TC0-00686

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-00686 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 17, 2021 Date de la décision Panel N. Kaufman Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Panteha Yektaeian Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] The Appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Appellant), a citizen of Venezuela, appeals the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) dated December 17, 2019, rejecting her claim for refugee protection because it found that the claim is not credible, and that any risk of persecution has no nexus to a Convention ground in that it is a result of criminal activity rather than because of any real or perceived political opinion. The Appellant alleges that she fears persecution in Venezuela based on her political opinion and that she fears harm at the hands of the Colectivo MERSUV because of her refusal to assist them in their corrupt activities. The Appellant argues that the RPD erred, and asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to substitute a positive determination or remit the matter to the RPD for redetermination. The Appellant does not seek to rely on new evidence and does not request an oral hearing. My role is to consider all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision. 1 DETERMINATION [2] For reasons that follow, I allow the appeal. I substitute my own decision that the Appellant is a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF THE APPEAL Appellant's allegations [3] Details of the Appellant's allegations are found in her Basis of Claim Form (BOC) narrative,2 and in her testimony at the RPD hearing. Briefly, she alleges that she has been persecuted, kidnapped, and threatened with death by the colectivos of the United Socialist Revolutionary Student Movement of Venezuela (MERSUV) (referred to herein as the Colectivo MERSUV). The Appellant was in charge of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXand XXXX XXXX XXXX for her private company employer. Individuals, who eventually identified themselves as being members of the Colectivo MERSUV, began demanding that she provide them with details and arrival dates of XXXXand XXXX XXXX, and special prices, so that they could acquire them and re-sell them, at greatly inflated prices, to other users, including XXXX, who would use the XXXX XXXX because of a severe shortage of XXXX XXXX in Venezuela. The demands increased and became more aggressive. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, three of the men arrived at her office, showed her guns under their shirts, and demanded that she provide the dates on which her company was expecting the arrival of XXXX. The Appellant lied to them, telling them she did not know the date because of supplier issues. They shouted at her that she was lying and that she should be careful with what she said, and they left. [4] On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, while driving home from work, the Appellant's vehicle was intercepted and stopped by the same armed men who entered the vehicle, forced her into the back seat, placed a cover over her head, and told her that, if she wanted to live, she must obey them, give them the products they were asking for, and follow their instructions, adding that they knew the details of where she lived, her mother's name, and the details of the Appellant's daily routine. They forced her out of the car, and kept her cell phone and her car, that was later found destroyed. She told her employer what had happened, and he told her that she should not report the matter to police, and that they were already regularly paying the group money for protection from being looted. The Colectivo MERSUV began calling her mother, telling her that the Appellant needed to cooperate. After taking some time off work, the Appellant returned to work. On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, the men from Colectivo MERSUV came to the office for the information they demanded. The Appellant stalled for more time, saying that she would cooperate, but the items would not be available until the first five days of XXXX. The Appellant was unwilling to provide the information requested because of her professional ethics, and because she could not allow herself to be part of the actions that would affect people in need economically and physically (because the XXXX XXXX for XXXX XXXX if XXXX by XXXX XXXX could be harmful or deadly). She therefore left Venezuela on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, and travelled to Canada, intending to stay until late XXXX 2017, believing that, by then, the situation would calm down and her employer would do something to help her. However, she learned that her mother continued to receive phone calls asking when the Appellant was returning, and that the Colectivo MERSUV came to her office inquiring about her return. Realizing that she could not return, the Appellant applied for refugee protection in Canada in September 2017. The Appellant fears that, if she returns to Venezuela, she will be harmed or killed by the Colectivo MERSUV, who she alleges to be agents of the Venezuelan government, and who work with the police, the National Guard, and the government. RPD's findings and Appellant's arguments [5] The RPD found that the Appellant lacked credibility regarding what occurred in Venezuela. It found that she was unable to provide reasonable responses to concerns regarding some key aspects of her allegations, that she provided evasive and embellished testimony, and that the incidents she described are criminal in nature and are not politically motivated, so there is no nexus to a Convention ground. The RPD found inconsistencies and material omissions in and between the Appellant's written and oral testimony, and found that the Appellant submitted "created" supporting documentary evidence. It found that the Appellant did not have a profile that would cause the authorities to seek her, and failed to establish that she would face a risk of politically motivated persecution by law enforcement or the Colectivo MERSUV if she returned to Venezuela. [6] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its credibility findings by basing those findings on misstatements of evidence, microscopic findings relating to immaterial details, and attempts to find inconsistencies where none exist, and by making unclear credibility findings. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL RPD's credibility findings [7] It is well-established law that sworn testimony is presumed to be truthful, but that presumption is rebuttable where testimony features inconsistencies, implausibilities, material omissions or other reasons to doubt its truthfulness. The RPD found reasons to doubt the credibility of the Appellant's testimony. After listening to the entire audio recording of the RPD hearing and independently assessing all the evidence, I find that the RPD erred in some, but not all of its credibility findings. Further, I find that the correct credibility findings are sufficient to rebut the presumption of truthfulness. Erroneous finding regarding the Appellant's use of the words "harassing" and "aggressive" [8] The Appellant testified that her problems with the Colectivo MERSUV started on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, when the three men came to her office demanding information about shipments of XXXX. When asked about her previous contact with the Colectivo MERSUV, she testified that, although men dressed in the same way (white shirts and jeans) had previously been at the office starting in XXXX XXXX2015, her contact with them had been by phone calls from them asking for information, but XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 was her first face-to-face contact with them. In her narrative, the Appellant stated that the phone calls occurred initially every three months, but that the "visits" started increasing as circumstances in Venezuela regarding scarcity and hyperinflation worsened, and the people "started being more aggressive in their approach and started harassing me, asking about the information on the XXXX products."3 The Appellant testified that she had not given the callers any information and had not told her employer about the phone calls because "everybody was asking about the XXXX because there was a XXXX shortage."4 When asked by the RPD what she meant when she said in her narrative that the callers became aggressive in their approach, the Appellant responded that the callers would yell at her and call non-stop. When the RPD asked if that is what she meant when she said they were harassing her, the Appellant replied "[y]es, because it was very persistent. They needed me to give them that information." The RPD found that the use of the wording, "harassment" and "aggressive," is an indication of something more than simple persistence. The RPD did not make a clear credibility finding or adverse inference regarding this testimony, but I agree with the Appellant that it appears from its Reasons that the RPD considered that there is an inconsistency between the Appellant's testimony and her narrative, and that her narrative testimony was embellished. [9] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to put the word "aggressive" to the Appellant so it could not impugn her credibility on that point. That is incorrect. The RPD specifically asked the Appellant about the use of both words "aggressive" and "harassing."5 The Appellant also argues that the RPD's finding is perverse because there was no inconsistency, and that a claimant could perceive "non-stop calling by armed thugs of the Venezuelan state who operate with impunity" as more than persistent. This characterization is not supported by the evidence. The Appellant stated that the Colectivo MERSUV members showed that they were armed when they came to the company in XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, but did not refer to the callers being armed before that day. Further, the Appellant, in her testimony, stated that she did not tell her employer about the calls because "everybody was asking about the XXXX." She considered it just "a normal activity" of the Colectivo MERSUV in Venezuela.6 In my assessment, there is a difference between the narrative, which suggests more serious conduct, and the hearing testimony, which suggests conduct that was not particularly concerning to the Appellant. However, I consider the difference to be more a matter of colour or emphasis, rather than an inconsistency or embellishment sufficient to justify an adverse credibility inference or finding. I am mindful that the Appellant was testifying (both in completing her BOC, and at the hearing), through an interpreter, and I am not satisfied that it is correct to base an adverse credibility finding on this difference in wording. To the extent that the RPD did so, that finding is set aside. Finding regarding omission in narrative of allegation about pointing of gun is correct [10] In her testimony at the hearing relating to the event that occurred on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, the Appellant testified that the men who intercepted her car forced her into the back seat, joined her in the back seat, pointed a gun at her, and then covered her head. The RPD asked the Appellant why, when describing those events in her narrative, she had not mentioned that she had a gun pointed at her. The Appellant responded that she did not know.7 The RPD found that the Appellant's explanation for