VC2-05410

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VC2-05410 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Date of decision March 23, 2023 Date de la décision Panel Soraya Farha Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal N/A Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) is a citizen of Jordan. He fears harm from the XXXX XXXX (XXXX) of his former employer. He also fears persecution in Jordan due to his Palestinian origin. [2] The procedural history of this matter is accurately set out in paragraphs 2 through 9 of the Decision of the Refugee Protection Decision (RPD) dated June 13, 2022, which denied the Appellant's claim. [3] The RPD determined that the Appellant was not excluded from refugee protection under Article 1F(b) of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The determinative issue at the RPD was credibility. The RPD found that the accumulation of contradictions, inconsistencies, and omissions regarding material elements of the Appellant's claim supported a negative conclusion about his credibility. The RPD found that while the Appellant alleged in his Basis of Claim (BOC) form that he feared harm from his former girlfriend's family in Jordan and his employer in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Saudi Arabia), at the hearing he confirmed that he feared one person, the XXXX at his former employer in Saudi Arabia, due to the Appellant's alleged refusal to participate in money laundering through the importation of XXXX containing money. The RPD found that the Appellant's testimony on this issue was vague and internally inconsistent and that the corroborative evidence did not sufficiently overcome the evidentiary deficits that arose from the credibility analysis. Finally, the RPD found that the Appellant in his circumstances would not face discrimination amounting to persecution if he returned to Jordan. [4] The Appellant is not represented by counsel on the appeal. He submits that the RPD erred in its credibility analysis. He submits that the RPD failed to make clear credibility findings and instead cast a nebulous cloud of unreliability around his evidence and testimony. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in impugning his credibility based on BOC omissions as he was not required to update his BOC before the RPD hearing. He asserts that the RPD ignored relevant testimony and country conditions evidence of the risks of deportation to Jordan considering his criminal record based on false prosecution and his fear of his former XXXX who has an incriminating video of him XXXX XXXX, thus failing to consider the totality of his risk profile considering all of the grounds cumulatively. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in concluding that he does not face discrimination amounting to persecution as a Palestinian in Jordan. Finally, the Appellant submits that the RPD member "has personal problems with Palestinians"1 which I have considered as an allegation of bias against the RPD Member. The Appellant has filed new evidence and seeks an oral hearing on the appeal. [5] I have conducted an independent assessment. In so doing, I have considered the Record, the Appellant's evidence including his testimony, and his submissions on appeal. For reasons that follow, I find that the Appellant's allegations of bias are without merit. Further, I find that the RPD's overall assessment of the Appellant's credibility was correct and that he has not established on a balance of probabilities that he faces a risk of harm as defined in subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Further, I agree with the RPD that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution as a Palestinian in Jordan. In sum, I find that the RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [6] The following is a summary of the Appellant's allegations from his BOC form and narrative. [7] The Appellant is a citizen of Jordan. His mother was born in Jordan, while his father was born in Palestine. The Appellant was born in Saudi Arabia but has no entitlement to Saudi citizenship. He alleges that as a Palestinian he is treated as a second-class citizen in Jordan. [8] The Appellant attended university in Jordan, XXXX XXXX to attend a XXXX XXXX XXXX He has a bachelors' degree in XXXX and a diploma in XXXX. [9] In 2007/2008 the Appellant became involved with a woman whose parents were opposed to their relationship. The parents forced the woman to lodge false charges of assault against him. In XXXX 2008 he was convicted of assault in Jordan. [10] From 2012 to 2015 the Appellant worked in Saudi Arabia as a XXXX XXXX for a company. In 2015, he changed employment and began working for XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX) as an XXXX with various positions including XXXX, XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX XXXX, and XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. He reported to a XXXX, MYA-S.2 [11] In XXXX 2017, the XXXX sent the Appellant to XXXX XXXX XXXX to pick-up a XXXX for transport back to Jordan. The Appellant told the contact in XXXX, MA, that he wanted to have the XXXX XXXX by a XXXX. MA told him that the XXXX was stolen and loaded with money, and that his employer was involved in money laundering and drug and arms smuggling. The Appellant called the XXXX and told him what MA had reported. MYA-S confirmed the money laundering story but told him not to worry about signing for the XXXX. The Appellant refused to take the XXXX back to Jordan as instructed. [12] When the Appellant returned to Saudi Arabia, MYA-S questioned why the Appellant had not signed for the XXXX and attempted to get him involved in the money laundering operations of the business, telling him he would be protected by the company's contacts in the Saudi Arabian government and that he would become a partner of the business. [13] The Appellant alleges that MYA-S tried again to recruit him to engage in the company's illegal activities. MYA-S came to his house and told the Appellant that he would be sent to XXXX, XXXX in the United States (US) to sign for two XXXX, one destined for Jordan and the other to Saudi Arabia. The Appellant understood the XXXX would contain cash. MYA-S told him he needed to do what was being demanded of him. The Appellant believed that the company could