TB8-28244

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-28244 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Ottawa, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision November 18, 2019 Date de la décision Panel Veena Verma Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Daniel M. Fine Barrister & Solicitor Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) is a citizen of Mexico. She alleges that her father and his employees abused her. She claims that if she returns to Mexico, she will be persecuted by her father. She also fears general criminality in Mexico. [2] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejected the Appellant's refugee claim, having found her subjective fear of persecution or risk to her life in Mexico had no objective basis. The RPD found the Appellant did not present credible or reliable testimony. [3] The Appellant now appeals the RPD decision before the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). She submits that the RPD erred by 1) ignoring witness statements and other evidence supporting her objective risk; 2) refusing to subpoena evidence from a CBSA officer; 3) misinterpreting psychological evidence and mental health law; and 4) misapplying the Chairperson's Guidelines on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender Related Persecution (Gender Guidelines) and Vulnerable Persons Appearing before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. She asks the RAD to allow new evidence and to hold an oral hearing. Supplementary legal references were sent to the RAD on December 4, 2018. [4] I will allow and consider the Appellant's additional legal references. However, I deny the Appellant's requests to admit new evidence and to hold an oral hearing. For the reasons that follow, I confirm the RPD's decision that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). BACKGROUND Basis of Claim [5] The Appellant claims that her father is a well-known, wealthy, and influential businessman in Mexico. He separated from the Appellant's mother in 2006, and they eventually divorced at the end of 2016. [6] In XXXX 2006, while the Appellant was in high school, her father moved the family to the U.S. because he was being investigated for money laundering activities. Her father stayed in Mexico and went into hiding. The Appellant eventually returned to Mexico, first to XXXX and then XXXX XXXX. [7] The Appellant worked at one of her father's businesses, and claims that she overheard him speaking to others about making sure actions were taken against people who interfere with his business objectives. The Appellant believes her father had been responsible for the deaths of some people who opposed him. [8] The Appellant states that her father came out of hiding after the chief investigator in her father's money laundering investgation died in a "suspicious" plane crash.1 She heard her father talk about this event, and after the death of the investigator, the investigation "seemed to go away."2 She also claims that her father talked about using his wealth for "influence peddling."3 [9] The Appellant claims that her father always made her uncomfortable. She felt controlled and manipulated by her father. She recalls taking showers with her father when she was a child which she finds difficult to discuss. Her father made her watch pornographic movies with him and she was present when he talked with his friends about sexual matters. A friend told the Appellant that her father looked at her as a woman and wife. She also recounts in her Basis of Claim (BOC) that in 2009, while she was unconscious in the hospital recovering from surgery, her father saw her naked. At the hearing, the Appellant corrected the date of this latter incident as happening in 2011. [10] Between 2011 and 2015, the Appellant studied at the XXXX XXXX XXXX. She returned to Mexico in XXXX 2015 because her father insisted that she work at one of his companies. She wanted to escape her father but she was financially dependant on him. While working at her father's company, the employees treated her badly and her father did not intervene. She attempted suicide because of these events. [11] The Appellant arrived in Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2016 and made a refugee claim at the Port of Entry (POE). In her BOC, she states that she told the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) officer that she was running away from her father. [12] After arriving in Canada, the Appellant called her sister and told her that she was staying at a shelter. On XXXX XXXX, 2016, the Appellant received a message that her father and sister were in XXXX, that they were concerned for her well-being, and that they brought her medication. They wanted her to withdraw her refugee claim and return to Mexico with them. [13] On XXXX XXXX, 2016, the Appellant met her sister and father at their hotel. She felt pressure and vulnerable, and therefore, allowed them to accompany her in order to withdraw her refugee claim. After the withdrawal, they went to the immigration office to obtain her passport. A CBSA