not mentioning that she was threatened with a gun was not credible, and that her testimony evolved to create a heightened sense of danger. The Appellant argues that this reflects a microscopic evaluation involving a fine detail of a traumatic event, which cannot be the reason the allegations are found to be embellished or not credible, and that adding an allegation that a gun was pointed at the Appellant would not substantially raise her risk or the sense of danger surrounding the event, given the other elements of what took place that day.8 I disagree. [11] Stating that the men who intercepted her vehicle were armed (as stated in the narrative) is not the same as saying that, not only were they armed, but that they pointed a gun at her. The Appellant had already testified that these same men were armed when they attended her place of employment on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, when they lifted their shirts to show their weapons. At that time, she did not consider that to be a death threat, and did not consider it to be so serious.9 As the RPD noted, the events of XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, were a critical point in the Appellant's allegations, and were described as such by the Appellant.10 Having a gun pointed at the Appellant is a significant event that adds gravity and an increased threat level, and is not something likely to be forgotten or overlooked when preparing what is a detailed narrative that is to contain everything that is important for the claim.11 I agree that the allegation is a material event, and that the omission of that allegation from the narrative undermines the allegation that the event occurred, indicates embellishment of the Appellant's hearing testimony, and undermines the general credibility of the Appellant. Finding regarding calls to the Appellant's mother before the Appellant left Venezuela [12] In her narrative, the Appellant stated that, after the events of XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, when she was detained and threatened, and when her attackers kept her phone and her car, the Colectivo MERSUV started calling her mother (with whom the Appellant lived) the next day, telling her that the Appellant needed to collaborate for everyone's safety. She stated that she found her car a few days later, following the instructions given to her mother "through one of the phone calls."12 She testified at the hearing that her mother began receiving calls from the Colectivo MERSUV using the Appellant's mobile phone which had been stolen by the attackers. When asked by the RPD why her mother answered the phone, given that she knew the attackers had taken the Appellant's phone, the Appellant stated that she did not know. When the RPD asked how many times her mother answered such calls, the Appellant stated that she just picked up once - the first call. The RPD pointed out to the Appellant that, in her narrative, she referred to information given to her mother "through one of the phone calls," and stated that this suggested that there was more than one phone call, and asked whether there was more than one phone call. The Appellant responded "[n]o."13 The RPD, in its Reasons, stated that the Appellant testified that her mother had received one telephone call only, that she did not know why her narrative indicates multiple phone calls, and that her testimony was that her mother only picked up one phone call from the unknown men.14 The RPD found that it is not credible that the Appellant would not recollect how many calls there were, or if there was more than one call received by her mother, with whom she lived. Although not expressly stated by the RPD, it appears that it considers that the testimony was inconsistent with the narrative, and that the narrative evidence suggesting multiple calls was embellished. [13] The Appellant argues that the RPD misstated the Appellant's testimony, and that the Appellant did not testify that her mother received only one call, but rather, that she picked up only one call - the first call. I agree with part of this argument. When the RPD asked how often her mother picked up calls, the Appellant testified that her mother picked up only one call - the first call. When the RPD pointed the Appellant to the narrative reference to "one of the phone calls," the RPD asked if there were more phone calls, and the Appellant replied that there were not. The RPD did not follow up and ask whether there were more calls that were not answered. Therefore, even though the Appellant did testify that there was only one call, it is unclear from this part of the record whether the Appellant, when stating that there were no other calls, was referring only to calls that were answered. I find no clear inconsistency. Further, as the Appellant correctly argues, the RPD did not identify the connection between this alleged inconsistency and the Appellant's allegations. Even if I had found there to be an inconsistency, it relates to a peripheral detail, and not to anything that is central to the Appellant's allegations. It is not significant whether there was more than one call. To the extent that the RPD found support for its adverse credibility finding in this alleged inconsistency, that finding is incorrect. It is set aside, and is not relied upon in my independent assessment of the evidence. Finding regarding supporting letter [14] The Appellant testified that she decided she could not return to Venezuela and resigned from her employment in XXXX 2017 after she heard that men, described as having characteristics like the Colectivo MERSUV members she had previously interacted with, were coming to the company looking for her. This information was obtained from one of her co-workers (DG). She stated in her narrative that