have him killed if he refused. He also believed that he was at risk in Saudi Arabia as his status there was temporary, and in Jordan, because MYA-S, a Palestinian with Jordanian citizenship, was married to a Jordanian woman, had a business in Jordan and was influential. [14] The Appellant agreed to go to XXXX with the intention of fleeing to Canada once in the US. MYA-S had bribed the Appellant with a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant went on the XXXX and then fled to Canada. [15] The Appellant alleges that he fears MYA-S for failing to comply with the demand that he participates in money laundering activities. He alleges that he also fears that MYA-S would disclose to the Saudi authorities that he XXXX XXXX XXXX with MYA-S and his friend, H.A.S, the manager of XXXX XXXX in Saudi Arabia. The Appellant alleges that he XXXX with these men and had picked-up the XXXX XXXX for them. He alleges he did not know what the XXXX was when the men put it XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and took a video while he was XXXX XXXX. NEW EVIDENCE [16] I can only accept new evidence that: arose after the RPD rejection of the claim; or was not reasonably available at the time of the rejection of the claim; or one could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the rejection of the claim.3 If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible, and relevant before I can accept it.4 [17] The Appellant presents as new evidence: (i) a WhatsApp message exchange dated XXXX XXXX, 2022, between the Appellant and "XXXX XXXX" who the Appellant indicates is MYA-S, translated; (ii) email correspondence with his Counsel at the RPD dated May 31, 2022; and (iii) the Appellant's unsworn affidavit reviewing the evidence in (i) above.5 [18] I note that the Appellant made submissions regarding the admissibility of the proposed new evidence under both subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, and Rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) Rules. The Appellant did not submit any evidence after the perfection of the appeal and therefore I have not considered Rule 29. Rather, I have assessed whether the evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and the Singh/Raza test. Evidence that is rejected [19] Item (iii) the Appellant's unsworn affidavit repeats the contents of the WhatsApp messages above and indicates that he told his Counsel about them on May 31, 2022, as per item (ii) above. He states that his Counsel asked him to give her a copy which she would have translated and sent to the RPD but that he could not afford to pay a translator so he did not send it. [20] The Appellant's affidavit itself does not contain new information; rather he provides submissions as to the relevance of the WhatsApp exchange, why he included a series of untruthful statements in his WhatsApp reply to MYA-S and why he did not provide the WhatsApp exchange prior to the RPD rejection of the claim. The affidavit does not contain new evidence and will not be accepted as such. However, I have considered the affidavit as submissions. [21] In addition, a Wikipedia entry on "XXXX in Saudi Arabia" appears in the Appeal Record.6 The Appellant has not identified it as new evidence or provided any submissions on how it meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, such as why it was not provided prior to the RPD rejection of the claim given that the Appellant's evidence is that he XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Saudi Arabia, nor does he explain how the document meets the Singh/Raza requirements of newness, credibility, and relevance. As such, it is not accepted as new evidence. [22] Finally, a document appears in the Appeal Record that was not submitted into evidence at the RPD which sets out arguments about what occurred during the Appellant's Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) interviews.7 I have not accepted this document as new evidence but I have considered it as submissions on the appeal. Evidence that is accepted [23] The Appellant submits that he did not file the WhatsApp message prior to the rejection of his claim because he could not afford to pay an interpreter. This is not reflected in the email, item (iii) above. In the email, the Appellant asks his Counsel for an update, advises her that he still does not have a renewed work permit, has no access to healthcare, and that MYA-S got his cellphone number and contacted him. He asks for Counsel's advice on whether he should change his number and his information on social media platforms. The Counsel's reply email is not reproduced in full. The portion that is included in item (iii) does not address the issue of the translation of the WhatsApp message. [24] Nonetheless based on these documents I accept the Appellant's submission that the WhatsApp message was not reasonably available prior to the RPD rejection of the claim because he could not afford the translation of the document, and the correspondence with his Counsel confirms that he did not have a work permit, and therefore lacked the funds to pay for translation. In these circumstances, I find items (ii) and (iii) meet the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Having reviewed the WhatsApp messages, I accept that they appear to be messages sent on the WhatsApp platform between the Appellant and his alleged agent of harm. The Appellant has provided a translation of them by a member in good standing of the Society of Translators and Interpreters of British Colombia. The emails appear to be correspondence between the Appellant and his former Counsel's office. I, therefore, find that the WhatsApp messages and email exchange meet the Singh/Raza requirements of credibility and relevance. They are accepted as new evidence. [25] The evidence I have accepted does not raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, nor does it justify allowing or rejecting the claim. As such, the requirements for the conduct of an oral hearing set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA are not met and no oral hearing can be held. ANALYSIS [26] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.8 The Appellant is not excluded under Article 1F(b) [27] Based on my independent analysis of the Record before me and the Appellant's evidence and testimony, I agree with the