VB4-03825

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB4-03825 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is (are) XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause the subject of the appeal (Also Known XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Appeal considered at Vancouver, BC Appel instruit à Date of decision May 5, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Rena Dhir Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is (are) Gilda Goffredo Conseil(s) du (de la/des) the subject of the appeal personne(s) en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, also known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), a citizen of Sri Lanka, appeals the November 25, 2014 determination of the Refugee Protection Division (the "RPD"). The claim was heard by the RPD on October 16, 2014 with a Notice of Decision being sent to the appellant on December 2, 2014. The RPD found that the appellant is neither a Convention refugee1 nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (the "Act").2 DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, the Refugee Appeal Division (the "RAD") confirms the determination of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, also known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee pursuant to section 96 of the Act nor a person in need of protection pursuant to section 97 of the Act. This appeal is therefore dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] Counsel for the appellant before the RAD is the same that he had at the RPD. The Minister has not intervened before the RPD or RAD. [4] A transcript of the RPD proceedings has not been included in the Appellant's Record (AR).3 [5] The appellant does not seek to present "new" evidence to the RAD pursuant to subsection 110(4) of the Act. Basis of Claim [6] According to the allegations set out in the appellant's Basis of Claim Form (BOC),4 the appellant is from Sri Lanka. The appellant came to Canada on March 11, 2008 on a work permit visa. He returned to Sri Lanka to attend his brother's wedding from May 12, 2011 to June 30, 2011. While in Sri Lanka, the appellant also got married on XXXX XXXX, 2011 and returned to Canada 5 days later. The appellant helped his wife's family financially and also sent his wife money on a monthly basis. However, his wife's family always pressured her to ask the appellant for more money. After ten months, his wife's family began to threaten the appellant to send them more money and have his wife join him in Canada or they will seek a divorce. The appellant continued to send money until June 3, 2012 when he learnt that his wife's parents scolded and assaulted his mother which caused her to have a heart attack. Both families made police reports against each other for various reasons. However, the appellant's family's police reports went unresolved due to his wife's family's connections with the police. [7] The appellant's wife commenced divorce proceedings on November 22, 2012 with false allegations against him. He learnt that a summons was served upon him with the Magistrate Court of Maligakande where he apparently committed a crime on the November 12, 2013 and he was to appear in court on November 27, 2013. The appellant fears the authorities as they are highly corrupt and easily influenced for the extortion of money and power. He also fears his wife's family as they continue to demand money from him and threaten his family in Sri Lanka. Grounds of Appeal [8] The appellant's submissions5 as to the grounds of this appeal can be summarized as follows: Did the RPD panel err in its findings with regards to the appellant's credibility? REMEDY SOUGHT [9] The appellant has requested that the RAD dismiss the decision of the RPD.6 ROLE OF THE RAD [10] Although the Act sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [11] RAD, being a new division, has struggled with the standard of review to be used in RAD appeals based on several Federal Court cases that have differed in their approach of what standard should be used. Initially, RAD followed the Supreme Court of Canada (the "Supreme Court") case Dunsmuir7 as the leading case on standard of review. In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court has said that there should be only two standards when reviewing decisions of administrative tribunals: reasonableness and correctness. The standard of correctness applies to questions of law, while the standard of reasonableness applies to questions of fact, and mixed fact and law. [12] In recent months, the Federal Court has issued differing decisions on the role of RAD when conducting an appeal of the RPD determination. These decisions include the Federal Court cases Iyamuremye,8 Eng,9 Alvarez,10 Huruglica,11 Njeukam,12 Yetna,13 Wahgmo,14 Alyafi,15 among others. [13] The Federal Court in Iyamuremye addressed the question of the proper standard of review to be applied by the RAD in reviewing RPD findings and confirmed that the appropriate standard of review for questions of fact and mixed fact and law is reasonableness, and the appropriate standard of review for questions of law is correctness: That said, the Court finds that in assessing the reasonableness of the decision, the RAD should, at the very least, have reviewed the evidence that was presented before the RPD and conducted an independent assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD, on the basis of the facts and the conditions of the country in question, had properly considered the evidence and reasonably justified its conclusion.16 [14] In Alvarez, Justice Shore said that: . . . the Court is of the view that the RAD must be able to correct any error of law in a decision of the RPD or any palpable or overriding error in the findings of fact or the application of the law to these facts.17 Furthermore, Justice Shore stated that: When analyzing a decision