VB4-02795

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB4-02795 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal Appeal considered at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit à Date of decision January 29, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) Mordechai Wasserman Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal Barrister and Solicitor personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), a citizen of Colombia, appeals the August 21, 2014 determination of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD"). The claim was heard by the RPD on August 21, 2014 with a Notice of Decision being sent to the appellant on August 29, 2014. The RPD found that the appellant is neither a Convention1 refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act").2 DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Act nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of the Act. This appeal is therefore dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] Counsel for the appellant before the RAD is the same counsel he had at the RPD. The Minister has not intervened before the RPD or the RAD. [4] A transcript of the RPD proceedings has not been included in the Appellant's Record (AR).3 I have listened to the CD of the proceedings in its entirety. [5] The appellant does not seek to present "new" evidence to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act. Basis of Claim [6] According to the allegations set out in the appellant's Basis of Claim Form (BOC),4 the family owned a XXXX in XXXX XXXX, in the north part of XXXX. It is about a two hour drive from XXXX, XXXX where the appellant lived. The appellant's father died in 1996 and left XXXX XXXX to his mother. The appellant's mother would go to XXXX XXXX at least once during the weekday, and then usually once during the weekend. She did not have any problems until the beginning of 2012. This is when the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) came to her and demanded monthly payments. For 10 months she paid the FARC. [7] The appellant lived in the US without status at that time from XXXX XXXX XXXX 2009 until he was deported in XXXX 2012. After his return to Colombia, the appellant began to run XXXX XXXX. He made his mother stop paying the FARC. In XXXX, someone came to XXXX XXXX to collect payment. The appellant did not pay and a week later he began to receive threats from the FARC at XXXX XXXX. The FARC threatened to kidnap and kill the appellant. On XXXX XXXX, 2013, the FARC killed one of the appellant's workers believing him to be the appellant. The police took the appellant to XXXX and took declarations from him and from his worker's daughter who was in the car when he got shot. The appellant requested protection but was told that the police only provide protection for politicians and for important people. They said that there were not enough police to protect everyone who had problems with the FARC. [8] The next day, the FARC brought letters and flyers to XXXX XXXX and continued to threaten the appellant. The police brought the letters and flyers to the appellant. [9] The following week, the appellant left XXXX and went to XXXX. He planned on opening a XXXX XXXX. He went back to XXXX twice to get XXXX for his planned business but never opened it. The FARC found out that the appellant was in XXXX and he had to flee. [10] In XXXX 2014, or after, a worker from a neighbouring XXXX called the appellant and told him that he found some letters from the FARC at XXXX XXXX. The letters said that the FARC knew the appellant was in XXXX. They demanded the appellant pay all the missed payments or they would kill him and seize XXXX XXXX. [11] With the help of his mother and a neighbour, the appellant obtained a fake Spanish passport. On XXXX XXXX, 2014 the appellant flew from XXXX to Panama to Mexico using his Colombian passport. The appellant flew to Canada with the fake Spanish passport and made a claim for refugee protection at the airport. [12] The RPD's reasons stated that the appellant's case for refugee protection was denied on the basis that he had state protection in Colombia. GROUNDS OF APPEAL [13] The appellant's submissions as to the grounds of this appeal can be summarized as follows.5 * Did the RPD Member err in finding that State Protection is available to the appellant in Colombia? REMEDY SOUGHT [14] The appellant has requested that the RAD, under paragraph 111(1)(b) of the Act, allow the appeal and set aside the RPD determination and find that the appellant is a Convention refugee. ROLE OF THE RAD [15] Although the Act sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of appellate review to be applied by the RAD. [16] The RAD, being a new division, has struggled with the standard of review to be used in RAD appeals based on several Federal Court cases that have differed in their approach of what standard of review should be used. Initially, the RAD followed the Supreme Court of Canada (the "Supreme Court") case, Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick6 as the leading case on standard of review. In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court has said that there should be only two standards when reviewing administrative tribunal decisions: unreasonableness and correctness. The standard of correctness applies to questions of law, while the standard of reasonableness applies to questions of fact, and mixed fact and law. [17] In recent months, the Federal Court has issued differing decisions on the role of RAD when conducting an appeal of the RPD determination. The majority of the Federal Court cases have highlighted that the reasonableness standard is not the appropriate standard to apply for RAD appeals. However, the Federal Court has come up with two differing standards which are an independent assessment of the evidence and palpable and overriding error. For both these standards, the Federal Court has said that deference should be given to the RPD on issues of credibility, although what level of deference is still debated. Some of the recent Federal Court cases dealing with RAD appeals include Iyamuremye,7 Eng,8 Alvarez,9 Huruglica,10 Njeukam,11 Yetna,12 Wahgmo,13 Alyafi,14 among others. [18] The Federal Court in Iyamuremye addressed the question of the proper standard of review to be applied by the RAD in reviewing RPD findings and confirmed that the appropriate standard of review for questions of fact and mixed fact and law is reasonableness, and the appropriate standard of review for questions of law is correctness. [19] That said, the Court found that in assessing the reasonableness of the decision, the RAD should, at the very least, have reviewed the evidence that was presented before the RPD and conduct an independent assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD, on the basis of the facts and the conditions of the country in question, had properly considered the evidence and reasonably justified its conclusion.15 [20] In Alvarez, Justice Shore said that, "the Court is of the view that the RAD must be able to correct any error of law in a decision of the RPD or any palpable or overriding error in the findings of fact or the application of the law to these facts."16 Furthermore, Justice Shore stated that "when analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error."17 Justice Shore also said in Alvarez that, "the RAD must nonetheless perform its own assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error." 