TB3-07769

RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-07769 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX(a.k.a. XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision January 8, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Atam Uppal Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Lani Gozlan Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Barrister and Solicitor Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, a.k.a.XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), claims to be a citizen of Somalia and he appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged in his first Basis of Claim (BoC) that he arrived in Canada in XXXX2013 and in April 2013 he filed a claim for refugee protection under the name "XXXX XXXX XXXX," and that his date of birth was XXXX XXXX, 1967. The Appellant did not provide any identity documents. [4] In his BoC, the Appellant claimed that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in Somalia because he is a member of the Tunni minority clan; and he is afraid of the Al-Shabaab, an extremist group, because at his photography shop in Mogadishu he took pictures for women wanting their pictures without their head covered. He alleges that he offended the values of Al-Shabaab and thus there is an element of political opinion or a particular social group of people that are championing human rights and dignity, and are being targeted because of that. [5] The Minister intervened at the RPD in this case and provided evidence that the Appellant's fingerprints were exactly matched by the US authorities with someone by the name "XXXX XXXX", a Somali with a date of birth of XXXX XXXX, 1970. The information also stated that this individual had claimed refugee protection at the Los Angeles asylum office on the XXXX of XXXX 1999. [6] After this information was provided to the Appellant, he provided an affidavit dated XXXX of XXXX 2013 that his name is XXXX XXXX with date of birth of XXXX XXXX XXXX 1970. He also stated in his affidavit that he did not tell the truth in his original BoC because he was afraid if Canadian authorities became aware of his "American connection it would harm his claim". [7] The RPD rejected the claim based on identity and also stated in its written reasons dated September 26, 2013, "I am of the view that there is insufficient trustworthy evidence to establish whether he is XXXX or somebody else, and I do not even know whether the identity he used in the United States was his true identity". [8] The RPD also expressed several other concerns about the credibility of the Appellant as well that are analysed later. [9] The Appellant submitted several documents with this appeal to the RAD for consideration as new evidence. [10] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its assessment of the Appellant's identity and his credibility. The Appellant also submits that the panel erred by not referring to his identity as a Tunni from the Somali community centre, that he belongs to the Tunni minority in his reasons, and that the witness' testimony was not given appropriate weight. [11] The Appellant wants the RAD to set aside the RPD decision and allow the appeal, and, in the alternate, refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. [12] The Appellant did not request a hearing before the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(6). ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal: [13] Subsection 110(4) of IRPA provides that the Appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [14] The Appellant provided the following with his appeal: (a) the Appellant's affidavit dated November 14, 2013 and affirmed on the same day in front of his counsel, (b) a photocopy of the Appellant's passport issued on XXXX XXXX, 2010, (c) a copy of birth certificate in the name of "XXXX XXXX XXXX" dated XXXX 2012. [15] In order for the RAD to consider these as new evidence, the items must meet the criteria set out in subsection 110(4) of the Act which basically provides that the evidence proffered must not have been reasonably available at the time of the hearing. S.110 (4) On appeal, the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [16] Additionally, if the evidence meets the statutory criteria, it must also be assessed against the factors set out in Raza,1 which is the leading case on "new" evidence. Even though the Raza case was specific to the Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) process, I consider it relevant to the RAD because the wording in s. 113(a) of the Act, which is regarding PRRA provisions, and ss. 110(4) of the IRPA regarding the RAD are similarly worded. [17] In Raza, the court posed the following questions that needed to be asked in deciding whether to accept new evidence for a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment case. These, as summarized by the Court, are: 1. Credibility: Is the evidence credible, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 2. Relevance: Is the evidence relevant to the PRRA application, in the sense that it is capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 3. Newness: Is the evidence new in the sense that it is capable of: (a) proving the current state of affairs in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the hearing in the RPD; or, (b) proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing; or, (c) contradicting a finding of fact by the RPD (including a credibility finding)? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 4. Materiality: Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been made available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 5. Express statutory conditions: (a) If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the RPD hearing, then has the applicant established either that the evidence was not reasonably available to him or her for presentation at the RPD hearing, or that he or she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the RPD hearing? If not, the evidence need not be considered. (b) If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered (unless it is rejected because it is not credible, not relevant, not new or not material). [18] Document 'a': In his affidavit, paragraph 7 (dated Nov. 14, 2013 - pages 12 to 17 of Appellant's Record), the Appellant provides an explanation as to how the passport and birth certificate are obtained for presentation to the RAD, that "they were located in a bag he forgot at the home of his wife's relatives, and that these documents arrived only after the hearing". He also states that he has been trying to get the passport since he arrived in Canada. I will accept this document's paragraph 7 as new evidence as it meets the express statutory conditions in ss 110(4) and the Raza test. [19] Document 'b' is a photocopy of the passport. This document did not arise after the rejection of his claim; it was reasonably available as it was issued in 2010 and was reasonably expected at the hearing. The Appellant knew or ought to have known the importance of establishing his identity. I heard the recording of the RPD hearing of the Appellant's claim, in that the Appellant's counsel submitted before the RPD that the identity is always an issue but in this case it is "critically so."2 Moreover, the need to establish identity is emphasized in s. 106 of the IRPA, the RPD Rule 11 and in the instructions in the BoC. [20] The ss.106 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act states that: The Refugee Protection Division must take into account, with respect to the credibility of a claimant, whether the claimant possesses acceptable documentation establishing identity, and if not, whether they have provided a reasonable explanation for the lack of documentation or have taken reasonable steps to obtain the documentation.3 Similarly, Rule 11 of the Refugee Protection Division Rules requires that: The claimant must provide acceptable documents establishing their identity and other elements of the claim. A claimant who does not provide acceptable documents must explain why they did not provide the documents and what steps they took to obtain them.4 [21] In addition, the Basis of Claim (BoC) form clearly advises that the refugee claimant is "responsible for obtaining and providing to the IRB any documents that may support your claim."5 [22] In Kabongo,6 a recent case, the Federal Court stated the following on the issue of identity documents: [18] There is no doubt that the onus is on a claimant to establish his or her identity with documentary evidence, and, if such documents are not provided, to explain what steps were taken to obtain them: IRPA, s 106; Refugee Protection Division Rules, SOR/2002-228, s 7. See: Qiu v Canada (MCI), 2009 FC 259 (CanLII), 2009 FC 259, at para 6; Zheng v Canada (MCI), 2008 FC 877 (CanLII), 2008 FC 877, at para 14 [Zheng]. Consequently, a lack of acceptable documents without a reasonable explanation for their absence, or the failure to take reasonable steps to obtain them, is a significant factor in assessing the credibility of a claimant. [23] The Appellant was represented by an experienced counsel before the RPD. It would be reasonable for him to know that identity was an issue. The importance of establishing identity is referred in the Act, the RPD Rules and the BoC form given to the Appellant. [24] In the RAD's view, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected to know that their identity would be an issue in their hearing and had an obligation to present documents that could establish his identity. [25] The Appellant in his Affidavit dated Nov. 14, 2013, at paragraph 7, states that he had passport issues in Mogadishu in 2010 and his birth certificate and "I had been making efforts to obtain these documents since my arrival in Canada." I note that the Appellant was questioned thoroughly at the RPD hearing about his identity and supporting documents, however he never mentioned that he had a Somali passport and that he was trying to get it. In fact, counsel for the Appellant submitted that Somalia is a failed state and thus there is an inability to get official identity documents. I, therefore, assign little weight to the Appellant's statements about the passport. [26] The Appellant submits the copy of a passport as a "Government issued credible identity document". This statement contradicts counsel's submission before the RPD that official identity documents are difficult to get because Somalia is a failed state. Moreover, counsel's submission before the RPD is supported by documentary evidence7 on the issue of passport and states the following: A media article reports that the Somali government has not issued passports since the internal conflict began in 1991 (AlJazeera 17 Jan. 2007). A statement from the Government of Canada explaining why Canada will not accept the Somali passport as a valid travel document states that, since 1991, Somalia has been functioning with virtually no government, and that satellite "Somali embassies" with no oversight from a central government have sold blank passport stock to finance their operations (16 Dec. 1999). Numerous sources report serious concerns about the integrity and reliability of Somali passports (ibid.; AlJazeera 17 Jan. 2007; The Ethiopian Reporter 10 Feb. 2007; Reuters 16 Feb. 2007). [27] The Appellant also submitted that the birth certificate is also a Government-issued credible identity document. I