TB8-04500

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-04500 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision April 24, 2019 Date de la décision Panel M. Oh Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal Penny Yektaeian Guetter Conseil(s) (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ("the Appellant") appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division ("RPD"), rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant is a citizen of Venezuela and fears persecution on the basis of political opinion. He argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of his credibility, which was the determinative issue in his case. [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"),1 the appeal is dismissed. The RPD did not err in its assessment of the Appellant's credibility. After conducting an independent assessment of the evidence, I agree that the Appellant has not established that he is either a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant claims that he was a student activist in university and that he joined the Primero Justicia party in 2010. He describes that the Tupamaros colectivos wished to recruit him, but that he refused to join them. As a result, he was subjected to threats on numerous occasions. The incident that precipitated the Appellant's departure from Venezuela took place in XXXX 2013, when the Tupamaros abducted the Appellant and threatened to kill him. The Appellant stopped attending university, moved to his grandmother's house, and kept a low profile. [4] In XXXX 2013, the Appellant left Venezuela. In XXXX 2016, he was apprehended for working without authorization in Canada. He then initiated a refugee claim in September 2016. The RPD heard his claim and rejected it on the basis of credibility. Role of the Refugee Appeal Division [5] The jurisprudence establishes that the Refugee Appeal Division ("RAD") is required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence and reach its own determination. Deference is owed to the RPD only where the RPD held a meaningful advantage in assessing evidence.2 [6] In the present case, I see no reason to show deference to any of the RPD's findings. I have applied a correctness standard and arrived at my own independent findings based on the evidence before me. Admissibility of New Evidence and Request for an Oral Hearing [7] The Appellant has submitted a new support letter from the Primero Justicia party on appeal. This document is not admissible as new evidence. [8] The IRPA limits the ability of appellants to present new evidence on appeal to the RAD. Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA states that, on appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the claim's rejection. If the new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, the RAD must then consider factors around the credibility, relevance, and newness of the evidence.3 [9] A previous version of the Primero Justicia letter was disclosed to the RPD but it was only a scanned copy and it contained an error in regard to whether the Appellant is an active member. The new letter has been amended, and now clarifies that the Appellant is still a registered party member, but that he has not been active since XXXX 2013. The letter also explains why an original copy of the first version of the letter was not sent to the Appellant directly.4 [10] The Appellant's hearing with the RPD took place in two sittings on July 17, 2017 and August 3, 2017. During the proceedings, the RPD questioned the Appellant as to why he did not have an original copy of his political party letter, and the RPD confronted him about the fact that it states that he is still an active member despite his testimony that he had not been active since XXXX 2013. The RPD rendered its decision months later, on December 14, 2017. [11] Although the new letter was issued after the RPD rejected the claim, it was open to the Appellant to attempt to obtain such evidence beforehand and to request additional time from the RPD to provide an amended letter. However the Appellant did not attempt to obtain an amended original letter until after the RPD had already rejected his claim. It cannot be said that this type of evidence was not reasonably available to the Appellant, or that he could not have been expected under the circumstances to have presented such evidence to the RPD. I consider that the Appellant's attempt to submit this new evidence is merely an effort to supplement a deficient record that was put before the RPD. This is not the purpose of the new evidence provisions.5 I find that the support letter does not meet the criteria of s. 110(4) of the IRPA. [12] As no new evidence has been admitted, the request for an oral hearing is denied. MERITS OF THE APPEAL [13] The Appellant argues the following on appeal: a) That the RPD breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to notify the Appellant of its concern regarding the authenticity of his political party letter; b) That the RPD engaged in a microscopic analysis of the evidence; c) That the RPD ignored the Appellant's psychiatric report in its credibility assessment; d) That the RPD made a number of flawed implausibility findings; and