TB6-12133

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-12133 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision March 29, 2017 Date de la décision Panel S.S. Kular Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Robin D. Bajer Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is a citizen of Afghanistan. He is appealing the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD), denying his claim for refugee protection. [2] The Appellant has not submitted new evidence pursuant to section 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA or Act).1 The Appellant is not asking for a hearing at the RAD pursuant to section 110(6) of the IRPA. [3] The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to substitute a positive determination as per section 111(1)(b) of the IRPA. In the alternative, the Appellant asks the RAD to refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination, with appropriate directions including, at a minimum, that the claim be assessed by a differently constituted panel, pursuant to 111(1)(c) of the IRPA. [4] The Minister is not intervening in the appeal. DETERMINATION [5] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND/ALLEGATIONS [6] The Appellant fears Taliban upon return to Afghanistan. [7] The Appellant was a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX starting in 2005. The Appellant was seventeen years old at the time and was attending high school in Kabul. The Appellant was XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX; the show also covered many discussion topics on air. The Appellant continued to work at XXXX XXXX until 2008. In 2008, gunmen attacked XXXX XXXX station and burned the equipment. Out of fear for his safety, the Appellant left his job at XXXX XXXX. Thereafter, the Appellant started to work at the XXXX XXXX XXXX (NRC). He worked at the XXXX from April 2009 to June 2011; the Appellant received no threats from the Taliban while working at the XXXX. [8] In 2011, the Appellant went to the United Kingdom (U.K.) to undertake further studies; he was there from 2011 to 2014. The Appellant studied business administration in the U.K. Upon return to Afghanistan in XXXX 2014, the Appellant learnt that while he was in the U.K., Taliban had issued several threatening letters to the Appellant's family. The Appellant was personally named in those letters. [9] On August 16, 2015, two motorcyclists pulled up and shot at the Appellant with a pistol; their shots hit the Appellant's car door. Out of fear of harm, the Appellant hid at his home, and his family moved away to hide. Subsequent to this event, the Appellant applied for a student visa to the United States (U.S.) which he received. Thereafter, the Appellant fled Afghanistan and arrived in the U.S. The Appellant, however, did not pursue his studies in the U.S.; instead, he made his way to Canada and filed his claim for refugee protection. [10] The Appellant's narrative, included in the Appellant's Basis of Claim (BoC) form,2 sets out the details regarding the Appellant's situation upon return to Afghanistan. The Appellant provided additional details at his RPD hearing. [11] The Appellant's claim was heard at the RPD on January 18, 2016 and February 2, 2016. In an oral decision of February 2, 2016, the RPD rejected his claim. [12] The RPD found that the Appellant does not have a well-founded fear of persecution on a Convention ground in Afghanistan. The RPD also found that the Appellant is not a person in need of protection. The RPD concluded that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee, nor a person in need of protection. [13] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its credibility findings. The Appellant submits that the RPD's analysis of the Appellant's residual risk is cursory, and unsupported by country conditions. ROLE OF THE RAD [14] The Canadian jurisprudence provides guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of the RPD, a first-level administrative tribunal. [15] On March 29, 2016, the Federal Court of Appeal (FCA) in Huruglica3 provided guidance on how the RAD is to properly approach its review of the RPD's findings of fact or of mixed fact and law which involve no issue of credibility of oral evidence. The Court held that the task of the RAD is to determine whether or not the RPD was wrong in law, fact or in mixed fact and law, in the context of the legislation. "Wrong" means "not true," "incorrect" or "mistaken," all of which "definitively points to the standard of correctness." [16] In closing, Justice Gauthier wrote: I conclude from my statutory analysis that with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law) such as the one involved here, which raised no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. Thus, after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD carries out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the appellant, the RPD erred. Having done this, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. No other interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions is reasonable.4 [17] Regarding the credibility of the oral evidence heard by the RPD, Justice Gauthier stated that the provisions of the IRPA, particularly with respect to paragraph 111(2)(b) concerning the question of when the RAD may refer a matter back to the RPD for redetermination, does acknowledge the fact that: "...