MB9-20957

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB9-20957 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision September 9, 2020 Date de la décision Panel E. Bobkin Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Stewart Istvanffy Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss the appeal brought by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria. [2] The Appellant alleges that he was involved in apprehending a Boko Haram suicide bomber in Biu, Borno state where his family owns a farm. He alleges that, as a result of this, he was targeted by Boko Haram who allegedly attacked him at his farm and ransacked his home in Abuja. He also alleges that Boko Haram continued to harass him via telephone after he fled Abuja. He alleges that he decided to come to Canada as a result of this, and he brought his claim for protection. [3] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that the Appellant had not established his allegations, on a balance of probabilities, with credible evidence. Specifically, the RPD found that the Appellant had omitted significant evidence from his Basis of Claim (BOC) and was inconsistent about the central allegations of the claim. [4] The Appellant argues that he has new evidence which proves his risk. He also argues that the RPD failed to consider reasonable explanations for the inconsistencies and omissions and that he was credible. After receiving the Appellant's record, I notified the Appellant that I would be considering the issue of internal flight alternative (IFA). The Appellant responded with submissions arguing he does not have an IFA because Boko Haram is everywhere in Nigeria and because police cannot protect him from Boko Haram. He also argues that the revocation of the Nigeria Jurisprudential Guide on IFA indicates there is no IFA. The Appellant also submits new evidence with his record and with his submissions on IFA. [5] I find that the Appellant has a viable internal flight alternative in Lagos. Therefore, I confirm the RPD's decision. DECISION [6] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD, for other reasons, that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE [7] According to the law,1 I can only accept evidence that: (i) arose after the RPD's decision; or (ii) was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or (iii) that could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [8] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.2 The Appellant submits the following as new evidence with his record: (a) medical records, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, and a prescription, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019; (b) phone purchase receipts from 2017 and 2018; (c) a crime diary extract, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, pertaining to events in 2017; (d) a crime diary extract, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, pertaining to events in 2017; (e) a crime diary extract, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, pertaining to events in 2017; (f) an undated letter from the Appellant's wife; (g) a letter from the Appellant's father, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019; and (h) news articles of various dates or undated. [9] In response to my notice that I would be considering IFA, the Appellant also submitted the following as new evidence: (i) an email conversation from XXXX 2018; (j) an undated WhatsApp conversation; (k) news articles; and (l) a letter from the Appellant's wife, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2020. [10] I find that the police documents, the letter from the Appellant's wife from XXXX 2020 and the news articles which post-date the rejection of the claim are admissible. They do not meet the test for an oral hearing. The remainder of the evidence is inadmissible. Medical records, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, and a prescription, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019 (category a) are inadmissible [11] The Appellant submits medical records and a prescription, dated XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX, 2019.3 The Appellant did not initially explain how these documents meet the requirements for admission under subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). His memorandum simply states these documents are "regarding the purchase of medical elements required for his health."4 In the Appellant's memorandum submitted in response to my notice that I would be considering IFA, the Appellant's Counsel argues that the previous counsel before the RPD deemed them not to be necessary, and this is why they were not submitted.5 [12] The Appellant's hearing before the RPD was July 10, 2019, and the decision was rendered August 19, 2019. The documents do not post-date the decision. The Appellant's explanation as to why the documents were not presented to the RPD did not come in the Appellant's record when the medical documents were submitted and, in my view, is not admissible, as it is not clear why this was not provided until I asked about IFA. However, even considering this explanation, the Appellant has not made any allegations that his former counsel was incompetent or followed the Board's procedure for making such allegations. Therefore, I do not accept this as an explanation establishing that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to provide medical documents for his refugee claim. The explanation also implies that the documents were reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of his claim. [13] Therefore, the documents are not admissible under subsection 110(4). Phone purchase receipts from 2017 and 2018 (category b) are inadmissible [14] The Appellant provided receipts of purchases of SIM phone packages in Nigeria from 2017 and 2018.6 Although, the Appellant has not explained what these are for, I understand they are to establish he changed his phone number. The Appellant did not explain