of the RPD, the RAD must not merely determine whether it was made in a reasonable manner, but, rather, analyze whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error.18 Justice Shore also said in Alvarez that: . . . the RAD must nonetheless perform its own assessment of all the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD relied on a wrong principle of law or misassessed the facts to the point of making a palpable and overriding error.19 [15] In Huruglica, Justice Phelan found that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. "It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection."20 Justice Phelan also states that, that notion may well justify deference to a RPD's decision in a circumstance where a witness' credibility is critical or determinative. Where there is no adverse finding of credibility, the policy rationale for deference is not sustainable.21 [16] Justice Phelan also found that the RAD's role should be to determine whether the RPD decision is wrong rather than look at whether it was a reasonable decision. Justice Phelan emphasized that the RAD's mandate is to conduct a fact based review. The RAD, Justice Phelan said "must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment. . . . Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision." Furthermore: In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error.22 [17] Counsel for the appellant submits . . . the RAD's standard of review in the present case is that of correctness, as the RPD panel's decision is based on the appellant's credibility, reliable and trustworthy evidence that can establish the appellant's allegations on a balance of probabilities. . . .23 [18] The Huruglica decision is the most thorough of all the recent cases and the first one where the Federal Court has certified a question for the Federal Court of Appeal. Again, I refer to paragraphs 54 and 55 of Huruglica which read as follows: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.24 [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a "palpable and overriding error."25 [19] Following the Huruglica decision, many other cases have followed the Huruglica approach in what the role of the RAD should be in assessing an appeal. There is another line of authority that suggests that the standard that RAD should apply is that of "palpable and overriding error" (Eng, Alvarez, Spasoja).26 In Alyafi,27Djoussou,28 and Siliya,29 the Federal Court notes that there are two competing approaches in the Federal Court jurisprudence and that the RAD Member is free to decide which approach to follow. [20] In Kanga, the Federal Court held: Furthermore, even where there is divided Federal Court authority on a point of law, I do not agree that the Board is required to explain why it has adopted one view over the other. Presumably, Federal Court jurisprudence speaks for itself and the Board has no obligation to offer any additional interpretation of the legal authorities that it chooses to rely upon in resolving a point of law.30 [21] In this appeal, and taking into consideration the Federal Court decisions regarding the role of the RAD, I will be applying the points set out in Huruglica. In this appeal, I have reviewed all aspects of the RPD's decision and have conducted my own independent assessment of all the evidence to determine whether the appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection, while giving a certain deference to the RPD's findings regarding the appellant's credibility and any other issues where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage. As well, it is clear from the many recent Federal Court cases that have been previously mentioned, all agree that the standard of correctness should be used for any error of law found in the RPD decision on appeal to the RAD. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [22] The appellant submits that the "RPD's credibility findings were generally arbitrary as it ignored the appellant's reasonable decisions and testimony, and his particular situation."31 [23] First, I note that the RPD Member finds: . . . that the claimant is not a Convention refugee as his fear of persecution is not by reason of any of the five grounds. he allegations before this panel, is that the claimant's risk emanated from threats of violence from extortion demands from a failed marriage. There is no evidence before this panel to conclude that this extortion is grounded in any of the five definitions as presented in the Convention definition. However, this analysis will proceed to determine if there is sufficient reliable and trustworthy evidence to determine on a balance of probabilities that the claimant would be subjected personally to a risk to his life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, should he return to Sri Lanka.32 [24] The appellant has not challenged the finding of the RPD that there is no nexus. Based on my independent assessment of the evidence, I find that there is no nexus to the Convention. I find that there is no nexus to the Convention. Therefore, I will be assessing this appeal under Section 97 of the Act. Based on a review of all of the evidence, the RAD finds that the determinative issue in this appeal is whether or not the RPD properly assessed the evidence before it, and whether the RPD's decision is reasonable in arriving at its credibility determination. Divorce [25] The appellant was asked during the RPD hearing of what he fears in Sri Lanka. The appellant testified that he fears 'threats from his ex-wife's family.'33 He testified at the RPD hearing that his ex-wife's family want money from him that they had asked for during the divorce proceedings. I note that initially the appellant testified that his ex-wife's family wanted him to agree to the divorce as he was against it. Later, after he consented to the divorce, the family wanted money from him despite