[In] some cases where oral testimony is critical or determinative in the opinion of the RAD, the RAD may not be in a position to confirm or substitute its own determination to that of the RPD."5 [18] Further, in a conclusion that may be obiter in the circumstances of Huruglica where the credibility of oral evidence was not an issue, the FCA found: This also recognizes that there may be cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because they require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to the oral evidence it hears. It further indicates that although the RAD should sometimes exercise a degree of restraint before substituting its own determination, the issue of whether the circumstances warrant such restraint ought to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. In each case, the RAD ought to determine whether the RPD truly benefited from an advantageous position, and if so, whether the RAD can nevertheless make a final decision in respect of the refugee claim.6 [19] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the RPD erred in its determination. The RAD will determine the appeal either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD, that the matter will be referred back to the RPD for redetermination. The RAD will afford deference to the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings only where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. The extent of this deference will be assessed on a case-by-case basis, and that being dependent upon the particular circumstances of the matter and in conjunction with the RAD's own analysis of the record as a whole. [20] In conducting its own independent assessment and making the determination in this appeal, the RAD considered the entirety of the evidence submitted/adduced in this case, including the recording of the RPD's proceedings, and the Appellant's Appeal Record. ANALYSIS [21] Based on its own independent analysis of the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD concurs with the RPD's determination that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. Credibility [22] The RPD found the Appellant's allegations of fear of harm at the hands of Taliban upon return to Afghanistan not credible due to several inconsistencies within the totality of the Appellant's evidence submitted/adduced at the RPD.7 The RPD found it not credible that the Appellant's family would continue to live normally for years despite continued threats from the Taliban.8 The RPD also found that the Appellant's actions and behaviour, i.e., posting personal entries on Facebook, demonstrated a lack of subjective fear.9 Appellant's role at XXXX XXXX morning program: [23] The Appellant testified at the RPD that while working at XXXX XXXX, his job included XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The Appellant's witness, XXXX XXXX XXXX, testified that the Appellant hosted a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, and was in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXincluding presentations by different people on topics such as science, women's rights, and for playing music on air. The witness had also provided a reference letter10 for the Appellant in which the witness wrote that the Appellant hosted the show. The reference letter states that the Appellant's show included discussion on topics such as women's rights, poor and corrupt governance, war criminals and cultural criminals, various local and world music programs, and political programs. Further, the reference letter refers to the Appellant being courageous to have hosted such a show. The RPD found that the Appellant's evidence including his testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of the witness and the reference letter provided, and the Appellant's other evidence submitted in support of the Appellant's role at XXXX XXXXo. Therefore, the RPD drew a negative credibility inference. [24] The Appellant submits that his testimony was consistent,11 i.e., with the testimony of the witness and the reference letter provided. The Appellant submits that he XXXX XXXX XXXX the show but never hosted the show. The Appellant submits that he "...never claimed that he was the host of these other programs or talked on these other programs."12 [25] In reviewing the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds the Appellant's evidence to be marred with several inconsistencies. The RAD finds that the Appellant testified, and also submits, that he never hosted the show. The RAD also finds that the testimony of the witness and the reference letter provided by the witness clearly show that the Appellant was in charge of the show, and that the show included music and discussion topics. The reference letter states that the Appellant hosted the show, and that his role atXXXX XXXX XXXX morning program was important. The reference letter contradicts the Appellant's own evidence. The Appellant maintained that he did not host the show, and that he only played music requests on air. In this respect, the RAD finds that the Appellant's own evidence is in stark contrast to his other evidence, i.e., the testimony of the witness and the reference letter provided. Regarding the above inconsistency, the RAD does not accept the Appellant's explanation that he was only a host to the people who came to discuss the various issues on XXXX XXXX. Further, the Appellant allegedly quit his job at XXXX XXXX in 2008; however, the RAD finds that the Taliban letters13 allude to the Appellant having been an employee of XXXX XXXX at the time the Taliban letters were written. [26] Although the RAD accepts that XXXX XXXX existed and was attacked by gunmen in 2008, based on the totality of the evidence in this case and the RAD's analysis presented above, the RAD does not accept that the Appellant worked at XXXX XXXX as alleged. The RAD concurs with the RPD in this respect that the Appellant's testimony was inconsistent with the testimony of the witness and the reference letter provided, and the Appellant's other evidence submitted with regard to the Appellant having been employed at XXXX XXXX as alleged, and