officer, named XXXX, met with the Appellant and her father. He explained that due to the holidays her passport was unavailable. He said he would notify the Appellant when it became available. The Appellant's father and sister returned to Mexico the next day. [14] A few days later, the Appellant told the same CBSA officer that she could not return to Mexico. He gave her until January 20, 2017 to reopen her refugee claim. The Appellant did not meet this deadline. Her father was sending her daily messages asking her to return to Mexico. [15] On January 20, 2017, the Appellant presented herself to the same CBSA officer for her removal. The officer called the Appellant's father to purchase her airline ticket. The Appellant also talked to her father. After the call, she reported to the officer that her father told her that she should kill herself. The officer gave the Appellant additional time to reopen her refugee claim. The Appellant made an application to the RPD to reopen her claim, which was granted on March 12, 2018. RPD Decision [16] The RPD found the Appellant's story evolved from when she first entered Canada to when she testified at the RPD hearing. The RPD contrasted statements made to the POE officer to later statements made to a psychiatrist, a psychologist and the RPD. The RPD found that the POE notes portray the Appellant "as someone who has had difficulties in coping with the wishes of her family, including her father, mixed with her desire to live her life as she pleases."4 The RPD further found that the Appellant embellished her story in her interviews with the psychiatrist and psychologist after being told by a shelter worker that she could not ensure the success of her her refugee case.5 [17] The RPD found that the Gender Guidelines were not applicable because the Appellant was not credible. The RPD rejected the Appellant's evidence that she is financially dependent on her father or vulnerable to his wishes because she is free to not work for her father's companies. The RPD also found the written statement of the Appellant's mother asserting that the Appellant and her siblings have good reasons to fear their father was unsupported by any documents from the Appellant's siblings. Rather, there was the evidence that the Appellant's sister readily travelled to Canada with their father to persuade the Appellant to return to Mexico and take her medication. [18] Finally, the RPD found the Appellant failed to establish an individualized risk of harm in support of her fear of general criminality and violence against women in Mexico. ANALYSIS New evidence [19] New evidence will only be admitted where: 1) the evidence arose after RPD rejection of the claim; 2) the evidence was not reasonably available; or 3) the appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence, at the time of the rejection.6 The RAD has no discretion to admit new evidence unless it falls under one of these three statutory categories.7 [20] If the new evidence meets the above statutory requirements, I must then assess whether the new evidence is credible, relevant, and new.8 [21] The Appellant asks that the RAD subpoena the notes of the CBSA officer who allowed her time to reopen her refugee claim on January 20, 2017.9 The same request was made to the RPD. At that time, the Appellant argued that the notes are material because they may provide reasons for deferring her removal and the officer's impressions of the Appellant's father and the Appellant vis-à-vis her father. The RPD refused the Appellant's request, finding the evidence was not relevant. [22] I do not find the officer's notes are relevant or material because I accept the Appellant's version of events when she appeared before the CBSA officer. The Appellant has failed to establish what additional evidence the notes can add that is not already in the record.10 In other words, I do not need the notes to corroborate the Appellant's version of events when I accept her testimony about what occurred when she was present with the CBSA officer. Therefore, I deny the Appellant's application to subpoena the CBSA officer's notes. I will not be consider whether the notes constitute new evidence because I do not have the notes before me. Request for an oral hearing is denied [23] Because no new evidence has been allowed on appeal, I have no jurisdiction to hold an oral hearing.11 The Appellant's request for a hearing is denied. Scope of RAD review [24] In my view, the determinative issue is whether the RPD erred in its assessment of the objective basis for the Appellant's fear of her father, including its assessment of the documentary evidence. [25] When reviewing the RPD decision, I am required independently to determine whether the RPD was correct in relation to each alleged error of law, fact, or mixed fact and law as submitted by the Appellants.12 I may defer to the RPD's credibility assessment of oral testimony, if I find that the RPD had a meaningful advantage in the circumstances.13 Having listened to the recording of the RPD hearing, I do not find deference is warranted in the present case. RPD did not err by