TB4-09123

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-09123 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision March 10, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Daniel McSweeney Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Ron Shacter Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Senegal, has appealed a negative decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) issued on August 19, 2013. DETERMINATION [2] The Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection, as per s. 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleges that she fears returning to Senegal because of her identity as a lesbian. The Appellant alleges that in 1989, during a blackout, she was caught having sexual relations with her friend (XXXX) by XXXX's brother. Family members and neighbours rushed into the room and assaulted the couple. The Appellant alleges that her brother and cousins joined the group and dragged her half-naked into the middle of the street and beat her. The Appellant was locked in a room for several days and was treated like an animal. The Appellant alleges that she was whipped, as per Islamic law. The Appellant did not have any relations with women after 1989. [4] The Appellant alleged that she was forced into marriage to a man she had never met in 2002. The man lived in France, while the Appellant was expected to remain in Senegal and raise his two children. The Appellant alleged that she asked for a divorce which dishonoured her and her husband's family, and she feared being killed by her family members for requesting the divorce. The Appellant alleged that she was not able to live her life as a lesbian for twenty years. [5] The Appellant fears mistreatment, torture, and death at the hands of her family and members of the community should she return to Senegal. [6] The Appellant left Senegal on XXXX XXXX, 2013 and travelled to Canada via XXXX, France on a valid visitor's visa. The Appellant made her claim for protection on May 16, 2014. [7] The Appellant had a refugee determination hearing on July 15, 2014, and written reasons were issued on August 19, 2014. In its reasons, the RPD decided the claim based on the Appellant's lack of credibility regarding her claim of being a lesbian. The RPD made the following findings: a) The RPD found that the Appellant's delay in leaving Senegal was not reasonable given that she testified that she was seeking a way to leave since 1989, and given the Appellant's profile as a well-educated, professional woman. Given the delay, the RPD drew a negative credibility inference in relation to the Appellant's credibility and her subjective fear. b) The RPD found the Appellant's explanation as to why she returned to Senegal after travelling to Morocco and Côte D'Ivoire were not reasonable given the severity of the treatment she alleged. c) The RPD found it unreasonable that the Appellant would allow her status in Canada to expire and risk detention or deportation given that she had asked people in the Senegalese community how she could find work, and given her background as an educated professional. d) The RPD drew a negative inference with respect to the Appellant's credibility based on her delay in joining or registering with the 519 Community Centre, as this was done for the purpose of bolstering her claim. e) The RPD assigned little weight to the report from the psychotherapist given that the assessment was based on self-reported symptoms and the allegations were found not to be credible. f) The RPD did not find the Appellant's testimony regarding her forced marriage reasonable given discrepancies in her evidence regarding her husband. [8] Appeal pleadings were received on October 16, 2014. In the appeal, counsel argued that the RPD erred in failing to do a Section 97 analysis. Specific errors included: a) The RPD erred in finding a lack of subjective fear as it failed to take into consideration the cultural context applicable to the Appellant in Senegal. b) The RPD erred by rejecting the Appellant's identity as a lesbian based on immaterial inconsistencies and a lack of subjective fear. c) The RPD erred in failing to consider the social context applicable to the Appellant as it relates to delay in claiming. The RPD did not consider the principles set out in the gender1 and sexual orientation guidelines related to delay. d) The RPD erred in its finding related to reavailment, as the Appellant did not voluntarily revail herself to Senegal as she was forced to return by her sister. e) The RPD erred in drawing a negative inference regarding inconsistencies about the Appellant's spouse's address and her knowledge of his occupation, as they were not material to her sexual orientation or her credibility. f) The RPD erred by failing to assess the impact of sending the letter requesting a divorce on the credibility of the Appellant's safety if she returns to Senegal. g) The RPD erred by giving no weight to the Appellant's registration with the 519 Church