how these meet the test for admission when he submitted them with his appeal record. When he submitted his further submissions in response to my notice about IFA, his Counsel argued that it was only his current Counsel who requested these documents.7 [15] This evidence does not post-date the rejection of the claim. The issue of the Appellant changing his phone number was discussed at the hearing.8 The Appellant therefore was aware that this issue was being considered by the RPD, at a minimum as of the date of the hearing (although it was his evidence, so he also should have been aware prior to the hearing). [16] The Appellant's explanation as to why the documents were not presented to the RPD did not come in the Appellant's record when the phone records were submitted and, in my view, is not admissible, as it is not clear why this was not provided until I asked about IFA. However, even considering this explanation, the Appellant has not made any allegations that his former counsel was incompetent or followed the Board's procedure for making such allegations. Therefore, I do not accept this as an explanation establishing that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to provide phone records, showing he changed his number, for his refugee claim or prior to the rejection of his claim. The explanation also implies that the documents were reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of his claim. [17] Therefore, the documents are not admissible under subsection 110(4). Crime diary extracts (categories c, d and e) are admissible [18] The Appellant submits three crime diary extracts which were printed after the rejection of the claim, but all deal with events in 2017 and 2018 which pre-date the rejection of the claim.9 [19] I find these documents are admissible. The Appellant testified at his hearing that he tried to get documents prior to his hearing but was refused and stated on appeal that his father was able to convince the police to provide documents by showing the negative refugee decision. Therefore, this explains that the documents were not reasonably available to the Appellant. This meets subsection 110(4). [20] I do not find any prima facie deficiencies with the documents and therefore they are credible for admission. I find them relevant to whether the Appellant was targeted by Boko Haram and new as they were not available to the Appellant for his hearing. They are admitted. [21] I do not find they meet the test for an oral hearing. Even accepting the past threats, I do not find them determinative because the Appellant has a viable IFA. The undated letter from the Appellant's wife and the letter from the Appellant's father (categories f and g) are inadmissible [22] The Appellant submits a letter from his wife with his Appeal record.10 The letter details the events in the Appellant's BOC. Nothing in the letter post-dates the rejection of the refugee claim. The Appellant also provides a letter from his father, dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, explaining the history of the Nigerian Police, information about Boko Haram and information from the Appellant's claim.11 Nothing in this letter post-dates the rejection of the refugee claim. Counsel argues that the letters "refer to new information that arose after the claim" but does not explain what this is, and I cannot find any such new information.12 If the Appellant is referring to news articles which accompany the letters, I have considered the news articles separately, below. [23] The Appellant explains that the letters from his wife and father are being provided to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) "since this was not previously discussed with the appellant with his previous counsel and now that these important elements have been discussed with him, he asked his father and his wife to provide it."13 I do not find this reasonable. [24] The Appellant has not made any allegations that his former counsel was incompetent or followed the Board's procedure for making such allegations. Therefore, I do not accept this as an explanation establishing that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to provide a letter from his wife or father for his refugee claim. The explanation also implies that the documents were reasonably available to the Appellant prior to the rejection of his claim. [25] The RAD is not an opportunity for the Appellant to provide better evidence which he could have provided to the RPD. These documents are inadmissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The email conversation (category i) is inadmissible [26] The Appellant submitted an email conversation between himself and his wife from 2018. The Appellant states that "it is only after receiving the letter from IRB concerning that we can make further submissions on the issue of IFA, that the appellant search further evidence that can respond to the inquiry of the RAD." [27] The email does not post-date the rejection of the claim. I do not accept the explanation above as establishing that the evidence was not reasonably available to the Appellant or as being something that he could not reasonably have been expected to provide prior to the rejection of the claim. [28] The issue of relocation (or IFA) was put to the Appellant at his hearing14 and addressed by the Appellant in his BOC.15 Therefore, the Appellant ought to have provided this information prior to the rejection of his claim. The Federal Court has held that the RAD is not an opportunity to do a better or new search for evidence.16 The Appellant could have searched for this evidence prior to his hearing. Therefore, I find that documents are inadmissible, pursuant to subsection 110(4). The WhatsApp conversation (category j) is inadmissible [29] The Appellant submits a WhatsApp conversation between himself and his child. The memorandum states that it is from 2020, but there is nothing on the conversation to establish this, and the Appellant has not provided any