TC0-08552

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-08552 TC0-08553 / TC0-08554 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision March 18, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Dilani Mohan Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Meera Budovitch Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] These are my reasons for allowing the appeal by the Appellants: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (Mr. XXXX) and XXXX XXXX XXXX (Ms. XXXX), and their child, XXXX XXXX XXXX (XXXX). After independently reviewing the record I find that the Refugee Protection Division's (RPD) decision is incorrect, and that the Appellants are persons in need of protection. BACKGROUND [2] The Appellants are Bangladeshi nationals who have experienced extortion, assault and kidnapping for ransom by criminals affiliated with the Awami League. Ms. XXXX was also threatened by members of Hefazat-e-Islam because of her volunteer work with a non-governmental organization (NGO), XXXX. Mr. XXXX was the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Dhaka, and a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. This made him a target for AL cadres who extorted money from him, intending to use it to pay for the release from jail of another cadre, XXXX. In April 2017, Mr. XXXX was approached by the extortionists and he paid them 500,000 taka, or 5 lakhs. The following month, those AL cadres demanded a much larger sum. When Mr. XXXX did not pay, he was physically assaulted and hospitalized. He filed a police report but received no help. Beginning around June 2017, Ms. XXXX was threatened by members of Hefazat-e-Islam because of her volunteer work with the non-governmental organization, XXXX, which assisted low-income children and families. On June 2, 2017, the Appellants' home was vandalized, and Ms. XXXX was directly threatened by Hefazat members. A General Diary was filed with the police, but nothing was actioned. The following month, July 2017, AL cadres kidnapped Ms. XXXX and held her until Mr. XXXX paid 20 lakh taka in ransom. After this the Appellants decided to leave Bangladesh using their Canadian visas, which had been issued the year before. They moved to Chittagong, where they stayed in hiding at a friend's home, before leaving for Canada, but they were also called and threatened while there. The friend with whom they stayed was also approached and asked about the Appellants' whereabouts. [3] The Appellants' claim was first heard in April 2019, but that hearing was adjourned in order to notify the Minister about integrity issues that the Member had identified. The Minister decided not to intervene. In the meantime, the Appellants' claim was assigned to a new RPD Member and was heard de novo. [4] The RPD rejected the Appellants' claims on February 19, 2020 because of credibility concerns that mainly arose from the corroborating documents, and the evidence related to the May 22nd incident. The RPD found it too coincidental that the Appellants only began getting extorted in 2017, when Mr. XXXX had been in business since 2013. The RPD gave the corroborating documents no weight and found, essentially, that none of the events the Appellants described had actually occurred. Arguments on appeal [5] The Appellants argue that the RPD's decision is incorrect because it is based on microscopic issues and improper plausibility findings. They argue that the RPD did not make any clear findings about the authenticity of the documents that it impugned, and that, when it did challenge the documents such as photos and police reports, it was based on an improper assessment. The Appellants further argue that because the RPD did not challenge the credibility of the Appellants' testimony on any of the incidents in their narrative aside from the May 22nd events, its incorrect assessment of the documentary evidence forms an inadequate basis to impugn the Appellants' credibility. [6] The Appellants have introduced new evidence with their appeal, and also filed a Rule 29(4) application to admit late evidence. This new evidence includes information about assaults on the Appellant's former housekeeper; assaults on Mr. XXXX mother, which sent her into hiding; the publication of an article about threats Ms. XXXX received from Hefazat and further threats from them; Ms. XXXX financial support of a Hindu cultural centre organized by her friend, and the subsequent pursuit of Ms. XXXX through her mother by members of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB). The Appellants have also requested an oral hearing. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION (RAD) [7] I have applied the standard of correctness while reviewing the RPD decision and have conducted an independent assessment of the evidence before me. NEW EVIDENCE: [8] The Appellants have introduced several pieces of new evidence which I must assess by different criteria based on the timing of their submission. The first set of documents, filed with the perfected appeal record, include four documents that relate to issues and events that were before the RPD and canvassed at the Appellants' hearing. These documents include: a) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXl and notarized copy of hospital identification.1 b) Notarized statement by XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX cousin.2 c) Notarized statement by XXXX XXXX XXXX the Appellants' friend.3 d) Letter from XXXX, Dr. XXXX XXXX, of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX.4 [9] Several other documents provided in the Appellants' record relate to events that arose in the time between the RPD hearing and the time the Appellants' record was filed in September 2020. These documents include: e) Letter from XXXX XXXX, the Appellants' housekeeper.5 f) Notarized letter and medical report from Dr. XXXX XXXX XXXX.6 g) Notarized letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX, Mr. XXXX cousin.7 h) General Diary extract, dated February 28, 2020, made by Mr. XXXX mother.8 i) Notarized letter from Md XXXX XXXX, Mr. XXXX brother.9 j) Notarized letter from Ms. XXXX brother, Md XXXX XXXX.10 k) Letter from XXXX XXXX and journalist identity card.11 l) Copy of news report published in The Daily Shomoyer Alo.12 m) Threat letter from Hefazat.13 [10] Then there are the documents that the Appellants filed as late evidence on February 10, 2021.14 These documents include the following: n) Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, dated January 11, 2021. o) Money transfer receipt, dated October 1, 2020. p) Affidavit of XXXX XXXX, dated January 9, 2021. q) Discharge certificate from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX dated November 23, 2020 for XXXX XXXX. r) Police report, dated November 24, 2020. s) Letter from XXXX XXXX, dated January 4, 2021. t) Letter from XXXX XXXX. u) Letter from the XXXX. [11] According to the law,15 I can only accept evidence that: i. arose after the RPD decision; or ii. was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or iii. that could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have been given to the RPD before the decision. [12] If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must decide if the evidence is new, credible and relevant before I can accept it.16 [13] Additionally, when Appellants make an application to admit late evidence, I can only allow it if the evidence is relevant and probative, brings new information to the appeal, and if the Appellants could not reasonably have provided it with their perfected record.17 Admitted: Items (e) - (u) [14] All of these items (e) through (m) post-date the RPD decision and relate to new events arising after the RPD hearing. As such they bring relevant new information to the appeal. I find them all prima facie credible and therefore allow them into the record. [15] Items (n) through (u) were all submitted as late evidence. They post-date the perfection of the Appellants' record and also relate to new events. I therefore find that these documents could not reasonably have been provided before the RPD decision or even with the perfected appeal record in September 2020. These documents bring relevant new information to the appeal and are also prima facie credible. They are admitted. Not admitted - Items (a)-(d) [16] Each of these items relate to information and documents that were before the RPD. These documents aim to clarify issues that the RPD raised with the Appellants. I find that the information in these documents could have been provided before the RPD reached its decision in February 2020 and, in any event, that they are not relevant to the appeal before me. I find that the issues that the Appellants seek to address through these documents are already resolvable with the information in the record. These documents therefore do not bring any new and relevant information. As such, they are not admitted. An oral hearing is not required [17] The RAD may hold an oral hearing only when there is new evidence that raises a serious issue about the Appellants' credibility, is central to the decision, and which, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the claim. I find that the accepted evidence does not raise a serious issue with respect to the Appellants' credibility, and I therefore find than an oral hearing is not necessary based on the circumstances and evidence in this case. ANALYSIS [18] I have independently reviewed the evidence and find that the RPD's decision is incorrect because it is based on credibility findings that either do not go to the heart of the claim, were reasonably explained, or which are not supported by the evidence. I further find that the Appellants have satisfactorily explained away the integrity issues that were raised. There is no integrity issue arising from the similar claims [19] I have applied the framework created by my colleague in the persuasive decision, TB7-16268,18 in order to assess the similarities between the Appellants' claim and the one identified by the first RPD panel. I note that the starting point of this assessment, as with any claim, is the presumption that the Appellants' sworn evidence is truthful. While that presumption may be displaced by evidence of a strikingly similar narrative from an unrelated claim, I do not find that to be the case here. [20] To begin, the RPD was concerned about