failing to reference the affidavit of XXXX XXXX [26] In support of her application to reopen her refugee claim, the Appellant submitted to the RPD an affidavit sworn by XXXX XXXX, a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in Toronto.14 The Appellant was a resident at the latter shelter. Ms. XXXX attested that the Appellant's BOC was generally consistent with notes maintained at the shelter,15 and she spoke with the CBSA officer who "had concern for [the Appellant's] well-being because he was aware how her father had treated her when he came to Canada to demand that she return to Mexico."16 [27] This affidavit was missing from the RPD record forwarded to the RAD. However, having listened to the audio recording of the RPD hearing, the RPD stated that the Appellant's application to reopen her refugee claim would be marked as Exhibit 1, and this application included Ms. XXXX affidavit. The Appellant's final written submissions before the RPD also includes reference to Ms. XXXX affidavit. Therefore, I accept that the affidavit of Ms. XXXX, included in the Appellant's Record, was part of the RPD Record. I believe that the affidavit was missing from the record forwarded to the RAD as a result of an administrative oversight. [28] I note that Ms. XXXX was present at the RPD hearing as an observer. The Appellant chose not to call her as a witness in the proceedings. [29] The RPD made no reference to Ms. XXXX affidavit in its reasons. The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by ignoring Ms. XXXX affidavit when assessing the objective basis of her claim. She argues that the RPD wrongly suggested the evidence was irrelevant on the merits of her case after it was successfully used to reopen her claim. She submits that ignoring this affidavit was procedurally unfair and a denial of natural justice. [30] I fail to see how the RPD's failure to mention Ms. XXXX affidavit denied the Appellant procedural fairness or natural justice. It is well established that the RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence and need not expressly reference every piece of documentary evidence in the record.17 An error only arises when the evidence omitted from any discussion in the reasons appears squarely to contradict the RPD's finding of fact.18 [31] In the present case, I do not find the evidence in Ms. XXXX affidavit contradicts the RPD's finding regarding the lack of objective evidence establishing the Appellant's future risk of persecution or harm. I find the affidavit has low probative value because her evidence does not sufficiently establish central facts of the case, namely the father's intent to harm the Appellant. Ms. XXXX simply confirms that the evidence the Appellant told her after she arrived in Canada is consistent with what the Appellant told the RPD. She gives no evidence that independently or objectively corroborates the underlying allegations relating to the Appellant's father. [32] I also find Ms. XXXX conversation with the CBSA officer in December 2016 has low probative value because her evidence of what the CBSA officer observed of the Appellant's father lacks details about how the Appellant's father treated her. [33] Based on my independent review of the evidence, I accept the Appellant's evidence of what her father said when she was before the CBSA officer. I accept the CBSA officer believed there were grounds for deferring the Appellant's removal on January 20, 2017 to allow her the opportunity to reopen her claim. I give more weight to the Appellant's evidence than Ms. XXXX evidence because the Appellant was present when these events took place. [34] I accept that the Appellant's father callously and cruelly told her that she should kill herself when she was on the phone before the CBSA officer on January 20, 2017. I also accept that these statements caused the Appellant to be distressed and she believes that her father will kill her based on those statements. But, when assessing the Appellant's risk, I must focus on what the father actually said, in the context of the totality of the evidence, and whether this statement objectively supports the Appellant's belief. [35] I do not want to diminish the impact that the father's statements had on the Appellant. However, when viewing the father's statements objectively, he did not say that he would kill the Appellant. Therefore, I do not accept that the Appellant's or Ms. XXXX evidence on what happened before the CBSA officer provides objective grounds for the subjective fear that she will be killed by her father. Rather, this evidence demonstrates a man who has given up on his daughter and no longer wants to be involved in her life. I come to this conclusion because there is no evidence of the Appellant's father making any attempts to contact the Appellant after this phone call. RPD's refusal to subpoena CBSA's officer's notes [36] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by refusing to subpoena the CBSA's officer's notes because the officer's reasons for deferring her removal went directly to the objective risk. She argues that in the absence of the CBSA's