RPD's conclusion that there is no credible evidence to support a finding that the Appellant has committed a serious non-political crime, and thus he is not excluded under Article 1F(b). I agree with and adopt paragraphs 27 through 38 of the RPD Decision which address the exclusion issue. Allegations of bias are without merit [28] Before proceeding further, I will address the Appellant's allegations of bias vis-a-vis the RPD Member. [29] A claimant or appellant is entitled to have their claim or appeal determined by an impartial and independent decision-maker. The duties of an impartial decision-maker include discretion, independence, objectivity, and impartiality. The decision-maker is required to exercise the discretion conferred by the statute. Decision-makers should be independent from those who appoint them and pay their salary. Based on my analysis of the Appeal Memorandum, the Appellant is not challenging the RPD panel's discretion and independence, but rather her impartiality. [30] A decision-maker must act with objectivity and impartiality, in other words, without bias. Bias is defined as a "...preconceived opinion; a predisposition to decide a cause or an issue in a certain way, which does not leave the mind perfectly open to conviction."9 The test for bias was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada as follows: What would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and having thought the matter through-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that the [decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.10 [31] The Appellant submits that the RPD Member "has personal problems with Palestinians."11 To support his assertion, he states that she failed to note that the Appellant is listed on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) card he filed as evidence, and that the card verifies his status as a refugee.12 I accept that in the Decision the RPD noted that the Appellant's father is listed in the card but failed to indicate that the Appellant too is listed there, although she plainly recognized this when reviewing the document with the Appellant at the hearing. I find that nothing turns on this oversight. It is clear from the Decision that the panel was aware that the Appellant is of Palestinian origin, and is also a citizen of Jordan, which is not disputed by the Appellant. The Appellant submits that as a Palestinian Jordanian citizen, he is nonetheless a refugee, and faces discrimination amounting to persecution. While the Appellant is listed on the UNRWA card, and there is no dispute that there are differences drawn between Palestinians and "East Bankers" in Jordan, there is no evidence that the Appellant, a Jordanian citizen who is a professional XXXX and highly educated, lived in a refugee camp, or would live in a refugee camp if he returned to Jordan. The RPD noted that Palestinians living in refugee camps may face discrimination in Jordan, but this is not the Appellant's situation. [32] Further, in conducting my independent assessment, I have reviewed the Record, including the audio transcript of the two sittings, March 2, 2022, and March 4, 2022. In my view, there is nothing in the Record that would lead an informed person to think that it was more likely than not that the RPD panel whether consciously or unconsciously would not decide fairly for any reason, including in light of the Appellant's profile as a Palestinian. The Member's conduct during the hearing was appropriate and respectful. She asked relevant questions and provided the Appellant an opportunity to fully present his case. At no point did the Appellant's Counsel who was present throughout the RPD hearing object to the conduct or questioning of the RPD Member. I recognize that there were instances where the RPD Member became frustrated as she was of the view that the Appellant had not answered the question posed, however, I find the general tenor of the hearing was respectful and appropriate. [33] I have considered the RPD findings on the allegation of discrimination amounting to persecution which was based on a consideration of the Appellant's personal circumstances together with the objective evidence. The RPD analysis of this issue is detailed and considered. Having reviewed the Record, the Appellant's evidence including his testimony, and the objective evidence, I agree with the RPD assessment that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution as a Palestinian in Jordan. My reasons on this issue are further addressed below. [34] In conclusion, I do not find that an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically, and having thought the matter through, would think that it is more likely than not that the RPD panel, whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly. I find the Appellant's submission that the RPD is biased or has a problem with Palestinians to be without merit. Submissions not related to credibility [35] Before addressing credibility, which is determinative of the appeal, I will review certain portions of the Appellant's submissions that do not pertain to credibility. [36] The Appellant's submissions are based in part on the submissions made by his Counsel on the first RAD appeal in May 2021. As such, some of the submissions are responsive to the decision by the first RPD panel that heard his claim.13 The determinative issue before the first RPD panel was Internal Flight Alternative (IFA). In his Appeal Memorandum on the present appeal, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of his risk in the proposed IFA and in Jordan generally and erred in its determination on the second prong as to the reasonableness of relocation to the IFA. The second RPD panel did not address IFA because it did not find the Appellant's allegations credible. For reasons set forth here, I agree with the determination by the second RPD panel that the Appellant has not presented sufficient credible evidence that he would face a serious possibility of persecution if he returned to Jordan. As such, it is not necessary for me to address IFA or the Appellant's submissions on IFA. [37] The Appellant also makes submissions that are responsive to the issue of exclusion under Article 1F(b) of the Convention, which is not challenged on the appeal since it was decided in the Appellant's favour. However, I understand that the Appellant may be making these arguments to establish that while the purchase of XXXX is not criminalized in Canada, it is considered a serious crime in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, in order to demonstrate the peril he alleges he would be in if the XXXX disclosed this activity to the authorities in either country. [38] The Appellant also disputes the accuracy of the CBSA interview notes regarding the false prosecution and states that he was not claiming asylum based on fear of his former girlfriend's family which he alleges was behind what he considers to be a false prosecution. The RPD confirmed that the Appellant feared harm from MYA-S, not the former girlfriend's family, and the Appellant has not challenged this finding on appeal. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to further address this submission. The Appellant's credibility [39] The Appellant's submissions generally, and on the issue of credibility, include long excerpts from the RPD Decision and are somewhat disjointed. I have carefully reviewed and considered his submissions, which may be summarized as follows: the RPD erred in making peripheral and unclear findings of credibility, failed to consider the totality of the evidence and rejected key pieces of his testimony and evidence, ignored evidence that explains apparent inconsistencies, and then made negative credibility findings; incorrectly made negative credibility findings based on omissions in his BOC since there is no positive obligation on claimants to update the BOC, and failed to consider his overall risk profile in assessing whether he would face a risk if he returned to Jordan. [40] The Appellant also asserts that the RPD erred in determining that if he returned to Jordan, he does not face a serious possibility of discrimination amounting to persecution as a Palestinian. This issue is addressed following my findings on the Appellant's credibility. [41] Having considered the totality of the evidence in the Record and the Appellant's testimony at the RPD, I agree with the RPD assessment that the Appellant confirmed in his testimony that he feared one person, his XXXX. I also agree with the RPD assessment that the Appellant's claim revolves around a relatively small fact pattern concerning the Appellant's alleged refusal to participate in two efforts to import XXXX with money in them, from XXXX, and then XXXX. While I disagree with some of the RPD credibility findings which I will address first, overall, I agree with the RPD assessment that the Appellant has not established his allegations that he would face harm by the XXXX, as defined in subsection 97(1) of the IRPA, on a balance of probabilities, if he were to return to Jordan. Material Contradictions: when the Appellant learned about the deal in XXXX and whether the Appellant drove with the XXXX or sat in the car [42] I find that the RPD erred in its assessment of the evidence on these issues, and I cannot uphold its findings. [43] The RPD impugned the Appellant's credibility because at his first RPD hearing before the former presiding RPD Member, he stated that he drove in the XXXX's car in Jordan when he was informed of the XXXX plan, whereas during the March 2, 2022 sitting of the second RPD hearing, he stated that he just sat in the car, which is supported by a letter filed by the Appellant's brother.14 The Appellant explained that when he said he had "ridden" in the car with MYA-S, he meant that he sat with MYA-S in the car, that the interpreter at the second RPD hearing made an error and started to say, correctly, that he "went" in the car but changed it to "rode" which is an incorrect translation of what he said in Arabic. I am not in a position to comment on the Arabic interpretation at the hearing and the Appellant has not alleged that the interpretation at the hearing was a problem in general. However, I accept his explanation on a balance of probabilities because it is clear in the audio recording that the interpreter first said the Appellant "went" in the car and then changed the interpretation to say he "rode" in the car. [44] Further, I cannot uphold the RPD findings on the apparent contradiction regarding where the Appellant learned of the XXXX plan (Saudi Arabia or Jordan). The RPD determination on this issue largely hinges on its interpretation of paragraph 7 of the Appellant's narrative and whether the Appellant states that he learned of the XXXX plan in Saudi Arabia or Jordan. The Appellant testified that after the XXXX incident, MYA-S told him, in Saudi Arabia, that he would have a "second chance" to participate again in a similar scheme, but that he was not advised of the XXXX scheme until both men were in Jordan for the Eid holidays. I find that the Appellant's testimony is not inconsistent with paragraph 7 of the narrative. On my reading of paragraph 7 it is ambiguous as to where the XXXX scheme was disclosed. The Appellant does state that the XXXX "actually came to my house in Jordan to give me directions about the XXXX XXXX job."15 When the Appellant states in paragraph 7 that he was to be given another chance to participate, it is not clear where that was communicated. I recognize, as noted by the RPD, that the Appellant agreed with the CBSA Officer Christopoulos who asked if the Appellant learned of the XXXX plan in Saudi Arabia. When asked to explain this discrepancy, the Appellant repeated his testimony that he was told in Saudi Arabia he would be given a second chance but learned of the plan in Jordan. Given the ambiguity in paragraph 7 of the narrative, I find it was an error to draw a negative inference on this matter. Vague and vacillating testimony [45] The Appellant submits that the RPD credibility findings cast a nebulous cloud of unreliability and were generally unclear or peripheral. I do not agree with this overall characterization of the RPD findings as it made a series of specific credibility findings based on material omissions and inconsistencies, which are correct, as discussed further below. [46] The RPD did make a general observation that the Appellant's testimony was often vague and vacillating and cited a specific example discussed below. Having carefully reviewed the Appellant's testimony, I find that there are multiple examples of the Appellant's vacillating testimony, whereby he