MB9-20695
The appellant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he would face a serious risk in Merida or that relocation there would be objectively unreasonable; therefore Merida is a viable internal flight alternative and the refugee protection claim fails.
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- MB9-20695
- Parties
- Appellant: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; Respondent: Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
- Court
- Refugee Appeal Division
- Jurisdiction
- Canada
- Judgment Date
- 13 November 2019
- Procedural Posture
- Refugee Protection Appeal / Appeal Decision (rad)
- Outcome
- Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed
- Legal Topics
- Internal Flight Alternative, Exclusion (article 1 F), Credibility Assessment, Standard of Review, Request for Hearing/new Evidence
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
Appellant
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Refugee Protection Appeal / Appeal Decision (rad)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the proposed internal flight alternative (Merida, Yucatan) is viable
- 2 Whether the appellant was excluded under Article 1F(b) or 1F(c)
- 3 Whether the RPD erred in credibility assessment
Ratio Decidendi
The appellant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he would face a serious risk in Merida or that relocation there would be objectively unreasonable; therefore Merida is a viable internal flight alternative and the refugee protection claim fails.
Court Disposition
Appeal dismissed; RPD decision confirmed
Orders
- Appeal dismissed and RPD decision confirmed pursuant to IRPA s.111(1)(a)
- Request for a hearing denied (no new documentary evidence filed under s.110(6) IRPA)
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
1 paragraphs
RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB9-20695 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Montréal, QC Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision November 13, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Me Bianca Eleonora Suciu Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Jamal Addine Fraygui Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Mexico, is appealing against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated August 20, 2019, rejecting his claim for refugee protection under sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). OVERVIEW [2] The appellant alleges that he fears criminals who were reportedly behind the death of his brother XXXX. XXXX was a delinquent who fell in with the wrong crowd. Following his divorce in 2013, XXXX moved in with the appellant and his sisters. Armed individuals allegedly monitored their home constantly and fired shots. The appellant was the target of intimidation by those individuals, who questioned him about his brother's comings and goings. [3] In XXXX 2017, the appellant came to Canada for five months. He returned to Mexico on XXXX XXXX, 2018, after his sisters told him that the situation at home had settled down. However, once he returned, he realized that things had not changed. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, the appellant heard shots and found out that his brother had been injured and was in the hospital. He left Mexico the next day, XXXX XXXX, 2018, to claim refugee protection in Canada. His brother died from his injuries on XXXX XXXX, 2018. The appellant still fears for his life should he return to Mexico. DETERMINATION OF THE REFUGEE PROTECTION DIVISION [4] The RPD determined that the appellant was not excluded under Article 1F(b) and Article 1F(c) of the United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees1 (the Convention). Concerning inclusion, the RPD concluded that the appellant had a viable internal flight alternative in Merida. More specifically, the RPD concluded that the appellant had not shown on a balance of probabilities that his brother's agents of persecution had the interest or the ability to pursue the appellant in the city proposed for the IFA. Finally, the RPD concluded that the appellant had not shown that his relocation to Merida was unreasonable. Yucatan remains the most peaceful state in Mexico, and the appellant acknowledged that he could find XXXX work, in which he has experience. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS [5] The appellant alleges, in general terms, that the RPD erred in its analysis. He also argues that the RPD erred in the assessment of his credibility and did not consider all of the evidence. He asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to allow the appeal and to hold a hearing. DETERMINATION [6] Having conducted an independent analysis of all of the evidence on the record, including the recording of the hearing, I agree with the RPD that the determinative issue in this case is the internal flight alternative (IFA) in Merida, and I confirm its decision, as explained below. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [7] The RAD must review the RPD decision and undertake its own analysis on the basis of all the evidence on the record in order to determine whether, in light of all the arguments advanced by the appellant, the RPD erred. The standard of review applicable in this case is correctness.2 REQUEST TO HOLD A HEARING [8] The appellant requests that the RAD hold a hearing.3 A hearing is not as of right. The RAD can grant a hearing only if new documentary evidence is submitted on appeal, in accordance with the criteria set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. In this case, the appellant has not submitted any new evidence to support his appeal. As a result, his request for a hearing is rejected. ANALYSIS Regarding the exclusion [9] The Minister did not intervene before the RPD or the RAD on the question of the appellant's exclusion under articles 1F(b) and 1F(c) of the Convention. Nor did the appellant challenge the RPD's conclusions on those aspects, which I find correct. Regarding the inclusion Credibility [10] The appellant submits that the RPD erred in the analysis of his credibility. He argues that the RPD should have assessed his explanations instead of highlighting the inconsistencies.4 [11] This argument has no merit since the RPD did not question the appellant's credibility when analyzing the inclusion.5 Analysis of the internal flight alternative [12] The IFA test is two-pronged. Once the issue of the IFA is raised, the onus is on the refugee protection claimant to establish that: 1) on a balance of probabilities, he faces a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual punishment in the locations proposed as an IFA; and 2) considering all the circumstances, it would be objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh for the applicant to relocate there. [13] Having carried out my own analysis, I am of the view that the RPD was correct in concluding that the appellant has a viable IFA in Merida, Yucatan. The appellant failed to establish that he would