e) That the RPD erred in its assessment of the risk that arises due to the Appellant's family profile. [14] These issues are addressed in detail below. a) Whether the RPD breached its duty of procedural fairness by failing to notify the Appellant of its concern regarding the authenticity of his political party letter [15] One of the key pieces of evidence provided by the Appellant was a letter from the Primero Justicia party,6 which the RPD gave no weight. The Appellant argues that the RPD breached its duty of procedural fairness by finding that the letter was fraudulent without bringing this to the Appellant's attention. I am not persuaded by the Appellant's argument on this issue. [16] The Appellant submits that the RPD's decision to place no weight on his party letter amounts to a finding that the letter was fraudulent. The Appellant argues that he has the right to know the case to be met, and that the RPD ought to have identified its concerns regarding the authenticity of the party letter. [17] There is no merit to this argument. Nowhere in its decision does the RPD state that the letter is fraudulent. The Appellant merely disputes the weighing of this evidence. However, there were good reasons for the RPD to assign no weight to the document. The RPD considered that there was no original copy presented, that the RPD had no way to verify how it came into the Appellant's possession, and that there was an inconsistency in the letter as to whether the Appellant is still an active member of the party. [18] Each of these issues were put to the Appellant during the proceedings. The Appellant testified that he was only active with the party until XXXX 2013. He explained that it was around that time that he informed the party that he would not be attending any more meetings, and that he wanted to distance himself from the party. Despite this, the party letter, dated XXXX XXXX, 2016, indicated that the Appellant was still an active member of the party. When confronted with this inconsistency, the Appellant had no explanation. In regard to the absence of an original letter, the Appellant explained that the letter was scanned and emailed to him by his friend XXXX, and that XXXX had been afraid to send the original letter due to fears that it would be intercepted. He went on to explain that he had no evidence of the email that was supposedly sent to him from XXXX, nor of any of his communications with XXXX about his request for the letter. He had deleted the email, and the phone he had used to communicate with XXXX had since broken. [19] In my view, the RPD's concerns regarding the weight that it could assign to the letter were clearly put to the Appellant, who was represented by counsel. He had every opportunity to address those concerns. Therefore I am not satisfied that any breach of procedural fairness arose under these circumstances. b) Whether the RPD engaged in a microscopic analysis of the evidence [20] The Appellant argues that the RPD engaged in a microscopic examination of his party letter, a support letter from his friend, and in finding an inconsistency in the Appellant's testimony regarding his kidnapping in XXXX 2013. I do not agree that the RPD made any errors in the disputed findings. Political party letter [21] In regard to the party letter,7 the Appellant submits that the initial letter contained a typographical error where it indicated that he is an active member, and that the RPD should not have dismissed the letter over a simple mistake. [22] I disagree. I share the RPD's view that the "mistake" in the letter is not a minor one. The Appellant testified that he had been active in the party up until approximately XXXX 2013, when he informed the party that he would no longer attend meetings, and that he wanted to distance himself from them following the attacks by the Tupamaros. Accordingly, the Appellant's Schedule A form indicates that his membership with the Primero Justicia party stopped in XXXX 2013.8 It is significant that despite years of inactivity, the party letter still indicated that he was an active member with the party. [23] In addition, as noted above, the inconsistency in the letter was not the only reason for assigning this letter no weight. The letter was not an original and the Appellant provided no way of verifying how he had obtained it. Though the Appellant argues that the Refugee Protection Division Rules did not require him to provide an original letter, this is plainly incorrect. Rule 42 clearly sets out that a party who provides a document must provide the original to the RPD no later than at the beginning of the proceeding at which the document will be used.9 Even if one could accept the Appellant's explanation for the absence of an original and the deletion of the email, the fact remains that the RPD was left with only a photocopy to assess. Ultimately, when all the evidence was considered and weighed, the RPD correctly found that the document could not be assigned any weight. Letter from the Appellant's friend [24] Another document relied upon by the Appellant was a letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, who wrote that the Appellant was a student leader who had organized protests. He described that