similarities between the factual circumstances of the two claims. These similarities included the facts that the adult male claimants were successful businessmen who were extorted by AL members, and the adult female claimants were NGO employees who were threatened by Hefazat. The RPD also noted that both claims included two police reports filed by the adult male and female claimants respectively. The RPD pointed out that both claims also involved a kidnapping followed by a visit to a psychologist rather than a hospital, and that both files included a letter from the claimants' Bangladeshi lawyer. Finally, the RPD noted that, in both claims, the Appellants went into hiding in Chittagong before coming to Canada. Perhaps most significantly, the RPD did not produce a copy of the narrative for comparison, but only the RPD's decision. [21] Although notified of the concerns, the Minister declined to intervene, stating that all relevant information could be found in the record. [22] Counsel for the Appellants made submissions on the issue and argued that the two adult males were businessmen but differently employed. He argued that it made sense that the women would have been employed in NGO's since there are many operating in Bangladesh and that these organizations are more likely to offer women employment given their western attitude and the difficulty women face in obtaining employment in Bangladesh. Counsel further stated that it is an error to draw a credibility concern from the fact that the Appellants both approached the police, and also an error to draw negative inferences from their decision to get a letter from their Bangladeshi lawyer due to the normalcy of that kind of decision. Counsel stated that kidnapping for ransom is commonplace in Bangladesh, such that there is nothing improbable about kidnapping appearing in both claims. Similarly, Counsel argued that it is common for people in Bangladesh to relocate to a large city like Chittagong because they are more likely to find people they can live with in those locations. He argued that there are few options for relocation in Bangladesh, so the choice of Chittagong is not a suspicious one. And finally, on request of the RPD, counsel provided copies of emails containing corroborating documents that were sent directly to his office by the Appellants' Bangladeshi lawyer. [23] In light of the Minister's decision not to intervene,19 the explanations from counsel which I find satisfactory, and the evidence of emails from the Bengali lawyer, which personalizes the narrative, I do not find that there is a serious integrity issue in this claim. I therefore proceeded with my analysis in the normal course. The RPD's credibility findings are incorrect [24] The RPD did not raise any concerns about the credibility of the Appellants' testimony on any of the incidents in their narrative, aside from the May 22nd incident. However, it drew a general negative credibility finding based on the timing of the extortion. For this reason, I begin my analysis here. Coincidental timing of the extortion [25] In finding that it was too coincidental that Mr. XXXX began facing extortion in 2017, the RPD pointed out that Mr. XXXX had been a businessman since 2013, and that he had obtained visas to come to Canada in XXXX 2016. The RPD also pointed to country documents indicating that extortion of businesses and private citizens is rampant in Bangladesh. The inference to be drawn from the RPD's reasons, is that it believed that Mr. XXXX should have been extorted earlier. [26] I agree with the Appellants that their credibility should not be affected by an arbitrary timeline established by the RPD. I also agree that it is contradictory logic to point to evidence of widespread extortion as a basis for concluding that, in this particular case, the extortion did not occur at all. This is not an instance where the timing is clearly impossible or even implausible. I overturn this finding. May 22, 2016 incident - medical report [27] The RPD drew most of its credibility findings about this incident from the related medical report,20 photos of Mr. XXXX injuries,21 a letter from Mr. XXXX driver,22 and testimony about those documents. The RPD raised two issues with the medical report. In the first instance the RPD noted that the medical report states he was hospitalized for two days before being discharged. Mr. XXXX testified that he was in the hospital for one day. The RPD did not accept that this was a simple mistake, noting that an educated person could be expected to know the exact date of his release, which was otherwise consistent in his Basis of Claim form and corroborating evidence. The Appellants argue that the RPD was treating Mr. XXXX testimony as a memory test, and I agree. I do not find the discrepancy between one or two days of hospitalization to be particularly relevant since the fact of the hospitalization is established. I overturn the RPD's negative credibility finding on this point. [28] In the second instance, the RPD took issue with the medical report's description of Mr. XXXX injuries as 'minor', when Mr. XXXX had testified that the injuries were 'brutal'. The appellants have argued that what is