the fact that this money was not granted by the Courts in Sri Lanka and only a divorce was granted to both parties. [26] The RPD Member notes in her decision that: The panel was also confused on the claimant's repeated assertions that he did not want a divorce that he wanted to work it out with his wife. However, provided no clear testimony on how or what efforts he made in circumventing this divorce. In his own evidence, he had testified that testimony that he had no contact with her, since April 2012. The panel would reasonably expect that a person, such as the claimant, who as he asserts adamantly did not want the divorce, would have made at least some attempt to circumvent the very thing he swears he did not want.34 [27] However, I will not be dealing with the issue of whether the appellant consented to the divorce or not as I find that is not directly relevant to the refugee determination for this appellant. I base this statement on the fact that the marriage has been annulled by the Courts as of December 13, 201335. As well, it is not the duty of the RPD or the RAD to re-try the court proceedings relating to the divorce. Rather, it is both panels' duty to assess whether the appellant would be at risk if he was to return to Sri Lanka. I find that the issue surrounding whether the appellant wanted a divorce or not is not binding on the RPD Member's final determination. The divorce has since been settled. The appellant has not been required by the court to pay the wife or his family anymore monies since the divorce was finalized. [28] The RPD Member finds: The claimant repeatedly reiterated that he refused the divorce, that he believed society would look down upon him. However, the country documents indicate that women are faced de fact discrimination in divorces according to the customary law of each ethnic group. 36 Considering, the country specific documentation, the panel would reasonably conclude that the risk of societal rebuke for having been divorced would be more likely weighed against the claimant's wife rather than himself. The panel finds that the claimant was unable to reasonably explain his aversion to a divorce so intensely sought by his wife. The panel does find that this issue which is unreasonably vague and not reasonably clarified by the claimant does undermine his credibility before this panel.37 [29] The appellant submits that the Board is being bias in this view, as in Sri Lanka, Divorce is still viewed as difficult and shameful in society, as generally women are usually housewives, while men are breadwinners, however, the decision should not be based solely on divorced women being discriminated against, as divorce men can also be viewed in a negative way and stereotyped as not being a good provider.38 However, there is no objective evidence before the RPD or the RAD to conclude that this exists in Sri Lanka for the appellant or that such discrimination establishes that the appellant is at risk of harm in Sri Lanka for this reason alone. Money Calculation [30] I further find that the appellant's argument on the RPD Member's mis-calculation of currency is also not relevant to the alleged risk the appellant fears in Sri Lanka. It is clear that the appellant's testimony that he acknowledged that the divorce court took into account the previous payments he made to his wife and that is why the court only granted the money and nothing else. The appellant testified that "my lawyer proved that I had paid before."39 It is clear that despite the many allegations made by the ex-wife and demands for money, the court settled on only the divorce to be finalized. Police [31] The RPD Member also finds: The panel has reviewed the evidence submitted in support of the claimant's allegations that his family had repeatedly gone to the police. The panel had questioned on why the family would continue to seek police protection when he had testified they believed that no protection would be forthcoming. The panel had asked the claimant, why the family would continue to seek intervention by the police if they believed that they had not done anything in the past and would not do anything in the future. The claimant explained that the family had gone to the police in order to file reports, as to put all the things that have happened to them at the hands of this family. The panel has reviewed the documents submitted by the claimant, which he has alleged are the sole reason why the family continued to report to the police. The statements allegedly from the claimant's family to the police have a number of issues present. These documents all contain contradictions between the testimony evidence, or contradict one another. They are vague in that they do not make clear allegations on the agent of harm or the dates of alleged harassments are not in line with the claimant's BOC. Two police reports allegedly made by the claimant's mother and brother indicate he is legally divorced; however they predate the legal judgement as submitted by the claimant.40 [32] Although the RPD member has not clearly explained the contradictions in her reasons, I do agree with the RPD Member that the police reports are vague and do not explicitly state that the ex-wife's family was responsible for these incidents. Furthermore, in reviewing the oral testimony, I note the RPD Member did address these contradictions and I also note that the appellant did not provide reasonable explanations for these contradictions. [33] Furthermore, in reviewing the evidence before the RPD and RAD, I note that the appellant's claim for refugee protection is based on his alleged fear of his 'now' ex-wife's family. It is clear from the record that the divorce has been granted as of December 13, 2013. Most documents relating to police reports41 or court documents are pre-dated to December 13, 2013, the divorce settlement date. I also note that the appellant's mother has