his allegedly having hosted/managed, or not, the alleged program on XXXX XXXX. The identity of the witness: [27] The witness testified on the phone from Afghanistan. The RPD asked the witness for his birth date; the witness was unable to provide his date of birth, the witness could not even provide the year of his birth. The RPD drew a negative inference from the failure of the witness to provide his birth date. In reviewing the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds that the witness testified that he had a high school diploma, had been a high school teacher, and was an employee at XXXX XXXX. The witness testified that he was the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RAD finds it reasonable to expect, in the circumstances, for the witness to have known, at least, the year of his birth. The RAD concurs with the RPD to have impugned the testimony of the witness because the RPD found the witness to be not trustworthy because he was not forthcoming in his testimony. [28] The RPD also found that the Appellant and the witness provided inconsistent evidence relating to the Appellant's role on XXXX XXXX morning program as discussed above, and relating to whether XXXX XXXXo had an internet presence.14 The witness testified that XXXX XXXX had a website; the witness, however, was unable to provide the website address. The witness testified that XXXX XXXX was in charge of the website. The Appellant testified that XXXX XXXX did not have a website. The RAD notes that this inconsistency was not resolved at the RPD. The RAD draws negative credibility inference from this inconsistency. [29] The RPD also noted that the witness provided no secure ID.15 The Appellant submits that the RPD did not wait for other ID documents from the witness,16 which the RAD finds to be a valid statement. Regardless, the RAD finds that since the RPD found the witness not to be credible relating to the central elements of the Appellant's claim, it was open to the RPD to proceed and not wait to obtain additional unsecure documents to confirm the personal identity, per se, of the witness. The RAD finds that the RPD did not err in this respect. [30] Based on the above-mentioned significant inconsistencies in the Appellant's evidence, the RPD found that the witness was not who he alleged he was. The existence of contradictions or inconsistencies in the evidence of a claimant or witness is a well-accepted basis for making a finding of lack of credibility.17 [31] For the reasons cited above, the RAD too finds that the Appellant's witness, on a balance of probabilities, is not who he alleged he was. The RPD drew further negative inference from the Appellant having presented a false witness at the RPD; in this respect, the RAD concurs with the RPD. [32] The RAD finds the Appellant not to be a credible witness. Lack of subjective fear: [33] The Appellant's evidence was that his family had been receiving threatening letters from the Taliban while the Appellant was in the U.K. Those Taliban letters allegedly had mentioned the Appellant by name. The Appellant was in the U.K. from 2011 to 2014. No one from the family had mentioned those letters to the Appellant. The Appellant returned to Afghanistan after completing his studies in XXXX 2014. Moreover, the Appellant had put up numerous posts on Facebook.18 In this regard, in the Appellant's alleged circumstances, the RPD found the Appellant's actions and behaviour not to be reasonable. Therefore, the RPD found that the Appellant demonstrated a lack of subjective fear;19 the RAD concurs. The RAD is aware that a lack of subjective fear is not determinative in and of itself; however, it can be a valid consideration in the presence of serious credibility concerns. The RAD finds that the Appellant has forwarded insufficient reliable and satisfactory probative evidence in support of the alleged activities/incidents in Afghanistan. Therefore, the RAD finds that a lack of subjective fear in this case further impugns the Appellant's credibility. Appellant's corroborating documents: [34] The RPD found the Appellant not to be credible. The RPD also gave the Appellant's personal documents little weight because the RPD found no significant reasons to find the documents more credible than the Appellant's impugned testimony.20 The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's corroborating documents because the RPD did not question the Appellant regarding its concerns with those documents.21 [35] In this regard, the RAD finds that it was apparent throughout the hearing that there were a number of significant inconsistencies within the Appellant's evidence, i.e., between the Appellant's testimony and testimony of the witness and several of the Appellant's personal documents submitted in support of his allegations. Moreover, the RAD finds that those inconsistencies remained unresolved. The onus is on the Appellant to forward his claim diligently at the RPD. Moreover, the RPD examined the Appellant's witness and found him not to be who he alleged he was. The RAD finds that the RPD provided clear reasons as to why it gave the Appellant's corroborating documents little weight. In reviewing the totality of the evidence in this case and in consideration of the Appellant's record and the RPD's "Reasons for Decision", the RAD finds that the RPD did not err in its assessment of the Appellant's corroborating documents. [36] In reviewing the totality of the evidence in this case, the RAD finds that there were significant inconsistencies within the totality of the Appellant's evidence. Moreover, the RAD finds that those inconsistencies remained unresolved. In the presence of significant unresolved inconsistencies, the RAD finds that the Appellant's corroborating documents provide