he had urged the Appellant to flee the country because his name was circulating as one of the leaders who would be murdered or otherwise made to disappear.10 [25] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred by discounting this evidence due to an inconsistency in the letter as compared to the Appellant's testimony. I find this argument unpersuasive. Contrary to the letter, the Appellant testified that XXXX had mentioned to him that opposition leaders in general were being sought. He stated that his own name was not specifically mentioned by XXXX as one of the individuals that were being sought. The Appellant could not explain this inconsistency and did not know why XXXX letter stated that the Appellant's own name was circulating as one of the leaders who was being sought. [26] The difference in the evidence is a major one. It is not immaterial. News that opposition leaders are being targeted is not particularly surprising, given the country conditions in Venezuela. However, information that the Appellant himself is a person of interest that is being targeted is an entirely different matter. Even accounting for the Appellant's psychological condition, I find that he and his friend would not remember such significant information so differently. I agree with the RPD's finding and treatment of this evidence. Kidnapping in XXXX 2013 [27] The Appellant described in his Basis of Claim Form that his mother was a XXXX XXXX in Venezuela, and that as part of her practice, she conducted corruption investigations and made reports on them. The Appellant alleged that in early XXXX 2013, he was abducted by the Tupamaros and questioned about his mother. He describes in his Basis of Claim Form that this was the first time that they had directly mentioned her, and that they asked him about her work as a XXXX XXXX. [28] The Appellant's mother was called as a witness during the proceedings, and the RPD considered that her testimony was inconsistent with the Appellant's evidence as to whether the Tupamaros had ever asked him about his mother's work. The Appellant argues that there was no inconsistency in the evidence, and that the RPD merely saw a discrepancy by microscopically examining the evidence. [29] I have reviewed the hearing record and agree with the RPD's finding. The inconsistency stems from the differences in the Appellant's mother's testimony as compared to the Appellant's written narrative. The RPD questioned the Appellant's mother about her work as a XXXX XXXX and whether it had resulted in any threats to her or other members of her family. The Appellant's mother testified that she had never received any threats as a result of her work, nor had any of her family members. She explained that at the request of her boss, she had to stop her work on corruption investigations and that she kept the information about her work very private. Importantly, when asked whether her son was ever asked about her work, the Appellant's mother answered, "not really", and that they had only asked him if he knew a XXXX XXXX. She went on to explain that her son had mentioned to her that the Tupamaros had mentioned something about a XXXX in a XXXX. [30] When this was put to the Appellant for an explanation, he explained that his kidnappers asked him about a female XXXX who worked for a XXXX, and that he had assumed that they were speaking of his mother. The Appellant argues that no inconsistency arises because the narrative does not specifically say that they identified the Appellant's mother by name. I am not satisfied that this eliminates any inconsistency. [31] It is worth considering what exactly is written in the Appellant's narrative. In his description of his abduction, the Appellant wrote: They asked about my mother. This was the first time they directly mentioned her to me. They asked about her work as a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [32] The above passage is rather clear that the Tupamaros were asking the Appellant about his mother, rather than in general terms about whether or not he knew any union lawyers. The Appellant testified that he had told his mother everything that the kidnappers had said. If that is so, one would reasonably expect that the Appellant's mother would be aware that the Tupamaros were questioning her son about her work. I therefore agree that an inconsistency exists between the Appellant's evidence and his mother's testimony, and that it was not reasonably explained. [33] Though the Appellant also disputes the RPD's finding about an omission regarding his aunt's whereabouts following this incident, I find that the above inconsistency is sufficient on its own to cast serious doubt on the allegations around the Appellant's claims of being abducted by the Tupamaros in XXXX 2013. c) Whether the RPD ignored the Appellant's psychiatric report [34] The Appellant argues that a number of the RPD's credibility findings were in error because they were made without regard to his psychiatric report. On an independent assessment, I agree that the RPD failed to address the report, however I find that the Appellant's psychiatric report is insufficient to account for the credibility issues. [35] After his first sitting at the RPD, the Appellant