TC0-12218

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-12218 TC0-12219 / TC0-12220 / TC0-12221 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Date of decision November 9, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Colin Anderson Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Max Berger Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION INTRODUCTION AND DECISION [1] The following reasons explain why I am dismissing the appeal of XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Principal Appellant), XXXX XXXX (the Associate Appellant), and their minor children XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX (together, the Minor Appellants). The Appellants have together appealed the Refugee Protection Division's (RPD) November 16, 2020 decision that rejected their claims for refugee protection. The Appellants have asked that I substitute the RPD's decision with my own finding that the Appellants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection, or that I return the files to the RPD for redetermination. I find that the RPD was correct to determine that the Appellants are not Convention refugees and that they are not persons in need of protection. BACKGROUND [2] The Principal Appellant acted as the designated representative for the Minor Appellants at the RPD and continues in this capacity at the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD). [3] The Appellants have made the following key allegations in their Basis of Claim (BOC) forms and at the RPD hearing: * That the Principal Appellant inherited partial ownership of a plot of land from his mother. The land was jointly owned by the Principal Appellant and his two maternal uncles following the inheritance. * That the Principal Appellant sought to arrange the legal segmentation of his third of the land from his uncles in order to sell it or otherwise use it as he saw fit. * That the Principal Appellant's uncles refused to segment the land and threatened the Principal Appellant and his family. * That the Principal Appellant sought the legal segmentation of the land through applications in civil court. * That the Principal Appellant's uncles responded with violence and intimidation, including the kidnapping and assault of the Appellants, their lawyers, and others who have helped them in their ongoing legal case. That the uncles have murdered and harmed other similarly situated people who have brought land disputes against them in court. * That the uncles have connections with the police and with politicians, rendering the police of no help to the Appellants. [4] The RPD found that the Appellants' claims all failed because the Appellants all had a valid Internal Flight Alternative (IFA) in Islamabad. The RPD also found that the claims had no nexus to the refugee Convention and were therefore assessed only under s. 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).1 [5] The Appellants have argued on appeal that the RPD erred by finding that there was no nexus to the refugee Convention and have further argued that the RPD erred in both prongs of its IFA analysis. The Appellants have also adduced several pieces of proposed new evidence to their appeal. PRELIMINARY MATTERS All the new evidence is admissible [6] The Appellants adduced several pieces of proposed new evidence at the time they perfected their appeal. I find all of this evidence to be admissible. The new evidence is as follows: * An affidavit of the Principal Appellant dated XXXX XXXX, 2021.2 * An affidavit of XXXX XXXX (a friend of the Appellants), dated XXXX XXXX, 2020.3 [7] Both the items above meet the statutory requirements for new evidence found in the IRPA s. 110(4). Both items were generated after the date of the RPD hearing, and more importantly, they recount events that occurred after the date of the RPD hearing. For this reason, they could not reasonably have been presented to the RPD. Both items further meet the criteria for admissibility outlined by the Federal Court in Singh. The items introduce new information that was not before the RPD, in that they recount an incident of assault involving the agents of harm in Islamabad. The items are relevant, in that the information relates to the uncles' ongoing vendetta against the Appellants. The items are also credible enough to be admitted and weighed, because the items themselves cause no new credibility concerns and because the RPD found the Appellants to be generally credible and I have no reason to find otherwise. [8] The Appellants subsequently adduced further evidence after the perfection of their appeal. These items are as follows: * An affidavit of the Principal Appellant dated XXXX XXXX, 2021.4 * A translation of a newspaper article from Daily Alakhbar dated January 8, 2021.5 [9] I find that both the items above are admissible pursuant to RAD Rule 29. I find this way because the items were both produced after the date the appeal was perfected (it was declared perfected on January 7, 2021), and more importantly, both items discuss incidents that apparently occurred after the date of perfection. For this reason, I accept that the items could not have reasonably been made available to the RAD in time for the perfection of the appeal. I also find this way because the items are relevant to and probative of the uncles' ongoing violence against their legal foes, and because the items bring new information to the appeal that was not available at the time of perfection. [10] Both items above are further admissible pursuant to the IRPA s. 110(4) because they post-date the RPD decision and therefore could not have reasonably been made available to the Board until now. Finally, the items meet the criteria of newness, relevance, and credibility described by the Federal Court in Singh. The items bring new information about the uncles' ongoing violence that was not before the Board until now, the information is relevant to the risk the uncles pose to their foes, and the items are credible enough to be admitted and weighed because they do not raise any new credibility problems on their own and because the RPD found the Appellants to be generally credible and I have no reason to find otherwise. No oral hearing is allowed [11] The IRPA s. 110(6) states that the RAD may only hold an oral hearing if, among other things, the new evidence admitted raises a serious issue of credibility with respect to the persons who are the subject of the appeal. In this case, none of the new evidence admitted raises any new credibility problems, the RPD generally found the Appellants to be credible, and I have no reason to find otherwise. For the purposes of my decision, I will treat the new evidence as entirely credible, and I therefore have no discretion (or reason) to hold an oral hearing. The role of the RAD [12] I have reviewed the entirety of the written record and have listened to the audio recording of the RPD hearing. The RPD had no meaningful advantage over me in assessing the credibility of oral testimony. I have therefore undertaken a review of the correctness of the RPD decision throughout. IFA as the determinative issue [13] As I will explain below, I find that the RPD was correct to determine that the Appellants have not shown that they face a serious possibility of persecution or a likelihood of a s. 97 risk in the proposed IFA location of Islamabad. The Appellants have also not shown that Islamabad would be objectively unreasonable in all the circumstances, including their own personal circumstances. The Appellants all have a valid IFA available to them and it is for this reason their claims cannot succeed. ANALYSIS A quick note on credibility [14] The RPD found that the Appellants lacked credibility with respect to one aspect of their evidence, namely the uncles' alleged attempt to find them in Hyderabad. Despite finding that the Appellants lacked credibility in this area, the RPD found the Appellants to be generally credible with respect to their allegations on a balance of probabilities. [15] The Appellants have not contested the RPD's findings on credibility in their appeal to the RAD. [16] Because there are other determinative issues in this appeal, I adopt the RPD's conclusion on credibility and will assume without deciding that the Appellants are credible with respect to their allegations and their supporting evidence, including the new evidence adduced on appeal. There is no nexus to the refugee Convention [17] The RPD found that there was no nexus to the refugee Convention and stated that it would only assess the claims under the IRPA s. 97. Despite its finding on nexus, the RPD went on to use the Convention's language and assessed the IFA location in Islamabad on the "serious possibility of persecution" standard as well as a likelihood of a s. 97 risk on a balance of probabilities. [18] The issue of nexus is important to this appeal for two reasons. First, the existence of a nexus governs how the IFA analysis should proceed (under s. 96, a serious possibility of persecution, s. 97, a likelihood of a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture on a balance of probabilities, or both). Second, the existence of a nexus as it has been proposed by the Appellants could potentially establish that the uncles' vendettas are persistent and related to the immutable characteristics of the Appellants rather than anything curable in an IFA (I note here that the RPD found that the IFA was viable because the uncles would not be motivated to continue to harm the Appellants should they take reasonable steps to end the legal dispute. This is explored fully in the IFA section below). [19] The RPD found that no nexus existed because the Appellants were all targeted solely because of the land dispute with their criminal uncles. The RPD noted that none of the Appellants were members of any of the protected classes described in the Convention, and further noted that land ownership is not recognized as a core human right under the international refugee Convention. [20] The Appellants have argued on appeal that they do have a nexus to the refugee Convention. Specifically, they argue that the uncles' motives are mixed and that they have been targeted not only because of the legal land dispute brought by the Principal Appellant, but also because they are heirs to a woman's property and are therefore subject to persecution on the basis of the Principal Appellant's mother's gender. They have also asserted that they have membership in a social group defined by their immutable status as family members of a woman who was the subject of - and who resisted - misogyny at the hands of her brothers. In short, the Appellants argue that the uncles' criminal vendetta is persecutory and gender-related and would persist even if the Principal Appellant were to drop the court case against them. [21] In support of their argument, the Appellants have pointed to country condition evidence showing that misogyny is prevalent in Pakistan and that women are often pressured to give up land rights. They note that the RPD accepted that the Principal Appellant's mother was pressured to give up her share of the land when it was owned by herself and the uncles. The Appellants have argued that, once the Principal Appellant inherited his mother's share of the land, it became clear that the uncles would not rest until their patriarchal attitudes were reinforced and they became the sole legal proprietors of the land. [22] I do not agree with the Appellants' interpretation of the evidence and I agree with the RPD that there is no nexus to the Convention on the basis of the evidence. First, to be clear, I accept that mixed motives, when they are partially related to a Convention ground, are sufficient to find that a nexus exists. Second, I accept the country condition evidence that the Appellants have pointed to and agree that gender-based persecution and general misogyny is prevalent in Pakistan. However, after careful consideration of all the Appellants' evidence, I see no mixed motives behind the uncles' actions as they relate to the Appellants and no evidence that the uncles' actions are motivated by anything other than the civil litigation brought by the Principal Appellant against them. [23] I find this way because there is no indication in any of the evidence that the uncles ever committed an act of violence or persecution against any of the Appellants at any time prior to the launch of the civil litigation, despite the fact that the Appellants all held the immutable characteristic of having been the family of a property-holding woman for many years prior to this. The Appellants' narrative states that the land in question was jointly bequeathed to the Principal Appellant's mother and her two brothers (the uncles) by their late father (the Principal Appellant's maternal grandfather) in the year 2000.6 The same narrative notes that five years later, in 2005, the Principal Appellant's mother and her two brothers were "incorporated in the revenue record as owner/co-sharers." The narrative notes that in 2014, the Principal Appellant's mother orally gifted her share of the land to the Principal Appellant. At that point, the narrative states, the uncles became "rude" to the Principal Appellant. The next incident described in the narrative occurs around late 2018 (I infer this because the Basis of Claim form was signed in late 2019 and the narrative refers to the incident occurring "about 1 years back...").7 In approximately late 2018, the Principal Appellant asked his uncles to legally partition the land so that he could use or sell his share. The uncles "lingered on the matter one pretext or the other" and then in mid-2019, when asked again, they "flatly refused" to undertake the partition and threatened the Principal Appellant's life "if [the Principal Appellant] again demanded for partition of said land."8 [24] As stated above, I am considering all of the Appellants' evidence credible in this analysis, and therefore accept at face value that the first persecutory act that the uncles undertook against the Appellants occurred when the Principal Appellant sought the legal partition of the land. [25] This, in my opinion, is completely at odds with the Appellant's interpretation of mixed motives or a gender or social group reason for the uncles' actions. According to the Appellants' own evidence, the Principal Appellant's mother held her portion of the family land along with the uncles from the year 2000 to 2014. I accept, as the RPD did, that the uncles pressured the mother into giving up her land during this time, but it is also compelling to me to note that the Appellants' evidence in no way recounts any persecutory or violent activity on the part of the uncles against the Appellants (or the Principal Appellant's mother) during this 14-year period. From the year 2014-2018, the Appellants' own evidence states that the Principal Appellant held his share of the family land that he had been gifted by his mother. Again, the evidence recounts no incidents of persecution against the Appellants during this four-year period, despite the fact that all the Appellants held the immutable status of having been related to a woman that held property in a patriarchal society. It was only after the Principal Appellant pursued the legal segmentation of the land that the uncles became threatening and violent. [26] I note that the Appellants amended their narrative twice before the RPD hearing. The first amendment notes that the Principal Appellant's mother was "requested" to surrender her share of the property during the period of her ownership.9 The same narrative notes that when the land was registered in 2005 in the name of the Principal Appellant's mother and the two uncles, the uncles "caused a fuss and asked that my mother transfer her share to them." The amended narrative notes no instances of violence or persecution against the Appellants or the mother during this period. The amended narrative notes that the uncles only became "enraged" and issued threats after the Principal Appellant pressed the issue of legal land partition. [27] The Appellants amended their narrative for a second time at the RPD. The second amendment to the narrative provides no new allegations regarding any persecutory activity on the part of the uncles before the Principal Appellant launched his civil litigation against them. Instead, the second amendment makes new allegations about the uncles' more recent criminal activity. Specifically, the second amendment notes that the uncles recently threatened to kill the Principal Appellant "and everyone who helps me."10 The uncles apparently kidnapped a family friend's brother (the family friend had recently helped the Appellants) as well as the Appellants' lawyer who was pursuing the Appellants' civil litigation. Crucially, the Appellant's evidence states that their former lawyer, apparently intimidated by the uncles' threats, withdrew from representing them in XXXX 2020.11 There is no evidence that the lawyer or anyone else has continued to be the target of the uncles' vendetta once they remove themselves from the ongoing civil litigation over the land dispute. The fact that the uncles apparently did not threaten or harm anyone prior to the launch of the legal land partition and the fact that the uncles apparently do not continue to threaten or harm related people like the lawyer once they remove themselves from the litigation (or assistance to the Appellants, who are pursuing it) strongly suggests to me that the uncles' vendettas do not carry mixed motives. In my opinion, the evidence is clear that the uncles' motive lies squarely with resisting the civil litigation brought against them by the Principal Appellant. [28] In conclusion, I see no evidence to support the Appellants' argument that the uncles "would not rest until their patriarchal attitudes were reinforced and they became the sole legal proprietors of the land." The uncles took no persecutory action against the Appellants for many, many years after the mother became a part owner, and only became threatening and harmful once the legal partition was commenced. For all these reasons, I see no mixed motives and find that the Appellants' risk of harm falls under the umbrella of a criminal vendetta. I see no nexus to the refugee Convention and will proceed to assess the appeal only under the IRPA s. 97. The RPD correctly framed the two-pronged approach to IFA analysis [29] The RPD confused matters somewhat when it referred to the "serious possibility of persecution" standard despite earlier finding that no nexus to the Convention existed. This is a minor error that likely benefitted the Appellants, since the serious possibility of persecution standard is generally considered lower than the balance of probabilities standard required for s. 97 analyses. Nevertheless, the RPD correctly framed the two-pronged approach to IFA analysis as required by the Federal Court. For clarity, the two prongs applicable to this appeal are as follows: * First, the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the Appellants would not be subject to a risk to life or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture. I refer to this as the prong of "safety" below. * Moreover, conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claimant[s], for [them] to seek refuge there. I refer to this as the prong of "reasonableness" below. [30] Both prongs of the test must be satisfied in order for an IFA to be considered valid. The RPD identified several possible cities as proposed IFAs at the RPD hearing, but only based its decision on the viability of Islamabad. First Prong Analysis: the IFA is safe [31] The RPD found that the IFA passed the first prong test of safety as articulated above. Specifically, the RPD found that, while the agents of harm would likely possess the means to find the Appellants in Islamabad if they so desired, the agents of harm would lack the motivation to continue to harm the Appellants if the Appellants were to drop the ongoing civil litigation against the uncles. [32] The Appellants have argued that the RPD's analysis on the motivation of the uncles to continue to harm them is lacking. Specifically, the Appellants have argued that, as the Principal Appellant is now involved in the "perceived misdeeds" of his mother (that is, being the beneficiary of property belonging to a woman in a misogynist society) in defiance of the uncles' wishes, the family would continue to face harm even if the civil litigation were dropped. The Appellants again have pointed to the country condition evidence showing that women face domestic violence and reprisal killings for alleged misdeeds. The Appellants point out that even if the land were no longer an issue, the uncles are established criminals involved in an organization called the "XXXX Group," and the Appellants would continue to be at risk. They also argue that the uncles would continue to be motivated because the Appellants reported the uncles to the police on several occasions, and objective evidence supports that people who report criminals to the police can face reprisals. They argue that police and other authorities might take vengeance on the Appellants wherever they go. They note that the evidence supports that others who have witnessed the uncle's crimes and others that have supported the litigation have been harmed. They argue that they could be accused of blasphemy and that the Board has an obligation to assess this risk despite the fact that they have not experienced this themselves to date. Finally, they argue that the RPD failed to give reasons as to why Islamabad would be different than any other city in Pakistan. [33] At the start of my analysis, I am mindful of all the various potential agents of harm in this case. First and foremost are the two uncles, who apparently have a vendetta against the Appellants because of the civil litigation launched against them by the Principal Appellant. [34] Second, the Appellants have at times suggested that the police may be agents of harm. The Appellants have suggested that the uncles are connected to and perhaps have the sympathy of the police, but they have not articulated these connections in any detail. The Appellants have suggested that the police would not investigate criminal complaints against the uncles, and that the police may have leaked information about criminal complaints to the uncles. However, the evidence does not make the connection between the uncles and the police clear. One affidavit, which I will assume is credible for the purposes of this analysis, claims that a friend who recently assisted the Appellants was assaulted by the uncle's associates from the XXXX Group and some people were dressed in police uniforms.12 The evidence taken as a whole does not establish that the police possess their own vendetta against the Appellants, and instead suggests that the police can be considered to be a tool used by the uncles in their criminal vendetta. In short, there is no evidence to suggest that the police would pose a threat to the Appellants except at the uncles' behest, and no evidence that any threat would exist from the police should the uncles' vendetta cease. [35] Third, the Appellants have vaguely referred to the uncles having connections to powerful political figures, but nowhere in the evidence makes any of these connections clear. There are no specific allegations that any politically powerful people have ever harmed the Appellants or anyone else related to them. As a result, I see no clear agent of harm in the political sphere that would continue to harm the Appellants absent the uncles' vendetta. It is unclear to me how the Appellants came to know that the uncles were politically connected, and further unclear to me why the Appellants would not articulate these political connections in detail, should they be aware of them. [36] With respect to the Appellants' arguments, there is absolutely no evidence supporting the notion that the uncles' vendetta is motivated by any "perceived misdeeds" on the part of the Principal Appellant's mother. This is explored fully in the section above on nexus. To summarize, the harm the uncles have unleashed on the Appellants did not begin until the Principal Appellant launched a formal bid to partition the family land. The Principal Appellant's mother had apparently jointly owned the land with the uncles for well over a decade beforehand, and there are no clear instances of harm having come to either the Appellants or the mother in the entirety of that time, despite the fact that the Appellants claim that they all resisted the uncles' desire to take full ownership of the land that entire time. I would expect that, had the mother's "perceived misdeeds" been any kind of motivating force for the uncles, the uncles would have taken action at some point in the preceding 14 years instead of only taking action in response to formal requests and legal proceedings. [37] I completely accept the country condition evidence showing that women face domestic violence and reprisal killings over alleged misdeeds. However, there is no evidence linking those country conditions to the facts of this case. The affidavit of the Appellant's mother notes that she is still living in Pakistan to this day - apparently safely - and I have no evidence indicating that she or anyone else related to the Appellants has been or would be subjected to domestic violence or reprisal for any gender-related misdeed.13 [38] The Appellants have adduced seven different media articles that mention the XXXX Group and their alleged criminal activities.14 The Appellants argue that since the uncles are established criminals, they would continue to be at risk regardless of the status of the litigation. The evidence does not support this. All of the affidavits in evidence detail very targeted assaults and other crimes such as kidnapping attempts. Each and every one of them is specifically targeted at a person that is actively involved in the ongoing litigation over the land. Conversely, other affidavits show that certain people, such as the Appellants' former lawyer, removed themselves from the litigation and there is no evidence that they continue to be harmed or threatened once they remove their involvement. The media reports are similar. They all detail incidents involving people that are actively involved in opposing the XXXX Group's land-related activities. Not one single piece of evidence - in seven media reports and twelve affidavits - details an incident in which the uncles or the XXXX Group has maintained a vendetta and harmed someone despite the resolution of the various land disputes documented in the evidence. The media articles claim that the XXXX Group is "notorious."15 Given the extensive media coverage of the group and their apparently well-known activities, I would expect that the media coverage would document crimes of revenge after the resolution of disputes, should revenge be the modus operandi of these criminals.16 I infer from the silence of the extensive evidence that revenge following the resolution of disputes is not the modus operandi of these criminals. The extensive evidence on the uncles' activities - taken at face value - details no ongoing motivation to harm people once the criminals get their way in their specific disputes. [39] The Appellants have argued that the uncles and the XXXX Group would be motivated to pursue them because the Appellants had reported their activities to the police on several occasions. I am not persuaded on this issue. This is because the Appellants' own evidence states that the XXXX Group has the "entire support of police" and because there is absolutely no evidence that the police ever took any action against the uncles or their associates, or ever registered a first information report of any kind against them.17 The Appellants have adduced extensive media reports and there is a complete dearth of information suggesting that the XXXX Group has ever acted out of revenge for police reporting or any other issue once the specific land dispute is resolved. I find this to be a highly speculative argument that is not supported by any evidence. [40] It is also highly speculative to suppose that the police or other authorities might take vengeance on the Appellants. This is, of course, theoretically possible, but there is no evidence that the police have a vendetta against the Appellants separate from the uncles' current vendetta. I note that people in police uniforms apparently assisted XXXX Group members in the recent assault of friends of the Appellants, but this is in the context of the ongoing pursuit of the civil litigation.18 There is no evidence that the police or other authorities have or would continue to harm people once the specific land dispute with the uncles is resolved. [41] The Appellants have argued that they could face false accusations of blasphemy in Pakistan because false accusations of blasphemy are a common tool used to harass and threaten people that are the subject of vendettas there. I am well aware of the country conditions that document numerous instances of this having occurred in recent years. This is certainly a theoretically possible future scenario, but the argument fails because it is, in this case, entirely speculative. There is absolutely no evidence that any of the Appellants ever has been or ever would be subject to blasphemy accusations. There is absolutely no evidence linking the uncles or the XXXX Group to past incidents of blasphemy accusations, so I have no reason at all beyond pure speculation to find that it is the modus operandi of the uncles or their criminal associates to use blasphemy accusations in an attempt to harm opponents. [42] The Appellants finally argue that the RPD erred in its IFA analysis because it did not articulate why Islamabad would be any different than any other city in terms of safety. I do not see this as an error. There is no need for Islamabad to necessarily be any different than other cities, as long as it meets the two-pronged test. [43] It is deeply unfortunate for the Appellants that the uncles are members of a criminal land grabbing group, and this is intensified by the fact that the uncles have set their sights on the land bequeathed to the Principal Appellant. The RPD noted at the hearing, however, that there is no internationally recognized core human right to wealth or land. The Appellants testified at the RPD hearing that, as of XXXX XXXX, 2020, the civil litigation brought by the Principal Appellant against the uncles over the land was still ongoing. The RPD asked the Appellants why they did not simply drop the legal campaign against the uncles and surrender their title to the land in order to try to end the threat of harm against them. It is unclear to me why the Appellants continued to pursue the land dispute against the uncles given the apparent threats and violence it has brought. [44] Over a year has now passed since the date of the RPD hearing. The Appellants in this time have filed their appeal documentation including new evidence and an additional post-perfection set of new evidence and submissions. The Appellants do not address the end of the civil litigation against the uncles in any way in this documentation. I infer from the Appellants' silence on this issue that they still, to this day, continue to pursue the civil litigation over the land against the uncles and have still not attempted to resolve the dispute with the uncles. [45] The Appellants, in their own Rule 29 submissions, point to the jurisprudence of the Federal Court on IFAs.19 That jurisprudence states in part that, "IFA must be sought, if it is not unreasonable to do so, in the circumstances of the individual claimant" and "if there is a safe haven for claimants in their own country... they are expected to avail themselves of it unless they can show that it is objectively unreasonable for them to do so." The Appellants, in this case, are obligated to take reasonable steps to attempt to resolve their dispute and render the IFA location safe before seeking the protection of Canada. The Appellants have adduced numerous pieces of evidence from their recent connections in Pakistan. They have shown an ability to send and receive correspondence with lawyers in Pakistan from abroad, and they are apparently in contact with other family members and friends in Pakistan, any one of whom could help facilitate the end of the legal, formal claim to the land and could end the dispute with the uncles, the XXXX Group, and their possible police or political sympathizers. I find it reasonable to expect the Appellants in the circumstances unique to them to attempt to end the civil litigation and the dispute with the uncles in order to render the IFA safe. It is entirely unreasonable to me that the Appellants continue to pursue this litigation and dispute while seeking the protection of the international community. [46] In summary, while the evidence shows that the uncles may have the means to find the Appellants in Islamabad, it does not support the notion that the uncles or their criminal associates continue to harm former opponents once specific land disputes are resolved. The Appellants have not established that any motive to harm them exists besides the current ongoing civil litigation that they have brought. It is reasonable to expect the Appellants to attempt to render their IFA safe by ending their claims to the disputed land. It is speculative to find that the uncles or their criminal associates would continue to be motivated to harm the Appellants if the Appellants took the reasonable step of ending their land claim. For these reasons, the RPD was correct to find that the Appellants have not shown that they would face a likelihood of a s. 97 harm on a balance of probabilities should they travel to and live in Islamabad, and take the reasonable steps above to render the IFA safe. Islamabad passes the first-prong test of safety. Second Prong Analysis: The IFA is reasonable in all the circumstances [47] The RPD asked the Appellants about the reasonableness of moving to and living in Islamabad at the hearing. The Appellants put forward no reasons why they could not do so in their circumstances. In closing submissions, the Appellants' counsel suggested that it would be unduly harsh for the Appellants to move to Islamabad since they do not have family there and because they have very young children. [48] The RPD noted that the case the Appellants cited regarding the viability of an IFA for a newborn referred to an unaccompanied newborn, and that the circumstances of that case are not at all similar to the circumstances of this one, in which the Appellants consist of their own family unit of father, mother, and two children. The RPD noted that the Appellants would all have one another as their means of family and social support. [49] The RPD assessed the reasonableness of Islamabad and found that there was no evidence that the Minor Appellants would be denied fundamental education. The RPD found that the Appellants would not need to live in hiding once the land claim was ended, and noted that the Appellants speak Urdu, the dominant language, and practice Sunni Islam, the dominant religion in Pakistan. The RPD also noted that the adult Appellants are both educated with extensive travel experience. The RPD found no evidence that the adult Appellants would have significant trouble finding employment. [50] The Appellants have argued on appeal that they would not be able to support themselves in Islamabad because the Principal Appellant was forced to shut down his former business. I am sympathetic to the Appellants regarding the shuttering of their former business, but I do not agree with them that this causes the IFA to be unreasonable. There is no fundamental right for the Appellants to own their own business and Islamabad need not offer the Appellants the opportunity to be business owners in order to be reasonable. Both Appellants are highly educated (the Principal Appellant has a XXXX XXXX, and the Associate Appellant has a XXXX in XXXX)20 and the Principal Appellant has a history of gainful employment. I see no conditions in Islamabad that would prevent the Appellants in their personal circumstances from finding reasonable dignified employment that could support them, whether they open their own business or become employees of someone else. The country conditions establish that Islamabad is a thriving major urban hub and a centre of employment in many fields. [51] The RPD was correct in its assessment of the conditions in Islamabad as they relate to the personal circumstances of each individual Appellant. The Appellants have advanced no convincing argument against the reasonableness of Islamabad as an IFA given their personal circumstances and I adopt the RPD's findings regarding the family unit, availability of education, language, religion, and employment. No argument was advanced regarding housing or the ability to travel to the IFA location. The Appellants have a history of adequate housing and have friends in Islamabad who they are apparently still in touch with and who I infer could help them settle and find housing. The country conditions do not support drastic unavailability of housing, and I see no reason the Appellants would be prevented from reasonably travelling to or around the city. Islamabad passes the second prong test of reasonableness in all the circumstances. Conclusion on IFA [52] The IFA in Islamabad passes the first prong test of safety because it could be reasonably rendered safe if the Appellants take steps to end their ongoing dispute with the uncles. Islamabad is also reasonable for the Appellants in all the circumstances, including those unique to them. The availability of a viable IFA is the determinative issue in this appeal. CONCLUSION [53] The RPD was correct to find that no nexus to the refugee Convention exists in this appeal. The RPD was also correct to find that the proposed IFA in Islamabad is viable because it meets both the test of safety and reasonableness prescribed by the Federal Court. [54] The Appellants have not shown that they face a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, or, on a balance of probabilities, a risk to life, risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture should they return to Pakistan. [55] The Appellants are not Convention refugees and they are not persons in need of protection. The appeal is dismissed pursuant to IRPA s. 111(1)(a). (signed) COLIN ANDERSON Colin Anderson November 9, 2021 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) (S.C. 2001, c. 27). 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at page 3. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at page 7. 4 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, February 1, 2021, at page 3. 5 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, February 1, 2021, at page 7. 6 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at page 141. 7 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at page 141. 8 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 4, at page 143. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at page 162. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 5, at page 186. 11 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at pages 267-268. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at page 7. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at page 274. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at pages 293-306; Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, February 1, 2021, at page 7. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at page 293. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at page 305. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6, at page 303. 18 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at page 7. 19 Exhibit P-3, Rule 29 Application, February 1, 2021, at page 17. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, BOC amendment, at pages 88, 94. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TC0-12218 TC0-12219 / TC0-12220 / TC0-12221 RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (August 20, 2021) Disponible en français