she called the company to arrange her return planned for late XXXX and DG answered the phone. This is somewhat different from her hearing testimony, where she stated that she called DG first, that is, before calling her boss about her return, because she feared that her boss was not going to be honest with her, so she called DG to ask her if the Colectivo MERSUV had come looking for her, and only called her boss after she spoke to DG. The Appellant states that DG told her that a man, who had a tattoo like the one on the man who had been threatening the Appellant, came to the office one week earlier, asked for the Appellant, told her he has been waiting for the Appellant, and asked when she would be coming back to work. DG told the Appellant that these men were angry and would probably kill her if they saw her, and recommended that the Appellant not return. The RPD asked the Appellant if DG told the Appellant how many times these men came to her place of work, and the Appellant responded that DG did not state the exact number. [15] The Appellant filed as evidence at the hearing what purports to be a letter from DG15 in which DG states that three men, who said they belong to the Colectivo MERSUV, had come looking for the Appellant on several occasions asking for the date of her return or a way to contact her. They said that the Appellant was in debt to them, that they needed her to return, and that "nobody mocks them." DG stated that those visits are the reason she called the Appellant in XXXX and informed her what was happening, and told her that she should not return to the country yet for her own security because these people had not stopped looking for her. The RPD noted that the Appellant had not stated in her narrative that DG told her the men had come to the company more than once, and did not include that in her testimony about what DG told her. The RPD asked the Appellant why she testified that she was the one who called DG, whereas DG stated that she called the Appellant. The Appellant stated that she didn't know, "but she's [meaning DG] confused because calls coming from Venezuela are restricted." She also testified that, when she arrived in Canada, her Venezuelan phone number, which is the number DG had, was deactivated. The RPD found that this letter was "created as evidence that the...[Appellant]...was still of interest to this group, despite her departure from the company and her belief that whomever [sic] replaced her is providing the information to the Colectivos."16 The RPD gave "no weight to this letter as evidence these unknown individuals were still in pursuit of the...[Appellant]...as late as XXXX 2017." [16] The Appellant argues that the Appellant did not state in her narrative or in her testimony, that the Colectivo MERSUV visited her place of employment only once during her absence. While this is true, the RPD's reference to this evidence was that the Appellant did not mention in her narrative, or in her description at the hearing of what she was told by DG during their call, the allegation that the Colectivo MERSUV had been at the company more than once looking for the Appellant. In my reading of its Reasons, the RPD did not consider this an inconsistency, as argued in the Appellant's memorandum,17 but as an omission of a significant allegation. [17] The Appellant also argues that the RPD failed to mention the reasonable explanation the Appellant provided for the inconsistency between the Appellant's testimony that she called DG, and DG's statement that she called the Appellant. I agree that the RPD did not specifically refer to this explanation. However, I also find in reading the RPD's Reasons holistically, and including paragraph 15 (in which the RPD found that the Appellant was unable to provide reasonable responses with respect to concerns noted regarding some key aspects in her allegations, which were then outlined) that the RPD found the Appellant's explanation did not reasonably explain the discrepancy. However, it erred because it did not say why it found this explanation to be unreasonable. However, I have considered the explanation in my independent assessment of the evidence, and I find that the explanation does not reasonably explain the inconsistent testimony. The explanation that DG could not have called the Appellant because outgoing calls from Venezuela are restricted and because she did not have the Appellant's Canadian phone number does not explain why DG stated that she did call the Appellant. DG is clear in her letter about why she called the Appellant - because of the visits from Colectivo MERSUV and their perceived threats against the Appellant - and that this is the reason she called the Appellant in XXXX. For the same reason, the suggestion that DG was confused is not borne out by DG's clear explanation of why it was she who called the Appellant. The letter does not support the allegation of confusion. [18] Despite my finding that there is an inconsistency that is not reasonably explained, I am not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the letter is fraudulent. It is supported by what purports to be DG's Venezuelan identity card, and by a letter from the company president confirming her employment by the company. However, while I do not find the letter to be fraudulent, I find that it is entitled to little or no weight in establishing ongoing interest by the Colectivo MERSUV in the Appellant. The inconsistent testimony is not merely a microscopic detail, but relates to an important part of the allegation that it is intended to prove. The circumstances surrounding the alleged telephone call are significant in evaluating if the call took place. The fact that the Appellant and DG tell different stories about how and why the call occurred undermines the