attended an interview for a psychiatric assessment. In that assessment, Dr. XXXX XXXX set out a diagnosis of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX as well as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and described some of the symptoms that the Appellant reported and that Dr. XXXX observed.11 Those include feelings of extreme anxiety, difficulties with sleep, recurrent nightmares, severe emotional and physical distress when asked questions about the traumatic history, difficulty with focus, as well as memory issues. Testimony regarding XXXX 2013 shooting [36] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to consider his psychological condition when it determined that the XXXX 2013 shooting did not occur due to an inconsistency in the Appellant's testimony. [37] The Appellant's Basis of Claim Form describes that on XXXX XXXX, 2013, the Appellant was at the Primero Justicia party headquarters when the Tupamaros arrived and began to shoot. The narrative mentions nothing more about the circumstances when the shooting took place. In contrast, during his hearing the Appellant testified that the shooting had occurred at a different location altogether and under different circumstances, at the National Election Centre. He described that he and others marched there in order to protest the fraudulent nature of the presidential elections, which Nicolas Maduro had won just days earlier. The Appellant was unable to explain why his Basis of Claim Form stated that the shooting had occurred at the party headquarters. [38] The Appellant argues that his memory issues were highlighted in the psychiatric report, but that the RPD had not addressed the report in this respect. I agree that the RPD erred in failing to address this issue. However, on an independent assessment, I am not satisfied that the psychiatric report adequately accounts for the discrepancy. [39] The psychiatric report identifies memory issues and difficulty sustaining focus as some of the Appellant's XXXX symptoms. The report also specifically discusses how the Appellant's condition might have impacted upon his testimony at the first sitting of the hearing. There is nothing in the report to suggest that the psychiatrist reviewed the recording of the hearing. It is important to note that the psychiatric report relies largely on the Appellant's self-report. According to the assessment, the Appellant stated that, "His mind went completely blank and he could not answer any questions properly".12 The report goes on to conclude that it is understandable that the Appellant would have lost all his composure and that he would not have been able to answer even the simplest questions. It states that the Appellant's capacity to present his case would be severely impaired.13 It is not difficult to imagine that this hearing was stressful for the Appellant. However, in my view the psychiatric report's characterization of the testimony is not at all supported by the hearing record. The Appellant's testimony, especially with respect to the XXXX 2013 shooting, was spontaneous, without hesitation, and replete with details. There is nothing in the hearing record to indicate that the Appellant had difficulty testifying about the XXXX 2013 shooting. [40] Though I have considered the Appellant's psychological condition and the possibility of some memory issues on his part, the Appellant's description in testimony that this shooting took place during a protest march at the National Election Centre to dispute the presidential election results, is a very significant departure from his description in the Basis of Claim Form about the location and circumstances of this event - whether it was at the party headquarters or at the National Election Centre, in the middle of a march or not. I find that the psychological report does not sufficiently account for the serious discrepancies, which I find undermine the Appellant's allegations regarding his attendance at that march and the shooting that he claims occurred. Appellant's delay in claiming and work without authorization [41] The jurisprudence establishes that a refugee claimant's delay in claiming is a valid factor to consider in assessing the credibility of the risks faced in the country in which persecution is alleged, and it is also relevant in assessing subjective fear. [42] In the Appellant's case, part of his psychiatric report addressed the Appellant's delay in claiming. The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to take into account his mental condition and his personal circumstances when it assessed his delay. The Appellant also argues that the RPD relied on unreasonable implausibility findings where it rejected his explanations for his delay in claiming and his unauthorized work in Canada. [43] I agree that the RPD erred by failing to address this aspect of the psychiatric report in its reasons. The report indicated that in the psychiatrist's opinion, the delay in claiming was "partly attributable" to the bad advice the Appellant had received from people he trusted in Canada, and "partly" because of his mental health conditions. The report describes that trauma can impair the capacity to make appropriate social judgments, and that