made police reports of ongoing issues since then. I also note that in the police reports,42 the mother refers to 'unknown persons' and not the ex-wife's family as the perpetrators of these incidents. There is a police report dated December 29, 201343 which refers to 'unknown persons.' Again, there is a letter written to the Inspector General of Police44 in Colombo which refers to the appellant's ex-wife and his family and also refers to incidents that happened prior to the divorce settlement but does mention the ex-wife's family. In another police complaint on August 5, 2014,45 the appellant's brother refers to the wife's family but also takes about an 'unknown' person who asked for the appellant in the family home and was verbally abusive.' The appellant testified that they were not allowed to provide names of who they feared as his ex-wife's family had connections in the police; thus, 'unknown persons' was written on the reports. However, this is inconsistent with what we see on other reports where the wife's family is mentioned. I agree with the RPD Member that the appellant and his family's behaviours are inconsistent with their fear. The family has continued to report the incidents to the police despite the alleged fear that the ex-wife's family is connected to the police. Thus, I agree with the RPD Member her finding the appellant is not credible. [34] Also, the RPD Member asked the appellant why he believes his ex-wife's family is connected to the police. The appellant testified that "they [ex-wife's family] have money and property close to the main road and they knew prominent businessmen and the elections were held on their land". I find the RPD Member's credibility assessment on this issue is accurate. Furthermore, given the evidence before the RPD and RAD, the appellant has not provided persuasive evidence that his ex-wife's family had and has connections with the police. Summons [35] The RPD Member finds: Further, documents attesting to the claimant having been sought by the police as the family had sought an arrest warrant for false allegations against him, have no weight. The document in question is a hand filled document that has no indication of time or place as noted to require nor is there any notation of any specific charge or circumstances. Finally, the claimant had explained that the family had used their connections to file a false charge against him to get a favourable court proceeding, however this document was dated after the divorce court's decision. The second summons allegedly against the claimant is again a hand written document that again does not include required information such as the noted on the summons, to include concisely the offence and name and place of complaining. The documentary evidence from the High Commission of Canada states that there are concerns that the front end issuance process, such as these documents, for Sri Lankan documents is open to abuse. Low civil servant salaries and decentralized procedures for the issuance of feeder documents are two key areas that can be exploited by persons seeking to improperly obtain documents. 46 Considering these numerous issues, the objective evidence on the ease in which a person can improperly obtain documents, the panel places no weight in the documents provided to this panel. Further, the panel does take negative inference against the claimant although he made several attempts to place blame on the agency taking the statements, this is in the panel's view is not sufficient to explain the numerous family generated documents that are inconsistent or vague.47 [36] I do not find the RPD Member made a clear finding as to why she completely rejected the summons that were disclosed as evidence at the RPD hearing by giving it no weight. The RPD Member cannot base this finding alone on the country document reports noting that fraudulent documents are available in a country without providing further explanations relating to the facts of the claim. The RPD is required to question the appellant and to seek answers to any issues that arise during the hearing. However, I note that the RPD Member did question the appellant on the summons documents and I have assessed this testimony for this appeal. [37] I note that the RPD Member did question the appellant on why his family did not try to find out why he was being summoned: Appellant: I'm here so can't happen. RPD Member: You have a lawyer who dealt with the divorce, why not help you in this legal matter? Appellant: Because my brother has to do it but then he will get into trouble. [38] In my own assessment of these documents and the testimony, I find that there is persuasive evidence to conclude that little weight be given to the summons. Some of my reasoning falls in line with the RPD Member's findings. First, the original summons is dated pre-divorce finalization date. Although the appellant was accused by his ex-wife, the divorce judgement does not make any final determinations on these accusations. Rather, the divorce was finalized based on both parties agreeing to the divorce. Furthermore, in my review of the summons dated November 12, 2013,48 it is incomplete. There is no indication of where the offence took place. There are very few details of the matter altogether. There is no mention of what the actual offence is or who the other parties are. As well, the summons state "as a complaint has been filed today before the under signed Magistrate, accusing that you have committed an offence punishable. . . ."As for the second summons dated October 7, 2014,49 I find that it is very difficult to come to any conclusion as to what this summons pertains to. I note that the English translation is poor and has little information. However, I do note that it refers to a complaint but does not mention anything else. Again, I find that the appellant's allegations that he will be arrested and detained