18 [21] In Huruglica, Justice Phelan found that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. "It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection."19 Justice Phelan also states that that notion may well justify deference to a RPD's decision in a circumstance where a witness' credibility is critical or determinative. Where there is no adverse finding of credibility, the policy rationale for deference is not sustainable.20 [22] Justice Phelan also found that the RAD's role should be to determine whether the RPD decision is wrong rather than look at whether it was a reasonable decision. Justice Phelan emphasized that the RAD's mandate is to conduct a fact based review. The RAD, Justice Phelan said, "must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment. . . Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision." Furthermore, "In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'."21 [23] Counsel for the appellant submits,22 Huruglica has carefully analysed and set out the role and powers of the RAD in an appeal. An appeal to the RAD is an appeal; it is not comparable to a judicial review. The RAD must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. The RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the refugee application and arrive at its own opinion. [24] The Huruglica decision is the most thorough of the decisions and the first where the Court certified a question for the Federal Court of Appeal. Again, I refer to paragraphs 54 and 55 of Huruglica which read as follows. [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.23 [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".24 [25] Following the Huruglica decision, many other cases have followed the Huruglica approach in what the role of the RAD should be in assessing an appeal. Njeukam,25 Yetna,26 and Wahgmo27 all support the notion that the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence. However, there are others cases as Alyafi28 and Guardado29 that stress that the review or assessment of a RAD appeal has only two approaches that should be applied: independent assessment of the evidence, and palpable and overriding error. In Alyafi, the Federal Court noted that there are two competing approaches regarding the standard of review and has left it open to the RAD Member to decide which approach to follow. [26] In Kanga,30 the Court held: Furthermore, even where there is divided Federal Court authority on a point of law, I do not agree that the Board is required to explain why it has adopted one view over the other. Presumably, Federal court jurisprudence speaks for itself and the Board has no obligation to offer any additional interpretation of the legal authorities that it chooses to rely upon in resolving a point of law. [27] In this appeal, and taking into consideration the Federal Court decisions regarding the role of the RAD, I will be applying the points set out in Huruglica. In this appeal, I have reviewed all aspects of the RPD's decision and have conducted my own independent assessment of all the evidence to determine whether the appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, while giving a certain deference to the RPD's findings regarding the appellant's credibility and any other issues where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [28] The appellant submits that "the Board31 erred in its fundamental finding that there was state protection in Colombia. Furthermore, the Board's analysis focussed on successes in combatting the FARC military and reducing the number of its fighters. It did not answer the fundamental question of whether or not the authorities were able to protect persons threatened by the FARC like the Appellant." The appellant further submits that "the Board ignored evidence given by the Appellant that the authorities themselves had informed him that they would not be able to protect him."32 [29] The appellant further submits that "the Board found there was evidence of operational effectiveness of state protection in Colombia and that the Appellant had not taken all reasonable steps to seek protection. One of the findings was that, because the Appellant did not tell the police immediately after XXXX murder that the FARC had been pursuing him. By not doing so he had withheld valuable information which the police could have used to investigate the matter." The appellant submits that the RPD Member did not "address the fundamental question: can the state provide adequate protection to the Appellant and those like him who have been specifically targeted by the FARC?"33 [30] The RPD Member found that the appellant did have state protection in Colombia. I have reviewed all the evidence before the RPD and the RAD, including listening to the compact disc (CD) of the hearing in its entirety. I find the RPD Member gave ample opportunities to the appellant to explain why he believes state protection was not available for him in Colombia. I also cite Federal Court jurisprudence referring to state protection and the obligations of a refugee claimant to pursue it in their country. The RPD is not obliged to provide proof that the state can offer the claimant effective protection, rather, the claimant bears the legal burden of rebutting the presumption that state protection exists by adducing clear and convincing evidence which satisfies the RPD, or the RAD, on a balance of probabilities.34 [31] In reviewing the RPD oral hearing CD, I note that the RPD Member did ask the appellant about his interactions with the police concerning the problems he was facing in Colombia. [32] The RPD Member asked the appellant if he ever went to the police regarding the threats the appellant received from the FARC and the extortion demands. The appellant testified "Many people who report them get attacked by the FARC. And, everybody knows in Colombia that the FARC have infiltrated members of the police force."35 The appellant testified that he also did not tell the police that the FARC had been threatening