officer's evidence, the best evidence is the uncontradicted affidavit evidence of Ms. XXXX that the officer had determined that she faced a risk from her father in Mexico. [37] I disagree. As I have already addressed above, I find the best evidence in these circumstances is the Appellant's testimony. The Appellant has failed to stipulate what additional facts the CBSA officer could provide that she has not already provided herself. Furthermore, the CBSA officer did not assess the Appellant's risk of persecution or harm, which is the function of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. Rather, the CBSA officer determined there were grounds to defer the Appellant's removal in order to give her an opportunity to reopen her refugee claim. [38] Finally, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred by finding "the impressions of the officer or the father were not material, especially in the absence of the father."19 She argues that the RPD's reasons demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias because the CBSA officer's views, coming from a third party, are impartial and it is perverse to require evidence from her father, the alleged agent of persecution. [39] I find the RPD's reasons in this respect are unclear. I am unable to make sense of why the "absence of the father" impacted the materiality of the evidence for the RPD. I agree that it would be absurd to require the agent of persecution to give evidence in order to find the evidence material. I accept the Appellant's evidence of what happened when she was in the presence of the CBSA officer. I explained above why the events as presented by the Appellant do not objectively support the Appellant's belief. The Appellant has failed to establish that the officer's notes would objectively add anything different from the Appellant's evidence in the assessment of her risk. [40] Furthermore, based on my review of the audio recording of the hearing and the record, I do not find the RPD's decision, either consciously or unconsciously, to not subpoena the notes was biased.20 The Appellant was represented by the same counsel before the RPD and he did not raise any concerns of bias, which is an implied waiver of any breach of natural justice.21 Statement from the Appellant's mother [41] The Appellant entered a written statement from her mother expressing her concern for the physical, psychological and emotional well-being of her daughter. Her mother states that her concern for the daughter's life is growing because as "each day that goes by," the Appellant's father is "becoming more and more angry, and has been thinking to avenge what he describes as 'my daughter's betrayal' on account of her having traveled to another country (Canada), and having spoken about him and his private life."22 [42] The RPD found this statement unreliable because the information she provides is untested, unsubstantiated, and "contains elements of personal anger, and biased conclusions."23 Contrary to the Appellant's submissions, the RPD did not dismiss the statement because of the relationship between the mother and the Appellant.24 Rather, the RPD found the mother's motivation to provide false information about her ex-husband was driven by the mother's acrimonious relationship with the Appellant's father. [43] At any rate, based on my independent review of the evidence, I do not find it necessary to comment on the mother's motivation because I find her evidence too vague to sufficiently establish a forward-looking risk of persecution or harm to the Appellant. The undisputed evidence is that the Appellant's parents have been separated since 2006 and they have an acrimonious relationship, including various disputes before the Mexican courts. Given their separation, she fails to explain the basis of her knowledge that her ex-husband, with each passing day, is becoming angrier and thinking to avenge the Appellant's perceived betrayal. [44] The mother states her belief that her ex-husband could easily have the Appellant's body disappear.25 She further states that he is publicly saying all of his money belongs to him and if anyone interferes or crosses his path, he has "the means to fix everything."26 I find these statements or the mother's beliefs are not substantially supported by any objective evidence. The statement that he has the "means to fix everything" can mean a range of things, and I have insufficient evidence to infer from this statement that this includes murder generally or the murder of the Appellant specifically. [45] The mother further states: "I know he is capable of having [the Appellant] raped. I know this because of the threats I've been constantly receiving from unknown sources over the landline telephone of the home where I'm currently living."27 I note that the mother states she has been receiving anonymous threats, but none were directed against her daughter. [46] I observe that both the Appellant's and mother's evidence is full of innuendo that the Appellant's father has killed people or arranged for assassinations. However, innuendo of this nature is insufficient