Street Centre, as it rejected the corroborative evidence once it found the Appellant lacked credibility instead of assessing the evidence before making a conclusion relating to credibility. [9] The Appellant submitted a letter and attached a document from the 519 Community Centre,2 which it requested the RAD accept as new evidence. The Appellant asked that the RAD substitute the negative RPD determination with its own positive determination. In the alternative, the Appellant asked that the matter be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. Admissibility of New Documents [10] The pleadings contained a letter and document from the 519 Community Centre which post-dated the hearing. Given that the document goes to the heart of the claim, given that the Appellant testified that she had registered to attend the 519 at the hearing, and given that the document post-dated the decision, the RAD accepted the letter as new evidence. As outlined below, the evidence from the 519 was found to have little probative value, and therefore the RAD found that there was no need to hold a hearing on the document. Analytical Approach [11] In assessing the appeal, the RAD is directed by the Huruglica3 decision in which Justice Phelan directed the RAD to conduct a hybrid appeal based on a review of all aspects of the RPD's decision and to come to an independent assessment of whether the Respondent is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. This authority comes from the broad remedial powers of the RAD, including the power to set aside and substitute the RPD's determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, as per s. 111(1)(b) of IRPA. The RAD can recognize and respect the conclusions of the RPD on issues such as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching its conclusion; however, the RAD has equal or greater expertise than the RPD in the interpretation of country condition evidence. The RAD is not restricted to intervening on facts where there is a palpable and overriding error. It is not necessary for the RAD to find an error on some standard of review basis in order to trigger its remedial power. The RAD concurs with counsel on the approach to analysis and will assess the claim based on the guidance in the Huruglica decision. Analysis [12] In analyzing the appeal, the RAD focused on one issue: Was the Appellant's allegation that she was a lesbian credible? [13] In analyzing the claim, the RAD bore in mind the particular background and situation of the Appellant. The RAD concurs with the RPD's assessment of the Appellant's background. Based on a review of the totality of the evidence on the record, the RAD finds that the Appellant had a high level of sophistication. She was mature, being over forty-two years of age at the time of the hearing. The Appellant was a well-educated woman, having completed 13 years of elementary and secondary schooling, and three years of post-secondary schooling. The Appellant worked as an XXXX since 2008 in a variety of settings, including a XXXX XXXX. The Appellant had a history of foreign travel (Cote D'Ivoire and Morocco), and she had experience applying for multiple visas to travel to Canada and the United States. The Appellant was well-spoken in French and able to provide testimony in French at the hearing. The assessment of the Appellant's level of sophistication is a determinative factor in this claim given that it relates directly to the reasonableness of the Appellant's explanation for her delay in claiming and other aspects of the claim. [14] The Appellant provided psychological evidence4 which was produced specifically to address counsel's concerns about the Appellant's mental health status. As a first step in its analysis, the RAD considered the jurisprudence related to forensic expert evidence provided by a claimant in support of a claim. The RAD noted that Justice Annis, in Czesak,5 indicated that decision-makers should be wary of reliance upon forensic expert evidence obtained for the purpose of litigation, unless it is subject to some form of validation. Courts caution a review on conclusions of forensic experts which have not undergone a rigorous validation process under court procedures. In relation to administrative tribunals, Justice Annis indicates that caution should be exercised in accepting them (forensic reports) at face value, particularly when they propose to settle important issues to be decided by the tribunal. Unless there is some means to corroborate the neutrality or the lack of self-interest of the expert in relation to the litigation process, the forensic results should be accorded little weight. [15] The RAD noted, in Avagyan,6 that Justice LeBlanc supports Justice Phelan's statement in Saha7 as follows: It is within the RPD's mandate to discount psychological evidence when the doctor merely regurgitates what the patient says are the reasons for his stress and then reaches a medical conclusion that the patient suffers stress because of those