MB9-14740

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB9-14740 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 31, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Nicole Ginsberg Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Mark Gruszczynski Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss the appeal of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), citizen of Nigeria. The Appellant is appealing a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated May 22, 2019, rejecting his claim for refugee protection. [2] The Appellant alleges that on January 16, 2016, his XXXX in Ado Ekiti, Ekiti State, was attacked by Fulani Herdsmen. The Appellant's two sons were killed in the attack. Several days later, the Appellant relocated to Lagos. The Appellant left Nigeria on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 and entered the United States (US). He arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2018, where he claimed refugee protection. [3] The RPD found that the Appellant has a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Lagos. The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by failing to consider the Appellant's circumstances under subsection 108(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA),1 and argues that, in view of new evidence, Lagos is no longer a viable IFA. The Appellant requests that the Refugee Protection Division (RAD) allow the appeal and substitute its own decision. Alternatively, the Appellant requests that a hearing be held pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA.2 [4] I have conducted an independent assessment of all of the evidence, including the Appellant's Record in its entirety and the oral testimony. For the reasons below, I find that the Appellant has a viable IFA in Lagos, and that this is determinative of his claim. DECISION [5] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention3 refugee nor a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [6] According to the law,4 I can only accept evidence that: i. arose after the RPD decision; or ii. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii. that you could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [7] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.5 [8] The Appellant submitted two news articles as new evidence on appeal. In his Memorandum, the Appellant argues that the new evidence reveals the herdsmen's presence in the IFA, Lagos, demonstrating that Lagos is no longer a viable IFA. [9] For the following reasons, I am accepting both news articles as new evidence. News article: NAIJ.com - "Police warn Herdsmen against committing crime in Lagos, Ogun" [10] This article describes a warning issued by the police in Lagos and Ogun states to herdsmen considering committing crimes in those states and describes the Nigeria Police Force's arrest of suspected criminals in the north of the country.6 The article post-dates the RPD decision and meets the criteria in subsection 110(4).7 This evidence is new and credible, in the sense that it appears to emanate from a genuine news source in Nigeria. Although the article does not discuss the actual presence or reach of the alleged agent of persecution or harm in Lagos, I accept that the article meets the criteria of relevance from Singh/Raza8 in so far as it relates to the police response to a perceived threat by the Fulani Herdsmen in Lagos state. Accordingly, the article is accepted as new evidence. News article: Punch - "Youths block Benin-Ore road over woman's killing by suspected herdsmen" [11] This article describes the rape and killing of a woman in Edo state by suspected Fulani Herdsmen.9 The article post-dates the RPD decision and meets the criteria in subsection 110(4). The evidence is new and credible, as it appears to emanate from a genuine news source in Nigeria. Although the article does not discuss the presence of the alleged agent of persecution or harm in Lagos particularly, I accept that the article meets the Singh/Raza criteria of relevance in so far as it relates to activity of the Fulani Herdsmen in Edo state, which is south of the North Central or Middle Belt area where Fulani Herdsmen violence has concentrated. Accordingly, the article is accepted as new evidence. ORAL HEARING [12] The Appellant is requesting an oral hearing. According to the relevant legislation, the RAD may hold an oral hearing if there is new evidence that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, that is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim.10 [13] The Appellant has not made any substantive arguments in favour of holding a hearing, but appears to relate the request for a hearing to his argument under subsection 108(4) of the IRPA and the new evidence tendered on appeal.11 The Appellant's argument under subsection 108(4) does not meet the legislative criteria for holding a hearing in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. Moreover, I do not find that the documents admitted as new evidence raise serious issues with respect to the Appellant's credibility, nor would they justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. As such, the criteria of subsection 110(6) is not met and I am not convening an oral hearing. ROLE OF THE RAD [14] My role is to look at all of the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.12 Citing the decision in Dunsmuir,13 the Appellant submits that the standard of review to be applied in this case should be one of reasonableness. The decision in Dunsmuir no longer applies in determining the standard of review applicable by an appellate tribunal to a first instance decision maker.14 Moreover, the Appellant has not provided any substantive argument to support a departure from the standard of correctness. In this case, in accordance with