little evidentiary support to his allegations. The RAD finds the Appellant not to be a credible witness. The RAD finds no significant reasons to place more weight on the Appellant's corroborating evidence in support of the Appellant's allegations than the Appellant's testimony which the RAD finds not to be credible. [37] The RAD finds that the Appellant's evidence submitted/adduced at the RPD, including his testimony, not to be credible generally. Alleged misstatement of the facts by the RPD: [38] The Appellant submits that the RPD misstated the facts in the case.22 In reviewing the RPD proceedings, the RAD finds that the RPD's statements, i.e., paraphrasing segments of the Appellant's testimony, not to be misstatements as alleged. For example, the RAD finds that the witness testified that the Appellant XXXX the show; and further the letter from the witness submitted in support of the Appellant's work at XXXX XXXX also stated that the Appellant was the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. The RAD finds that the RPD did not misstate the facts relating to the Appellant's role at XXXX XXXX as communicated through his witness' testimony and the letter he had written in support of the Appellant's work at XXXX XXXX. Similarly, the RAD finds that the RPD did not misstate any facts relating to the Taliban letters that the Appellant had submitted at the RPD. The RAD finds that the Appellant is picking on words that the RPD used in paraphrasing some segments of the Appellant's evidence. The RAD finds that the RPD did not err in this respect. The RAD finds that the RPD's statements were contextually and content-wise communicating the Appellant's evidence as it had been submitted/adduced at the RPD. Appellant's submissions relating to implausibility findings by the RPD: [39] The Appellant also submits that the RPD's implausibility findings were in error.23 In reviewing the RPD's "Reasons for Decision", the RAD finds no mention of any implausibility findings by the RPD. It is noted in the RPD's "Reasons for Decision" that the RPD gave little weight to the Appellant's corroborative documents because of significant inconsistencies in the totality of the Appellant's evidence. The RAD finds the Appellant's submissions relating to the alleged RPD's implausibility findings not to be meritorious. Appellant's residual profile: [40] The Appellant submits that the Appellant's residual claim is established by the objective evidence; and that the RPD's analysis of the Appellant's residual risk is cursory, and unsupported by country conditions.24 The Appellant submits that the RPD did not consider that the Appellant is of fighting age. The Appellant also submits that the RPD did not consider the Appellant's sur place claim because he would be returning from the West. The Appellant submits that the RPD did not refer to any evidence that lays out the risks for westernized people in Afghanistan. [41] In determining this appeal, the RAD has considered that People fleeing Afghanistan may be at risk of persecution for reasons that are related to the ongoing armed conflict in Afghanistan, or on the basis of serious human rights violations that are not directly related to the conflict, or a combination of the two.25 [42] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) considers that in relation to individuals with the following profiles a particularly careful examination of possible risks is required: (i) Individuals associated with, or perceived as supportive of the Government and the international community, including the international military forces (IMF);... ...(iii) Men and boys of fighting age;... ...(vi)Individuals perceived as contravening the Taliban's interpretation of Islamic principles, norms and values;...26 [43] In reviewing the totality of the evidence submitted/adduced in this case, the RAD finds that the Appellant is a twenty-nine year old man from Afghanistan. [44] The documentary evidence shows: ...depending on the specific circumstances of the case, men and boys of fighting age living in areas under the effective control of AGEs [anti-government elements], or in areas where pro-government forces and AGEs are engaged in a struggle for control, may be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, men and boys of fighting age living in areas where ALP [Afghan Local Police] commanders are in a sufficiently powerful position to forcibly recruit community members into the ALP may equally be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their membership of a particular social group. Men and boys who resist forced recruitment may also be in need of international refugee protection on the ground of their (imputed) political opinion. Depending on the specific circumstances of the case, family members of men and boys with this profile may be in need of international protection on the basis of their association with individuals at risk.27 [45] The RAD finds that the risk to men and boys of fighting age is not solely based on the age of the person, i.e., not all twenty-nine-year old men are at risk of forced recruitment by the Taliban. The RAD finds that there is insufficient reliable and satisfactory evidence forwarded by the Appellant to establish that he, in his particular situation and circumstances, faces a personal risk upon return to Afghanistan such that he would be persecuted on a Convention ground, or, that he would face a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment at the hands of Taliban upon return to Afghanistan because he is of fighting age. [46] Regarding the Appellant's returning from the West, since the RAD found that the Appellant has forwarded insufficient reliable and satisfactory probative evidence in support of the alleged incidents in Afghanistan, the