to prove that the Appellant's father has killed anyone or intends to kill the Appellant. Vague statements of this nature do not meet the threshold of a balance of probabilities in establishing that the father has been involved in any murders. The fact that the Appellant's father is influential and has financial means does not sufficiently equate to an intent to harm the Appellant. [47] I weigh the mother's evidence with the fact that the Appellant's father has made no attempts to contact the Appellant in over two and a half years, and there are no threats that he will kill her or harm her. After reviewing the evidence, I find the Appellant has had a long-standing troubled relationship with both of her parents.28 While she testified that her father was constantly trying to control her, there is evidence that her father was largely absent during her childhood and he wanted her to live independently and fix things for herself, which the Appellant herself resisted.29 When the Appellant's family tried to get her psychiatric help, she testified that she resisted treatment believing her parents wanted to control her.30 When she was asked by the RPD if her father physically abused her, she described an incident that occurred when she was 7 years old. Despite any past abuse alleged by the Appellant, on a balance of probabilities, I find that the Appellant's father has decided to abandon his daughter. Therefore, I find there is insufficient evidence of a serious possibility of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, a risk of harm under s. 97 of the IRPA, on a forward-looking basis. Psychological evidence [48] The Appellant refers to psychiatric and psychological evidence before the RPD, and submits that these reports corroborate psychological and emotional risk in Mexico "where pressures would again put [the] claimant in a desperate state."31 Citing Kanthasamy,32 among other case law, the Appellant argues that it is a legal error to discount psychological evidence in assessing the risk of returning a claimant. [49] The jurisprudence relied on by the Appellant is misplaced in the present case. For example, Kanthasamy33 deals with humanitarian and compassionate relief and Danyi34 deals with a removal order. They do not assist the Appellant in a claim for refugee protection where the legal and evidentiary framework is different. [50] Other cases relied on by the Appellant relate to the Board's assessment of the reasonableness of an internal flight alternative.35 The paragraphs cited by the Appellant have no application to her case where IFA is not the determinative issue. [51] Another case relates to the application of s. 108(4) of the IRPA where a claimant who is found to previously to have been a Convention refugee no longer faces a risk because of a change of circumstances and may exceptionally stay in Canada because of compelling reasons.36 Section 108(4) does not apply in the present case because the Appellant was found not to have a well-founded fear of persecution, therefore, the condition precedent to consider compelling reasons has not been met in the present case. [52] In short, I find the Appellant's arguments and jurisprudence relate to the hardships arising from her removal to Mexico or internal relocation within Mexico. She has incorrectly blurred the distinction between refugee claims and humanitarian and compassionate applications.37 These two procedures are governed by different objectives and considerations. The cases cited by the Appellant do not assist her on the determinative issue of whether there is sufficient evidence in objectively establishing a future risk of persecution or harm by her father if she returns to Mexico. [53] Contrary to the Appellant's submissions, I find the reports from her mental health specialists do not provide independent or objective evidence of her future risk of harm by her father. Rather, they merely repeat evidence that she provided to the RPD.38 Recounting events to a psychologist or psychiatrist does not provide a sufficient basis of the Appellant's future risk of persecution or harm.39 [54] However, I agree with the Appellant that the RPD erred by failing to consider her psychiatric diagnosis when assessing the evolution of her statements to the POE officer and later on to various support workers and mental health practitioners. But, even accepting that her mental health issues explain for her evolving evidence, there is still insufficient evidence to establish that the Appellant will face a serious possibility of persecution or a risk of harm at the hands of her father if she returns to Mexico. Where the Appellant's father has made no attempt to contact her in the last 2 1/2 years, I find there is insufficient evidence to establish a serious possibility of persecution or a risk of harm under s. 97 of the IRPA. Application of the Vulnerable Persons Guidelines and the Gender Guidelines [55] I do not accept the Appellant's submission that the RPD erred by not applying Chairperson Guideline 8: Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing before the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. The