the current jurisprudence, I am reviewing the RPD decision on a standard of correctness, as I do not find that the RPD had a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral evidence, and I do not view there being any reason to depart from this standard in this case. ANALYSIS Subsection 108(4) of the IRPA is not applicable in this case [15] The Appellant argues that there are compelling reasons not to return the Appellant to Nigeria and that the RPD erred by failing to consider the Appellant's past persecution in Nigeria pursuant to subsection 108(4) of the IRPA.15 [16] The RPD did not make a finding with respect to subsection 108(4) of the IRPA, nor did the Appellant raise this argument before the RPD. The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD was required to "analyze the compelling reasons of previous torture if the refusal is based on the fact that the reasons for the well-founded fear of persecution have failed to exist"16 and that it committed an error in law by failing to do so, in view of the fact that previous persecution and torture was accepted by the RPD in the Appellant's case. I disagree. For the following reasons, I find that the RPD was correct in not conducting an assessment of subsection 108(4) of the IRPA because the Appellant did not establish that the reasons for his claim have failed to exist, which is a precondition for the application of subsection 108(4). [17] The jurisprudence is clear that the RPD should not undertake a subsection 108(4) assessment in every case. The Federal Court of Appeal in Yamba concluded that there is an obligation to consider whether there are compelling reasons "in every case in which the Refugee Division concludes that a claimant has suffered past persecution, but [there] has been a change of country conditions."17 [18] Moreover, the Federal Court stated the following in Contreras Martinez: [19] ...It is only when para. 108(1)(e) is invoked by the RPD that a "compelling reasons" assessment should me made, i.e. when the refugee claimant was found to be a refugee but nevertheless had been be denied refugee status given the change of circumstances in the country of origin. In Kalumba c. Canada (Ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration), 2005 CF 680, [2005] A.C.F. No. 879, at para. 18 and 19, Justice Shore provided a succinct summary of the applicable principles: [MY TRANSLATION] As per the wording of the section, before considering the application of subsection 108(4) of the Act, the Commission must conclude that the person would have been granted refugee status notwithstanding the change of circumstances which occurred in the country. In the matter at hand, the Commission determined that M. Kalumba had an internal flight alternative in his country of origin and therefore concluded that Mr. Kalumba was neither a refugee nor a person in need of protection as per sections 96 and 97 of the Act. Secondly, the Commission never mentions in its reasons such a change of circumstances in the RC that would have an effect of depriving the grounds for his fear of persecution. As such, the Commission did not have to conduct a "compelling reasons" analysis pursuant to subsection 108(4) of the Act. ... [21] It is clear from the wording of sub. 108(4) that it is not aimed at creating a broad obligation for the RPD to assess the existence of "compelling reasons" in every refugee claim. If a refugee claimant is neither a refugee nor a person in need of protection because the conditions of the general definition of section 96 and 97 of the IRPA are not met, then no "compelling reasons" assessment need be performed by the RPD. It is only necessary where the rejection of the claim is based on 108(1)(e).18 [19] According to the relevant jurisprudence, before the Immigration and Refugee Board can consider, under subsection 108(4) whether there are sufficient compelling reasons to grant refugee status, the Appellant must not only establish that at some point he met the definition of a Convention refugee or a protected person, but that it must be determined that the reasons for the claim have ceased to exist due to country conditions.19 In this case, the RPD has not invoked paragraph 108(1)(e)20 in rejecting the Appellant's claim based on a change of circumstances. Nor has the Appellant argued or demonstrated that there has been a change of circumstances in Nigeria that would have the effect of depriving the grounds for his fear of persecution21 or that would result in a claim for refugee protection no longer being available.22 The Appellant does not argue, nor has there been any finding, that his risk at the hands of the Fulani Herdsmen has dissipated or ceased to exist. To the contrary, Counsel argues on appeal that "while the Appellant acknowledged that, at the time of the hearing, the proposed IFA in Lagos would be a safe place for him to seek refuge,"23 it has since become unsafe due to the herdsmen's presence there. In the absence of a change of circumstances in this case as envisaged in the relevant legislation and jurisprudence, I find that subsection 108(4) is not applicable. The Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution or a section 97 risk in Lagos [20] The RPD found that the Appellant was credible as to his key allegations but, having proposed Lagos as an IFA, found that the Appellant failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Fulani Herdsmen are motivated to find him if he was to relocate to there. For the reasons below, and after having conducted my own independent analysis, I agree with the RPD's conclusion on this prong of the IFA analysis. [21] For the first prong of the IFA analysis, I must be satisfied that there is no serious possibility that the Appellant would be persecuted or that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant would not be personally subjected to a danger of torture or a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment in the IFA location.24 The Appellant bears the burden of proof. For the reasons below, I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated that the Fulani Herdsmen have either the motivation or the means to find and harm him in Lagos. [22] For the purposes of this appeal, I accept the Appellant's allegations as credible. Specifically, I find that the Appellant has credibly established that on January 16, 2016, when he was living in Ekiti State, his XXXX was attacked by Fulani Herdsmen and that two of his sons died in the incident. The Appellant has also credibly established that, after the attack, he relocated to Lagos with his wife and surviving son, where he lived until he left Nigeria for the US in XXXX 2017. [23] The RPD questioned the Appellant as to whether he could relocate to Lagos. The Appellant testified that he does not have a fear of attack by the Fulani Herdsmen in Lagos.25 He explained that Lagos is surrounded by water and there is no land to graze there.26 The RPD found that the Appellant acknowledged that Lagos would be safe for him, which was corroborated by the fact that the Appellant had not suffered any harm there after moving to Lagos in XXXX 2016, after the attack in Ekiti state.27 The RPD found that the Appellant had failed to establish that his alleged agents of persecution or harm would have the interest or motivation to find him in Lagos. [24] On my own independent analysis, I do not find that the Appellant has established that the Fulani Herdsmen have either the motivation or the means to find and harm the Appellant if he was to return to live in Lagos. He has not alleged that the Fulani Herdsmen are interested in finding him or that they showed any interest in doing so after the initial attack in January 2016. The evidence indicates that the Appellant lived in Lagos for nearly 1.5 years before his departure from Nigeria without being contacted or harmed by the alleged agents of persecution or harm. [25] Moreover, the objective documentary evidence on file does not support a risk for the Appellant in Lagos under sections 96 or 97 of the IRPA. The objective documentary evidence indicates that the issue of Fulani Herdsmen violence is limited geographically, based on their operational goals. A Response to Information Request of the Immigration and Refugee Board indicates that the Fulani Herdsmen, described as nomadic pastoralists, operate in rural areas where they are focused on clearing land in their search for pasture.28 Although there are religious and ethnic dimensions to the conflict, the conflict is largely resource-motivated, with the dominant driving factor of Fulani Herdsmen violence being a desire to protect their livelihoods.29 [26] Although there may be instances of Fulani Herdsmen violence throughout Nigeria, the objective documentary evidence indicates that Fulani Herdsmen violence is concentrated specifically in the Plateau, Benue and Nasarawa states in the North Central (or Middle Belt) geopolitical zone and in the adjoining Adamawa and Taraba states in the North-East zone.30 The objective documentary evidence further indicates that Fulani clans operate as independent groups and there are no clear indications that the Fulani herdsmen have a common political objective or that the clans are unified by common goals throughout Nigeria.31 [27] The Appellant has not tendered any country evidence that effectively negates or overcomes the objective documentary evidence discussed above as to the geographic operation or reach and modus operandi of the Fulani Herdsmen, that is, that would corroborate their operation in urbanized areas such as the IFA location. The 2017 report of the International Crisis Group submitted by the Appellant before the RPD indicates that that the conflict is "spreading southward"32 and the February 2018 news article submitted by the Appellant before the RPD indicates that the Fulani Herdsmen are "causing mayhem" in the south-eastern states of Ekiti, Ondo and Ogun.33 An article tendered by the Appellant on appeal speaks to a Fulani Herdsmen attack in Edo state.34 However, there is no evidence before me to establish that the Fulani Herdsmen have mounted attacks in the city of Lagos or that they are departing from the modus operandi described in the objective documentary evidence discussed above of targeting farm or other land in pastoral or non-urbanized areas, for the purpose of ruminant animal grazing.35 The Appellant himself testified that in Lagos, where he lived, there is no land to graze. [28] The Appellant argues that the new evidence presented on appeal demonstrates that Lagos has become unsafe for the Appellant due to the presence of the Fulani Herdsmen.36 I disagree. The Appellant has not demonstrated that the country conditions are, or have changed have such that, the city of Lagos is rendered unsafe for the Appellant. The new evidence tendered on appeal indicates that the police in Lagos state and Ogun state are anticipating criminal activity and have warned the Fulani Herdsmen against expansion into their area,37 and reports a suspected Fulani Herdsmen attack in Edo state.38 The Appellant has not demonstrated, through this documentary evidence or otherwise, that the Fulani Herdsmen have moved into Lagos state, no less into the IFA location of Lagos city. More importantly, however, the Appellant has not demonstrated that the modus operandi of the group and its pursuit of grazing lands has changed such that the large, urbanized centre that is Lagos would be unsafe for him. [29] The Appellant also testified that if he was to return to Nigeria, he would suffer trauma as a result of his past experiences.39 He has not advanced a substantive argument in this