it can make people act on their feelings without stopping to consider the long-term consequences.14 [44] On appeal, the RAD is able to consider this evidence as part of its independent assessment. I have also considered the Appellant's arguments on the RPD's findings regarding his delay in claiming. I acknowledge that due to psychological factors, people who face risks in their home countries may not act in ways that would be seen as rational or reasonable. I accept that the Appellant's psychological condition is an important factor to consider in assessing his delay. However, there is more to consider here. [45] The delay in claiming in this case is lengthy. After arriving in Canada in XXXX 2013, the Appellant did not make a refugee claim. Instead, over the course of nearly three years, he traveled from Canada to the United States, Mexico, and also to Argentina.15 He held nothing but visitor status in all of these countries. He was refused a study permit in Canada in 2015, and eventually began to work without authorization in Canada, which led to his arrest by Canada Border Services Agency ("CBSA") in XXXX 2016. It was only in September 2016 that the Appellant completed his Basis of Claim Form and initiated a refugee claim. [46] The Appellant offered various explanations for his delay in claiming, which the RPD considered and rejected. The Appellant explained that initially, when he left Venezuela he hoped that the situation would improve and that he would be able to return. However, by March 2014, he realized that he would not be safe in Venezuela. The Appellant chose not to make a claim because he understood that by doing so, he would be separated from his family. By XXXX 2014, however, the Appellant's mother and sister had arrived in Canada. Still, the Appellant did not make a claim because someone who worked at his school had told him that it was too late for him to make a claim. Instead, he attempted to apply for a study permit, which was refused in XXXX 2015. Even after obtaining legal advice from a paralegal in February 2016 about how he could bring his girlfriend to Canada, he did not get advice about his ability to make a refugee claim. The Appellant began to work without authorization so that he could earn money for an engagement ring for his girlfriend, in order to propose to her so that she would be able to join him in Canada. Counsel argues that the Appellant was only 22 years old when he arrived in Canada, and that his close relationship with his mother and relationship with his girlfriend caused him to make poor decisions. [47] In the RAD's view, the problematic part of the delay is not so much about the Appellant's delay in claiming prior to his mother's arrival in 2014. In this respect, the psychological report is useful in explaining how the Appellant's condition might have affected his judgment. However, the report is insufficient in explaining the delay that occurred beyond this. What is alleged here is that after the arrival of his mother and sister in 2014, the Appellant would have made a refugee claim had he simply known that he could still do this. The Appellant argues that it was not implausible that he simply accepted the advice of someone at school that it was too late for him to file a claim. [48] The RPD doubted the credibility of this explanation and I agree with the RPD that this is not believable. The RPD questioned the Appellant's mother about the Appellant's delay in claiming and why she had not encouraged him to make a claim after they were reunited in Canada. The Appellant's mother, a XXXX, apparently simply accepted that her son had heard from someone at school that it was too late to make a claim. It is difficult to believe that the Appellant's mother would just accept this opinion without seeking any further information or verification. The Appellant was capable of finding the necessary information and taking the necessary action to maintain his visitor status throughout his time in Canada and in multiple countries. He had consulted a paralegal to find out how he could bring his girlfriend to Canada. I do not accept that it would take him such a lengthy period to learn, only after the refusal of a study permit and his eventual arrest by CBSA, that he could in fact still make a refugee claim. It is more likely than not that the Appellant was aware of the possibility to make a claim, but that his circumstances in Venezuela were simply not such that he would have been eligible for refugee protection. I too find that the Appellant's delay in claiming undermines the credibility of his allegations of the risk to him in Venezuela. d) Whether the RPD made a number of flawed implausibility findings [49] The Appellant submits that the RPD made unreasonable implausibility findings in its decision. I do not agree that the RPD erred. Family risk profile [50] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding it implausible that the Tupamaros would be interested in searching for him after raiding his aunt's house in XXXX 2017. There is no merit to this argument. [51] The Appellant alleged that the Tupamaros had targeted some of his other family members, and that his Aunt XXXX house had been raided by them. During the raid, documents