RPD specifically raised with the Appellant's counsel at the beginning of the hearing whether the Appellant needed a designated representative. Counsel stated a designated representative was not necessary. The RPD member said he would stay alert to the possibility of a designated representative in the course of the hearing. Counsel made no request for any procedural accommodations. [56] I agree with the Appellant that the RPD erred by suggesting that the Gender Guidelines were not relevant because the Appellant was found not to be credible. The RPD should have considered the Gender Guidelines throughout the evaluation of the weight and credibility of the Appellant's evidence, and not after a conclusion on credibility was already made. [57] Nevertheless, the Gender Guidelines do not call for a certain result, but rather a certain approach. The Federal Court held: Although the guideline requires the RPD to be sensitive to the reality of refugee claimants who have experienced spousal violence and who, as a result, often present with post-traumatic symptoms that may affect their manner of testifying, Guideline 4 is not intended to "serve as a cure for all deficiencies in an applicant's claim or evidence" (Duran Mejia v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 354 at para 66), or to corroborate "any evidence of gender-based persecution so that the giving of the evidence becomes proof of its truth" Newton v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 182 FTR 294 at para 18, [2000] FCJ No. 738).40 [58] In the present case, I accept that the Appellant felt controlled and mistreated by her father. However, the Appellant's testimony of her future risk is largely speculative, and insufficient in establishing a risk of persecution or harm for reasons I have already set out above. CONCLUSION [59] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, I confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [60] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) Veena Verma Veena Verma November 18, 2019 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, p. 24, para 16. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., RPD Decision, p. 16, para. 78. 5 Ibid., pp. 16-17, para. 79. 6 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 7 M.C.I. v. Singh, 2016 FCA 96, paras. 34-35, 63, 74. 8 Ibid., paras 38-49, 74. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Written Statement, p. 70; Memorandum, p. 91. 10 Chen v. M.C.I., 2019 FC 334, para. 23. 11 Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA; Abdi v. M.C.I., 2019 FC 54, paras. 29-30. 12 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93, para. 103; Dahal v. M.C.I., 2017 FC 1102, paras. 30-31; Huang v. M.C.I., 2017 FC 1090; Liu v. M.C.I., 2017 FC 736, paras. 25-28; Broni v. M.C.I., 2019 FC 365, paras. 14-16. 13 Huruglica, ibid., paras. 70, 103. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 37-39. 15 Ibid., p. 37, para. 4. 16 Ibid., p. 39, para. 12. 17 Cech v. M.C.I., 2016 FC 1312, para. 12; Cheng v. M.P.S.E.P., 2019 FC 1318, paras. 10. 18 Cepeda-Gutierrez v. M.C.I., 1998 CanLII 8667, para. 17. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Decision, p. 14, para. 71. 20 Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, p. 394. 21 Bankole v. M.C.I., 2005 FC 1581, para. 21; Jackson v. M.C.I., 2002 FCT 89, paras. 37-40. 22 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, p. 94, para. 4. 23 Ibid., RPD Decision, pp. 13-14, paras. 68-69. 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 9, para. 33. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, p. 94, para. 6. 26 Ibid., para. 7. 27 Ibid., p. 96, para. 18. 28 Ibid., Exhibit 5, Psychiatrist's Notes, p. 105. 29 Ibid., Exhibit 1, POE Interview Notes, pp. 51, 54, 56-57; Exhibit 5, pp. 105-106. 30 See also, ibid., p. 105. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 84, para. 49. 32 Kanthasamy v. M.C.I., 2015 SCC 61; Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 85, paras. 51-52. 33 Ibid. 34 Danyi v. M.C.I., 2017 FC 112. 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, p. 16, para. 58, citing Cepeda-Gutierrez, supra note 18, para. 26, Javaid v. M.C.I., (1998), 157 FTR 233, paras. 7 and 9, Canto Rodriguez v. M.C.I., 2009 FC 262, para. 59. 36 J.M.H. v. M.C.I., [1996] F.C.J. No. 994, cited by the Appellant as Hinson. 37 Ranganathan v. M.C.I., [2001] 2 FC 164 (FCA), para. 17; Akinfolajimi v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 722, paras. 31-33. 38 Serhan v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 226, paras. 30-31. 39 Iyere v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 67, para. 47; Boyle v. M.C.I., 2016 FC 922, paras. 53-54; Verma v. M.C.I., 2016 FC 404, paras. 28-29; Yasun v. M.C.I., 2019 FC 342, para. 17. 40 Doualeh v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 531, para. 21. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB8-28244 RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français 14 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (April 04, 2019) Disponible en français