MB4-03987

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB4-03987 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered at Montréal, Quebec Appel instruit à Date of decision June 26, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Me Maria De Andrade Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Me Dieudonné Kandolo Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant désigné Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] The appellant, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is appealing against the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) to reject her claim for refugee protection by determining that she is not a "Convention refugee" or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). [2] The appellant is asking the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the RPD's determination and to refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination of the claim for refugee protection by a differently constituted panel. [3] The appellant submitted three new documents as "new evidence" under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. Their admissibility will be analyzed later when considering the statutory requirements. Since these new items of evidence serve to establish her identity and credibility, the appellant is asking for a hearing to be held before the RAD as provided for in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. [4] The Minister did not intervene on appeal. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [5] Pursuant to subsection 111(1) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" within the meaning of section 97 of the IRPA. [6] The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [7] The original facts in the claim for refugee protection are summarized as follows. The appellant claims to be a XXXX who fled the DRC on XXXX XXXX, 2013, because of the death threats she received after XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX in the North Kivu region. In her first BOC Form, the appellant states that, when she left the DRC, she took refuge in the Republic of the Congo until she left for Canada in XXXX 2014. She claimed refugee protection at the airport. [8] On April 15, 2014, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (the Minister) filed a notice of intervention. He submitted that the claimant's claim for refugee protection raised questions about the claimant's identity and credibility. He withdrew the notice of intervention after having questioned the claimant. [9] On June 12, 2014, after the first day of the hearing, the appellant sent the RPD some amendments to the BOC Form. She states that she took refuge in France, not the Republic of the Congo. She also mentions claiming asylum in France. Impugned decision [10] On August 5, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim for refugee protection, concluding that she had not established her identity or her main allegations in a credible manner. The RPD emphasized that, taken in isolation, each aspect might seem insufficient to find that there was a lack of credibility, but [translation] "the cumulative effect of each and every problem leads the panel to conclude that the claimant has not produced sufficient credible evidence to come to a conclusion in her favour."1 [11] Among the aspects that undermined her credibility, the RPD notes the following: - the failure to reveal her stay in France at the first opportunity; - anomalies in her passport; - inconsistencies in her testimony about the way in which she obtained her birth certificate; - insufficient explanations and a lack of reasonable effort to justify her missing voter's card; - the failure to indicate the use of an alias on the IMM-0008 form; - omissions in her previous statements, particularly in her visa application, about aspects of the make-up of her family; - abandonment of her claim for asylum in France; - a lack of reasonable effort to support her allegations about her job as a XXXX; and - the failure to declare that people continued to look for her after she left the country. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE [12] The appellant added three new documents to her memorandum.2 These are a replacement for a lost identity card, issued on XXXX XXXX, 2012, a birth certificate issued on XXXX XXXX, 2014, and a graduation certificate issued in Kinshasa on XXXX XXXX, 2003, by the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX [XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX]. [13] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA stipulates that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. In Iyamuremye,3 Justice Shore states that the provision deals with evidence that "might have affected the outcome of the RPD hearing if that evidence had been presented to it." [14] In R. v. J.A.A., 2011 SCC 11, referring to the criteria established in Palmer v. The Queen [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, the Supreme Court states that "...the evidence should generally not be admitted if, by due diligence, it could have been adduced at trial and that the fresh evidence must be such that if believed it could reasonably, when taken with the other evidence adduced at trial, be expected to have affected the result." [15] In Raza,4 the Federal Court of Appeal dealt with the various factors to consider in determining what constitutes "new evidence" under paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA, a legislative provision that uses the same language as subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. The application of that decision, made in the context of a PRRA, to the context of the RAD is not universally accepted by the Federal Court. [16] Personally, I share the idea that the RAD may follow the spirit of the criteria developed there without applying them strictly5 so that appellants may have "a full, fact-based appeal."6 [17] The appellant submits that the three new documents establish her identity and her credibility. She mentions in her memorandum that they [translation] "adequately establish her identity and contain the same information as her passport."7 In her view, they are enough to change the determination. In the affidavit attached to her memorandum of appeal, she states that [translation] "on the day of my hearing, June 20, 2014, I did not have all my identity documents in my possession because my family was not able to send them to me before that date for financial reasons."8 She states that