TB6-03502

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB6-03502 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision April 27, 2016 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Evan C. Duffy Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS AND DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX(the Appellant), a citizen of Jordan, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal and requests an oral hearing. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the determination of the RPD and either substitute a positive determination or return the matter to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD refers this matter back to the RPD for redetermination. This appeal is allowed. Background [3] The Appellant claims that he left Islam and converted to Christianity. He alleges that, as a result of this conversion, his family has declared him an infidel and threatened to kill him. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on November 30, 2015. The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness (the Minister) intervened in the proceeding.1 By a decision of December 16, 2015, the RPD rejected the claim on the basis of credibility. [5] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD made various errors in finding him to lack credibility. He also asks the RAD to accept new evidence in support of his appeal. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellants may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claims or that was not reasonably available, or that they could not reasonably have been expected2 in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] It is for the Appellants to make full and detailed submissions in their Memorandum about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4) and how that evidence relates to the Appellants.3 Application of Section 110(4) [8] Section 110(4) establishes a disjunctive test.4 The RAD must first consider whether the proposed new evidence arose after the rejection of the refugee claims. If it did, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. If it did not, the RAD must consider whether the evidence was reasonably available for presentation to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims. If it was not reasonably available at that time, it meets the requirements of section 110(4). If the evidence did not arise after the rejection, and it was reasonably available, the RAD must consider whether the Appellants could reasonably have been expected, in their circumstances, to have presented the evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of their claims. If they could not have been expected to do so, the evidence meets the requirements of the section. [9] If the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claims, was reasonably available, and could reasonably have been expected, in the circumstances, to be presented to the RPD prior to the rejection of the claims, the evidence does not meet the test in section 110(4). The RAD does not have discretion to admit such evidence.5 [10] As the RAD understands it, section 110(4) provides the Appellants with an opportunity to present evidence that could not have been submitted to the RPD - either because the evidence did not exist at the time of the RPD proceeding, or because it did exist but was unavailable, or because it did exist and was available, but the Appellants could not have been expected to present it to the RPD. [11] Section 110(4) does not provide an opportunity for Appellants to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.6 [12] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. In the RAD's view, a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.7 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Assessment of Evidence that Meets the Requirements of Section 110(4) [13] Where a document meets the test in section 110(4), as discussed above, the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. While section 110(4) provides the RAD with factors to consider in assessing a document's "newness," these factors alone cannot determine the admissibility of new evidence in an appeal. To put it simply, if a document is lacking in credibility, or is irrelevant, it would make little sense to admit such document even if it meets the test in section 110(4). [14] In Singh8, the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza9 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of section 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on the nearly identical wording of section 113(a). In that case, the Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.10 In Singh, the Court found that the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of section 110(4).11 [15] Where evidence meets the test in section 110(4), the RAD will go on to assess it for credibility. While this is a factor set out in Raza, there are also other reasons to apply it. Section 171(a.3) of the IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered "credible or trustworthy in the circumstances." This provision makes it clear that, in addition to the factors in section 110(4), the RAD must consider the credibility or trustworthiness of proposed new evidence. [16] Relevance is a basic condition for the admissibility of any piece of evidence.12 RAD Rule (3)(3)(g)(iii) requires the Appellants' Memorandum to include full and detailed submissions about how any proposed new evidence "relates to the Appellant." It would be highly inefficient for the RAD to admit irrelevant evidence, and contrary to section 162(2) of the IRPA, which requires all divisions of the IRB to "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [17] In addition to credibility and relevance, the factors in Raza include "newness" and "materiality." Newness is implicitly incorporated into section 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in section110 (6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.13 [18] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellants' proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence that passes the test in section 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of section 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [19] The Appellant asks the RAD to admit two pieces of proposed new evidence: (a) A report from the XXXX Police Service, dated XXXX XXXX, 2015;14 and, (b) A letter from the Reverend Father XXXX, of XXXX XXXX XXXX Parish, dated January 13, 2016.15 [20] With respect to document (a), the Appellant submits that "this evidence directly contradicts the Panel's