proof of this, such as an affidavit. Therefore, I find that the Appellant has not established that this post-dates the rejection of his claim. Similarly, given that the Appellant has not established this post-dates the rejection of the claim, I find he has not established that this evidence was not reasonably available to him or was evidence he could not have reasonably been expected to provide prior to the rejection of the claim. The evidence is inadmissible under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The letter of the Appellant's wife from XXXX 2020 (category l) is admissible [30] The Appellant provides a letter from his wife from XXXX XXXX XXXX 2020. I find this is admissible, as it addresses the Appellant's wife's movements since the claim was rejected and therefore post-dates the rejection of the claim. It is also therefore new. I see no prima facie deficiencies in the letter, and therefore it is credible for purposes of admission. It relates to IFA and is therefore relevant. I admit the letter. [31] Given that the letter pertains to events occurring after the Appellant left Nigeria which he has no firsthand knowledge of, I find the letter raises no serious credibility issues with regard to the Appellant. Also, as will be explained below, even accepting the Appellant's wife moved, I do not find this evidence justifies accepting the claim as I still find a viable IFA. Therefore, this evidence is not determinative. The evidence, therefore, does not meet the test for an oral hearing. News articles (categories h and k) - the articles post-dating the rejection of the claim are admissible, and the articles pre-dating the rejection of the claim are inadmissible [32] The Appellant submits various news articles about the Nigerian Police and about Boko Haram. Some of the articles are undated; some pre-date the rejection of the claim, and some post-date the rejection of the claim. No explanation has been given as to why this evidence was not presented prior to the rejection of the claim (for the articles that pre-date the rejection). [33] The articles which are undated or pre-date the rejection of the claim are inadmissible. The Appellant has not explained why these were not provided prior to the rejection of his claim. He has not established that they were not reasonably available to him or were not evidence which he could reasonably have been expected to provide. Therefore, they do not meet the test under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [34] The articles which post-date the rejection of the claim are admissible. They deal with the Nigeria Police and Boko Haram and are therefore relevant. They come from objective third-party news agencies and are therefore credible. They post-date the rejection of the claim and are therefore new. [35] As the admissible articles are general country conditions documents, I find they do not raise any serious credibility issues with regard to the Appellant, and therefore they do not meet the test for an oral hearing. THE ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION [36] My role is to look at all the evidence and decide if the RPD made the correct decision.17 There is an exception to this, where the RAD defers to the RPD if the RPD had a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral evidence. I do not find this case falls into the exception. Therefore, I will be looking at whether the RPD's decision was correct. ANALYSIS [37] The RPD based its decision on a finding that the Appellant lacked credibility. The Appellant argues that the credibility assessment was incorrect and that the RPD ignored explanations for the purported credibility issues. Generally, I agree with the Appellant. For these reasons, I am not relying on the RPD's credibility findings. For the purposes of the appeal, I accept the allegations as credible, unless otherwise stated. I am therefore not addressing the Appellant's arguments about errors in the RPD's credibility assessment, as I am not relying on this assessment. [38] I raised the issue of IFA and provided the Appellant an opportunity to respond. I have considered the Appellant's response in reaching my conclusion. [39] The test to be applied in determining whether there is a viable IFA is two-pronged, and both prongs must be satisfied for a finding that an appellant has a viable IFA. First, I must find that there is no serious possibility of the Appellant being persecuted nor risk to life, danger of torture or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, on a balance of probabilities, in the suggested IFA. The Appellant bears the burden of proof to show that he faces a section 96 or 97 risk in the entire country and, specifically, in the suggested potential IFA. Secondly, I must be satisfied that conditions in the suggested IFA are not such that it would be objectively unreasonable in all of the circumstances, including those particular to the Appellant, to relocate and reside there. [40] In this instance, I find that both prongs of the test are met in the proposed IFA location of Lagos. The Appellant has not established that he would face a section 96 or 97 risk in Lagos [41] The Appellant's arguments that he would not be safe in Lagos are as follows: (a) His family is continuously relocating to remain safe; (b) Police cannot protect the Appellant; (c) Boko Haram is everywhere in Nigeria, including in Lagos; and (d) Use of phone/bank information to track the Appellant. [42] Considering these arguments, I do not find that the Appellant has established that he faces a serious possibility of persecution or a section 97 risk, on a balance of probabilities, in Lagos because he has not established that Boko Haram has the means or motivation to locate him in Lagos, on a balance of probabilities. I will address each of the Appellant's arguments. The family's relocation [43] The Appellant argues that "the personal evidence shows that the appellant and his family are in danger to this day, it demonstrates that