provided testimony to support one aspect of his allegations, while simultaneously contradicting or undercutting another allegation, from which I draw a negative credibility inference. [47] For example, to support his allegations respecting the risk posed by the XXXX, the Appellant testified that he feared going on the XXXX because he feared the XXXX might have a surprise for him in the form of someone on the XXXX who would harm him. When asked why he would go on the XXXX anyway, the Appellant stated that it was safe actually, because there were 3000 people XXXX XXXX and thus too large a crowd in which he could be targeted. [48] Another example is the Appellant's evidence regarding what was to happen after the XXXX. The Appellant insisted that the XXXX through his employer had made and paid for his travel arrangements. He claimed it was part of the plan for him to go to a hotel and await instructions, however, he admitted that he did not have a hotel booking for after the XXXX. His explanation for the lack of a hotel booking was because someone was to pick him up after the XXXX and take him to a XXXX to deal with the XXXX and that he would be staying there, contradicting his allegation that he was to first go to a hotel. He stated that the XXXX told him in advance he would be staying at a XXXX, and he feared going to a XXXX because it was not a public place and thus would be unsafe. As discussed further below, there is nothing about this plan in the Appellant's BOC narrative. I find based on this contradictory and vacillating testimony, coupled with the BOC omission and absence of corroborating digital communications or threats after the Appellant left XXXX, that there was no plan for the Appellant to arrange for a shipment of XXXX to launder money, as alleged, on a balance of probabilities. I find it more likely than not that the Appellant added the allegation about going to a private XXXX location as an embellishment, to suggest a higher level of risk to his safety. [49] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in paragraphs 105 and 106 of its Decision and that there is corroborating evidence to indicate that XXXX paid for his travel to XXXX, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and for the XXXX. Even if XXXX paid for his travel as claimed by the Appellant, these documents do not corroborate his allegations that he was to sign for XXXX that were full of cash, at the behest of the XXXX and therefore I give them some limited weight as they support that the Appellant travelled to XXXX and went on a XXXX. However, I note that these documents also run counter to the Appellant's argument that part of the overall arrangement was that he was to go to a hotel and await instructions because if this was the case, as discussed above, it is reasonable to expect that the hotel booking would be included in the arrangements. [50] I note that the RPD drew a negative inference because the Appellant offered vacillating testimony on how he was to learn the details of the XXXX XXXX arrangements once he arrived in the US-by email or other digital communication. I find the exchange on this specific issue included repeated miscommunications between the RPD panel and the Appellant. However, the salient point from this exchange is that the Appellant testified that he was to receive instructions via a phone call, WhatsApp, or Facebook communication, and later testified that he had no evidence of a missed phone call or WhatsApp or Facebook communication and thus is unable to corroborate his allegation. This is further addressed below. [51] In sum, I agree that the Appellant offered vacillating and inconsistent testimony on material allegations, from which I draw a negative credibility inference. Material Omissions: threats and blackmail; whether the Appellant received multiple calls and messages from his XXXX after he fled XXXX [52] The RPD found that the Appellant's BOC narrative contained material omissions. I agree with the RPD analysis on the omissions. I find the omissions from the BOC, coupled with a lack of probative evidence to support the Appellant's allegations that he faces an ongoing threat of harm from the XXXX, are central to my determination that the Appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that he would face an ongoing risk of harm from the XXXX if he returned to Jordan. My reasons follow. [53] The RPD drew a negative inference because the Appellant did not include in his narrative the following testimony: when he met with the MYA-S in Jordan, he threatened to use the video of the Appellant XXXX XXXX XXXX against him, threatened that he would be on a blacklist, and the family of the woman he was engaged to in Jordan would not accept him in their family; and he received multiple threatening communications from the XXXX after he fled XXXX. The RPD also drew a negative inference because the Appellant did not include in the narrative that he fled XXXX because he was terrified MYA-S or his agents would kill him and that he would be killed at the XXXX where he was supposed to pick up the XXXX. There is no mention of the XXXX in the BOC narrative, which the Appellant testified was of particular concern to him as it was a non-public place. [54] The Appellant explained that he did not know he ought to have included the details about the threats of harm and blackmail in the BOC narrative, an explanation rejected by the RPD because he had experienced Counsel, who had assisted him with making other amendments to his narrative. The Appellant submits that his Counsel only helped with the last two pages of his narrative because he was detained while he was preparing the first part with the help of an interpreter whose job is not to assist with the BOC. The Appellant submitted that his Counsel at the first RPD hearing said that the reason the BOC does not include all the information is that the Appellant was in custody, however, this does not explain why these allegations were not included in the additional narrative prepared after the Appellant was released from custody and filed by the Appellant's Counsel on the first RPD proceeding.16 Like the RPD, I do not accept the Appellant's explanation as reasonable. [55] I find that the RPD was correct to make a negative credibility finding regarding these omissions from the BOC. These omissions share a