she had not submitted them to the RPD [translation] "for reasons beyond her control. Her documents were only recently sent by her family."9 [18] After carefully examining the three documents she submitted, I am of the opinion that they do not constitute new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA for the reasons that follow. Document No. 1, birth certificate [19] This birth certificate, issued in Kinshasa on XXXX XXXX, 2014, does not in my opinion constitute new evidence under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. In fact, an examination of the RPD record reveals that a birth certificate showing that XXXX XXXX XXXX was born in XXXX on XXXX XXXX, 1975, was in evidence before the RPD.10 Although these are two different documents, the information they contain is essentially the same. Document No. 2, statement replacing a lost identity card [20] The appellant submitted a statement issued in Kinshasa on XXXX XXXX, 2012, in which she declares that she was the victim of the theft of two passports and a sum of money. It seems to me that this document was submitted to corroborate her testimony at the hearing that her passport, which she had in her purse, had been stolen. After considering the arguments presented, I am of the opinion that the appellant has not established in a credible fashion that the document, issued in 2012, was not reasonably available at the time. The Federal Court has stated that "[t]he fact that the new evidence corroborates events, contradicts findings of the Board, and clarifies the evidence before the Board does not make it new evidence".11 Document No. 3, graduation certificate [21] The appellant submitted a graduation certificate issued in Kinshasa on XXXX XXXX, 2003, showing that she had obtained a degree in communications. The document has no photograph that allows it to be linked to the appellant, and her first name does not appear on the document. I am of the opinion that the [translation] "financial" arguments made by the appellant in her memorandum are not sufficient to justify her not submitting it to the RPD. In addition, just as for the two other documents she submitted, I am of the opinion that the appellant has not established that this document, issued in 2003, was not reasonably available at the time. Whether a hearing should be held [22] Generally, an appeal to the RAD is a paper-based process. A hearing can be held only if there is new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. In addition, even supposing the "new evidence" is accepted, the RAD will not hold a hearing except in the exceptional circumstances set out in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. The new evidence must raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, it must be central to the decision, and it must justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [23] I will not hold a hearing in this appeal. First, in my opinion, the documents submitted do not constitute new evidence within the meaning of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. I am also of the opinion that, even if they had been submitted as evidence to the RPD, the documents submitted would probably not have changed the decision. In this case, the documents were submitted in order to establish her identity and her credibility as to the loss of her passport. But the appellant's credibility was undermined by a number of factors that have nothing to do with her identity and, furthermore, are not linked to the loss of her passport. [24] Later in the analysis of the merits of the appeal, I will deal with the probative value to be attributed to the documents from the DRC in light of the information in the documentary evidence about the ease with which false documents can be obtained. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND REMEDY SOUGHT Appellant's allegations [25] The appellant alleges that the RPD erred in its assessment of her credibility and did not correctly evaluate the evidence as to her identity. Specifically, she points out that the member failed in his duty of impartiality by calling her a liar throughout the decision. She also points out that documents from a foreign government are presumed to be valid and that the member erred in not attributing probative value to an authentic passport issued by the DRC. ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE RAD [26] According to the appellant, the RAD is not applying the criteria of judicial review when conducting an appeal. Without suggesting the standard to be applied when reviewing an RPD case, she points out the Federal Court's statement in Eng that the RAD must "perform its own assessment of all of the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error."12 Her submission is that, in Huruglica, the Federal Court states that "the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment.... Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision."13 [27] Since an appeal to the RAD is a statutory remedy, its mandate and its powers are defined in its home statute, the IRPA. [28] The statutory provisions indicate precisely the allowable grounds for appeal14 as well as the [translation] "remedial powers" available to it. Parliament allows the RAD to confirm the determination, to set it aside and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, or to refer the matter to the RPD for re-determination, giving the directions to the RPD that it considers appropriate.15 [29] Called upon to decide the appropriate type of review by the RAD of decisions rendered by the RPD, the Federal Court recognizes its [translation] "expertise" in refugee-related matters. The Court is of the opinion that broad powers are conferred by the IRPA, "thus allowing the RAD to dispose of the merits of appeals",16 and states that "[t]he idea that the RAD may substitute an original decision by a determination that should have been rendered without first assessing the evidence is completely inconsistent with the purpose of the IRPA".17 Despite these observations that a number of judges have shared, the Federal Court is faced with two important lines of case law. [30] According to the proponents of the first line of case law laid out by Justice Shore: [27] ... [T]he RAD must be able to correct any error of law in a decision of the RPD or any palpable or overriding error in the findings of fact or the application of the law to these facts....18 [31] Justices Roy and Leblanc also share the idea that an error must be "palpable and overriding to succeed on appeal."19 Justice Roy emphasizes that appeals to the RAD are intended to be generous, but that "this does not mean that it will be an opportunity for a new trial or a reconsideration of the matter in its entirety."20 Justice Roy is also of the opinion that "[i]t will be on the basis of the record of proceedings before the RPD that the appeal will be heard based on the questions identified and raised, subject to the documentary evidence (subsection 110(3)) or evidence that is consistent with subsection 110(4)."21 [32] In Huruglica,22 Justice Phelan proposes a different approach. According to Justice Phelan, the "RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal." [33] It must "review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a 'Convention refugee' or a 'person in need of protection.' Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision."23 [34] In discussing the deference that the RAD owes to RPD findings, Justice Phelan states that it may be justified to show "deference to a RPD's decision in a circumstance where a witness' credibility is critical or determinative". Nevertheless, when it comes to interpreting the documentary evidence of country conditions, Justice Phelan states that "there is no reason for the RAD to defer to the RPD on this type of assessment." [35] Having reviewed the Federal Court decisions rendered to date, it appears to me that the RAD, as a tribunal specialized in refugee protection matters, must examine all the evidence in order to determine whether the decision is well founded in light of the evidence before the RPD and any additional evidence accepted as new evidence by the RAD under subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. [36] In examining the evidence, the RAD may show a measure of deference when the credibility of a refugee protection claimant is at the heart of the decision, or when the RPD is in a more advantageous position than the RAD. Nevertheless, when findings of fact or of mixed law and fact are erroneous or not supported by the evidence, the RAD must intervene by one of the means set out in subsections 111(1) and 111(2) of the IRPA. [37] As for errors of law, Justice Shore states that "the RAD must be able to correct any error of law".24 ANALYSIS Failure to observe the principle of natural justice Bias on the part of the member [38] I will first deal with the appellant's argument that the member failed in his duty of impartiality. She alleges that [translation] "the judge constantly called the appellant a liar, a person given to hiding the truth, so much so that it is legitimate to question the panel's neutrality and impartiality."25 She adds that the member's judgment was [translation] "clearly biased because he was of the opinion that the appellant was a liar, as he repeated constantly throughout his decision."26 [39] As the Federal Court has emphasized, "[a]n allegation of bias is a serious matter that must be supported by credible evidence and sound reasoning."27 The bar is set high in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, pages 394 and 395: [T]he apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information.... [T]hat test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and having thought the matter through-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly." [40] After having carefully examined the evidence and listened to the CD of the hearing, I have insufficient evidence to conclude that the member failed in his duty of impartiality. Because of the omissions and inconsistencies in the evidence, the member had serious doubts about the appellant's credibility. He indicated his reservations and invited her to explain herself. In my opinion, that is his role. Nowhere in his decision do I find the term [translation] "liar." It is not a sign of bias on his part to express his doubts by stating that the refugee protection claimant's credibility is compromised or undermined by her hesitant testimony or because the information in the documents completed specifically as part of her visa application differs from the testimony about her work to the extent that he is entertaining serious doubts about the appellant's allegations. I am of the opinion that it has not been established that an informed person would think that it is more likely than not that the decision-maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, was acting unfairly. Credibility [41] In a well-structured and extensively reasoned decision, the RPD sets out the various factors on which it based its conclusions that the claimant had not met her burden of credibly establishing her identity and her main allegations.28 [42] In summary, the RPD does not believe the facts that the appellant alleges because of the many inconsistencies in her statements, the omission of important facts in the documents she completed and the attempts to mislead the Immigration and Refugee Board on at least two occasions when she was under oath. [43] The assessment of credibility is a complex question of fact regarding which the RPD is generally in a better position than the RAD because it has the advantage of seeing and hearing the refugee protection claimants and the witnesses.29 The RAD, which generally proceeds on the basis of the record, has that advantage only in limited cases. In this case, it does not enjoy that opportunity. [44] After an exhaustive examination of all the evidence on the record, I am of the opinion that the RPD rendered the appropriate decision. While some credibility findings may seem weaker and less important, others are crucial and are sufficient in themselves to reject the claim for refugee protection because of a lack of credibility. Stay in France [45] The RPD saw the appellant's failure to declare at the first opportunity that she stayed in France and sought asylum there as a factor that undermined her credibility. [46] The appellant submits that [translation] "the RPD put great stock in the fact that the appellant lied by stating that she had fled to and hidden in Brazzaville in the Republic of the Congo and concealed her stay in France before correcting her story."30 [47] Like the RPD, I am of the opinion that the appellant's credibility is seriously undermined by the fact that she first stated that she had taken refuge in the Congo, not in France, and that she persisted with this lie when she was questioned about the situation in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). [48] While some may see this aspect as ancillary