his family is still moving around Nigeria without any stability and living in fear of getting harmed or killed by Boko Haram."18 I do not find this established by the evidence. [44] The letter from the Appellant's wife states that, as of XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017, she and the children have been in XXXX and that she has relocated within XXXX.19 Therefore, this relocation is not evidence that the Appellant could be located in Lagos. Moreover, this evidence does not establish that the Appellant is in danger. The Appellant's wife does not state that she has received any recent threats from Boko Haram. Rather, she states: "I feel I am been watched by members of the group, hoping for the reappearance of my husband."20 While it is understandable that the Appellant's wife is afraid given what happened in the past, there is no evidence that Boko Haram has threatened the Appellant or his family since the Appellant left Nigeria in XXXX 2018, over two years ago. Therefore, I find the evidence does not show Boko Haram remain motivated to locate the Appellant should he return to Nigeria now, on a balance of probabilities. [45] I note that the Appellant provided evidence that he relocated within Nigeria after the ransacking of his house in XXXX 2017 and that he stated that he was moving from house to house and that in the time from the ransacking, he received threatening phone calls.21 He also stated that, in this time, he stayed temporarily in Lagos.22 The RPD had credibility concerns with this because it was not included in the BOC narrative. I agree with this. However, even accepting this as credible, I do not find that threatening phone calls, over two years ago, establish that Boko Haram have the means or motivation to locate the Appellant in Lagos today, on a balance of probabilities. As discussed above, the lack of concrete threats in this time indicates a lack of motivation. As I will discuss below, the capabilities of Boko Haram have also changed which impacts on their means to find the Appellant. [46] For these reasons, I do not find that the Appellant's past relocation, or his family's continued relocation, establish a section 96 or 97 risk from Boko Haram in Lagos. Police Protection [47] The Appellant argues that the evidence shows that it is impossible to get state protection in Nigeria which renders the IFA unsafe for him.23 I do not find this argument relevant. Given that I find the Appellant has not established that he would face a risk in the IFA location, he does not need to access police protection. Therefore, state protection is not relevant to the assessment. Boko Haram's reach [48] The Appellant argues that Boko Haram is everywhere in Nigeria and, in particular, is present in Lagos, and therefore he cannot have a safe IFA.24 I do not find this evidence persuasive. I find that, based on the most up-to-date evidence, while there may be members of Boko Haram present in many places in Nigeria, including Lagos, the group's power and reach is diminished such that the Appellant has not established that Boko Haram could locate him in Lagos, on a balance of probabilities. [49] The UK Home Office states that Boko Haram rarely operates outside of the north-east and "certainly" does not operate in the south and coastal areas of Nigeria.25 The same report notes that Boko Haram attacks are primarily in north-east Nigeria, but it has claimed responsibility for attacks in central Nigeria.26 It goes on to note that, although the group has attempted attacks in Lagos, the group's reach in southern Nigeria appears limited.27 The report notes that there may be Boko Haram cells outside of their main area of operation but that the violence is mostly confined to the north-east and that, in Lagos, Boko Haram related violence is all but absent.28 Boko Haram's territory is limited.29 [50] The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) report notes that "Christians and Muslims residing in the middle belt and southern states face an extremely low risk of violence from Boko Haram."30 The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) notes that, at the peak of its insurgency, Boko Haram controlled 20,000 square miles of territory in the north-east of Nigeria but that the group has lost control of much territory, and their large-scale attacks have diminished.31 The US Department of State notes that Boko Haram maintains the ability to stage forces in rural areas and launch attacks against civilian targets across the northeast.32 [51] A response to information request (RIR) from the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) indicates that Boko Haram's capacity to pursue individuals who relocate is "greatest in the northeast" with "diminishing capacity moving away from this region."33 The report notes that the group has intelligence capabilities, but they are not that advanced, and they do not have the cyber sophistication to track individuals through electronic systems.34 The report also notes that the group is most likely to target "high-status individuals such as local government area officials . . . or religious elites" particularly those who have a "public profile."35 The Appellant is not such an individual. It may be that he was of interest to Boko Haram in 2017 and early 2018 because he was involved in the apprehension of a suicide bomber, but he is not a government figure or someone with a prominent profile. He was a graphic arts officer who had a farm.36 [52] The same report notes that the group would be more likely to target senior military, police officers and school teachers and that Boko Haram is "decentralized and local" and "does not appear to have the interest or capacity to go after an individual outside the northeast-except for former Boko Haram operatives".37 The report states that there is no evidence of Boko Haram tracking down people beyond their area of operation in the northeast and north central regions.38 The report states that Boko Haram has a limited