TB5-03783

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-03783 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision August 19, 2015 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Clifford D. Luyt Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) Martin Ginsherman Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, (the Appellant), a citizen of Colombia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. She has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to overturn the decision of the RPD and to find that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests an oral hearing in accordance to section 110 (6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). In the further alternative, the Appellant requests the matter be returned to the RPD to be heard by a different panel. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she has reason to fear for her life in Colombia because her father has been threatened by paramilitaries and is also being persecuted by the government of Colombia. More details can be found in the Appellant's Basis of Claim form1and in the audio transcript2 of the hearing. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on January 28, 2015. The Minister intervened in the case, serving notice on December 19, 2014 of his intent to intervene. The Minister submitted evidence3 for the RPD hearing which undermined the Appellant's credibility as well as the merit of her claim. The panel handed down its decision, in writing, on March 18, 2015 finding that the Appellant was neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred when it misunderstood the claim of the Appellant, failed to properly consider whether the Appellant had a well-founded fear of persecution by the paramilitaries and "Bandas Criminales" (Criminal Bands) or BACRIM, and otherwise erred in fact and law. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] Even where a document meets the test in Section 110(4), this does not require the RAD to admit it into evidence without any further consideration. It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in her Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of Section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellant.4 [8] The Appellant has submitted a document5 known as "Constancia de Atencion a Quien Pueda Interesar" (English - Record of Service) from an organization called the "Personeria de Medellin", a government operated Ombudsman for human rights issues. This document may have been available before the decision of the RPD was handed down however, it would not have been reasonably available to the Appellant as the document was issued in Colombia, to the Appellant's mother who is in hiding. The mother then forwarded the document to the Appellant's father who then sent it to the Appellant. The RAD will allow this document because it does speak to some of the allegations made by the Appellant. The RAD will assess the amount of weight to give this document, separately. Role of the RAD [9] Counsel has made some submissions in regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision. The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,6 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error." [10] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RAD will recognize and respect the credibility findings of the RPD or other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. The RPD's Findings [11] The RPD found many discrepancies between oral testimony of the Appellant and her documentary evidence. Specifically, for example, in oral testimony, the Appellant testified that from about 2004 or 2005 until 2011 she resided in Medellin with her maternal grandmother however; in her documents,7 sworn to be true, accurate and complete, the Appellant had written her address as being at her father's home in the city of Valencia during that similar time period. When confronted with this inconsistency, the Appellant testified that she had not wanted to be with her grandmother so considered her father's home to be her home. The panel found that to be an issue as the Appellant was obviously telling two different entities of the Canadian government two different stories. The RPD drew a negative inference from this inconsistency. [12] Another inconsistency was pointed out to the panel by the Minister. In her application for Humanitarian and Compassionate grounds the Appellant had disclosed her reason for being sent to live with grandparents was due to the fact that her parents were impoverished, however in oral testimony, the Appellant claimed she was sent away for security reasons. [13] The Appellant argues that the credibility issues (other than those dealing with the Appellant's father and familial risk factors) are of little or no relevance to the merits of the claim. Some of the credibility issues identified were based on contradictions or inconsistencies between oral testimony by the Appellant and sworn statements which were completed for her on her behalf. The Appellant argues that, as a minor, she should not be held responsible for the wrongs, regardless of how right-minded they were, of the adults who were trying to help her. The RAD agrees with the Appellant on that issue and consequently does not infer negative credibility in regards to those specific issues. Although the Appellant is now an adult, she was not so when her paper work was filed or when she had