to her claim for refugee protection, given the circumstances of this case, I am of the opinion that the RPD was correct to conclude that the appellant's credibility is undermined. Indeed, on two occasions when she was under oath, before an Immigration Division member31 and the RPD member, the appellant confirmed information that she knew to be false. Without going over the RPD's detailed analysis again, I am also of the opinion that, by acting that way, the appellant did serious harm to her credibility. Her action was reprehensible; her behaviour could be likened to an [translation] "act of perjury." Her explanation that she had received poor advice is not acceptable, considering that this was not the first time she had claimed refugee protection. I would add that the appellant is an educated young woman who was advised about the consequences of providing [translation] "false testimony." [49] The RPD's conclusions as to her failure to mention her stay in France in her first BOC Form are based on the evidence and take case law principles into account. Indeed, the Federal Court has stated that: However, the Board is entitled to consider the contents of the PIF in reaching its determination and to draw negative inferences about credibility if matters considered important are omitted from the document or are only added after the hearing has commenced.32 Identity [50] The RPD member has serious doubts as to the appellant's identity because of anomalies on the passport she submitted, her inconsistent testimony about the way in which she had obtained the birth certificate, the lack of reasonable effort to justify her missing voter's card, and her use of an alias on her Facebook account and her failure to mention it. [51] The appellant submits that an analysis of the passport she presented shows that it was genuine. She also points out that the Minister's representative withdrew from the hearing because [translation] "in his opinion, and after his research, the appellant had legitimately met her burden of establishing her identity."33 According to the appellant, the member [translation] "decided in a capricious manner that the passport was false.... His judgment was clearly biased because he was of the opinion that the appellant was lying, as he constantly repeated throughout his decision."34 [52] The appellant relied on various Federal Court decisions as well as the Federal Court of Appeal decision in Ramalingan v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] F.C.J. No. 10, which states that "identity documents issued by a foreign government are presumed to be valid unless evidence is produced to prove otherwise". [53] Personally, I am of the opinion that a member does not lose his or her discretion to decide on the evidence and is not bound by the opinion that a representative of the Minister may have who withdraws from a case in the course of a hearing. In this case, I am of the opinion that the member is correct to state that, even if the analysis shows a passport to be genuine, [translation] "it does not exclude the possibility that it may have been obtained fraudulently." That comment also appears on the report of the person who analyzed the passport.35 [54] Establishing the identity of a refugee protection claimant coming from the DRC is no easy task. The member must exercise caution because the documentation reveals the following: An October 2005 report from the United Kingdom ... indicates that birth, marriage and death certificates "can be easily obtained by bribing the relevant officials, or by forgery".... The authors of Documents d'identité, citing people interviewed during their mission, agree that [translation] "it is difficult to be trustful of an identity document from the DRC, because any type of document can be obtained for a price"....36 [55] In that context, it seems to me that the credibility of a refugee protection claimant must be considered in evaluating the weight to be given to the documents submitted. In this case, the RPD noted that the passport indicated that its holder was male. It found it curious that the passport would contain a diminutive of her first name rather than her full first name. Although these factors may appear inconsequential, it is important to consider them with the other factors noted by the RPD, including an adjustment to her testimony when she was asked about [translation] "information submitted in order to obtain her second passport"37 and her testimony about "the moment she realized the error in indicating her sex." [56] The appellant submits that [translation] "the RPD had no grounds on which to challenge the authenticity of that passport. This is especially so given that, in 2011, the appellant had submitted that same passport to the Canadian embassy in order to get a tourist visa without even noticing that her sex was wrong."38 She maintains that the RPD had no reason to conclude that it was [translation] "false."39 [57] First, the evidence does not allow me to conclude that, if the claimant presented a passport issued in 2011 to the Canadian embassy in order to obtain a visa, that passport indicated [translation] "male" as the sex. The passport on the record was issued in XXXX 2012. [58] I do not share the appellant's reading of the decision. Contrary to her allegations, the RPD did not conclude that it was false. Actually, the RPD concluded that it [translation] "gives limited probative value to the passport as a document establishing the claimant's identity." In the particular circumstances of this claim, I would have come to the same conclusion, especially since the appellant also contradicted herself about the manner in which she obtained the birth certificate submitted into evidence before the RPD and since she acknowledges using the name XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX on her Facebook account. The appellant also omitted this last point when she completed the documents accompanying her claim for refugee protection. In this case, there is room for serious doubt not only about her identity, which has not been established, but also about her credibility. [59] Considering the numerous credibility problems, I am of the opinion that the principle established in Sheikh may apply to the appellant's allegations in this case. The Federal Court of Appeal has stated that: ... even without disbelieving every word an applicant has uttered, a...panel may reasonably find him so lacking in credibility that it concludes there is no credible evidence relevant to