him and this could be the cause of his worker's death.36 The reason he gave was that he "was confused and I did not know what kind of information I could give police or not and looked for assistance from the prosecutor's office."37 However, the appellant testified that he did go to the Attorney General's office the day after the murder to ask for protection. However, the appellant testified that he was told that "they can only protect politicians or important persons who had problems with the FARC."38 The RPD Member asked the appellant if he knew what happed to the investigation surrounding the murder. The appellant testified "No, most likely none. That is the case in Colombia all the time."39 [33] I agree with the RPD Member that the appellant has not provided persuasive evidence that the police were not willing or able to help him in Colombia. I have also taken into consideration the country documents on Colombia. Colombia is a constitutional, multi-party republic. In 2010 voters elected Juan Manuel Santos President in elections that observers considered free and fair. Authorities maintained effective control over security forces. Security forces committed human rights abuses. The government continued efforts to prosecute and punish perpetrators, including members of the security services, who committed abuses. It increased resources for the Prosecutor General's Office, prioritized human rights cases, and employed a new contextual analysis strategy. Nonetheless, a high rate of impunity persisted.40 [34] Taking into consideration the country reports and the appellant's lack of efforts to seek protection in his country, I find the appellant has not provided clear and convincing evidence that state protection was not available for him in Colombia. Nor is there any information before the RPD Member, or the RAD, that state protection is ineffective in Colombia. A claimant who alleges that the state protection is inadequate must persuade the Immigration and Refugee Board that the evidence establishes that the state protection is inadequate.41 The claimant's (evidentiary) burden of proof is directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state's institutions, the more claimants must do to exhaust all courses of action open to them.42 Clearly, the appellant's one attempt at seeking state protection is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of state protection. [35] Counsel for the appellant focuses on the document titled 'Colombia: State protection programs for victims and witnesses of crimes'43 which was not only before the RPD, but counsel also refers to this document in the appellant's Memorandum. In reviewing the document, I agree with the RPD Member who notes in his decision "in order for you to have protection under this legislation or this program you must meet one of the criteria such as being a documented member of an organization and you did not meet any of the qualifications to receive protection under this program."44 However, there is no persuasive arguments before the RAD that, because the appellant does not fall under these protection requirements, this does not go to say that state protection was not available for the appellant at all in Colombia. [36] I have reviewed the country documents surrounding police and the FARC. I note that the problems with such guerilla groups as the FARC have been ongoing in Colombia for many years. However, I also note that the FARC's strength has diminished over the years in Colombia due to government intervention. Counsel submits that "FARC's reduced military capacity does not mean that the state can protect people who have been specifically targeted by the FARC for harassment or extortion."45 Courts have said that "a state's efforts to provide state protection are a relevant consideration but these efforts must also translate into operational adequacy.46 However, the Federal Court has held that a standard of perfection is not required. Less than perfect protection is not a basis to determine that a state is either unwilling or unable to offer reasonable protection.47 Again, I note that the state protection situation in Colombia is not perfect. As noted earlier, the protection need not be perfect.48 One measure of the adequacy of the protection is whether the state is making "serious efforts" to protect its citizens.49 [37] On the operational level, the documentary evidence indicates that the police arrest and prosecute the perpetrators of crimes, including crimes committed by FARC members. The RPD Member also notes this in his decision "In item 4.2, it talks about the activities of the revolutionary armed forces of Colombia or the FARC, especially after the death of its leader, Alfonso Cano, gives a lot of detail about FARC's operational effectiveness in what it does in Colombia. There is a section on page 7 of that page that the government is concentrating on joint military operations and with the police and with the air force and navy, which include the areas where you XXXX, was in in North XXXX and along the border with Venezuela. They have dismantled nine FARC camps in that area. There are sources that Colombian Police have destroyed 24 cocoa laboratories. Those are examples of operational effectiveness." I agree with the RPD Member. [38] The Colombian government's efforts to eradicate the FARC are well documented in the country condition documents. The RPD Member has described in detail "there is some evidence that paramilitary groups and guerilla groups have infiltrated some aspects of the national government, including the National Police, but the evidence before me is that it is not so widespread as to make state protection inadequate. In fact an overall view of the documents indicates that the security forces are effective in combating the FARC." [39] The RPD Member also finds "We do not know the particular circumstances of XXXX death and that investigation because you are the only one that could give us that information and you never followed up on it. So since you did not follow up you did not provide clear and convincing evidence that the police did not respond adequately in the investigation." A claimant cannot rebut the presumption of state protection in a functioning democracy by asserting only a subjective reluctance to engage the state.50 [40] Finally, the Federal Court has said that "in the absence of a compelling explanation, where the state is a functioning democracy with a willingness and the apparatus necessary to provide a measure of protection to its citizens, a failure to pursue state protection opportunities within the home state will usually be fatal to a refugee claim.51 This is so even where the protective services of the state have gaps or deficiencies.52 It is