and photos were among the items taken from the home. The Appellant's name is supposedly included in those documents, and he is depicted in the family photographs that were taken. [52] The Appellant mischaracterizes the RPD's finding. The RPD found that it was "pure speculation" to conclude that the Tupamaros would be searching specifically for the Appellant simply from the fact that they took some documents and photos from his aunt's home. The RPD noted that the theft of the documents and photographs may have been incidental, since the Tupamaros did not seem to have any specific interest in the Appellant during the break-in. This was not a credibility finding or a plausibility finding. The RPD took the facts alleged about the raid and simply assessed the forward-facing risk to the Appellant as a result of this incident. Reavailment [53] The Appellant also submits that the RPD erred by finding it implausible that he would have returned to Venezuela in XXXX 2013 for three weeks despite his fear of persecution. [54] I am not persuaded by this argument. The Appellant argues that the error arises because the RPD failed to consider whether he had the financial or familial resources to stay in the United States or to go straight to Canada. The context here is important to consider. The Appellant described in his Basis of Claim Form that after he was kidnapped and threatened in XXXX 2013, he knew that he had to leave Venezuela. With this context in mind, the RPD found it difficult to accept the Appellant's subsequent actions. Following the XXXX 2013 incident, the Appellant traveled to the United States with his family for vacation, returned to Venezuela for three weeks, and then flew to Canada for English language classes. In my view, it was safe to assume that the Appellant could have simply remained abroad, since he was already planning on moving to Canada for his language studies and had the means to do so. [55] A refugee claimant's reavailment to the country in which they claim to fear persecution is a valid consideration in assessing credibility and subjective fear. The RPD questioned the Appellant about his reavailment and correctly rejected the Appellant's explanation. Therefore, I find no error in its reasons here. e) Whether the RPD erred in its assessment of the risk that arises due to the Appellant's family profile [56] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of the risk that arises from his association to his family. I do not agree that the RPD erred. [57] The RPD accepted that some other members of the Appellant's family had been threatened and attacked by the Tupamaros. For instance, the Appellant's Aunt XXXX fled from Venezuela and was granted refugee status in Canada due to her activities with the Voluntad Popular party and an association of academic professionals. The Appellant's Aunt XXXX fled to the United States due to her political activities. However, the RPD found that the Appellant had not established that there was a sufficient degree of risk to him from the profile of his family members. The RPD noted that other members of the family had been threatened and attacked as a result of their own political activities, or else as a result of their close familial association to the members of the family that were politically active. Aunt XXXX awareness of Appellant's political activities [58] The Appellant seems to argue first of all that the RPD wrongly determined that the Appellant's Aunt XXXX had only a superficial awareness of his political activities. I do not believe that the RPD erred. The Appellant points to the fact that XXXX narrative identifies the Appellant as having left Venezuela due to his political activities in university, and that she testified that he was politically active. However, these vague statements do not change the fact that XXXX herself testified in his hearing that she was only superficially aware of the Appellant's political activities. It was not an error for the RPD to cite her own testimony and rely on it in this regard. Closeness of association between Appellant and his aunts [59] The Appellant also argues that the RPD erred in finding that the Appellant did not have a close familial association with his aunts. His counsel states that from the cultural context of Latin America, a close family member is not limited to one's immediate family member. Pointing to a letter from the Appellant's Aunt XXXX, the Appellant argues that XXXX "nephews" were among those identified as possible targets for harm by those who threatened her. [60] The Appellant misconstrues the RPD's reasons. In my view, the RPD did not ignore Aunt XXXXs letter. The RPD specifically noted that there is evidence from both XXXX and XXXX on record. It is true that XXXX letter states that she was approached by people who threatened to harm her family members, including nephews among others. She described events that occurred to her in XXXX XXXX, where she lived. Her letter indicates that her father (the Appellant's grandfather) was kidnapped and drugged.16 His death took place in XXXX XXXX, in the far western part of Venezuela.17 However, the RPD considered where XXXX lived and whether she and the Appellant had a close familial