reasons. This is particularly the case when the RPD rejects the underlying facts of the diagnosis. In this case, there were no independent clinical studies performed to support the psychological assessment and no other medical basis for the diagnosis. [16] Given that the report was requested by counsel for the purposes of the claim, given that the information contained in the report was based on the Appellant's own self-reported symptoms and was not independently corroborated, given that the psychotherapist did not indicate that she ruled out any evidence of malingering, and given that the report does not specifically comment on the nature and causation of the trauma that the Appellant alleged (the report indicates: "we did not feel the need to question the client in regards to the trauma she had lived through"), the RAD finds that little weight could be placed on the psychological report in support of the Appellant's allegations that she was a lesbian, that she was forced into an unwanted marriage, that she was tortured in Senegal, and that she would face persecution or harm upon her return to Senegal. The RAD found the failure of the psychological assessment to mention that the Appellant was a lesbian or claimed to be a lesbian was a significant omission, as this allegation went to the heart of the claim and was the cause of her alleged mental health issues. The RAD concurs with the RPD that little weight can be placed on the psychological report in support of the Appellant's allegations. [17] The RPD found that the Appellant's delay in claiming undermined her subjective fear as well as the credibility of her allegations. The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013. She was provided a six-month visa, which meant that her visa expired on XXXX XXXX, 2013. She alleged that she lived with her nephew for two months in Sudbury and that she moved to Toronto in XXXX of 2013. She made her claim for refugee protection on May 16, 2014, some XXXX months after her visa had expired, and XXXX months after her arrival in Canada. [18] The RAD referred to the jurisprudence regarding the issue of a delay in claiming. The RAD noted that the jurisprudence supports the fact that delay can impact negatively on a refugee claimant's credibility, as well as his or her subjective fear. The RAD noted a decision by Justice Crampton8 in which he concluded that: "It is well established that, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, the delay can be fatal to such claim, even when the credibility of an applicant's claim has not otherwise been challenged". The decision goes on to cite seven previous Federal Court decisions in support of this statement. [19] The RAD noted that timing is a factor to consider in relation to a finding of a lack of subjective fear. In Kaur,9 Chief Justice Crampton indicated that: "however, I would note for the record that the mere failure to claim refugee protection in Canada for a period of a few weeks after the claimant's arrival in this country would not normally constitute a reasonable basis, in and of itself, for making a finding of lack of subjective fear, particularly when, as here, the applicant sought the assistance of counsel during that period." [20] The RAD noted that the possession of a visa does not rebut the presumption that a true refugee would claim protection at the first opportunity. In Peti,10 Justice Scott acknowledged that: "An applicant's behaviour may become important in analyzing his or her credibility and determining his or her subjective fear". The reason goes on to cite Niyonkuru,11 in which Justice de Montigny wrote: "It is true that the applicant had a visa which allowed him to remain in Canada until XXXX 2003. The fact remains that his actions were not those of someone truly fearing for his life if he were to return home." [21] The RAD considered the particular circumstances of the Appellant, as well as her explanations for her delay in claiming. The Appellant was in Canada for some XXXX months without status before making her claim, and was in Canada for some XXXX months before seeking refugee protection. The Appellant testified that she had wanted to leave Senegal since 1989 and that she had planned to leave and seek refugee protection in the United States since her first visa application in XXXX of 2005. She testified that she came to Canada with the intention of not returning to Senegal. It is evident from the evidence that the Appellant had intended to seek international protection as early as 2005 in the United States, and that she came to Canada with the intention of remaining here. [22] When asked about her delay in claiming, the Appellant explained that she did not know the procedure. She indicated that she found out in XXXX that she could seek refugee protection in Canada. The RAD considered this explanation in light of the Appellant's profile. The Appellant was well-educated and sophisticated. She knew about the concept of refugee protection before she left Senegal. She