minor in the medical context and to doctors can be different from how it is subjectively perceived by the injured person. I find this a reasonable explanation. Doctors routinely address a wide range of injuries varying from the invisible to the ones requiring urgent surgery. Along the spectrum of needs, it stands to reason that Mr. XXXX injuries, though brutal to him, might have been characterised by a physician as minor. I therefore overturn the RPD's credibility finding on this point as well. [29] I note that the RPD did not raise any concerns about the genuineness of the medical report. Based on my review, I see no reason to doubt the authenticity of the report and therefore give it full weight. May 22, 2016 incident - photos of injuries [30] Regarding the photos, the RPD drew a negative credibility inference from Mr. XXXX inability to definitively identify the photographer. It reasoned that, because he was conscious and the subject of the photos, he should have known who took the pictures. The RPD characterized Mr. XXXX testimony as convoluted, contradictory, and unreasonable, but I agree with the Appellants that the audio recording demonstrates that Mr. XXXX consistently stated that he did not know the photographer's identity because he was physically and mentally unwell at the time. It is only after being repeatedly asked to provide an identity that he suggested that it could have been a hospital staff member or a friend. Mr. XXXX testimony was reasonable. He had just suffered a violent attack and gone to the hospital. Taking mental note of who was photographing his injuries may not have been at the top of his mind, or even a detail that he would have thought important to retain. I further note that this inconsistency, to the extent that it can be characterised as such, only arose because of the RPD's pressure on Mr. XXXX to identify someone. [31] The RPD also found that Mr. XXXX was not clear about how the photos came into his possession. I disagree. Based on my review of the hearing recording, Mr. XXXX was clear that he had asked his relative to obtain those photos for him. For all of these reasons, I overturn this credibility finding and give the photos full weight as corroboration of the injuries sustained in the May 22nd incident. [32] Finally, the RPD raised a concern with the letter from Mr. XXXX driver. In the letter, Mr. XXXX driver stated that he was an "...eye-witness of some occurrence...".23 The RPD took this to mean that there were multiple occurrences of assaults that the driver witnessed. The Appellants argue that, the RPD not only failed to put its concern to Mr. XXXX for clarification, but that it also misapprehended the meaning of the letter. They note that the term "occurrence" appears as singular rather than plural, which supports Mr. XXXX assertion that there was only one assault that the driver witnessed. I agree with the Appellants on both points and overturn the RPD's credibility finding. [33] As I noted earlier, the RPD did not raise any other credibility concerns with the testimony or evidence regarding the March 22nd incident. Since I see no credibility concerns or problems with the corroborating evidence, I overturn the RPD's finding that this event did not occur. I find, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. XXXX was assaulted and hospitalized on this date. The RPD's treatment of the corroborating documents is incorrect [34] The RPD did not raise any credibility concerns with the Appellants' testimony regarding any of the other incidents in their narrative. All of the remaining credibility findings are related to the documentary evidence. On the basis of these findings, often times without even making any clear findings about the genuineness or authenticity of the documents, the RPD found that entire incidents in the Appellants' narrative did not occur. As I explain below, this is an error. General problem [35] Firstly, I note that the RPD stated that it was giving little or no weight to the Appellants' corroborating documents, in part because "...21 EU member countries, indicate that fraudulent documents have been submitted by Bangladeshi asylum seekers..."24 Although this comment appears late in the RPD's reasons, I find that this articulated the RPD's suspicion of the general authenticity of the Appellants' documents which is evident in the RPD's assessment of the evidence. I note that the presence of fraudulent documents by claimants from a particular country does not mean that all claimants from that country will be appearing with fraudulent evidence. June 2017 hospital discharge certificate [36] The RPD concerns with the June 2017 discharge certificate25 are speculative. The RPD noted that the discharge certificate for the June incident looked considerably different from the certificate that was produced for the May 2017 incident. It does not appear that the RPD considered that Mr. XXXX was treated at two different hospitals and that this might account for the differences in the appearance of the certificates. The RPD further noted that the June discharge certificate was formatted like an advertisement that would be found on a website, and that the section containing the