note that the name of the person in a copy of the original in the Somali language is, "XXXX XXXX XXXX"8 and not "XXXX XXXX XXXX",9 as it states in the translated copy. Even if the birth certificate is genuine, it does not connect directly to the Appellant. It does not contain photographs, fingerprints, or even descriptions of the Appellants. The field of his work has been overwritten, and there is a clear black line across the page as if two pages have been taped. However, since I have not seen the original, I am not going to make a finding whether the document is genuine. Even if the document is genuine, this does not mean that it belongs to the Appellant or assists in establishing his identity. [28] Documentary evidence also shows10 that, "unofficial passports can be obtained within minutes in "every back alley in big cities such as Mogadishu" for $100 US dollars (JSL 3 Apr. 2008). He describes them as "generally larger in size than the standard ISO passport size" with handwritten information and a photograph "glued in" (ibid.). I note that the copy of the passport the Appellant provided and the information in there is handwritten. [29] The RAD finds that the new identity documents, i.e., a copy of the passport and birth certificate submitted by the Appellant did not arise after the rejection of his refugee claim, were reasonably available for presentation to the RPD, and the Appellant reasonably could have been expected, in the circumstances, to have presented this at the time his claim was rejected pursuant to subsection 110(4) of IRPA and therefore are not admitted as new evidence in this appeal. [30] For these reasons, documents submitted with this appeal by the Appellant as proposed new evidence are not admissible before the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of IRPA. [31] Thus, this appeal will be considered on the Record and submissions by the Appellant. STANDARD OF REVIEW [32] The issues, according to the Appellant, are 1. "Does the new evidence establish the Applicant's identity?; and 2. Did the panel err in its credibility findings and in consideration of the evidence before it? [33] The first issue about new evidence now is moot as the RAD is not accepting the documents submitted with the appeal as new evidence. [34] The second issue, in my opinion, can be rephrased to - was the RPD's assessment of the evidence reasonable? This is an issue of fact. [35] The Appellant did not make submissions on the standard of review. [36] The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies but it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD in considering appeals before it. [37] The Supreme Court of Canada considered the foundations of judicial review and the applicable standards of review in Dunsmuir,11 and concluded that there are two standards of review, correctness and reasonableness. Dunsmuir has limited applicability to the RAD because the RAD is an administrative appellate body and not a reviewing court. [38] The Supreme Court gave broad deference to a tribunal's interpretation of its own statute in Khosa.12 This case was not specifically in the context of an appeals tribunal reviewing the decision of a tribunal of first instance. [39] The Alberta Court of Appeal in Newton considered the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to a decision of a lower tribunal. The court considered Dunsmuir and other appropriate jurisprudence, and, therefore, I believe this case is highly relevant for the RAD in Newton.13 The court suggested the following factors be considered: (a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; (b) the nature of the question in issue; (c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; (d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; (e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; (f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and (g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context. [40] The respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation: The RPD's principle role is to hold hearings to determine whether refugee claimants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.14 An appeal to RAD may be made by the subject of the RPD proceedings or by the Minister against certain decisions of the RPD. An appeal may be made on a question of law, fact, or mixed law and fact, and the RAD is able to determine questions of law and fact, including questions of jurisdiction. After considering the appeal, the RAD must confirm the RPD's decision, set aside that determination and substitute another, or refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. [41] In the RAD's view, these respective roles suggest a high degree of deference is owed to the findings of fact, or findings of mixed fact and law by the RPD. It is the RPD, the tribunal of the first place which saw the Appellant before it, questioned the Appellant and took into consideration his demeanour in assessing direct testimony of the claimant (the Appellant) and all other evidence. [42] The interpretation of the statute as a whole: The purpose and provisions of IRPA, when considered together, suggest a legislative intent to provide a fair and efficient adjudicative process which leads to finality. [43] Canada's refugee system is about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted.15 Section 3(2)(e) of IRPA identifies one of the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees: (e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings. [44] In the context of an appeal to RAD, this objective can be understood as ensuring that appellants receive a fair and efficient adjudication of their appeals and are given refugee protection when appropriate. Section 