based on these summons are speculative as there is no persuasive evidence that he has been charged with any offence. [39] Also, the appellant's explanation for why nothing was done about the summons given that he had the ability to inquire about it is not reasonable. Given the incomplete information and the appellant's lack of explanations, I find it is appropriate to give little weight to these documents. Although I find the RPD Member's assessment of the evidence is not entirely accurate, I find that I would come to the same conclusion after my review of the evidence. Police Extortion [40] The appellant also submits that "the documentary evidence from the High Commission of Canada, which makes him believe that he does have face a risk to his life, when he is being issued an arrest warrant and a summons for false accusations that he believes has been fabricated with bribes by his ex-wife to the police causing him to have a problem with the authorities, even when it is entirely not true, but the RPD panel cannot assume that although the arrest warrant and summons may be true documents, he believes that these false accusations may still be used by the police for extortion of money."50 However, I note that the appellant never expressed this fear during his testimony or in any other evidence before the RPD Member. Therefore, I will not be giving any weight to this argument and the appellant has not put forward any submissions on consideration of new evidence'. Brother's Custody [41] Another argument put forth by the appellant is the omission of his brother's custody on June 3, 2012 in his BOC used for a no credibility finding by the RPD Member. The RPD Member provided the appellant the opportunity to explain this omission. The appellant testified that at the time he wrote the BOC 'he didn't have proof.'51 This is an important element to the appellant's refugee claim in my view and it is adequate to expect the RPD Member have this information in the documents before her prior to the hearing. I find that the RPD Member did not err in her assessment of this major omission. Mother's Heart Attack [42] The appellant submits that . . . it is unfair and unjust for the RPD panel to conclude without medical evidence that the appellant's mother's heart condition was an ongoing medical ailment and concluding a negative inference against the appellant's credibility. [43] The RPD Member finds: In testimony and as stated in the claimant's BOC he had submitted to the panel that his mother was attacked by the offending family in her home on June 3, 2012.52 In testimony the claimant had repeatedly testified to her having been hit on the chest or assaulted that it caused her to have a heart attack. The testimony was disjointed and confusing to the panel on the nature of the assault against the mother and what efforts she sought for medical relief. The evidence before this panel is that 23 days later she spent two days in the hospital to have a heart stent put in place.53 The claimant in his testimony stated that this severe assault caused her to have a heart attack. There is no evidence that the respondent had a heart attack, it is more likely than not that she attended the hospital as part of a pre-emptive heart repair, i.e. stent or arterial tube, as the medical bills indicate. The panel does take a negative inference against the claimant's credibility as this appears to be a significant embellishment of the threat against the family, as the claimant repeatedly attempted to characterize his mother's heart condition as a result of an alleged assault, rather than an ongoing medical ailment.54 [44] I note that the appellant testified that his mother sought medical attention after the June 3, 2012 incident but he does not say that she had a heart attack at that point in time.55 Furthermore, there is no credible evidence that this incident resulted in the mother's heart problems. I do not find the RPD Member erred in her finding that there is no credible, trustworthy evidence that the mother's heart condition was solely based on the threats against the family. I also find that this issue is not determinative of the outcome of neither the RPD Member's decision nor this appeal. [45] I have reviewed the divorce settlement in its entirety. Regardless of the allegations against the appellant by his ex-wife and her family, there is no persuasive evidence that the courts in Sri Lanka accepted these allegations and considered further action against the appellant. I note that the RPD Member points out country reports that state: The objective evidence before this panel is the civil judiciary exhibited relative independence and impartiality in adjudicating these types of cases.56 Although there were inefficiencies in this system which had led to delays, there appears to be no excessive delays in the divorce case, in the panel's view. Further, the objective country condition evidence indicates that where compensations were awarded by these civil courts, there were relatively few problems in enforcing court orders.57 The claimant submitted no evidence that the divorce itself was unfairly obtained by his ex-wife. The panel would reasonably, considering the objective evidence on the relative effectiveness and impartiality of the civil courts, that the judgement on the divorce was accurate and fairly obtained. [46] What the appellant fears is his ex-wife's family. The appellant fears that his ex-wife's family will continue to extort him for money if he returned to Sri Lanka. Further, he also fears that they have connections to the police. I note that there are numerous accusations between the appellant and his family, and the ex-wife and her family over the years. These are all documented in the police reports, and the divorce proceedings before the Court. However, there is no persuasive evidence that either party has the influence or connections to