discharge information was placed among several different squares, which contained general information about the hospital, and its contact information. Based on this assessment, the RPD concluded that the certificate was neither authentic nor reliable, and found that the June incident did not occur. [37] The Appellants rightly argue that the RPD has no expertise or specialized knowledge on the appearance of Bangladeshi discharge certificates. They also point out that the discharge certificate was in the form of a booklet, and that this explains the different 'squares' or formatting that drew the RPD's concern. I find the RPD's credibility finding on this point to be without merit and I therefore overturn it. I further find that the Appellants have credibly established the facts of the June 2017 incident on a balance of probabilities. Letter from friend in Chittagong [38] The RPD's treatment of the letter26 from Mr. XXXX friend in Chittagong is incorrect because it is based on an assessment of what the letter does not say, rather than what it actually says. It is trite law that this is an improper way to assess corroborating evidence. I find the RPD erred by concluding that the entire incident on August 30th did not occur simply because Mr. XXXX friend did not mention that he had personally been stopped on August 30th in his letter. While the omission is noteworthy, in the absence of other reasons to doubt the Appellants' testimony about this incident, I find it is an insufficient basis for finding that the Appellants were never sought in Chittagong. I find, based on my own assessment, that the Appellants have established this allegation on a balance of probabilities. Mrs. XXXX mental health evidence [39] To corroborate her kidnapping by AL members, Ms. XXXX provided a letter from a Bangladeshi clinic reflecting her treatment by a staff psychiatrist, Dr. XXXX XXXX XXXX.27 The letter indicated that Ms. XXXX had been treated on July 8, 2017; that she was found to be "persistently fearful and mentally upset" and that she was prescribed medication and rest, as well as recommended further therapy. The letter also included a brief description of the cause of the visit, noting that Ms. XXXX stated she had been kidnapped by AL terrorists and held for ransom. The RPD gave no weight to this letter because it was prepared by the clinic manager rather than Dr. XXXX. The RPD also gave the letter no weight because the letter lacked detail about the method of assessment and was based on self-reported symptoms. [40] Ms. XXXX also provided a letter from her physician in Canada.28 This letter confirmed that Ms. XXXX receives treatment for XXXX XXXX XXXX. The doctor notes that Ms. XXXX informed them that the cause was the kidnapping on July 6th. The RPD did not mention this report in its assessment. [41] A third letter,29 dated December 19, 2019, was the most recent piece of mental health evidence that Ms. XXXX introduced. This letter, from a different family physician, stated that Ms. XXXX had been seen multiple times since November 2019 regarding "...XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX."30 The doctor notes that Ms. XXXX had a traumatic experience in Bangladesh and reports that she has been prescribed Zoloft and referred to the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH). The RPD gave this letter no weight because the letter lacked information about the method of assessment, and because the cause of Ms. XXXX mental health symptoms is unknown. Based on its findings about the two medical reports, the RPD concluded that the kidnapping was not credible. [42] I disagree with the RPD. Firstly, I note that there were no negative credibility findings regarding the testimony about the incident. Secondly, the RPD did not raise any issues about the genuineness of the documents. Thirdly, the clinic manager stated that the report was produced using records from the hospital and it is not entirely unreasonable that a manager or other hospital worker would produce a report summarizing a patient's treatment history. I note that the identity of the author was clearly stated. Fourthly, and while I agree that the reports do not establish a causal link between Ms. XXXX symptoms and the kidnapping, I do not find that to be the purpose of the evidence. The reports corroborate that Ms. XXXX sought treatment on July 8th, a day after her release by the kidnappers. They also corroborate that Ms. XXXX has experienced mental health issues. They further establish that, Ms. XXXX has been consistent in reporting to her physicians that she was kidnapped and held for ransom in Bangladesh. There is nothing internally inconsistent, either between these documents, or between the testimony and these reports. I therefore find that the RPD erred by using its concerns about the weight to assign to these reports as sufficient to find the entire kidnapping incident not credible. I overturn that finding. Moreover, as I have found no credibility concerns with either the medical reports or the Appellants testimony on the issue, I find they have established the facts of the kidnapping on a balance of probabilities. General diaries [43] The Appellants produced