111(1)(b) of IRPA empowers the RAD to set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that, in the RAD's opinion, should have been made. However, subsection 111(2) of IRPA places restrictions on the RAD's referral of matters back to the RPD. [45] Section 171(c) provides that a decision of a three-member RAD panel has precedential value for the RPD and for single-member RAD panels. Section 162(2) of IRPA requires that each Division of the IRB "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [46] The provisions set out above, when considered together with the "fair and efficient" reference in the Act's objectives, suggest that the RAD is empowered to bring finality to the refugee protection process and, to do so, may be entitled to show less deference to the RPD. [47] The expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance compared to that of the appellate tribunal: Both the RPD and the RAD are specialized tribunals dealing with refugee protection. Neither is bound by legal or technical rules of evidence,16 and each can take notice of information and opinion within its specialized knowledge.17 The RPD holds a significant advantage in fact finding and credibility assessment. It must hold a hearing,18 while the RAD must, except in certain circumstances, not hold a hearing and must instead proceed on the basis of the record of the RPD proceeding.19 The effect of these provisions is that the RPD has the chance to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD will infrequently have this opportunity. Despite other similarities between the RPD and the RAD, this difference suggests that the RAD show deference to the RPD on findings of fact and particularly in respect to credibility,20 other than in situations where the RAD holds an oral hearing and therefore has the opportunity to consider evidence first hand. [48] The need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals, and preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance: In Newton, the Court noted that it is "singularly inefficient" for a first-level hearing to be repeated at the appellate tribunal.21 The Court observed that failure to show deference to the first-level decision maker undermines the integrity of those hearings, which would in effect be reduced to a type of preliminary inquiry. In this respect, it is important to consider that one purpose of IRPA is to "establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system...." [49] Interpretation of the legislation as a whole may appear to suggest that the intended finality lead the RAD to consider the refugee claim on its merits, showing little or no deference to the findings of the RPD, which appears to be consistent with the submissions by the Appellant. [50] There are other factors which favour a more deferential approach on questions of fact. The RAD is restricted in ways that the RPD is not, specifically in admitting evidence and holding oral hearings. The question in issue is one of fact, and the Courts have consistently held that triers of fact are better situated to make findings of fact at first instance.22 The RPD has the opportunity to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD may not. Failure to defer to the RPD on matters of fact and credibility would be singularly inefficient, would undermine the integrity of the RPD process, and would do nothing to limit the length and cost of appeals to RAD, as the RPD proceedings would be reduced to little more than preliminary inquiries. [51] For these reasons, the RAD concludes that, in considering this appeal, it must show deference to the factual and credibility findings of the RPD. The notion of deference to administrative tribunal decision-making requires a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of the decision made. Even if the reasons given do not seem wholly adequate to support the decision, the RAD must first seek to supplement them before it substitutes its own decision.23 [52] The issue in this appeal is a matter of fact and thus the appropriate standard of review in this appeal is one of reasonableness. [53] According to the Supreme Court of Canada, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and intelligibility within the RPD decision-making process, but also with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.24 Analysis [54] The RPD found that it "cannot really establish identity on a trustworthy basis" and that "I am not of the view that there is sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence before me to establish that the claimant would have a reasonable chance of being persecuted in Somalia, or that more likely than not he would be subject to death, torture or cruel and unusual treatment or punishment". [55] The RPD stated that, "The first issue that must be decided is identity," and noted that he made the refugee claim in the name of XXXX XXXX XXXX, born in XXXX of 1967 in Somalia. [56] The Minister intervened and submitted that they have credible information that "serves to seriously undermine the claimant's credibility". The Minister identified that the documentary evidence25 shows that the Appellant did not provide accurate information and noted that the fingerprints of the Appellant were exactly matched with those of someone who was fingerprinted on XXXX XXXX, 1999 at the Los Angeles Asylum office; that the Appellant used the name XXXX XXXX in the USA; that in 2001 he tried to enter Canada without a visa and was denied entry; that he stated in his form IMM0008 that he had never used any other name; that he provided incorrect information about whether he sought protection anywhere; and provided wrong information about whether he had been denied entry into any country. He never