finding" that no report was made to the police. He argues that this document was not available: "the Appellant simply did not have a copy of that police report to provide to the Panel, since it was his wife that made the report only a few days before the hearing."16 He also states that he did not have the document in his possession until January 3, 2016, after his claim was rejected. [21] The document in (a) did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. The report is dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2015; the Appellant's refugee claim was rejected on December 16, 2015. Given that he was questioned in the refugee hearing about the report,17 the RAD finds that he could reasonably have been expected, in his circumstances, to have presented the document to the RPD if it was available. The only question remaining under section 110(4), then, is whether the document was reasonably available to present to the RPD prior to the rejection of his refugee claim. [22] The Appellant has simply not provided an explanation of why this document was not available until January 3, 2016. The report was made on XXXX XXXX in XXXX; the issue was discussed at his hearing five days later. Why did it take the Appellant, who also lives in XXXX, more than five weeks to obtain this important document? He provided an affidavit in support of his appeal, in which he states that his ex-wife did not provide him with a copy of the report when she made it: "I obtained a copy of this police report on January 3, 2016.... I am submitting this as new evidence in respect of my refugee claim since I did not have the document in my possession at the time of my hearing."18 This does not explain why he did not obtain and disclose this document sooner. [23] Approximately twenty-one days passed between the filing of the police report and the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. The report was discussed in the refugee hearing. He could reasonably have been expected to present this document to the RPD, and he has provided no explanation for his failure to do so. [24] The document in (a) does not meet the requirements of section 110(4), and it is therefore inadmissible. [25] The document in (b) was written after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, and contains updated information about the Appellant's practice of Christianity. It is relevant, and the RAD has no reason to doubt its credibility. This document is admitted as new evidence. [26] The Appellant asks for an oral hearing. The RAD may convene such a hearing where there is new evidence that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal, is central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. The RAD finds that document (b) does not meet any of these criteria. A similar letter already exists in the RPD record;19 this updated letter cannot justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. The RAD declines the Appellant's request to convene an oral hearing. The Role of the RAD [27] While the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [28] The Appellant submits that the RAD should examine the matter de novo, though it should also read the RPD's reasons to determine whether they are persuasive. He argues further that the RPD's decision is wrong under any standard, as it is both incorrect and unreasonable.20 [29] It is settled law that the RAD is not to review decisions of the RPD in the manner of a judicial review.21 [30] The RAD is a creature of statute and so is the appeal before it; its role and jurisdiction are best determined by looking at the legislative provisions creating the RAD and the appeal.22 Such an appeal (i) is directed at the decision of the RPD, (ii) unless new evidence is accepted, is to be entertained on the basis of the record as it was constituted at the time of the RPD's decision, and (iii) is to be concerned solely with the errors of law, of fact or of mixed fact and law that, according to the appellant, the RPD made. This is the statutory configuration of an appeal before the RAD.23 [31] According to the Federal Court of Appeal, the RAD is to carefully consider the RPD's decision and then carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellants, the RPD erred. It is then to provide a final determination, either confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting the RAD's own determination of the refugee claim. If the RAD cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence already presented to the RPD, the matter can be referred back to the RPD.24 [32] With respect to findings of fact and of mixed fact and law, the RAD is to review the RPD's decision applying a standard of correctness.25 When applying that standard, the RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the RAD to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the RPD; if not, the RAD will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer.26 [33] There are, however, cases where the RPD enjoys a meaningful advantage over the RAD in making findings of fact or mixed fact and law, because such findings require an assessment of the credibility or weight to be given to oral evidence heard by the RPD.27 The Federal Court of Appeal, in discussing the standard of review to be applied by the RAD to the RPD's decision, has declined to provide the scope and degree of deference to be shown by the RAD: The RAD should be given the opportunity to develop its own jurisprudence in that respect; there is thus no need for me to pigeon-hole the RAD to the level of deference owed in each case.28 [34] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo: [T]here also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i) the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii) the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed.29 [35] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such conclusions. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [36] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where the determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.30 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.31 [37] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? In Huruglica, the Federal Court held that the RAD can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error".32 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [38] Although the Court did not explain what level of deference is established by recognizing and respecting a conclusion of the RPD, it has repeatedly upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD.33 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [39] In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome. 34 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, the RAD finds this framework helpful in considering its own approach to deference. [40] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [41] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [42] The RAD will apply a standard of correctness to its consideration of the RPD's decision: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. [43] However, the RAD will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error. [44] Having done this, the RAD will provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD's decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination. If it cannot do so without hearing oral evidence that was already heard by the RPD, it will refer the matter back for redetermination. The RPD's Findings [45] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its assessment of his credibility. [46] Letters and phone calls: The RPD made negative credibility findings with respect to communication from the Appellant's family in Jordan. It found that the Appellant's evidence was contradictory, as he testified both that his family threatened him by telephone and that they threatened him by letter because they could not reach him by telephone. The panel also found it implausible that his relatives would make death threats in writing, "which could lead to severe consequences for them, should anything happen to the claimant."35 [47] The Appellant argues on appeal that there was no contradiction in his evidence about the telephone conversation - he initially did speak with his relatives over the phone, but when he stopped taking their calls, they threatened him in writing. He submits further that the RPD erred in its implausibility finding, as the panel unfairly expected him to explain the actions of his persecutors. [48] Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD finds that the RPD misunderstood the testimony with respect to the telephone calls. The Appellant testified that he initially took calls from Jordan because his sister was visiting there; she called him and asked him to talk to his father and brother.36 He testified that he was certain that the written threats came after he stopped taking phone calls from his family. The RPD's finding with respect to the phone calls is not based on the evidence and is therefore in error. [49] The Federal Court has cautioned that the RPD: ...must be careful when rendering a decision based on a lack of plausibility because refugee claimants come from diverse cultures, and actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian standards might be plausible when considered from within the claimant's milieu. Plausibility findings should only be made in the clearest of cases.37 [50] In the RAD's view, it is almost always perilous for the RPD to make a plausibility determination with respect to the thoughts or actions of alleged agents of persecution. In this case, the RPD engaged in its own assessment of how an angry Jordanian family should conduct itself when dealing with an apostate son who has fled to another country. This finding was not based on any objective evidence and did not appear to take into account any cultural or religious factors. If the Appellant's family is unreasonable enough to plan to kill him, why should they be expected to act reasonably in how they threaten to do so? Further, as the Appellant points out on appeal, the RPD unfairly expected him to explain the conduct of his persecutors. [51] The RPD found it implausible that the Appellant's family would threaten him in writing. This finding was not made in the clearest of cases and was therefore an error. [52] Police report: The RPD considered the Appellant's testimony that he had received threats while in Canada, and that his ex-wife had reported these threats to the police. The RPD noted that there was no police report in evidence, that the ex-wife's letter did not refer to a police complaint, and that there was no evidence of the police investigating the concern. The panel concluded that there was no report made to the police, and that no report was made because there was no real threat to be reported. [53] The Appellant challenges this on appeal. He seeks to rely upon the newly-submitted police report but, for reasons set out above, the RAD has not accepted this as evidence. He also argues that the panel failed to distinguish between his fear of his family in Jordan, where they are able to harm him, and the threats in Canada, where he does not believe they can reach him. [54] The RPD's findings with respect to the lack of a police report are not in error. The Appellant claimed that a police report was made, but did not provide it; he claimed that his ex-wife made the report, but this is not mentioned in her letter38 and she did not testify. There was indeed no evidence of the police investigating the death threats, and the Appellant himself was not concerned enough to personally go to the police. [55] However, it was too great a leap of logic for the RPD to conclude that the absence of a police report was indicative of a lack of threats. The Appellant's family is in Jordan, and it seems rather obvious that he believes he can find safety in Canada. The RPD was entitled to make a negative credibility finding with respect to his claim that the threats were reported to the police; however, it was an error to use finding as the basis for a conclusion that threats were not made. The Appellant's fear is of harm in Jordan, not in Canada. [56] Immigration History and Conversion to Christianity: The RPD considered the Appellant's rather remarkable immigration history. He arrived in Canada on a work permit in XXXX of 2013, but was laid off later that year and did not work again. In XXXX of 2015, only weeks before his status was to expire, he married a Canadian citizen who was approximately twice his age. In XXXX of 2015 he made an application for permanent residence, with his wife filing a sponsorship application in support. In XXXX of 2015, the marriage began to break down, and the Appellant and his wife separated in XXXX of 2015. In that same month the Appellant allegedly began to consider converting to Christianity, finally deciding to do so in July of 2015. At the end of XXXX, 2015, his wife withdrew her sponsorship application, and as a result the Appellant's application for permanent residence was denied on XXXX XXXX, 2015. He claims that in the same month his family began to threaten him, and he then initiated a refugee