common theme: they all relate to the Appellant's alleged ongoing fear of reprisal and harm from MYA-S, which is central to his allegations. I agree with and adopt the RPD findings regarding these omissions, set out in paragraphs 82 to 86, and 88 to 91 of its Decision. I find that these omissions undermine the credibility of the Appellant's allegation that he fears harm and reprisal from MYA-S if he were to return to Jordan. [56] The Appellant alleged that he feared that the XXXX would use the XXXX video as blackmail to force him to participate in money laundering. He stated this fear but did not set out any specific instances of actual threats of blackmail in his narrative. When the RPD questioned him on this, the Appellant testified that he had been threatened with blackmail in Jordan when the XXXX plan was communicated, as described above. The Appellant's alleged fear of the XXXX and the latter's use of this video is central to his allegations and yet he failed to include this highly material allegation in his BOC narrative, referring to it only when the RPD noted an absence of any allegations of particular instances of blackmail. I draw a negative credibility inference from this omission. [57] Similarly, the Appellant does not state in the BOC narrative that he fled XXXX because he feared that the XXXX or his agents would kill him. Again, this is a material allegation that goes to the heart of his claim that he has a forward-facing risk of harm, yet it was omitted from the BOC. I make a negative credibility finding from this omission. [58] When the RPD asked the Appellant if the XXXX ever acted on his threats of harm, he testified that the XXXX withheld the consent required by the Saudi Arabian authorities so that he could apply for a new job, with XXXX. This is a material allegation-an alleged instance of the XXXX exercising power and control over the Appellant-and yet it was omitted from the BOC. When asked why this was omitted, the Appellant stated that he did not know he had to put this allegation in his BOC narrative and had mentioned it to a CBSA officer. I draw a negative inference from this omission as it is highly material to the Appellant's claim that the XXXX threatened to harm him and poses a forward-facing risk if he returned to Jordan. [59] The Appellant also submits that the omitted testimony was covered in his interviews with the CBSA and therefore they were otherwise provided in the Record and should not be considered omissions. I have reviewed those interviews and they do not set out the detailed allegations to which the Appellant testified regarding the XXXX trip and the threat to use the XXXX video, and do not assist to explain the omissions from the BOC. In the interview with Officer Christopoulos, the Appellant states that he was to go to XXXX to pick up XXXX containing money. He said that the "exact episode of XXXX was about to be replicated in XXXX. I was told when I take the flight to XXXX airport, go to a hotel from there, somebody will contact me and introduce himself to me, exactly the way which has been transpired in my travel to XXXX XXXX"17 The Appellant goes on to tell the officer that the only person he heard from upon arrival in XXXX was MYA-S who contacted him to confirm he had arrived. The Appellant then stated that MYA-S had told him that the call would come to the hotel after the XXXX, but he did not go to a hotel nor receive a call and fled to XXXX. He did not tell the officer that the deal was to take place at a XXXX. [60] In his interview with Officer Wunderlich, the Appellant stated that he did not refuse to go to XXXX because MYA-S had videos of him XXXX XXXX XXXX, however, he did not state that they blackmailed him with threats to use the video against him if he did not go, as alleged in his testimony.18 [61] These material omissions are coupled with an absence of corroborating evidence to support the Appellant's allegations that he received threats of harm from MYA-S after he fled XXXX having failed to deal with the XXXX. [62] As referenced briefly above, the Appellant testified that he expected to receive electronic communication regarding the plan with the XXXX in XXXX at approximately 5:30 to 6:30 pm following the conclusion of the XXXX at 5:00 pm, but he turned his phone off. The RPD invited him to file any evidence of having received such a communication. On the second hearing day, the Appellant confirmed that he did not have a missed voicemail, WhatsApp or Facebook call during these hours, or other evidence of electronic communication of these plans or communication regarding his failure to follow through on the plans regarding the XXXX. The Appellant therefore did not proffer any corroborating evidence of a digital communication after the XXXX either communicating the plan or asking why he was not responding to communications as expected. [63] The Appellant testified that he received threats through Facebook 3 or 4 times. Having reviewed the Appellant's Facebook and WhatsApp messages in the Record, nothing in those communications indicates that he was being threatened. Further, the Appellant remained employed by XXXX for some weeks after he fled XXXX, and as noted by the RPD, he continued to be in touch with his former employer which more likely than not explains the ongoing contact. [64] The WhatsApp messages dated XXXX XXXX, 2022, accepted as new evidence appear to have been initiated by the XXXX (identified as "XXXX XXXX" on Facebook). The XXXX asks "How are you" at the beginning. He asks the Appellant to call him. The Appellant then sets out what has happened to him in Canada through the refugee application process. In his appeal submissions, he admits that he embellished these. The XXXX does not threaten him in the message. He states that they will talk when the Appellant is back in Jordan. I do not find that this WhatsApp exchange of messages supports the Appellant's allegations that he faces a risk of harm by the XXXX if he returned to Jordan. [65] The Appellant alleges that he received a threatening audio message from H A-S and that the reference to "Iraq" in H A-S's message is a reference to the XXXX.19 The message from H A-S. is cryptic, referring to "Iraq" and "Carrefour." The Appellant has not provided evidence to explain how this message is probative of his allegation that he was being threatened