allegation that the call took place, the allegation that the Colectivo MERSUV continue to seek the Appellant, and the credibility of the Appellant, both generally and with regard to the central allegations of her claim and the existence of a forward-looking fear of persecution or harm. Failure to consider important evidence [19] On XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, shortly before the November 20, 2019 hearing date, the Appellant submitted as evidence what purports to be a printout of a conversation on the Facebook Messenger social media application between the Appellant and her mother on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019 (the Message).18 In the conversation, the Appellant asks her mother whether "they" have bothered her again. Her mother responds that she does not go out and does not answer unknown numbers, but the previous week, she called the neighbour, XXXX, who told her that "they were surrounding the house and asking for us and if they didn't know where we have moved."19 This relates to the fact that the Appellant's mother relocated to a new home in XXXX 2017, and the neighbour mentioned is a neighbour living at the mother's former location. No questions were asked about this document at the hearing by either the RPD or the Appellant's counsel, although the Appellant testified that her mother had told her about the conversation in XXXX 2019 with the former neighbour. The Message was not referred to in counsel's submissions at the RPD, nor in the RPD's Reasons. [20] The Appellant argues that the RPD found that the Appellant does not face a forward-looking risk without regard to this significant evidence. As the Appellant correctly argues, although there is no requirement for the RPD to refer to every piece of evidence it has considered, and it is presumed to have considered all the evidence, the more important the evidence that is not mentioned and analyzed, the more likely a court may be to infer from the silence that the tribunal made a finding of fact without regard to the evidence, thereby making the finding of fact erroneous. Similarly, when the tribunal refers in some detail to evidence supporting its finding, but is silent on evidence pointing to the opposite conclusion, it may be easier to infer that the tribunal overlooked the contradictory evidence when making its finding of fact.20 I agree that this Message, if authentic, is significant in relation to the issue of whether the Appellant faces a forward-looking fear of persecution or harm. The RPD dealt in some detail with the letter from DG, which the RPD found was fraudulent and did not support the claim that the Appellant was still of interest to the Colectivo MERSUV, but did not refer to the Message, which arguably points to a different conclusion on that issue. In my view, some specific reference to and analysis of the Message is required before reaching a conclusion on that issue, and I find that the RPD reached its finding on that issue without regard to this evidence, and therefore erred. [21] The information in the Message is not sworn evidence and there is no certification by the mother that it is accurate. I acknowledge that there is no requirement that evidence before the RPD be given under oath, but the fact that the information is not sworn, or even sent by letter to be used before the RAD, detracts somewhat from the weight I attach to the Message. Although the fact that the Message relates to a conversation between the Appellant and her mother, which involves a risk that the conversation does not describe real events and may have been "staged," particularly given the existence of credibility concerns already identified. I have no basis for finding it to be not authentic or genuine. However, its weight is also affected by the fact that the mother has no personal knowledge of the ongoing presence of the agents of persecution/harm at their former home; she is reporting what she was told by someone else. The Message does not clearly indicate when "they" were surrounding the former house. Given that the Appellant's mother moved from her old house in XXXX 2017, the described event could have occurred anytime between XXXX 2017 and XXXX 2019. In my independent assessment of the evidence, I find that the Message is entitled to moderate weight in support of the Appellant's allegation that the Colectivo MERSUV have shown continued interest in the Appellant, and that she faces a forward-looking risk. [22] However, I also note that it appears from the content of the Message that the Colectivo MERSUV did not locate the Appellant's mother in the two years since she moved to another house, and the Appellant confirmed in her testimony that her mother had not been contacted by any of the people from XXXX 2017 until the hearing.21 This does not support the Appellant's allegation that the people who wish to harm her are so connected with the state that they can find her anywhere in Venezuela. Summary regarding credibility [23] Although I find that the RPD erred in some of its credibility findings, I find that it correctly identified credibility concerns that are of sufficient significance to rebut the presumption of truthfulness. [24] However, the fact that the Appellant does not benefit from the presumption of truthfulness does not eliminate the need to assess all the evidence, including the remaining credible evidence supporting the Appellant's claim, to determine whether, on a balance of probabilities, that evidence establishes the essential elements of that claim. [25] While there are reasons to question the credibility of the Appellant, there are also factors that support her credibility. I have listened to the entire hearing recording. I find that, when considered in its entirety, the Appellant's testimony