regard. Although I acknowledge the terrible hardship faced by the Appellant in the past as regards the loss of his sons, I note that in this prong of the IFA analysis the burden is on the Appellant to demonstrate that he faces a serious possibility of persecution in the IFA location, in this case as a result of his psychological hardship, or that this would constitute a risk as defined in section 97 of the IRPA, in the IFA location. He has not done so in this case. Moreover, the Appellant's psychological condition is an element that is discussed in the second prong of the IFA analysis, below. [30] In view of the foregoing, I find that the Appellant has not established that he faces a serious possibility of persecution or a risk as defined under section 97 of the IRPA in Lagos. Lagos is not an objectively unreasonable location for relocation in the Appellant's circumstances. [31] The RPD found that the Appellant did not demonstrate that relocating to the proposed IFA of Lagos would be objectively unreasonable in the circumstances. This is uncontested by the Appellant. Although I find fault with certain aspects of the RPD's analysis, as discussed below, I agree with the RPD's conclusion on this prong of the IFA analysis. [32] For the second prong of the IFA analysis, the Appellant must demonstrate that the conditions in the IFA are such that it would be objectively unreasonable in the circumstances for him to seek refuge there. The central question in the second prong of the test is whether expecting the individual to relocate to the proposed IFA location(s) would be "unduly harsh."40 The courts have set a very high threshold for the unreasonableness prong of the test in that "it requires nothing less than the existence of conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of a claimant."41 [33] The Appellant testified that he would face psychological trauma if he returned to live in Lagos, because of what he experienced in Ekiti with the deaths of his sons.42 In addition, he testified that it would be difficult for him to find work in agriculture if he was to return to Nigeria.43 His former counsel argued in his submissions before the RPD that even if the Appellant could find a job in Lagos in a domain other than his previous area of architecture, this would represent a regression in his professional plans, income and quality of life.44 [34] I have reviewed the record carefully, including the Appellant's profile, and on my own analysis I do not find that the Appellant has demonstrated that relocating to Lagos would be unduly harsh or objectively unreasonable in his particular circumstances. The Appellant lived in Lagos for numerous years before he moved to Ekiti State in 2015.45 He is trained in XXXX XXXX and ran an XXXX XXXX from 2012 to 2015 while living in Lagos, from which he earned his income.46 He testified that the company still exists, although it is not operating.47 In 2015, when he moved to Ekiti State, he began working in XXXX.48 [35] Although the Appellant may prefer to work in the domains of XXXX XXXX XXXX, his inability to work in the field of his choosing does not, on its own, render the IFA location unduly harsh or objectively unreasonable. The jurisprudence is clear that in order to establish that a proposed IFA is unreasonable, it is "not enough for refugee claimants to say ... that they may not be able to find suitable work [in the proposed IFA]."49 The Appellant is an educated man with a higher national diploma in XXXX XXXX50 and numerous years of work experience, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. Although his then-counsel pointed out in his submissions before the RPD that the Appellant had to move from Lagos to Ekiti to find work,51 I find that according to the evidence, he is in a better position than the average Nigerian in terms of securing employment. The documentary evidence indicates that there is a high rate of unemployment in Nigeria generally,52 and that obtaining employment can be difficult. The total years of education completed on average for Nigerian men is nine years.53 The Appellant has well exceeded that average at seventeen years,54 having completed a post-secondary degree, as well as having had a meaningful work history. As a result of the foregoing, I find, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's personal circumstances are such that he would be able to find employment and support himself and his family in Lagos, where he has lived in the past and where he was able to find work, lodging and to support his family. [36] The Appellant has argued that he would face psychological trauma in having to return to Nigeria. It is not evident that the RPD considered the Appellant's psychological condition in assessing the reasonableness of the IFA location for the Appellant. For this, it can be faulted. The jurisprudence supports that the Appellant's psychological condition may affect the reasonableness of a proposed IFA.55 Nonetheless, the Appellant has not advanced a substantive argument in this regard, and on my own independent analysis, I do not find that the Appellant has demonstrated that his psychological condition renders relocation to Lagos unduly harsh or objectively unreasonable in the circumstances. The threshold in this regard is a very high one and requires proof of adverse conditions that would jeopardize the life and safety of the Appellant in the IFA location.56 The Appellant has not demonstrated that, in his particular circumstances, in a major centre such as Lagos, he would not be able to access adequate treatment, or that his psychological condition would otherwise render the IFA location unduly harsh or objectively unreasonable. [37] I note again the very high threshold set by the courts for the unreasonableness prong of the IFA analysis. I also note that the jurisprudence is clear that it must be objectively unreasonable for the Appellant to live in the IFA, in that it is insufficient for the claimant to demonstrate mere subjective reluctance to relocate there.57 [38] As a result of the foregoing, I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated that the proposed IFA location would be objectively unreasonable or unduly harsh in his particular circumstances. [39] Considering all of the above, I agree with the conclusion of the RPD and find that the Appellant has a viable IFA in Lagos. CONCLUSION [40] As the Appellant has a viable IFA in Lagos, I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. Nicole Ginsberg Nicole Ginsberg March 31, 2021 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27, section 108(4). 