his claim.... In other words, a general finding of a lack of credibility on the part of the applicant may conceivably extend to all relevant evidence emanating from his testimony. [60] For those reasons, after carefully examining all the evidence, I am of the opinion that the RPD made the appropriate decision in this case. The decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious. It is based on the evidence on the record since the incongruities in that evidence go to key elements of the claim for refugee protection. [61] As the explanations offered are inadequate, I am of the opinion that the appellant's credibility is compromised to the extent that there is cause to conclude that there is no credible evidence that would allow for an analysis under section 97 of the IRPA. Profile as a XXXX [62] It is important to point out that the existence of documentary evidence in itself cannot be considered to be the basis of a claim. That evidence must also be related to the personal situation of the refugee protection claimant.40 I note that the completed documents differ as to the position she held in the DRC. Some state that she is a XXXX; in others, she claims to have worked as a XXXX and that she ran into problems because of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. [63] On February 25, 2014,41 the RPD sent the appellant a letter asking her to submit documents in support of her claim, specifically [translation] "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX" as well as "XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX" and the documents in her possession that would establish that she was a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. But when questioned about the XXXX XXXX that supposedly caused her problems, her testimony was vague. I would also add that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX has been submitted to date. Of course, corroborative evidence is necessary only in cases where there is serious doubt, but that is the situation here. With the appellant's credibility seriously undermined, a negative inference can be drawn from the fact that no document corroborates her allegations42 about the XXXX XXXX she keeps mentioning, the one that allegedly caused problems for her, as well as the copies of the letters of complaints from her supervisor. [64] For these reasons, it seems to me that the appellant has not discharged her burden of establishing a profile as a XXXX that may have caused her problems or that, on a balance of probabilities, could cause them for her if she were to return. [65] Consequently, I am of the opinion that, because of the serious problems with her credibility, the appellant has not discharged her burden in terms of section 97 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [66] For these reasons, I confirm the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX is not a "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA or a "person in need of protection" under section 97 of the IRPA. [67] The appeal is dismissed. Maria De Andrade Me Maria De Andrade June 26, 2015 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record, page 4, para. 8 of the RPD decision. 2 Appellant's memorandum, pages 17 to 21. 3 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 4 Raza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2007 FCA 385. 5 Vahid Ghannadi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 879, Iyamuremye v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494, Denbel v. M.C.I., 2015 FC 625. 6 Singh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 102, Khachatourian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 182. 7 Appellant's memorandum, page 24. 8 Idem, page 17. 9 Idem, page 24, para. 9. 10 RPD record, page 66, document No. 5 in a bundle, birth certificate issued XXXX XXXX, 2013. 11 Indradei Parrasram Dhrumu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2011 FC 172. 12 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2014 FC 711. 13 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 14 Subsection 110(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA): "Subject to subsections (1.1) and (2), a person or the Minister may appeal, in accordance with the rules of the Board, on a question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact, to the Refugee Appeal Division against a decision of the Refugee Protection Division to allow or reject the person's claim for refugee protection." 15 Subsection 111(1) of the IRPA. 16 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711, Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 17 Idem. 18 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711, Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702. 19 Spasoja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Roy, 2014 FC 913, Lamia Aloulou v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Justice Leblanc, 2014 FC 1236. 20 Spasoja v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 913. 21 Idem. 22 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 23 Idem. 24 Supra, footnote 18. 25 Appellant's memorandum, page 24. 26 Idem, page 25. 27 Bulut v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 1627. 28 Appellant's memorandum, page 4, RPD decision, para. 8. 29 Allalou v. M.C.I., (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1084, para. 17, Sajad v. M.C.I., (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1107, para. 20. 30 Appellant's memorandum, page 27. 31 RPD record, page 61. 32 Kutuk v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-2484-94, Ovais v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), No. IMM-4094-99. 33 Appellant's memorandum, page 24, para. 11. 34 Idem, para. 13. 35 RPD record, page 156. 36 Idem, pages 64 to 85, national documentation package on the DRC, March 14, 2014, Tab 3.10, Code: COD101014.FE: Incidence and accessibility of fraudulent identity, administrative and legal documents (February 3, 2006). Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 37 Idem, page 6, para. 14 of the decision. 38 Appellant's memorandum, page 25. 39 Idem, page 26. 40 Mirna Guadalupe Gomez Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2010 FC 136. 41 RPD record, page 121. 42 Pinedo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2009 FC 1118, Ahortor v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1993), 65 F.T.R. 137 (FCT). --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MB4-03987 18 RAD.25.02 (2014.09.11) Disponible en français