not sufficient to rely solely on documentary evidence listing certain flaws or weaknesses in the country's justice system.53 [41] I find that the appellant has failed to rebut the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing evidence. The appellant has not provided any persuasive evidence that if he was to return to Colombia and encounter problems with the FARC that the authorities would refuse to investigate his allegations and refuse to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators if there was sufficient evidence. Where there is evidence that the government is taking steps to protect the target group, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it must be presumed that these steps will be effective.54 [42] In summary, having considered all the evidence, I find that I agree with the RPD that the appellant has state protection in Colombia. REMEDY [43] For all these reasons, I confirm the determination of the RPD in accordance with paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is therefore dismissed. (signed) "Rena Dhir" January 29, 2015 Date 1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act"), S.C., 2001, c. 27. 3 Refugee Appeal Division (RAD), Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR). 4 Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR). 5 Exhibit 2, AR. 6 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] SCC 9. 7 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 8 Eng v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711. 9 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702. 10 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 11 Njeukam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 859. 12 Yetna v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 CF 858. 13 Wahgmo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 923. 14 Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 15 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494; para. 41. 16 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702; para. 27. 17 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702; para. 28. 18 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702; para. 33. 19 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799; para. 54. 20 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 21 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799; para. 55. 22 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 23 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799; para. 54. 24 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799; para. 55. 25 Njeukam v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 859. 26 Yetna v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 CF 858. 27 Wahgmo v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 923. 28 Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 29 Guardado v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-882-14), Martineau, October 8, 2014; 2014 FC 953. 30 Garcia Kanga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 482. 31 Immigration and Refugee Board. 32 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 33 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 34 Nadeem, Choudhry Muhammad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6320-00), McKeown, November 15, 2001; 2001 FCT 1263. The Court stated: "The issue is not whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the police would not be reasonably forthcoming with a guarantee of effective protection but whether there is clear and convincing evidence that the police would not be reasonably forthcoming with serious efforts at protection. The onus is on the claimant to produce clear and convincing evidence that the police would not provide protection, not on the Board to provide proof that there will be state protection."; and Kaleja, Michal v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4106), Near, June 9, 2011; 2011 FC 668. 35 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Compact Disc (CD) Recording, 00:34:48. 36 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD Recording, 01:02:54. 37 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD Recording, 01:03:18. 38 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD Recording, 01:02:20. 39 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD Recording, 01:08:14. 40 Exhibit 3, RPDR, National Documentation, US Department of State. 41 Flores Carrillo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636 (F.C.A.), 2008 FCA 94, para. 20, 24. 42 M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A., no. A-388-95), Hugessen, Décary, Chevalier, October 15, 1996. Reported: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kadenko (1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (F.C.A.), at 536. 43 Exhibit 3, RPDR, National Documentation Package, April 30, 2014, Colombia, Item 7.3 State protection programs for victims and witnesses of crimes; requirements to access the programs; statistics on the number of people granted and refused their application for relocation; duration and effectiveness of these programs COL104011.E Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 30 March 2012. 44 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 45 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 46 Lopez, Jeronimo Ocampo v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-1748-10), Huges, November 23, 2010;2010 FC 1176. 47 Jaroslav, Spacil v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3214-10), Kelen, May 31, 2011; 2011 FC 634. 48 Zalzali v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1991] 3 F.C. 605 (C.A.). 49 Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.), at 132. 50 Judge, Gurwinder Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5897-03), Snider, August 9, 2004; 2004 FC 1089; Martinez, Dunnia Patricia Suarez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7329-04), Phelan, July 29, 2005; 2005 FC 1050; Kim, Eun Mee v.M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8191-04), Phelan, August 17, 2005; 2005 FC 1126; and Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. 51 Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. 52 Salazar Santos, Marco Antonio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4602-06), Barnes, July 30, 2007; 2007 FC 793. 53 Marquez Alvarez, Guillermo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2477-09), Boivin, February 23, 2010; 2010 FC 197 and Romero Castaneda, Manuel Alejandro v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4838-09), Boivin, April 13, 2010; 2010 FC 393. 54 Manorath, Rahonie v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2369-94), Cullen, January 26, 1995. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB4-02795