RAD finds the Appellant's fear of Taliban mainly emanates from him having spent about three years in the U.K. as a student, and the time in the U.S. and Canada since he fled Afghanistan in 2015. The RAD finds that with the exception of about three years when the Appellant was studying in the U.K., the Appellant had only resided in Afghanistan prior to coming to the U.S. in 2015. The RAD is aware of the general situation of returnees to Afghanistan from the West. The RAD finds that the Appellant, on a balance of probabilities, has not established that he has a profile heightened such that he would be targeted by the Taliban upon return to Afghanistan as alleged. [47] The RAD is aware that returnees, whether they are internally displaced or returning from abroad, face difficulty in rebuilding their lives in their community of origin in Afghanistan.28 In this Appellant's case, the RAD is particularly cognizant that persons returning to Afghanistan from the westernized countries, in certain situation and circumstances, are perceived to be infidels by the Taliban and other extremist groups.29 [48] The RAD finds that the objective evidence in this case, however, does not establish that all returnees from the West, in this Appellant's particular situation and circumstances, would face a risk of harm at the hands of Taliban upon return to Afghanistan. In reviewing the totality of the evidence submitted/adduced in this case, the RAD finds that there is insufficient objective evidence on the record to establish that the Appellant would face a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, or, that he would, on a balance of probabilities, be personally subjected to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to a danger of torture as alleged upon return to Afghanistan. [49] The Appellant has not forwarded significant reliable and trustworthy probative evidence, on a balance of probabilities, to establish that his particular situation and circumstances set him apart from returnees from the westernized countries generally. Therefore, the RAD finds that the Appellant's sur place claim fails pursuant to both sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. [50] Based on the totality of the evidence in this case and in consideration of the UNHCR Guidelines, the RAD finds that the Appellant has provided insufficient reliable and satisfactory probative evidence in support of his particular situation and circumstances such that there is more than a mere possibility that he would be persecuted on a Convention ground, or that he would, on a balance of probabilities, be personally subjected to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to a danger of torture as alleged upon return to Afghanistan. Conclusion [51] Based on the foregoing reasons, the RAD finds that, in the circumstances particular to this case, the Appellant has not established a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, or that he would, on a balance of probabilities, be personally subjected to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or to a danger of torture upon return to Afghanistan. [52] Based on the above reasons, the RAD concurs with the RPD's determination that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. [53] The RAD confirms the RPD's determination of the Appellant's claim. DISPOSITION [54] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to both sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. [55] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "S.S. Kular" S.S. Kular March 29, 2017 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, last amended on February 6, 2014 [the "Act" or "IRPA"]. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Exhibit 2. 3 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93 [Huruglica]. 4 Huruglica, supra, footnote 3, at para. 103. 5 Huruglica, supra, footnote 3, at para. 69. 6 Huruglica, supra, footnote 3, at para. 70. 7 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 5-10. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 7-8. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 10-12. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 217-218. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 20-21, at paras. 28-29. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 20-21, at para. 29. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 254, 257. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 7. 15 Ibid. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 21-22, at para. 32. 17 Dan-Ash v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1988), 93 N.R. 33 (F.C.A.). 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 287-432. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 10-12. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 12-14. 21 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 24-25, at paras. 39-42. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 20-22, at paras. 28-32 and at pp. 25-26, at paras. 43-45. 23 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 21-24, at paras. 30-38. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 16-20, at paras. 6-26. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Afghanistan (17 July 2015), item 1.5, at p. 4. 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Afghanistan (17 July 2015), item 1.5, at p. 4. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Afghanistan (17 July 2015), item 1.5, at p. 41. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Afghanistan (17 July 2015), Sections 1, 2, 5, 7, and 14. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Afghanistan (17 July 2015), Sections 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, and 12. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-12133