claim.39 [57] The RPD noted that when the Appellant was about to lose his status in Canada, he married a much older woman, but the marriage lasted a very short period of time. Faced again with a loss of status, he became interested in Christianity, was allegedly threatened as a result, and made a refugee claim. The RAD agrees that this history is suspicious. [58] The RPD, however, used this questionable immigration history to conclude that the Appellant is not truly a Christian convert. The Appellant argues that the RPD should have evaluated things like church attendance, Christian knowledge, or the supporting evidence filed by the priest and other parishioners. Instead, the panel made its determination solely on the basis of when he converted, despite evidence from a priest describing him as having "sincerity and deep desire."40 [59] There are some cases where a refugee claimant is so lacking in credibility that none of his evidence can be trusted. This is not such a case. The RPD made erroneous findings with respect to the telephone threats, the written threats, and whether he had a fear in Canada. Although the Appellant's immigration history is indeed suspicious, this itself is not sufficient basis to undermine all of his evidence. [60] The RAD notes that the RPD proceeded with an alternative analysis with respect to the treatment of Christians in Jordan. This cannot save its decision, however, because that analysis is based on the erroneous conclusion that the Appellant is not at risk from his own family. CONCLUSION [61] The RPD erred in its treatment of the Appellant's credibility. As the RPD's decision rests on its credibility findings, its determination cannot stand. [62] The Appellant asks that the RAD substitute its own determination that he is a Convention refugee. The RAD is in no position to do so. As the Appellant himself points out, the genuineness of his alleged conversion has not been assessed; further, the Appellant's immigration history does raise credibility concerns. [63] Pursuant to section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD sets aside the determination of the RPD and refers this matter back to the RPD for redetermination. This appeal is allowed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld April 27, 2016 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 154. 2 In the French version of the IRPA, this phrase is instead the equivalent of "normally have been expected;" see Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1022, para 51. 3 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, section 3(3)(g)(iii). 4 See Olowolaiyemo, Olatunji v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7767-14), Gascon, October 29, 2014, 2015 FC 895, para. 19. 5 Deri, Samuel v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7050-14), Strickland, September 2, 2015, 2015 FC 1042, para. 55; Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, para. 63. 6 Singh, supra, footnote 4, para. 54 7 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, para. 16. 8 Singh, supra, footnote 4, para. 64. 9 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 10 Ibid., Raza, paras. 13-15. 11 Singh, supra, footnote 4, para. 64. 12 Singh, supra, footnote 4, para. 45. Also: "If a matter is not relevant it cannot be taken into account. It should not be admitted into evidence:" Robert W. Macaulay & James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before Administrative Tribunals, loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2004) at17-6.12; Re Bortolloti and Ministery of Housing (1977), 15 O.R. (2d) 617; Ontario (Provincial Police) v. Cornwall (Public Inquiry), 2008 ONCA 33 at para. 64. 13 Singh, supra, footnote 4, para. 48. 14 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 23. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 25. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 77. 17 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 18, Transcript, 1 :11 :20. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 21, Affidavit. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 183. 20 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 81, Memorandum, paras. 31-32. 21 See, for example, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, para. 33. 22 Dhillon, Jatinder Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5156-14), LeBlanc, March 13, 2015, 2015 FC 321, para. 14; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, para. 46. 23 Dhillon, paras. 14-18. 24 Huruglica, supra, footnote 2, para. 103. 25 Ibid. 26 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9; [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, para. 50. 27 Huruglica, supra, footnote 2, para. 70. 28 Ibid., supra, footnote 2, para. 74. 29 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina, Yani v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233, para. 11. 30 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; see also Huruglica, supra, footnote 2, para. 72. 31 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, 2014 FC 78, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.) 32 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799, para. 55. 33 See Yin, Sarom v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2845-14), Noël, December 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1209, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Gaelle Leonelle Nguedo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7280-13), Locke, September 10, 2014, 2014 FC 859, Akuffo, Edwin Yaw Sarfo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6640-13), Gagné, November 12, 2014, 2014 FC 1063, Allalou, Abedelkrim v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7217-13), Shore, December 17, 2014, 2014 FC 1084, and Sajad, Zeeshan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-926-14), Shore, November 21, 2014, 2014 FC 1107; also Bui, Van Son v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1654-14), Shore, November 28, 2014, 2014 FC 1145. 34Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 35 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons, paras. 27-28. 36 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, pp. 19-20, Transcript. 37Valtchev, Rousko v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4497-99), Muldoon, July 6, 2001, para. 7. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 195, undated letter. 39 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, RPD's Reasons, para. 32. 40 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, p. 183. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR :