by the RPD for greater precision, he said he had not heard from them since the 10th or 11th of August. He explained that he lost contact with them because the communications network in Libya is under surveillance and they feared that their attackers would locate them if they communicated.40 When the RPD pointed out that his Basis of Claim narrative gave the impression that he was in contact with his brothers until after XXXX funeral, and possibly until the time he departed Libya, the Appellant stated that he did not know what he told the translator, but he was sure he had not spoken to his surviving brothers since 10 August 2015.41 The Appellant listed only one residential address in Tripoli in his immigration forms.42 [28] The RPD did not believe that XXXX had disappeared.43 Due to discrepancies in the date that they allegedly lost contact and the omission of any address where the Appellant stayed after the burning of his family's home, the RPD also did not believe that the Appellant and his other brothers had gone into hiding.44 Moreover, the RPD did not believe that the Appellant was obliged to go to the hospital to identify the body of his errant brother, due to an inconsistency regarding XXXX occupation on his death certificate, and because the Appellant adjusted his testimony about who attended at the hospital.45 In addition, the RPD gave no probative value to the death certificate because it gave the cause of death without providing any information about the circumstances or the motive of the shooting.46 [29] In light of the new information offered by Exhibit A-1, and for the reasons stated above at paragraph 12 of these reasons, I accept that there is no contradiction in the Appellant's testimony about his knowledge of XXXX whereabouts. However, I agree with the RPD that the Appellant's testimony about the necessity to hide and the loss of contact with his surviving brothers contains discrepancies. At one point it seemed the Appellant was stating that he had had indirect contact with his brothers, but he later asserted there was none.47 As the RPD noted, the potential span of time between the date he asserted he lost contact with his brothers (10 August 2015) and the time that he left Libya (1 October 2015) is considerable. On this question of fact, the interplay between the Appellant's signed documents, sworn statements and live testimony, makes the weighing of evidence a delicate matter. Where there is an inconsistency between oral and documentary evidence, the RAD has held that the RPD may have a meaningful advantage for having seen and heard the Appellant, chosen the questions and listened to the answers.48 I find that the RPD did have a meaningful advantage to assess shifts in the Appellant's testimony and the reasonableness of his explanation for failing to provide additional addresses. Therefore I give deference on this finding. The Appellant has not established his credibility regarding the loss of contact with his brothers, which also brings into question whether they all were forced to hide. [30] Similarly, the Appellant gave confused and shifting testimony regarding which of his family members dealt with the administration of the hospital where XXXX body lay. The RPD had a meaningful advantage for having seen and heard the Appellant, chosen the questions and listened to the answers on this point. I give deference to the RPD finding that the Appellant has not established his credibility about his involvement in the process of identifying and recovering XXXX body. [31] However, I cannot agree with the RPD that the Appellant's weak testimony justifies the outright dismissal of the independent document certifying the death of his brother. Nor do I find the error about XXXX occupation on the face of that document determinative. The RPD did not state any other reason for doubting the authenticity or the trustworthiness of this document. In my view, it deserves some weight as circumstantial evidence supporting the Appellant's allegations, i.e. that members of his family are at risk of persecution by another Tripoli family that is able to carry out its threats. While it is true that this document cannot provide a motive for the shooting, this does not limit its usefulness as documentation of a violent death. Delay in claiming [32] After the events of August 2015, the Appellant states he remained in hiding and began to make preparations to leave Libya and return to Canada. He testified that since the primary airport had been burned, he was forced to leave through the secondary airport, which was controlled by the militia. Due to his fear of his brothers-in-law, and the concern that his name might be flagged by militia at the airport, the Appellant alleges he sought help to depart Libya. The people assisting him specified that he would leave on XXXX XXXX 2015, and he did so.49 Upon arrival in Canada on XXXX XXXX 2015, the Appellant still held a valid work permit. He states that he hoped somehow the problem between the two families would be resolved, but did not know what to do to resolve it. Ultimately he despaired of finding a solution and, informed of the refugee protection system in Canada by a friend, he decided to make a claim in January 2016.50 [33] The RPD found the Appellant's testimony vague. The RPD drew a negative inference from the Appellant's delay in claiming once he arrived safely back in Canada, observing that it was unlikely that he was unaware of the refugee protection system, and that nothing prevented him from claiming refugee status and then changing his mind if he found a solution to his problems in Libya.51 [34] Having conducted an independent analysis of the record, I find that the Appellant's credibility is not diminished by any delay. First, he provided a reasonable explanation for the delay in departing Libya. Although he could return to a legal status in Canada, he feared that his brothers-in-law would intercept him at the airport, and so he sought assistance to evade them on departure. Second, upon arrival in Canada the Appellant states he did not immediately consider staying permanently, since he still hoped to return to his new wife and the rest of his family in Libya. [35] The RAD does not owe any deference on plausibility findings and I find that the RPD erred in concluding, without evidence, that the Appellant was aware of Canada's refugee protection system. Moreover, even had the Appellant been aware of this option, the RPD's assertion that there was no impediment to him claiming refugee status and then changing his mind is not quite accurate. A holder of temporary immigration status in Canada becomes ineligible to retain that status upon declaring their intention not to leave Canada at the end of their authorized stay.52 Moreover, they do not become eligible again for a full year after a negative determination of their refugee claim.53 Therefore, persons in the position of the Appellant, who enjoyed a valid temporary status, must consider carefully the consequences of making a claim. Finally, the Appellant gave an explanation for waiting to claim. He said this was the first time in his life that such a thing had happened to him and he hoped that a solution would present itself. In the words of Václav Havel, "Hope is not prognostication. It is an orientation of the spirit, and orientation of the heart; it transcends the world that is immediately experienced, and is anchored somewhere beyond its horizons." The Appellant should not be punished for hoping. His credibility is not impugned because of his delay in claiming refugee status. [36] In summary, I have found the Appellant credible about the attacks and threats he experienced in Tripoli. I also believe that his brother XXXX was murdered and that his murder was related to his secret marriage into a family that rejected him due to his Amazigh ethnicity. I find that the Appellant has a subjective fear of his brothers-in-law, whom he believes to be part of a militia. For these reasons, key findings of the RPD on credibility cannot stand, and the decision as a whole must be set aside. [37] I find that the Appellant has not established his credibility with respect to his loss of contact with his surviving brothers, or his own role in dealing with the body of his brother XXXX. Outstanding issues [38] It remains for the Appellant to establish his credibility in a positive sense before the RPD. In addition, the Appellant must address the ability and willingness of his brothers-in-law to continue persecuting him, in order to establish his risk of future harm. I cannot draw a conclusion about the likelihood of harm, the adequacy of state protection, nor about the existence of an internal flight alternative. Since these determinative aspects of the claim were not mentioned in the RPD reasons, they were also not the subject of this appeal. I am not able, therefore, to make a decision on the merits of this case. These issues must be analysed in order to draw a conclusion whether the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution in Libya pursuant to IRPA s. 96, or whether it is more likely than not that the Appellant would face a risk of torture or a risk to his life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in Libya pursuant to IRPA s. 97. CONCLUSION [39] I am unable to confirm or set aside the RPD decision without hearing evidence that was presented to the RPD with respect to likelihood of harm, adequacy of state protection and internal flight alternative. Pursuant to section 111(1)(c) of IRPA, the RAD refers the refugee claim of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX back to the RPD for re-determination by a differently constituted panel. DECISION [40] The appeal is allowed. (signed) Christina Harrison Baird Me Christina Harrison Baird October 30, 2017 Date 1 Identified in Canadian immigration documents as XXXXX XXXX, hereinafter "the Appellant". 2 Appellant's Record, pages 36-40. 3 Ibid., pages 24-28. 4 Section 110(4) of IRPA. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96 (CanLII) at paras. 38 and 44 to 49. 6 Ibid., para. 63. 7 Basis of Claim narrative, line 69, RPD Record, page 23. 8 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 2:08:46. 9 RPD Reasons, para. 21. 10 Appellant's Record, page 38. 11 Appellant's Memorandum, para. 54. 12 Section 110(3) of IRPA. 13 Balde v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-3724-14, Mosley, May 12, 2015, 2015 FC 624 at para. 32. 14 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, at paras. 37, 48, 78 and 103. 15 Ibid., at para. 70. 16 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/h41zf. 17 Ibid., at para. 116. 18 Section 111(1)(a) and 111(1)(b) of IRPA. 19 Section 111(1)(c) and 111(2) of IRPA; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 at para. 103. 20 Attakora v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1989] FCJ No. 444. 21 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 0:43:44. 22 Ibid., at hour 1:24:25. 23 Exhibits D-5, D-6 and D-7, RPD Record, pages 26 to 31. 24 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 0:35:07 and 2:31:00. 25 RPD Reasons, para. 14. 26 Ibid., paras. 24-26. 27 Ibid., paras. 30-33. 28 Ibid., paras. 15-17. 29 Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.). 30 Basis of Claim narrative, line 55, RPD Record, page 22. 31 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/h41zf, para. 57. 32 Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Libya: The situation of Amazighs (Berbers) and their treatment by society and the government since the fall of Muamar Qaddafi (September 2011-October 2012), LBY104237.FE, 25 October 2012. 33 National Documentation Package for Libya dated 29 April 2016, Tab 2.1, United States of America. Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Libya, 13 April 2016, at pages 3-4 and 12. 34 Ibid., Tab 10.2, Small Arms Survey. Politics by other means: Conflicting interests in Libya's security sector, October 2014, at pages 18-19. 35 Appellant's Memorandum, paras. 77-79. 36 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 1:06:00. 37 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 0:37:57 and 1:24:25. 38 Exhibit D-4, RPD Record, pages 49 to 51. 39 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 2:08:46. 40 Ibid., at hour 0:28:14. 41 Ibid., at hour 2:06:52. 42 IMM5669, Question 12, RPD Record, page 106. 43 RPD Reasons, para. 21. 44 RPD Reasons, paras. 18-20. 45 Ibid., paras. 22-23. 46 Ibid., para. 29. 47 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 2:03:20. 48 X (Re), 2017 CanLII 33034 (CA IRB), http://canlii.ca/t/h41zf, para. 50. 49 Audio recording of the RPD Hearing on 12 May 2016, at hour 1:55:28. 50 Ibid., at hour 2:15:13. 51 RPD Reasons, paras. 27-28. 52 Sections 179 and 180 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. 53 Section 24(4) of IRPA. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ 13 RAD.25.02 (September 11, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB6-03487