volunteered information about his stay in the USA and that he received refugee protection in the USA. [57] I also note that the Appellant did not volunteer correct or complete and true information under oath when he claimed protection in Canada. He omitted critical elements of his past, in particular his claim in the USA and the fact that he used a different name. Later on after the Minister's disclosure, he changed his personal and other information, again under oath, but did so only after irrefutable evidence was presented by the Minister's representative. [58] The Appellant submits that he provided a reasonable explanation for his misrepresentation to the US authorities and his return to Somalia. The RPD, in its reasons, addressed both of these issues and was not satisfied that the Appellant provided a reasonable explanation, that being that "he was motivated by fear"26 and relied on a smuggler's advice. The Appellant submits that the RPD's conclusion is a reviewable error. The RPD as the tribunal of the first instance, who took direct testimony from the Appellant, was not satisfied with his explanation. I find that the RPD was reasonable in its findings. [59] The Appellant submitted that the RPD erred as it did not give weight to the testimony of the witness. The Appellant states at page 93 of his memo that the RPD's "concerns were not pointed out to the witness or applicant at the hearing". I disagree. The RPD analysed, in details, the testimony and the affidavit from the witness, XXXX XXXX XXXX,27 and stated, "He said that he lived across the street for a number of years, and remembers things well. When I asked about what the brother and sister did, some details about family life, and how the brother commuted out to the farm, the details were foggy at best. I did not get any sense of the kind of details one would expect from somebody with vivid memories of a living relationship with a family across the street. That testimony could easily have been given by anybody who had simply read the Basis of Claim form" and also stated, "That evidence and affidavit in and of themselves do not have sufficient weight to establish identity. It has to be given weight in the context of all of the evidence and in light of the claimant's explanations of what happened. We have a number of identities, and he even switched back and forth". Moreover, the Appellant was represented by experienced counsel who had the opportunity to question the witness and ensure that the witness has served the purpose for which he was brought to the hearing. The RPD did not find the witness to be incredible but found that, "That testimony could easily have been given by anybody who had simply read the Basis of Claim form." [60] The RPD heard directly from the Appellant and made several observations such as "He did not spontaneously tell me what kind of travel document he had." and that he was evasive in his response; for example, "Again, at this point, if we are talking about a travel document that is valid for travel issued by the U.S. Department of State, the question is "why did you then not get a replacement, or explain or declare that to the Americans?" The response was, "There is not an American embassy in Somalia." The RPD did not find it to be a reasonable explanation, and I cannot find this to be an unreasonable conclusion? [61] Based on the totality of the evidence before it, the RPD did not err in its reference to or treatment of evidence before it. [62] The RPD's adverse credibility finding was justifiable, transparent, and intelligible. It was reasonable in light of the evidence that was before the RPD. I note that the Appellant was given an opportunity to speak to the issues and RPD was not satisfied that the Appellant provided reasonable explanation. [63] I note that the RPD noted deficiencies, inconsistencies, omissions and lack of credible supportive documents. Even though the choice of words or failure to mention each and every document may be less than ideal, the RAD however finds that the RPD's identity determination was reasonable. [64] The RPD's finding that the Appellant has not established his identity falls within a range of possible, acceptable, outcomes that is defensible in respect of the facts and law. As such, these appeals cannot succeed. CONCLUSION [65] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [66] The appeal is therefore dismissed. (signed) 'Atam Uppal' Atam Uppal January 8, 2014 Date 1 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385 2 RPD record, CD of the recording STARTING at 2:03: 3 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, Section 106. 4 Refugee Protection Division (RPD) Rules, SOR/2012-256. 5 Appellants' Record, (AR), p. 19, Basis of Claim Form, p. 1 of 12. 6 Kabongo, Johnson Mili Tshibola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1084-12), de Montigny, October 25, 2013, 2013 FC 1086 7 RPD Record, Exhibit 4, item 3.5 (page 67 of the RPD Record) 8 AR, page 64 9 AR, page 63 10 Ibid., item 3.7 11 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. 12 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. 13 Newton, para. 43. 14 IRPA, Sections 96 and 97. 15 IRPA, Section 3(2)(a). 16 IRPA, Sections 170(g) and 171(a.2). 17 IRPA, Sections 170(i) and 171 (b). 18 IRPA, Section 170(b). 19 IRPA, Section 110(3). 20 Khosa, para. 89. 21 Newton, para. 80. 22 Khosa, para. 89. 23 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 (December 15, 2011) para. 12. 24 Dunsmuir, para. 47; in Khosa, para 4, the "range of reasonable outcomes." 25 RPD Record, page 83-86 26 AR page 88. 27 AR page 34 --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (April 9, 2013) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB3-07769