two General Diaries to corroborate their testimony that they had sought police assistance after the incidents in May, April and June. The RPD gave no weight to these documents because "...anyone can write a GD, make a complaint, and submit it by addressing it to the Officer in Charge."31 The RPD noted that there are online videos about how to write police reports, before pointing to the experience of 21 European Union countries in receiving fraudulent Bangladeshi documents in refugee claims. [44] I have already noted the reasons why the experience of other countries has little relevance in assessing the use of fraudulent documents in any particular claim. While it demonstrates that non-genuine documents can be created, it does not automatically mean that the documents produced by these specific claimants are suspect. The decision-maker must point to concrete issues with the documents they have been given to establish fraud. The RPD did not do that in this case. Moreover, it is perverse to hold against a claimant the fact that any resident can make a police complaint. That is the point of police protection. And it is also the reason why police reports are frequently requested by the RPD itself as corroboration in refugee claims. I overturn the RPD's findings about the general diaries and give these documents full weight. [45] Having found that the Appellants provided credible testimony about their experiences in Bangladesh and seeing no issues with the corroborating documents that they have provided, I find that the elements of their claim have been established on a balance of probabilities. State protection and IFA [46] The Appellants fear persecution by not only AL affiliated criminals, but also various religious extremists because of Ms. XXXX work with XXXX and her support of other progressive ventures.32 There is ample evidence demonstrating that state protection would not be forthcoming because of the inadequate and extremely corrupt or politicized system of protection that exists in Bangladesh.33 Those with political power and influence are able to act with relative impunity.34 The evidence regarding religious extremists also indicates that protection would not be forthcoming.35 I find that the evidence establishes, on a balance of probabilities, that the extortionists and extremists that the Appellants describe in their narrative have benefitted from this impunity. As such, I find that the Appellants will not have state protection if they return to Bangladesh. And because the agents of persecution include state-affiliated actors and operate throughout Bangladesh, I find that the Appellants do not have internal flight alternatives. [47] On the basis of the reasons outlined above, I find that the Appellants face a serious possibility of religious persecution and that they are, on a balance of probabilities, also persons in need of protection. CONCLUSION [48] The appeal is allowed. I substitute my own decision that the Appellants are Convention refugees and persons in need of protection. (signed) Dilani Mohan March 18, 2021 Date 1 Exhibit P-2, Appellants' Record, pages 26-28. 2 Ibid., pages 29-31. 3 Ibid., pages 32-37. 4 Ibid., pages 38-39. 5 Ibid., pages 40-44. 6 Ibid., pages 45-47. 7 Ibid., pages 48-51. 8 Ibid., pages 52-54. 9 Ibid., pages 55-58. 10 Ibid., pages 59-62. 11 Ibid., pages 63-65. 12 Ibid., pages 66-67. 13 Ibid., pages 68-70. 14 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29, dated February 10, 2021, pages 10-39. 15 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended, subsection 110(4). 16 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96; Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Raza 2007 FC 385. 17 Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) Rules, SOR/2012-257, as amended, Rule 29(4). 18 X (Re), 2018 CanLII 101516 (CA IRB). 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 11 at page 372. 20 Ibid., Exhibit 11 at page 337. 21 Ibid., at page 369-370. 22 Ibid., at page 342. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., RPD Decision at page 14, para 53. 25 Ibid., Exhibit 11 at pages 334-335. 26 Ibid., at pages 363-368. 27 Ibid., page 338. 28 Ibid., page 371. 29 Ibid., page 261. 30 Ibid., Exhibit 9, at page 261. 31 Ibid., RPD Decision, page 12, para 45. 32 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29, dated February 10, 2021, Exhibits A, B, H, pages 10-39. 33 National Documentation Package (NDP) for Bangladesh (November 30, 2020), item 1.8, United Kingdom. Home Office, April 2020 at pages 6-11, 15-19; see also item 1.9, United Kingdom. Home Office, April 2020 at pages 26, 45-47; See also item 7.1, U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre; Transparency International, February 15, 2019. 34 Ibid., item 1.8, April 2020 at pages 6-9. 35 Ibid., item 1.13, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2020 at pages 3, 7-8, 11, 33; See also item 1.15, United Kingdom. Home Office, September 2017 at page 15; See also item 7.8, International Crisis Group, February 28, 2018 at pages 9, 10, 21. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-08552 TC0-08553 / TC0-08554 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français