face a serious risk of persecution there or that, on a balance of probabilities, he would face any of the risks set out in section 97 of the IRPA, namely a risk to his life, a danger of torture, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. He also failed to establish that relocating would be unreasonable for him. I agree with the RPD's conclusions for the same reasons. [14] The appellant makes a general argument to the effect that the RPD erred in the IFA analysis. [15] First of all, the appellant does not specify for the RAD what errors the RPD is supposed to have committed in its assessment of the evidence or the law. According to paragraph 3(3)(g) of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules, a memorandum must include full and detailed submissions regarding the errors that are the grounds of the appeal. [16] In this case, the appellant, for the most part, is merely repeating the allegations he made before the RPD. First prong: fear in the IFA [17] The appellant is challenging the RPD's analysis in paragraphs 21 to 24 and 33 to 34 of the decision, alleging that he is a person of interest for his brother's assailants, as he is the one who would answer the door when his brother was out and tell them to leave. [18] The RPD considered that explanation and correctly concluded that it was insufficient to support the conclusion that his brother's assailants would be interested in coming after the appellant, given the following facts: the appellant was never violent or aggressive toward them in such a way as to incite them to revenge or to arouse their interest in him; these criminals never attacked the appellant; they had achieved their objective of murdering his brother.6 [19] The appellant also argues that the assailants may think that he is going to avenge his brother's death and that, to prevent him from doing so, they would come after him.7 That argument does not satisfy me either. Nothing on the record would indicate that the assailants are interested in the appellant or that they have been looking for him since his brother's death. In addition, the city proposed for an IFA is considerably far-nearly 17 hours by car-from where the appellant was living when the events took place. Therefore, the appellant would be well out of the criminals' sight, and I do not see how a return to that city could suggest to them that he would want to avenge his brother's death, as the appellant alleged. [20] The appellant is also challenging the RPD's analysis in paragraphs 25 to 27 and 31 to 32 of the decision, alleging that the criminals, although they previously did not need to make a big effort to find his brother, would not have difficulty in using the tools at their disposal to find him. As the appellant is active in the labour market, his personal information can be accessed by his persecutors. Having a cellular telephone can make it easier to find the appellant.8 [21] The RPD took those allegations into consideration and correctly concluded that they do not show that the criminals in question have the ability and the resources to find him in Merida, the city proposed for the IFA, given the following: the appellant does not know whether the criminals who killed his brother are part of a drug cartel or a neighbourhood gang; although the documentary evidence indicates that citizens' personal information can be bought for $12,000 US, nothing would suggest that his brother's assailants have the resources or the ability to access that kind of information. Concerning the argument that someone can be found if they have a telephone number, the documentary evidence indicates that this is not the case if the user has a private number, which would be an option for the appellant. [22] The RPD was also correct in concluding that, although some criminal groups may have access to personal information, in this case, as explained above, the appellant failed to show that the people who murdered his brother have an interest in coming after him. [23] I agree with the RPD that the appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, the criminals' interest in finding him in Merida or their ability to do so. [24] Finally, the appellant argues that the panel had the obligation to independently examine the merits of each allegation and to objectively evaluate the facts and the evidence to determine whether the claimant's fear of persecution was well-founded.9 [25] I find that the RPD correctly considered all of the evidence on the record in its analysis of the appellant's prospective risk in the IFA, which I find to be correct. Second prong: reasonableness of the IFA [26] The appellant argues that the RPD erred in paragraphs 36 and 37 of its decision because, although he acknowledged to the panel that he could find a job in Merida, the lack of family support would put the appellant in a difficult and awkward position.10 [27] Contrary to the appellant's contention, a lack of family support does not make the IFA unreasonable. As the Federal Court held in Ranganatham, the bar must be set very high when it comes to determining whether it is unreasonable for a refugee protection claimant to relocate elsewhere in the country to flee the alleged danger. The Court states as follows: It requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant in travelling or temporarily relocating to a safe area ... This is in sharp contrast with undue hardship resulting from loss of employment, loss of status, reduction in quality of life, loss of aspirations, loss of beloved ones and frustration of one's wishes and expectations.11 (Emphasis added by the panel) [28] The appellant's circumstances do not meet the unreasonableness threshold of IFA, and the RPD did not err in that regard. [29] The RPD was right to conclude that the appellant has a viable IFA in Merida. CONCLUSION [30] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, I dismiss the appeal and confirm the RPD's determination that the appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, has not established that he is a refugee or a person in need of protection pursuant to section 96 or section 97 of the IRPA. [31] The appeal is dismissed. (Signed) Bianca Eleonora Suciu Me Bianca Eleonora Suciu November 13, 2019 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 189 U.N.T.S. 150 2 Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145, paras 90, 91; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, paras 70-74. 3 Appellant's memorandum, para. 58. 4 Appellant's memorandum, paras 29, 51, 56 and 57. 5 RPD decision, para. 6 RPD decision, paras 21-24. 7 Appellant's memorandum, paras 30-33, 43-46. 8 Appellant's memorandum, paras 35-38, 40-41. 9 Appellant's memorandum, para. 52. 10 Appellant's memorandum, paras 47-50. 11 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001] 2 FC 164, para. 15. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB9-20695 RAD.25.02 (April 4, 2019) Disponible en français 7 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 4, 2019) Disponible en français