was fluent in one of the official languages of Canada. She had XXXX months to acquaint herself with the refugee application process in Canada. She was out of status for XXXX months before she made her claim for protection. The Appellant was resourceful enough to leave her nephew's home in Sudbury and come to Toronto and find a place to live. She was resourceful enough to reach out to the Senegalese community in Toronto. The psychological evidence12 does not make a finding that the Appellant suffered any psychological or cognitive issues which would prevent her from gathering information on the refugee protection process or seeking protection. The evidence indicates that the Appellant has had nightmares, headaches, and reduced appetite. The evidence concludes that the Appellant is currently in a relatively healthy mental state. The evidence does not indicate that the Appellant is suffering from what the Chairperson's Gender Guideline13 describes as Battered Women's Syndrome or any other condition that would prevent her from seeking assistance. [23] The RAD considered the jurisprudence on delay put forward by counsel. The RAD finds that the facts of the appeal, the Appellant's profile, the timing of the claim (2014 vs. 2009), that the Appellant came to Canada as a woman of 41 and not as a child or teen, the nature of the abuse alleged, the psychological and mental impact of the alleged abuse, and the reasonableness of the Appellant's explanation differentiates the current appeal from the fact situation in Elcock,14 Charles,15 and Dion John.16 [24] The Appellant testified that she first found out about refugee protection in XXXX of 2014. Given the Appellant's sophistication and linguistic ability, the RAD finds it unreasonable that the Appellant's delay seeking any assistance in seeking refugee protection before XXXX of 2014 when the issue of protection came up out of a discussion related to the Appellant seeking employment. [25] The Appellant testified that she had planned to leave Senegal and seek protection for some eight years. She had the intention of remaining in Canada before she arrived. Given the fact that the Appellant is sophisticated, mature, is fluent in one of the official languages of Canada, was able to leave her nephew's home and find a place to stay in Toronto, and had regular interaction with members of the Senegalese community in Toronto, the RAD finds that the Appellant's explanation for not seeking protection earlier was not reasonable. [26] Based on a review of all of the evidence and arguments regarding the issue of delay, the RAD concurs with the RPD that the delay in claiming and the unreasonable explanation for the delay undermined the credibility of the Appellant's allegations that she was persecuted because of her lesbian identity as well as her subjective fear. The RAD finds that the Appellant's delay in claiming was significant and egregious and was not consistent with the behaviour of a person who was persecuted because of her sexual orientation and who alleged that she suffered ongoing persecution at the hands of her family members. The Appellant's delay in claiming was also sufficient to rebut the presumption of truthfulness, as per Maldonado.17 [27] The RAD considered the remaining evidence provided in support of the Appellant's allegations. The RAD noted that the onus is on the refugee claimant to adduce sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to establish that there is a reasonable chance that the claimant would be persecuted if returned to his country of origin.18 The RAD considered the letter19 that the Appellant allegedly sent to her home requesting a divorce. The Appellant was questioned at the hearing about the letter. She testified that it was sent by mail to her family's home, as she did not know her husband's address in Marseille, France. The Appellant did not provide any evidence that the letter was sent, what address it was sent to, to whom the letter was sent, or evidence that it was received. The letter does not request that the receiver (the Appellant's family members) forward the letter or the request for a divorce to the Appellant's husband. The letter does not state that the Appellant was a lesbian, and it only makes a remote reference to not wanting to lie any longer. [28] The RAD also noted that the letter on its face is irregular for a personal letter given that it has the typed words [signature] at the bottom above the Appellant's signature. In addition, the RAD noted that the letter indicated that the forced marriage was "precipite" (precipitated) by her parents. The RAD noted that the marriage took place in XXXX of 2002. At that onset of the hearing, the Appellant testified that her father had died in 1988 and her mother in 2000. The RAD finds that the content of the letter did not conform to the Appellant's oral testimony that her parents arranged the marriage given that her father had died in 1988 (before the alleged lesbian affair), and her mother had died two years before the marriage. [29] Given the inconsistency in the content and lack of evidence of how and when the letter was sent, the RAD finds that it cannot place significant weight on the document in support of the Appellant's allegations. In addition, given that the letter does not state that the Appellant is a lesbian, the RAD finds that the letter has little probative value in supporting this aspect of the claim. [30] The RAD considered the handwritten note from XXXX.20 The letter indicates that the writer assisted the Appellant in locating the 519 Community Centre, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and the Centre Francophone. The RAD noted that the letter did not provide sufficient detail regarding when and how the Appellant was introduced to the three offices. The letter also was not accompanied by any evidence of the existence of the author. The Appellant testified that the author of the letter had been in Canada for some time. It would be reasonable to expect that the author would provide some proof of his identity such as a driver's license, citizenship card, landing papers, etc. The RAD also noted that the letter did not indicate that the Appellant was a lesbian, and that the Appellant and the writer had spoken about services to the gay and lesbian community and the 519 Community Centre as the Appellant testified. Given the lack of detail in the letter (dates, times), given the concerns with the lack of evidence of the author, and given that the letter does not state that the Appellant was a lesbian and was referred to the 519 because of her sexual orientation, the RAD finds that the letter had little probative value in establishing the Appellant's allegations and in justifying her delay in claiming. [31] The RAD considered the evidence on record to establish the Appellant's identity as a lesbian. The Appellant submitted evidence from the 519 Community Centre.21 The RAD noted that the Intake Request Form solely indicates that the Appellant self-identified as a lesbian, and the Settlement Service Orientation Training Record does not comment on the Appellant's sexual orientation. It is important to note that the Appellant registered for settlement services at the 519 on XXXX XXXX, 2014, which was after she made her claim for protection on May 16, 2014. The Appellant had not attended any programs at the 519 before the hearing. The letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX indicates that the Appellant is an active member of the LGBT Refugee Support Group, which is a peer driven support group for LGBT refugee claimants only. The letter does not confirm that the Appellant is a lesbian, other than confirming the Appellant's attendance at the group since XXXX. As such, the letter has little probative value in establishing the Appellant's identity as a lesbian. [32] The Appellant was asked about her involvement with the lesbian community in Toronto, and her response was that she had no involvement. She indicated that she had registered with the 519 Community Centre, and she was waiting for them to get back to her. Other than registering, the Appellant had no involvement or interaction with the lesbian community in Toronto. The Appellant explained that she was waiting for the 519 to introduce her to the community. The RAD considered this explanation in light of the Appellant's time in Canada, as well as her background. A person's sexual orientation is a core aspect of their sense of self. The Appellant alleges to have been a lesbian since 1989. The Appellant was forced to repress her sexual identity in Senegal. The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and only reached out to the 519 Community Centre on XXXX XXXX, 2014, after making a refugee claim and shortly before her hearing date. The RAD finds it implausible that the Appellant would not make any attempts to inquire about or express her sexual identity as a lesbian in the XXXX months that she was in Canada, and that she would depend on a social agency (the 519 Community Centre) as the only way to express her sexual identity as a lesbian. The Appellant's ability to express her sexual identity was supressed for all of her adult life. The Appellant was a sophisticated woman who was fluent in one of the official languages of Canada. The Appellant had come to a country where she would not face persecution or harm for expressing her sexual identity as a lesbian. The Appellant was free from her family members when she left her nephew's home in XXXXr, 2013. The Appellant did not make any attempts to assert her identity as a lesbian community until XXXX XXXX, 2014, even after she made her claim for protection based on her sexual orientation in XXXX of 2014. The RAD finds that it is implausible that a person who alleges being a lesbian would not take any minimal efforts to express her personal identity as a lesbian until after she made a claim for protection some XXXX months after her arrival in Canada. [33] The RAD considered counsel's argument that the RPD erred in its treatment of the evidence related to the 519 Community Centre and the Leke22 decision. The RAD notes that the Leke decision reveals that the 519 serves the gay and lesbian community. The decision found that the RPD erred in dismissing the: "applicant's membership in the 519 Church Street Community Centre as proof of his membership in an organization that serves minorities like him in and near the City's Gay Village." The issue in the current appeal is distinct from the reasoning in the Leke case given that the RPD did not misapprehend the evidence; it found that the Appellant's affiliation with the 519 was done to bolster her claim. Given an analysis of the totality of the evidence on the record regarding the Appellant's credibility and her sexual orientation, the RAD concurs with the RPD that the Appellant's involvement with the 519 Community Centre was done to bolster her refugee claim. [34] Given that the Appellant's allegations were found not to be credible and her subjective fear was undermined by her delay in claiming, given that the Appellant has not provided sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence to establish her personal profile as a lesbian, the RAD concurs with the RPD that the Appellant has not established that she is a lesbian. [35] Given that the Appellant alleged that she was forced to marry by her family because of her lesbian history, given that the Appellant's identity as a lesbian was found not to be credible, given that the letter sent to her family requesting a divorce was found not to be credible, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence to establish a fear of return to Senegal because of her request for a divorce. Summary [36] Based on a review of the totality of the evidence, the Appellant has not provided sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence in support of her claim that she was a victim of persecution based on her sexual orientation as a lesbian, and to support her claim that she was forced into an unwanted marriage. The Appellant's significant delay in claiming without a reasonable explanation also undermined the credibility of her allegations as well as her subjective fear. DISPOSITION [37] Based on the analysis above, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection, as per s. 111(1)(a) of IRPA. [38] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Daniel McSweeney" Daniel McSweeney March 10, 2015 Date 1 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appeal Pleadings, Letter from 519 Community Centre, September 22, 2014, p. 80. 3 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 4 RPD's Record, Exhibit 6, Psychotherapist Report, July 8, 2014, pp. 159-160. 5 Czesak, Maria v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-9539-12), Annis, November 14, 2013; 2013 FC 1149. 6 Avagyan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2596-13), LeBlanc, October 22, 2014; 2014 FC 1003. 7 Saha, Gobinda Chandra v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5193-07), Phelan, March 23, 2009; 2009 FC 304, at para. 16. 8 Velez, Liliana v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5660-09), Crampton, September 15, 2010; 2010 FC 923, at para 28. 9 Kaur, Parmjit v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-424-12), Crampton, November 28, 2012; 2012 FC 1379, at para 21. 10 Peti, Qamile, v. M.C.I., (F.C., no. IMM-1764-11), Scott, January 19, 2012; 2012 FC 82, at paras 41-42. 11 Niyonkuru, Joseph v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-4230-04), De Montigny, February 4, 2005; 2005 FC 174. 12 RPD's Record, Exhibit 6, Letter from Centre francophone, pp. 159-160. 13 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 14 Elcock (Milkson), Joan Theresa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2985-98), Gibson, September 20, 1999. 15 Charles, Selma v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-213-06), Gauthier, January 30, 2007; 2007 FC 103. 16 John, Shontel Dion v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1683-10), Bédard, December 14, 2010; 2010 FC 1283. 17 Maldonado, Pedro Enrique Juarez v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-450-79), Heald, Ryan, MacKay, November 19, 1979; [1980] 2 F.C. 302 (C.A.); 31 N.R. 34 (F.C.A.). 18 Ismaili, Ali Saleh Zahran v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-10401-12), Strickland, January 24, 2014; 2014 FC 84. 19 RPD's Record, Exhibit 5, Letter dated 20 September, 2013, p. 137. 20 RPD's Record, Exhibit 5, Note from XXXX, July 2014, p. 139. 21 RPD's Record, Exhibit 5, Intake Request Form, p. 140-146; Exhibit 8, Newcomer Orientation Training Record, p. 174; Exhibit P-2, Appeal Pleadings, Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and supporting document, dated September 22, 2014, p. 80. 22 Leke, Tunji Diran v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4191-06), Lagacé, August 22, 2007; 2007 FC 848. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-09123