by the XXXX or H A-S. [66] In addition to the lack of evidence of threats of blackmail before or after the XXXX trip, there is a lack of concrete evidence regarding the power and position of the alleged agent of harm, MYA-S, and as I have found above, I have drawn a negative inference regarding the alleged threats of blackmail before the XXXX trip given their omission from the BOC narrative. [67] The Appellant testified that MYA-S is a Palestinian Jordanian, married to a Jordanian woman. The Appellant has made general allegations that MYA-S is an individual with power and influence, and despite being Palestinian, has "wasta" (meaning access to power and influence) in Jordan, because he has money. However, he has provided no specific evidence to support this. While the Appellant suggested it was significant that MYA-S's wife is Jordanian, he provided no evidence about her family or about how they might wield power against him. The Appellant testified that he did not know exactly how big MYA-S's power in Jordan was but then said when he learned that the XXXX from XXXX would enter through customs, he knew his power was "very strong."20 When asked to explain how he knows this, the Appellant stated that MYA-S has contacts in the Jordanian customs authority. I do not find this to be probative of the Appellant's claim that MYA-S has significant power or influence in Jordan such that he would have power over the Appellant. The Appellant has not explained how contacts in the customs authority would translate to authority and influence over him. Further, if MYA-S wields influence and power in Jordan, one might expect there to be instances where he has done so to affect others, however, the Appellant provided no examples of MYA-S's influential, threatening, or violent behaviour towards anyone else. In sum, the Appellant alleges that MYA-S is untouchable and above the law in Jordan due to his power and influence but has provided no concrete evidence of this. [68] Furthermore, when asked by the RPD, the Appellant had no information that MYA-S is connected to a broader criminal organization (and the Appellant specifically denied any knowledge that the XXXX company, which he states MYA-S left after the Appellant came to Canada, is itself involved in criminal activity). [69] The Appellant alleges further that MYA-S fears him because he knows about his illegal activities, yet the Appellant claims that he himself has no power and influence in Jordan, while he asserts that MYA-S is above the law. I find this allegation to be speculative. There is no evidence to support it and it contradicts the Appellant's own allegations about the power dynamic. I also note that the Appellant allegedly has information about MYA-S's criminal activities and drug use and therefore is implicated in any narrative he might disclose about the Appellant. [70] Finally, the Appellant confirmed that he has no evidence that MYA-S has contacted or threatened his family in Jordan since he fled to Canada. [71] In sum, there is no credible evidence that the Appellant was blackmailed or threatened by MYA-S at any time, including before or after the XXXX trip, nor is there credible evidence that MYA-S poses an ongoing threat of harm to the Appellant if he returned to Jordan. [72] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by failing to address a serious issue raised regarding his former Counsel and an interpreter putting fake evidence in his file. I have examined the relevant portion of the audio recording of the hearing.21 The RPD asked if the Appellant had reported the issue regarding potential fraud by his former Counsel and the interpreter. The Appellant's Counsel stated that this was a criminal matter, that the former Counsel was facing serious criminal charges and this matter was minor compared with the charges the prosecution decided to proceed on. Counsel confirmed that the allegations against the interpreter had not yet been reported to the RPD, and the RPD panel stated that she would report it. I find no fault in the RPD's handling of this matter. The former Counsel's alleged placement of false evidence in the Record and the interpreter's alleged involvement was not relevant to the RPD assessment of the Appellant's claim, nor is it relevant on appeal. [73] In conclusion, I find that there is insufficient credible evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant faces a risk of harm as defined in subsection 97(1) of the IRPA, by his alleged agent of harm. Discrimination amounting to persecution as a Palestinian in Jordan [74] The RPD concluded that while persons of Palestinian origin face some discrimination in Jordan, the level of discrimination does not, even when considered cumulatively, and in the context of the Appellant's particular circumstances, rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for persons bearing his profile, namely a highly educated Jordanian citizen who does not live in a refugee camp, who is of Palestinian origin. [75] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to take into account his entire profile in determining whether he faces a serious possibility of persecution in Jordan. He notes that not only his father, who was born in Palestine, but his entire family including the Appellant himself, is listed on the UNWRA card, which he asserts demonstrates that notwithstanding his Jordanian citizenship, there is still racism in Jordan, he is identified as a Palestinian, and is subject to unequal treatment. He submits that in addition to his allegations of discrimination in education and employment for example, the RPD failed to consider that he has a criminal record based on false prosecution, that the family of his former girlfriend was able to influence the exercise of state power against him, and that Palestinians in Jordan have little "wasta." [76] I note that Palestinians in Jordan bear differing statuses. I have not considered the treatment of Palestinians in the categories of "ex-Gazan," or Palestinians who have fled the Syrian civil war, who may face persecution in Jordan, as the Appellant does not fit these profiles.22 Based on the evidence in the Record, the Appellant is in the group of Palestinians and their children who migrated to Jordan and the Jordan-controlled West Bank after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war