infiltrate the police. It is clear from the divorce settlement that the ex-wife made many accusations and asked for a monetary settlement. However, it is also clear that neither was considered by the court. The appellant has not provided persuasive evidence to establish that his ex-wife's family has connections to the police in Sri Lanka. [47] Therefore, the only issue that remains is whether he would be subjected to a risk of harm, on a balance of probabilities, at the hands of his ex-wife's family. Taking into consideration the contradictions in his testimony regarding his brother's alleged custody, the vagueness in the police reports, and the ambiguity in the summons reports, and also through my own independent assessment of all the evidence before the RPD and RAD, including listening to the entire CD of the RPD hearing, I find the appellant has not provided any persuasive arguments, or evidence, to persuade me to conclude that, on a balance of probabilities, there is a risk of harm to the appellant upon his return to Sri Lanka. REMEDY [48] For all these reasons, I confirm the determination of the Refugee Protection Division in accordance with paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Act, namely, that , XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, also known as XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "appellant"), is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is therefore dismissed. DECISION The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Rena Dhir" Rena Dhir May 5, 2015 Date 1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees: Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, "Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status", under the 1951 Convention. 2 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act S.C., 2001, c. 27. 3 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR). 4 Exhibit 3, Refugee Protection Division Record (RPDR). 5 Exhibit 2, AR. 6 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 7 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9. 8 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494. 9 Eng v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711. 10 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702. 11 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799. 12 Njeukam v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 859. 13 Yetna v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 CF 858. 14 Wahgmo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 923. 15 Alyafi v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 16 Iyamuremye v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 494, at para. 41. 17 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, at para. 27. 18 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, at para. 28. 19 Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, at para. 33. 20 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, at para. 54. 21 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, at para. 37. 22 Huruglica v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, at para. 55. 23 Exhibit 2, Appellant's Record (AR), Memorandum. 24 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, at para. 54. 25 Huruglica v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 799, at para. 55. 26 Eng v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 711, Alvarez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 702, Spasoja, Francisca v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 913. 27 Alyafi v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 952. 28 Djoussou v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 1080. 29 Siliya v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 120. 30 Garcia Kanga v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2012 FC 482, at para 11. 31 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 32 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 33 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Compact Disc (CD), RPD Hearing; 00:13:00. 34 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 35 Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp.225. 36 Exhibit 3, RPDR, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Sri Lanka (March 14, 2014), item 2.1, Sri Lanka. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. United State, Department of State, 27 February 2014. 37 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 38 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 39 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD-Oral Hearing; 1:40:20. 40 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 41 Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp.119. 42 Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 119 and 126. 43 Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 227-228. 44 Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 127-128 45Exhibit 3, RPDR, pp. 227-228. 46 Exhibit 3, NDP, item 3.2. RIR, LKA103785.E, Prevalence of fraudulent National Identity Cards (NICs), Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. 22 July 2011. 47 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 48 Exhibit 3, RPDR, p. 222. 49 Exhibit 3, RPDR, pg. 274. 50 Exhibit 2, AR, Memorandum. 51 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD, Oral Hearing; 2:18:20. 52 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Basis of Claim. 53 Exhibit 3, RPDR. 54 Exhibit 3, RPDR, Member's Decision. 55 Exhibit 3, RPDR, CD, Oral Hearing, 00:39:38. 56 Exhibit 3, RPDR, NDP, Item 2.1, Sri Lanka. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. United States. Department of State. 27 February 2014.p. 21. 57 Exhibit 3, RPDR, NDP, Item 2.1, Sri Lanka. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013. United States. Department of State. 27 February 2014.p. 21. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : VB4-03825