association. In my reading of the RPD's reasons, I have not interpreted the RPD's words to mean that nephews in general are not considered to be close family members. In XXXX case, the RPD noted that this aunt had lived far away from the Appellant. Her letter indicates that she lived in XXXX XXXX, which is a great distance away from the Appellant's former place of residence. [61] In addition, in regard to XXXX, the RPD noted that she was only superficially aware of the Appellant's political activities, that she did not live with him, and that she stayed with him only briefly in XXXX 2013. It is in this sense that the RPD correctly found that the aunts did not have a close familial association with the Appellant that would cause him to face a risk as a result of their activities in Venezuela. There is no error in this aspect of the RPD's reasons. Assessment of risk as a family member [62] The Appellant argues that the documentary evidence clearly establishes that family members of political activists are targeted by the government, and that it is therefore not pure speculation that the Tupamaros would be searching for the Appellant if he returns to Venezuela. [63] I have reviewed the documentary evidence relied upon by the Appellant and I do not agree with this assessment. Counsel cites items 4.2 and 4.3 of the version of the National Documentation Package for Venezuela that was entered into evidence by the RPD.18 The memorandum does not elaborate on how these reports establish that there is pattern of targeting family members. Item 4.2 describes the case of a family that was detained and charged for political reasons. However, in that case, every member of the family was politically active with the Primero Justicia party. Item 4.2 also mentions the case of a politician who went into hiding, evading attempts at his arrest. According to a coordinator from the Voluntad Popular party, SEBIN (Servicio Bolivariano de Inteligencia/Bolivarian Intelligence Service) officials appeared at this politician's home to threaten him and his family. There is no information about any subsequent harm to this individual's family.19 [64] Item 4.3 discusses the case of a protester, who was detained. He released an open letter announcing that he would be starting a hunger strike. On the same day, SEBIN agents reportedly threatened him and his family before beating him. The report does not indicate that any harm eventually came to the family members. The only other relevant information about family members from that document concerns the wife of Leopoldo Lopez (co-founder of Primero Justicia), who complained of persecution and harassment against her and her children.20 [65] In my assessment of the evidence, the documentary evidence regarding the targeting of family members is rather limited. It does not establish that there is a pattern of targeting family members. I agree with the RPD's determination that the Appellant is not sufficiently close to the other members of his family that have been targeted that a risk would arise for him personally in the event of his return to Venezuela. The evidence is insufficient to establish that the Appellant himself would face a serious possibility of persecution in Venezuela due to his family profile. CONCLUSION [66] The Appellant has not demonstrated any error in the RPD's decision that would be sufficient to set it aside on appeal. As I agree with the RPD's determination on an independent assessment, the RPD's negative determination is confirmed. The appeal is dismissed, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) "M. Oh" M. Oh April 24, 2019 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; see also Rozas del Solar v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 3 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, [2016] 4 FCR 230, 2016 FCA 96. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 28-29. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Singh, [2016] 4 FCR 230, 2016 FCA 96, at para 54. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 118-119. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 118-119. 8 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, at p. 61. 9 Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2012-256, rule 42. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 141-144. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, at pp. 231-235. 12 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, at p. 233. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, at p. 235. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7, at pp. 234-235. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, at p. 62. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 167-169. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at pp. 177-179. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Venezuela (31 May 2017). 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Venezuela (31 May 2017), item 4.2. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, NDP for Venezuela (31 May 2017), item 4.3. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-04500 RAD.25.02 (September 18, 2018) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (September 18, 2018) Disponible en français