was generally consistent, both internally, and with the detailed narrative, spontaneous, and sufficiently detailed to be credible, despite the credibility concerns identified in these Reasons. In my assessment, the credibility concerns relate more to issues at the edges of the heart of the claim, rather than to events that are at the core of the claim. Although there is not a lot of credible supporting documentary evidence, there is some documentary support for her testimony. Most significantly, I find the Appellant's evidence about the events upon which her claim is based to be believable, both in its content, and in the way in which the testimony was given; it has the "ring of truth." I identified no evasiveness, and it appeared that she was endeavouring to tell the truth. When considered in its entirety, I find that the credible aspects of the Appellant's testimony outweigh the negative effects of the credibility concerns, and that her testimony is sufficient to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the events she describes, and upon which her claim is based, occurred substantially as described by her. The Appellant is a person in need of protection [26] I disagree with the RPD's finding that the Appellant has not established that she was pursued by Colectivos.22 Having undertaken my own independent assessment of the evidence, I find that the Appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that she faces a personalized risk to her life not faced generally by others in Venezuela, pursuant to subsection 97(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).23 There is a pattern of events over time that are explicitly connected by virtue of the agent of harm's threats, demands and targeting.24 The situation evolved over time, increasing in degree, progressing from repeated demands for information about XXXX XXXX to a specific assault and threat against the Appellant's life delivered in person when she was kidnapped in her car, and again at her place of employment. The Appellant has been personally and specifically targeted for death, both because she failed to comply with the Colectivo MERSUV's demands, and because she "mocked them" by lying to them and escaping. They continue to seek her even though the Appellant believes that the person who replaced her at the company is cooperating with the Colectivo MERSUV, who are getting what it demanded from the Appellant. This risk to life is distinguishable in nature and degree from the risk faced generally by others in Venezuela, even though crime by Colectivos is widespread and prevalent. I find it more probable than not that the Appellant faces a personal risk to her life not faced generally by others in Venezuela. [27] As I have found that the Appellant has made out her claims under subsection 97(1), it is not necessary for me to go on to determine whether the RPD erred in its section 96 finding that the Appellant's fear does not have a nexus to a Convention ground. The Appellant does not have access to operationally adequate state protection or internal flight alternatives [28] I find that state protection is not available for the Appellant in Venezuela. The serious political, social, and economic crisis in Venezuela has resulted in the absence of the rule of law and growing insecurity.25 Many victims of violent crime in Venezuela do not report to the authorities due to a fear of retribution and a lack of confidence in the police, who are widely known to engage in corruption, torture, and extrajudicial killings with impunity.26 Although the country evidence is mixed regarding the affiliation of all groups known as Colectivos with the state, there is considerable evidence of economic and political support for such organizations by the state and its security agencies, including police.27 Having considered all of the evidence, I find that state protection is not available for the Appellant in Venezuela, and that the risk to the Appellant exists throughout Venezuela. CONCLUSION [29] The appeal is allowed. I substitute my own decision that the Appellant is a person in need of protection. (signed) N. Kaufman N. Kaufman March 17, 2021 Date 1 Canada (M.C.I.) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 103. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record (RPD Record), Exhibit 2, Basis of Claim Form (BOC) narrative (narrative), pp. 21-24. 3 RPD Record, Exhibit 2, narrative, para. 5, p. 21. 4 Audio recording of RPD hearing on November 20, 2019 (Hearing recording), at 35:07 to 35:48. 5 Ibid., at 35:55 to 37:00. 6 Ibid., at 1:37:24 to 1:39:19. 7 Ibid., at 1:49:04 to 1:50:34. 8 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, memorandum (memorandum), paras. 26-30, pp. 12-13. 9 Hearing recording, at 1:47:39 to 1:48:40. 10 RPD Record, Exhibit 2, narrative, para. 8, pp. 22-23. 11 BOC instructions, Exhibit RPD-1, p. 12 12 RPD Record, narrative, Exhibit 2, para. 10, p. 23. 13 Hearing recording, at 53:25 to 56:10. 14 RPD Reasons, para. 22, p. 8. 15 RPD Record, Exhibit 4, pp. 128-131. 16 RPD Reasons, para. 24, p. 8. 17 Exhibit P-2, memorandum, para. 33, p. 15. 18 RPD Record, Exhibit 10, pp. 277-282. 19 Ibid., p. 278. 20 Cepeda-Gutierrez v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1998] F.C.J. No. 1425, at paras. 16-17. 21 Hearing recording, at 1:11:55 to 1:13:05. 22 RPD Reasons, para. 17, p. 7. 23 IRPA, ss. 97(1). 24 Correa v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2014 FC 252. 25 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Venezuela (February 26, 2021), items 2.12, and 14.4. 26 Ibid., items 2.1, and 2.4. 27 Ibid., items 2.1., 2.4, 2.10, and 4.6; RPD Record, Exhibit 4, pp. 159-175. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-00686 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français