capacity south of Abuja and that their reach is weak in the south due to religious and ethnic differences.39 [53] All of this evidence indicates that Boko Haram would not have the means to locate the Appellant in Lagos, on a balance of probabilities, given their diminished reach and strength. I have reviewed the articles provided by the Appellant suggesting that Boko Haram is everywhere. I do not find they can be read as broadly as the Appellant suggests, and I do not find they outweigh the evidence in the National Documentation Package (NDP). One article notes that, because the group has been "subdued in the North-east" Boko Haram has become "scattered" and can be found all over Nigeria including in Lagos state.40 The article goes on to discuss that the Boko Haram insurgency has been subdued, and, as a result, the group does not control territory and are scattered and are terrorists who are spread out.41 In my view, this does not indicate that Boko Haram members who may be scattered throughout Nigeria, including in Lagos state, have the means and resources to track the Appellant, on a balance of probabilities. [54] Similarly, I acknowledge one article suggesting that Boko Haram has informants in the Government. I do not find this establishes that Boko Haram has the means or motivation to track the Appellant as the article discusses any informants as being concerned with military actions.42 [55] When I look at all the evidence of Boko Haram in its totality, I do not find that the Appellant has established, on a balance of probabilities, that the group has the means or motivation to locate the Appellant in Lagos. Use of phone/bank to track the Appellant [56] The Appellant did not argue this in his memorandum, but in his wife's letter, she states that Boko Haram could find out information about him because he would have to give information to get a phone line to open a bank account and get a driver's licence.43 I find these arguments speculative. [57] First, as discussed above, the Appellant has not established that Boko Haram is motivated to pursue him, on a balance of probabilities, should he return. Second, as discussed above, documents in the NDP state that Boko Haram does not have the cyber sophistication to track individuals through electronic systems.44 Moreover, while personal data is collected to obtain a bank account or SIM card, evidence is that it is difficult to access SIM card data, short of a written request by a high-ranking security authority, unless the individual is a criminal.45 Moreover, the Appellant's wife and family continue to reside in Nigeria and have not provided any evidence that they do not have a bank account and phone which could be used by the Appellant should he return. [58] The Appellant's wife provided no information as to how the Appellant could be tracked by getting a driver's licence, and I find this to be speculative. Similarly, the Appellant's wife states that the Appellant could be found by word of mouth by friends or former business partners. I also find this speculative, as the Appellant has not explained how Boko Haram would track him down in this way. [59] For all these reasons, I do not find this argument persuasive. COVID-19 and the first prong [60] The Appellant did not make arguments or provide any evidence that the COVID-19 pandemic would enable him to be located in Lagos and put him at risk there. Without an evidentiary foundation, I find it would be speculative to conclude that the pandemic establishes a risk for the Appellant. Moreover, given that the Appellant does not fear the state, I find that the Appellant has not established that any increased monitoring of travelers or requirement to isolate upon entry would lead to Boko Haram discovering his location in Lagos, on a balance of probabilities. Conclusion on the first prong of the IFA [61] Considering all the evidence in its totality, I find that the Appellant has not established that Boko Haram has the means or motivation, on a balance of probabilities, to locate him in Lagos. Therefore, I find that the Appellant has not established that he faces a serious possibility of persecution, a risk to his life, a risk of torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, on a balance of probabilities, should he relocate there. The Appellant has not established that relocation to Lagos is unreasonable [62] For the following reason, I find that the Appellant has not established that relocation to Lagos would be unreasonable in his personal circumstances, on a balance of probabilities. [63] The Appellant has not made any concrete arguments about why an IFA would be unreasonable for him. He simply points out jurisprudence that the impact on a claimant's children, his age, the likelihood of safely reaching the IFA and the ability to reside there legally are relevant concerns to the IFA analysis.46 He also points to the UNHCR guidance of IFA and the fact that the Jurisprudential Guide on Nigeria IFAs has been revoked.47 Again, all of this is general, and the Appellant has not explained how this applies to him specifically. [64] I appreciate that the Jurisprudential Guide has been revoked. However, it still provides a useful framework of analysis for the reasonableness of IFA, including areas that should be considered.48 These include: transportation and travel, language, education and employment, accommodation, religion, indigeneship, and the availability of medical and mental health care. I am guided by this framework. Travel and transportation [65] In general, Nigerians have freedom of movement and freedom to reside throughout the country.49 Notably, there are security curfews and other movement restrictions in areas affected by communal violence or the Islamist insurgency. 