and received full citizenship.23 The Appellant holds a Jordanian passport and Jordanian national identity number, which is noted on his passport.24 According to the documentary evidence, Palestinians can be in possession of documents other than those issued by UNRWA, including Palestinians with Jordanian citizenship and the right to a Jordanian passport. UNRWA operates two forms of eligibility-the eligibility to register with UNRWA and the eligibility to receive UNRWA services.25 There is insufficient evidence before me to determine into which category the Appellant falls, but regardless there is no dispute that he possesses Jordanian citizenship and a national identity number. Based on the objective evidence including the June 2020 Danish Immigration Service report on Palestinian refugees in Jordan,26 individuals such as the Appellant who have a full passport and national identity number are considered Jordanian citizens and are not at risk of having their citizenship revoked. [77] I have considered the Appellant's submissions, the Record, and the audio-recording of the RPD hearing. I have also considered the evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP) for Jordan and for the Palestinian Territory (Occupied) regarding the situation of Palestinians in Jordan. The issues, evidence, and arguments before me are the same as those before the RPD. Based on my independent analysis, I agree with and adopt the RPD's findings in paragraphs 117 to 126 of its Decision and I conclude, as did the RPD, that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution in Jordan on account of his Palestinian heritage. In paragraphs 119 to 123 the RPD canvasses and correctly summarizes the objective evidence regarding education, property ownership, business activity, and social discrimination in respect of Palestinian citizens in Jordan. [78] The documentary evidence27 indicates that while Palestinians in Jordan may be treated differently than non-Palestinian Jordanians, and face what the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) describes as "low level" official discrimination in some areas, I do not find that they face systemic discrimination amounting to persecution in Jordan. For example, while Palestinians are underpopulated in public sector employment, they dominate in the private sector.28 There is no evidence in the Record to establish on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant faced discrimination in employment in Jordan amounting to persecution. Jordanian Palestinians are entitled to the same healthcare and have the same health status as other Jordanians, can own property, and can attend public and private schools.29 There does seem to be discrimination against Palestinians in accessing post-secondary education and the Appellant indicated that he had to XXXX XXXX for his university education, but in my view, this does not rise to the level of persecution. He was able to complete a XXXX degree and a certificate in XXXX in Jordan. [79] I recognize that there is evidence in the NDP that Palestinians may face discrimination in terms of state protection.30 The Appellant submits that his false prosecution initiated by the family of his former girlfriend demonstrates that he was discriminated against as a Palestinian. There is insufficient evidence on the Record for me to find on a balance of probabilities that the Appellant was subject to false prosecution, nor do I find that the evidence on the Record demonstrates on a balance of probabilities that he was prosecuted because he is Palestinian. The incident occurred in 2008. The Appellant was able to complete his university education thereafter and obtain a further educational certificate. I do not find that the evidence in the Record on this issue supports a finding that the Appellant was subject to discrimination rising to persecution or to a finding that the Appellant faces a serious possibility of discrimination amounting to persecution if he returned to Jordan. [80] In sum, I find that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of discrimination amounting to persecution if he returned to Jordan. CONCLUSION [81] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Soraya Farha Soraya Farha March 23, 2023 Date 1 Appellant's Record, at p. 46. 2 Personal identifiers have been removed, except where necessary to explain the reasoning of the decision. 3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), SC 2001, c 27, as amended, at ss. 110(4). 4 Singh v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FCA 96 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 230; Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 FCA 385 (CanLII). 5 Supplementary Appellant's Record, at pp. 2-9. 6 Appellant's Record, at p. 155. 7 Appellant's Record, at pp. 152-154. 8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 9 The Law Dictionary, "The Law Dictionary Featuring Black's Law Dictionary," 2nd Ed.<https://thelawdictionary.org.> [Accessed Mar. 2023]. 10 Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369. 11 Appellant's Record, at p. 146. 12 RPD Record, Exhibit 5, UNRWA Card, at p. 141. 13 Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at p. 13, paras. 20, 22, 40, 41. 14 RPD Record, Exhibit 5, Personal Documents, at p. 138. 15 RPD Record, Exhibit 2, at p. 39, para. 7. 16 RPD Record, Exhibit 2, at p. 112. 17 RPD Record, Exhibit 16, at p. 398. 18 RPD Record, Exhibit 1, at p. 73. 19 RPD Record, Exhibit 16, at pp. 427, 432. 20 RPD Hearing Recording, second sitting held on March 24, 2022, at 01:00:00-01:05:15.21 RPD Hearing Recording, second sitting held on March 4, 2022, at 5:00-10:00. 22 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Jordan (December 21, 2022), item 13.1. 23 National Documentation Package (NDP) for the Palestinian Territory (Occupied) (December 21, 2022), item 3.1. 24 RPD Record, Exhibit 1, at p. 80. 25 NDP for Palestinian Territory (Occupied) (December 21, 2022), item 3.12. 26 NDP for Jordan (December 21, 2022), item 13.6. 27 NDP for Jordan (December 21, 2022), item 13.1. 28 NDP for Jordan (December 21, 2022), item 13.1, at p. 7. 29 NDP for Jordan (December 21, 2022), item 13.1. 30 NDP for Jordan (December 21, 2022), item 13.1. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VC2-05410 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français