her hearing. [14] However; whether the Appellant lied or nor about her place of residence during those years and regardless of the motive for those lies, the fact does remain that the Appellant lived with her grandmother from about 2005 to 2011 with no apparent problems, in Medellin. According to her testimony, the Appellant came to Canada to go to school; however her passport indicated that she had only a basic visitor's visa. The Appellant testified that she did receive a paper after arriving in Canada which allowed her to go to school. It was not until the time came in 2014 that the Appellant apparently found out about her father's difficulties through her aunt with whom she resides in Mississauga. This is the time when it was decided that she would apply for refugee status, as she was about to return to Colombia. The RAD finds that the Appellant has accessed the refugee system as a last ditch effort to stay in Canada where she will enjoy a better education and a better future, and not because she will be persecuted in her home country. [15] The Appellant argues that the new evidence establishes that the Appellant's family was forcibly displaced in 1996, that they were subjected to further threats and extortion demands in or up to XXXX 2014 and that a further complaint was registered against government entities on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015. [16] The RAD notes that the documentary evidence8 speaks to the internally displaced persons (IDPs) as numbering in excess of 5.7 million, making the Appellant's family part of a very large segment of the population as opposed to a specifically targeted segment. The new evidence does confirm that the family became IDPs in 1996, nineteen years ago. Although tragic for anyone to suffer, that alone does not qualify one to be considered as a Convention refugee. The new evidence also speaks to the fact that the Appellant's mother complained of a threat against the family on the same day that the family was forcibly displaced, in 1996. The document further verifies that the Appellant's mother complained on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014 about being extorted but gives no details. Lastly, the document speaks to the fact that the mother swore out a complaint against government entities. That complaint was referred to the appropriate authorities, that is, the Office of the Attorney General for the Nation, the Ombudsman, and the Superior Council of Judiciary. None of the content of this document actually speaks to persecution of anyone. It speaks to a nineteen year old incident which has affected millions of Colombians. It speaks to a criminal act of extortion which is criminality. Criminality is not a ground for refugee status if it is a generalized risk. The document also speaks to a complaint against a government entity which appears to be given due notice and referred to three separate adjudicatory processes. In regards to this new evidence, the RAD can give it little weight as it does not confirm anything more than that noted above, none of which is a ground for refugee protection. [17] The Appellant argues that as a "returnee" to Colombia, she would face the same issues identified in documents that IDPs face in Colombia. This amounts to a "sur place" claim. The Appellant was already an IDP since 1996, as a child but spent about seven of those years (2004-2011) living peacefully with her grandparents. Should she return to Colombia, she has been unable to provide any logical reason why she could not return to live with those same grandparents, who understandably are a few years older than when she left, but so is the Appellant. The Appellant is now an adult who is capable of seeking employment like most adults do. The Appellant argues that she has never worked a day in her life and would not know how to find a job. The same would be true no matter where she lives; including in Canada, so that is not a reason for her not to return to Medellin. The RAD finds that there is no substantial reason given to prevent the Appellant from returning to Medellin. The RAD finds that the Appellant could safely return to exactly where she had been living prior to her coming to Canada. State Protection [18] The Appellant testified that her father has faced extortion and death threats when he failed to meet the demands of the extortionists. The Federal Court has held that victims of crime, corruption9 or vendettas10 generally fail to establish a link between their fear of persecution and one of the Convention grounds in the definition of Convention refugee. The Board has been upheld in its finding of lack of nexus, where the claimant was a target of a personal vendetta11 or where the claimant was a victim of crime.12 [19] The Appellant's fear in this case is not linked to race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group. Therefore, I find the Appellant's father is a victim of crime, and this does not provide her with a link to a Convention ground. As a result this claim must fail under section 96 of the IRPA. However, a separate analysis under section 97 of the IRPA follows. Generalized Risk [20] I also find that the risks feared by the claimant has no nexus to the Convention as they are risks generally faced by other citizens in Colombia, especially those in business. [21] The harm feared by the Appellant does not amount to persecution or to a personalized risk to her life, or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to a danger of torture. The courts have expressed the view that consideration of an application under section 97(1)(b)(ii) of the Act requires a personalized review in the context of the actual and potential risks to which the Appellant is subject. In cases like this, where the general public is subject to the risk of crime, the fact that some individuals are more exposed to the risk because they live in more dangerous areas or because they are perceived as being wealthier, does not necessarily make them "persons in need of protection". A person who is a direct victim of crime is not automatically a person in need of protection within the meaning of section 97 of the Act.13 Documentary evidence indicates that crime is prevalent in Colombia, especially so in the largest cities such as Cartagena. [22] I find that the appellant's father was a victim of criminal extortion, but that this crime is widespread in Colombia and not specific to the Appellant's father. There was no persuasive evidence before me that the Appellant's father was targeted for any other reason than he was the owner or operator of a non-union construction company who refused to pay the extortion demands made of him. The IRPA does not extend its protection to persons such as this Appellant. [23] Section 97(1) of the IRPA states: "A person in need of protection is a person in Canada whose removal to their country or countries of nationality or, if they do not have a country of nationality, their country of former habitual residence, would subject them personally (b) to a risk to their life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment if ... the risk would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country." [24] I find the Appellant's fear is a generalized one. The Court sees nothing in s. 97(1)(b)(ii) that requires the RAD to interpret "generally" as applying to all citizens. The word "generally" is commonly used to mean "prevalent" or "widespread."14 [25] I have reviewed the jurisprudence relating to generalized risk, and in this connection, I considered the case of Vickram,15 a businessman of Indo-Guyanese origin, who was threatened, beaten and harassed repeatedly by a group of black bandits in Guyana, and was determined to have been victimized due to his profile of belonging to a wealthy business family. The Federal Court upheld the Board's determination that the risk faced by that claimant16 was criminal activity and was no greater than that faced by the population at large, and that the perception of wealth does not constitute a particularized risk under section 97. [26] While their case differs from the present case, I am of the view that if the risk to violence or injury or crime is a generalized risk faced by all citizens of Colombia, the fact that a specific number of individuals may be targeted more frequently, does not mean that they are not subject to a "generalized risk" of violence. The fact that they share the same risk as other persons similarly situated does not make their risk a "personalized risk" subject to protection under section 97. [27] In Martinez Pineda and a case similar to it, Zacarias,17 the Court ruled that the Board must consider the specific circumstances of the claimants, which I have done. Referring to the other cases I have mentioned, Acosta was facing death at the hands of the Maras for inadvertently failing to pay the extortion money taken from bus drivers and fare collectors. Paz Guifarro faced retaliation for not complying with the extortion demands of the Maras and reporting them to the police. That, however, did not turn their risk as one of many such victims of these gangs into a personalized risk. In Acosta, the Court stated that victims of generalized violence are often known to the perpetrators, by name, by position, or for any number of different reasons. The fact that the victims of generalized violence have an identity, as all people do, and that that identity is or becomes known to the perpetrator, does not mean that they are not a victim of generalized violence. Furthermore, regarding generalized risk in Paz Guifarro: The Court underscored that it is now settled law that claims will not meet the requirements of section 97(1)(b(ii) of the IRPA where (i) targeting is because of the claimant's membership in a sub-group of persons returning from abroad or perceived to have wealth for other reasons and (ii) that sub-group is sufficiently large that the risk can reasonably be characterized as being widespread or prevalent in that country. A sub-group numbering in the thousands would be sufficiently large as to render the risk widespread or prevalent and therefore "general" even though that sub-group may only constitute a small percentage of the general population in that country. [28] Consequential harm experienced by persons who are targeted by criminal elements does not necessarily mean that their risk is personalized/not generalized, whether risk of actual or threatened violence is faced generally by others and not specific to the claimant. In summary, the fact * that a person or group of people may be victimized repeatedly or more frequently by criminals, for example, because of their perceived wealth or because they live in a more dangerous area, * that the claimant continues to be pursued after reporting to police or relocating, * that the claimant faces retaliation for not complying with the demands of the criminals, does not remove the risk from the exception, if it is one faced generally by others. The consequential harm faced in the circumstances does not mean that the risk is not a generalized one.18 [29] Even though the Appellant's father may have been specifically targeted by the Union, everyone in Colombia faces a similar risk as the Appellant's father experienced. It is not just the fear of the risk, which is a section 96 analysis. To succeed under section 97, the risk must be a personal or individualized risk and must be likely to occur on a balance of probabilities, and that risk "would be faced by the person in every part of that country and is not faced generally by other individuals in or from that country." [30] In this case, it is accepted that the Appellant's father was subjected personally to a risk to harm under section 97 of the Act. Members of the Union "goon squad" targeted the Appellant's father due to his refusal to comply with extortion demands. [31] However, in accordance with the documentary evidence, the risk faced by the Appellant's father as a result of being a target of extortion is faced generally by all people in Colombia. The extortion would be faced in every part of the country and is faced generally by all individuals in Colombia. The evidence in this case shows that the fear of extortion has been recognized as a generalized risk. A generalized risk does not have to affect everyone in the same way. The Federal Court has upheld the Board in finding generalized risk for various victims of criminal actions. [32] I find, consequently, that on a balance of probabilities, the risk which the Appellant's father faced is generalized and one which is faced generally by the population of Colombia. Based on the particular facts of this case, even if the Appellant faced a particularized risk of harm in accordance with section 97 of the IRPA, the risk faced by the Appellant is generalized, which falls under the paragraph 97(1) (b) exception. [33] The documents19 indicate that there is very adequate state protection available to the Appellant's father. [34] According to the website of the National Police of Colombia (Policía Nacional de Colombia), that institution, the Administrative Department of Security (Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, DAS), and the Corps of Technical Investigators (Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación, CTI) of the Office of the Attorney General (Fiscalía General de la Nación) are the agencies responsible for receiving complaints of crimes such as homicide, bodily injuries, threats, sexual violence and harassment, trafficking in persons, theft, fraud, counterfeiting, extortion, terrorism and kidnapping (Colombia n.d.a). The US Department of State indicates in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010 that "the National Police are responsible for internal law enforcement and are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense" (US 8 Apr. 2011 Sec. 1d). The report also indicates that law enforcement duties are shared with the DAS and the CTI (ibid.). However, the DAS website indicates that the department is being disbanded and will conclude all operations in 2013 (Colombia n.d.b). [35] Further, the same document speaks to the specialized GAULA as follows: 4. Unified Action Groups for Personal Freedom The Ministry of Defence website indicates that the Unified Action Groups for Personal Freedom (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal, GAULA) are [translation] "exclusively dedicated to preventing and acting against kidnapping and extortion" (Colombia n.d.i). GAULAs are made up of personnel from the CTI, the Office of the Attorney General, the armed forces and the DAS (ibid.). They also collaborate with the National Kidnapping and Extortion Unit (Unidad Nacional contra el Secuestro y la Extorsión) of the Office of the Attorney General (ibid. n.d.j) in the preliminary investigation of kidnapping, extortion and related crimes (ibid. n.d.k). They are responsible for carrying out military rescue operations to free kidnapped persons and for dismantling criminal groups that commit these crimes (ibid.). GAULAs consist of the following four units: 1) Unified Management Unit, which is managed by the prosecutor assigned to the case and a military or police commander; 2) Intelligence and Evaluation Unit, which is composed of intelligence analysts and communication technicians that collect information and submit a variety of action plans to the Unified Management Unit; 3) Operations Unit, which is composed of armed forces personnel that plan and execute rescue, protection, and detention operations; and 4) Investigative Unit, which is composed of detectives and judicial police officers who conduct criminal investigations (ibid. n.d.i). [36] According to the Ministry of Defense website, there are 15 urban GAULAs that are run by the National Police, and 19 rural GAULAs managed by the army (ibid.). [37] The Appellant argues that her father is at risk from the paramilitaries and the "Bandas Criminales" (Criminal Bands) or BACRIM as well as from political opponents. However, the Appellant has failed to provide convincing evidence to prove that her father is being persecuted. The new evidence shows that the family was displaced in 1996, sharing that tragic fate with 5,700,000 other Colombians. The document indicates that the Appellant's father was threatened and that he has some sort of issues which remain unspecified with some government entity. Evidence20 was entered at the hearing showing that the Appellant's father was under "house arrest" effective XXXX XXXX XXXX 2014, however that was followed up by an Appeals Court ruling21 overturning that decision, on XXXX XXXX, 2014. This does not necessarily indicate persecution by the state but could be simply prosecution by the state. This also reflects the protection offered by the state against wrongful conviction. The Appellant was unable to provide any substantial documentation from her parents which would support her claim of the persecution of her family. In fact, the Minister provided a document22 which was a statement from the Appellant's father, dated XXXX XXXX, 2013 which was attached to the Appellant's earlier application for Humanitarian and Compassionate (H&C) consideration, in her attempt to remain in Canada prior to her refugee claim. That statement, in part, read "Since our economic situation does not allow us to give her an adequate education that will enhance her intellectual potential which would not give her the opportunities to promote herself as a professional in a country with few opportunities for low-income people without advanced education..." The sentence did continue on to mention the increasing violence against women, especially girls who are daily victims of abuses and trafficking of women. In his statement on behalf of his daughter's H&C, the Appellant's father speaks predominantly about educational opportunities in Colombia, or the lack thereof, for his daughter, the Appellant. He mentions the general dangerous conditions of the country which a very large percentage of the female population is facing but he does not take the opportunity to discuss his alleged persecution by government entities or BACRIM. [38] If the Appellant's father was being persecuted by government entities, then he has proven the existence of state protection as it was that state judiciary system which overturned the lower court ruling, presumably setting him free. [39] If the Appellant's father was being extorted and he reported that extortion to the authorities, then he should have provided his daughter with proof of his reports. According to the Appellant's testimony, her father was unable to obtain a copy of the reports he filed. Although sometimes difficult to obtain, police reports are obtainable and should have been provided to substantiate this claim. The documents23 speak to this issue as follows: Procedure for obtaining a copy of a complaint [40] In correspondence with the Research Directorate, a former criminal judge who is now a law professor at the Latin American Autonomous University (Universidad Autónoma Latinoamericana) stated that obtaining a copy of a complaint is [translation] "very complicated" because criminal investigations are sensitive and prosecutors are reluctant to share information while the investigation is ongoing (Professor 28 Sept. 2011). This was corroborated in a telephone interview with a practicing lawyer who also said that it might be [translation] "difficult" given the sensitive nature of the investigation process (Lawyer 29 Sept. 2011). However, the professor said that lawyers can opt to file a [translation] "Right to Petition" (Derecho de Petición), a right specified in Article 23 of the Constitution, to compel authorities to provide the document within 15 days of receipt of the request (Professor 28 Sept. 2011; see also Lawyer 29 Sept. 2011). [41] The professor indicated in follow-up correspondence that a person can authorize any third party, including a lawyer, to obtain a copy of a complaint on his or her behalf (Professor 3 Oct. 2011). It requires a letter of authorization (poder) that has been authenticated by a public notary in Colombia or by a Colombian consulate in other countries (ibid. 28 Sept. 2011). If a person does not know someone in Colombia who can obtain the report, he or she must contact a lawyer in Colombia to [translation] "act as their representative" (Colombia 22 Sept. 2011). The professor also stated that when the complainant resides somewhere other than where the complaint was made, and prosecutors are reluctant to provide the copy of the report, the complainant can file a Right to Petition by regular or certified mail (28 Sept. 2011). The petition should include the date of the request and an expected delivery date to ensure the 15-day time limit for responding is respected (Professor 28 Sept. 2011). [42] If the agency does not comply with the Right to Petition, the person can file a tutela as [translation] "a means to oblige the public servant to respond immediately" (ibid.). A tutela is a mechanism for providing legal recourse when a person's basic constitutional rights have been [translation] "infringed or threatened by the action or omission of any public authority" (Colombian.d.k)." [43] It may require a great deal of effort on the part of the Appellant's father but he could have and should have provided such proof in support of this claim. The fact that he did not provide such evidence for his daughter's hearing is an issue which the documents that have been provided do not overcome. The RAD has insufficient evidence before it to determine that the Appellant's family is being persecuted. The RAD does find that the family is IDPs and have been for almost twenty years, but as previously