50 Lagos is not one of those such areas. Many Nigerians relocate within the country for economic reasons.51 Lagos has an international airport.52 The Appellant has not provided evidence that travel and transportation would render relocation unreasonable for him, and reviewing the evidence, I find it does not. [66] The Appellant has also not provided any evidence to suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic would render travel to Lagos unreasonable. I appreciate that travel to Lagos may be more difficult, but there is no evidence to suggest that Nigeria is not permitting re-entry of citizens. Therefore, to conclude such, without an evidentiary foundation, would be speculative. Language [67] The Appellant speaks Yoruba, Igbo and English.53 He testified at his hearing in English without the use of an interpreter and completed his BOC in English without the use of an interpreter.54 The main languages spoken in Nigeria include English, Yoruba and Igbo.55 The official language is English.56 The main language in the southwest, where Lagos is, is Yoruba.57 The Appellant has not made any arguments that language would render relocation unreasonable, and I find he has not established this, on a balance of probabilities. Education and employment [68] Nigeria has a large number of people living in poverty, and there is significant unemployment.58 However, the Appellant has six years of post-secondary education, including a bachelor's degree and a diploma in XXXX XXXX.59 He has over ten years of work experience in XXXX XXXXand experience running a farm.60 For these reasons, I find that the Appellant has not established that difficulties in finding a job would render relocation unreasonable. I note that the Appellant has school-age children. He has provided evidence that he would be unable to find schools for the children in Lagos. Accordingly, I do not find education issues render relocation unreasonable. Accommodation [69] There is a range of housing in Nigeria, but supply of adequate housing does not meet demand.61 Previously, the Appellant had a home in Abuja, and his father had a farm in XXXX. His father is a XXXX and retired XXXX XXXX, who has been supportive of the Appellant.62 As discussed above, the Appellant has an employment history and significant education, which will assist in his ability to support himself and therefore find accommodation. The Appellant's wife also has 16 years of education, including a bachelor's degree.63 The Appellant has not submitted evidence to suggest he could not find accommodation in Lagos. While I appreciate that finding accommodation may be difficult, I find that the Appellant's personal and familial circumstances would ameliorate this to some degree and that the Appellant has not established that finding accommodation would render relocation unreasonable. Religion [70] The Appellant is Christian.64 Christianity is the majority religion in the southern states where Lagos is.65 I find that the Appellant has not established that his religion would render relocation unreasonable. Indigeneship [71] Non-indigenes can have difficulty relocating to a new state without familial connections or financial means. They may also face discrimination in accessing government services, including education and employment. However, this does not apply to Lagos.66 The Appellant has not submitted any evidence that indigeneship issues would render relocation unreasonable, and I find that he has not established that it would, on a balance of probabilities. Healthcare [72] There is a mixture of public and private healthcare facilities in Nigeria, but access to care can be difficult particularly for those in rural areas and poor people.67 The Appellant has submitted some evidence that he has "XXXX XXXX" health issues with his XXXX and has received medical care for this and that he has been prescribed XXXX which can be used for mental health.68 I accept that there is evidence that healthcare in Nigeria is not at the same level as in Canada. However, a report from the UK Home Office notes that almost all medical conditions can be managed in the country particularly in Lagos, although this may be very expensive.69 The same report notes that treatment of mental illness is possible in public hospitals in Nigeria, although mental illness is stigmatized.70 Therefore, while I acknowledge that access to healthcare and mental healthcare may make relocation more difficult, I do not find it renders relocation unreasonable for the Appellant. [73] With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic and healthcare, the Appellant has not provided any evidence to suggest that he is at particular risk for serious complications from COVID-19 or that the pandemic would affect him in such a way as to render relocation unreasonable. Conclusion on the second prong [74] The Federal Court has held that the threshold for the "objectively unreasonable" standard is very high and requires, at a minimum, the proof, through actual and concrete evidence, of adverse conditions which would jeopardize the life and safety of the Appellant in relocating to a safe area.71 I find that the Appellant has not provided such evidence, and, as such, it would not be unreasonable for him to relocate to Lagos. CONCLUSION [75] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD, for other reasons, that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Erin Bobkin E. Bobkin September 9, 2020 Date 1 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 2 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 2-4. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 62. 5 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 62. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 5-9. 7 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 62. 8 Exhibit RAD-1, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at pp. 52-53. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 10-11, 31. 10 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 12-16. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 17-19. 12 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 63. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 63. 14 Exhibit RAD-1, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at pp. 12, 14. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 22. 16 Arafa, Abubeker v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-840-18), Walker, January 3, 2019, 2019 FC 6. 17 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93; Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145. 18 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 67. 19 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at pp. 38-39. 20 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 39. 21 Exhibit RAD-1, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 14. 22 Exhibit RAD-1, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at pp. 13-14. 23 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 60; and Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 64-69. 24 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at pp. 55-56. 25 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.4, United Kingdom Home Office, "Country Policy and Information Note, Nigeria: Boko Haram, Version 2.0", January 2019, at p. 16. 26 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.4 (ibid.), at p. 16. 27 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.4 (ibid.), at p. 16. 28 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.4 (ibid.), at pp. 17-18. 29 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.4 (ibid.), at p. 17. 30 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.8, Australia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, "DFAT Country Information Report: Nigeria", March 9, 2018, at p. 17. 31 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.13, European Union, European Asylum Support Office, "EASO Country of Origin Information Report, Nigeria: Targeting of Individuals", November 2018, at pp. 28-29. 32 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 2.1, United States Department of State, "Nigeria: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019", March 11, 2020, at p. 17. 33 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26, IRB, RIR NGA105451.E, "The capacity of Boko Haram to pursue individuals who relocate to another region or city, such as Lagos (2013-March 2016)", March 11, 2016, at p. 3. 34 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26 (ibid.), at p. 3. 35 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26 (ibid.), at p. 3. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 106. 37 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26, IRB, RIR NGA105451.E, March 11, 2016, at p. 4. 38 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26 (ibid.), at p. 4. 39 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26 (ibid.), at pp. 5-6. 40 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 4. 41 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at pp. 4-5. 42 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 7. 43 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at p. 40. 44 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 7.26, IRB, RIR NGA105451.E, March 11, 2016, at p. 3. 45 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.14, IRB, RIR NGA106245.E, "Requirements and procedures to obtain a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card and to open a bank account; ... (2018-February 2019)", February 18, 2019. 46 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at pp. 58-59. 47 Exhibit P-3, Supplemental Record, at pp. 57, 59- 60. 48 Notice of Revocation of JG - Nigeria, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/revocation-tb7-19851.aspx. 49 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17, United Kingdom, Home Office, "Country Policy and Information Note, Nigeria: Internal relocation, Version 1.0", March 2019, at p. 23. 50 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17 (ibid.), at pp. 21-22. 51 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17 (ibid.), at p. 24. 52 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.10, World Food Programme, "Main domestic and international road corridors, 2.3 Nigeria Road Network, Logistics Capacity Assessments (LCAs)". 53 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 15. 54 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 28; and Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing. 55 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17 (supra endnote 49), at p. 10. 56 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.8 (supra endnote 30), at p. 8. 57 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.8 (ibid.), at p. 8. 58 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.8 (ibid.), at pp. 8-9. 59 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 106. 60 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 106. 61 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17 (supra endnote 49), at p. 6 62 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 171. 63 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 103. 64 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 15. 65 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.8 (supra endnote 30), at p. 8. 66 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17 (supra endnote 49), at p. 24; and item 1.8 (supra endnote 30); and item 2.1, United States Department of State, "Nigeria: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2019", March 11, 2020. 67 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.17 (ibid.), at p. 6. 68 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at pp. 209-216. 69 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.9, United Kingdom, Home Office, "Country Policy and Information Note, Nigeria: Medical and Healthcare Issues, Version 2.0", August 28, 2018, at p. 8. 70 NDP for Nigeria (July 31, 2020), item 1.9 (ibid.), at p. 15. 71 Singh, Barinder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-826-13), Noël, September 26, 2013, 2013 FC 988. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : MB9-20957 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français