2 IRPA, section 110(6). 3 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 4 IRPA, section 110(4). 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, [2016] 4 FCR 230; Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), FC 385. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp 12-14: Insecurity: Police warn herdsmen against committing crime in Lagos, Ogun, NAIJ.com news article. 7 IRPA, section 110(4). 8 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, [2016] 4 FCR 230; Raza v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), FC 385. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 15-18: Youths block Benin-Ore road over woman's killing by suspected herdsmen, Punch news article. 10 IRPA s. 110(6) 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p.10 at para. 10. 12 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, [2016] 4 FCR 157; Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145, [2019] 2 FCR 597. 13 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190. 14 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, [2016] 4 FCR 157, at para. 47. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, pp. 8-9 at paras. 3-6. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 9 at para. 5. 17 Yamba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 15191 (FCA), at para. 6; Alfaka Alharazim v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 1044, at para. 36. 18 Contreras Martinez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 343. 19 Jairo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 622; see also, Brovina v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 635, at paras. 5-6; Goksu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 382, at para 41; Kudar v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2004 FC 648, at para. 10; Luc v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 826, at para. 32. 20 IRPA, section 108(1)(e). 21 Contreras Martinez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2006 FC 343, at para. 19. 22 Pazmandi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2020 FC 1094, at paras. 48-49. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Appellant's Memorandum, at para. 8, at p. 10. 24 Rasaratnam v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (F.C.A.). 25 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at p. 31. 26 Ibid. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, at para. 22. 28 Exhibit RAD-1, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 7.31: Fulani herdsmen, including motivations, modus operandi and recruitment methods; raids by Fulani herdsmen in schools in Benin City in October 2016 (2016-August 2018), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, August 10, 2018. 29 Exhibit RAD-1, NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 7.31. 30 Exhibit RAD-1, NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 7.20: Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence. Africa Report N°262, International Crisis Group, July 26, 2018. 31 Exhibit RAD-1, NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 7.31. 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 112. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 139. 34 Supra., note 9. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 122. 36 Supra., at endnote 23. 37 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 13-14. 38 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 16-18. 39 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at pp. 31 and 36-37. 40 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), 22 Imm LR (2d) 241. 41 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164, at para. 15. 42 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at pp. 36-37. 43 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at p. 37. 44 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 154. 45 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at p. 24. 46 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at pp. 23-24. 47 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at pp. 24-25. 48 RPD Transcript (May 13, 2019), at p. 24. 49 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (MCI), [1994] 1 FC 589 (C.A.). 50 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 90. 51 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 154. 52 Exhibit RAD-1, NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.6: Nigeria. The World Factbook, United States. Central Intelligence Agency, November 18, 2020. 53 Exhibit RAD-1, NDP for Nigeria (November 30, 2020), item 1.6. 54 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 90. 55 Cardenas v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 1194, at para. 21. 56 Ranganathan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2000 CanLII 16789 (FCA), [2001] 2 FC 164. 57 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1993 CanLII 3011 (FCA), 22 Imm LR (2d) 241. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB9-14740 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français