mentioned, so too are over 5 million other Colombians. [44] The RAD has looked at and spoken to the "sur place" element of this claim and finds that the Appellant should be able to safely return to Medellin to live with her grandparents, as she was before coming to Canada to go to school. The RAD believes that the Appellant is in Canada for a better and brighter future and for the education which would help her achieve that future. The RAD does not place any blame on the Appellant for the inconsistencies, contradictions and untruths sprinkled throughout her various documents as she was a minor at the time of production of these documents and as such, cannot be held accountable for the directions given her by adults. However; equally, the RAD cannot ignore the facts that, in spite of good arguments on that topic made by both counsel for the Appellant and earlier, by her designated representative, the evidence more strongly suggests that on a balance of probabilities, this Appellant has put forth a claim under section 96 of the Act, with no well-founded fear and no legitimate nexus for no other reason than to remain in Canada where she hopes to access a better and subsidized education than would be available to her in Colombia. The RAD finds no reason why the Appellant could not return to live with her grandparents as the Appellant has never suffered any mistreatment or persecution because of her father's problems while living with her grandparents Disposition [45] The RAD has found that the RPD did not err in the assessment of the evidence. In its own independent assessment of the evidence before it, the RAD concurs with the RPD and concludes that the Appellant is not credible. The decision of the RPD stands. CONCLUSION [46] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe August 19, 2015 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 2, pp. 19-35 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's record, pp. 27-88 3 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 4, Minister's Submissions, Exhibits M3-M9, pp. 191-230 4 Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, s. 3(3)(g)(iii). 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 20-24 6 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD`s Record, Exhibit 1, POE notes , Schedule A, pp. 47-50 8 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Columbia (30 April, 2014), item 2.2 9 Leon, Johnny Edgar Orellana v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3520-94), Jerome, September 19, 1995; Calero, Fernando Alejandro (Alejandeo) v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3396-93), Wetston, August 8, 1994; Vargas, Maria Cecilla Giraldo v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1301-92), Wetston, May 25, 1994 10 Marincas, Dan v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5737-93), Tremblay-Lamer, August 23, 1994; De Arce, Rita Gatica v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5237-94), Jerome, November 3, 1995. Reported: De Arce v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1995), 32 Imm. L.R. (2d) 74 (F.C.T.D.); Xheko, Aida Siri v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4281-97), Gibson, August 28, 1998. 11 Rivera, Omar Martin Farro v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-572-98), Tremblay-Lamer, February 22, 1999 12 Bacchus, Amit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4679-03), Mosley, June 8, 2004, 2004 FC 821 13 Innocent, Philomena v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-541-09), Mainville, October 8, 2009, 2009 FC 1019 14 Osorio, Henry Mauricio Gil v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-585-05), Snider, October 27, 2005, 2005 FC 1459 15 Vickram, Safraz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3632-06), de Montigny, April 30, 2007, 2007 FC 457 16 Vickram, Safraz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3632-06), de Montigny, April 30, 2007, 2007 FC 457 17 Zacarias, Gabino Olegario Aguilar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3293-10), Noël, January 19, 2011, 2011 FC 62 18 Acosta, Dunis Joel Acosta v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3731-08), Gauthier, March 2, 2009, 2009 FC 213; Ventura De Parada, Ana Margarita v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1021-09), Zinn, August 27, 2009, 2009 FC 845; Perez, Henry Sotero Rodriguez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-646-09), Kelen, October 14, 2009, 2009 FC 1029; Perez, Franklin Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4450-09), Boivin, March 30, 2010, 2010 FC 345; Mendoza, Javier Castillo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6696-09), Zinn, June 15, 2010, 2010 FC 648; Cruz Pineda, Melvin Alonso v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1709-10), Kelen, January 24, 2011; 2011 FC 81; Guifarro, Osman Jose Paz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3097-10), Crampton, February 15, 2011, 2011 FC 182 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD`s Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Columbia (30 April, 2014), item 10.2 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 5, pp. 246-247 21 Ibid., pp 243-244 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 4, Minister's Submissions, Exhibit M-9, p. 228 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Columbia (30 April, 2014), item 9.3 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-03783