VB8-05811

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB8-05811 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision October 13, 2020 Date de la décision Panel M. Oh Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Andrew Z Wlodyka Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister Randal Hyland Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX ("the Appellant") is an Iraqi citizen from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He worked with the Asayish security forces in Erbil between 2003 and 2009. He fears persecution from the Kurdistan Regional Government ("KRG") because of his knowledge of the Asayish's role in a staged explosion that occurred in 2010 and the assassination of his friend, who revealed this information to him. The Refugee Protection Division ("RPD") rejected the Appellant's claim, as it found that he was excluded from refugee protection under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention for his complicity in torture and imprisonment in violation of fundamental rules of international law during his time with the Asayish. The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in relying on a transcript of an interview that contained interpretation problems. He also argues that the RPD erred in its application of the test for complicity. [2] Pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act ("IRPA"), the appeal is dismissed. I agree with the RPD's reasons for relying on the transcript. I also see no error in the RPD's application of the test for complicity. I determine that the Appellant is excluded from refugee protection pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention. I therefore confirm the RPD's decision. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant is a member of the Kurdistan Democratic Party ("KDP"). He obtained a job with the KDP Asayish while he was a university student. The Asayish are the security forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan ("PUK") and the KDP operate their own Asayish units in their respective zones of control, which are reportedly separate in practice and effectively controlled by political leaders.1 The KDP controlled the governorates of Erbil and Duhok, while the PUK controlled the governorate of Sulaimaniya and part of the Kirkuk governorate.2 The Appellant worked in the anti-terror section of the KDP Asayish, specifically in the investigations department, at the Asayish General Directorate in Erbil. [4] According to the Appellant, it was mainly individuals suspected of terrorism who were brought to his section. The Appellant was working part-time, and he was responsible for supervising detention visits. He explained the rules of the visits to detainees and their visitors, and instructed them not to discuss the circumstances of their arrest or detention. The visits were limited to only a few minutes. The Appellant was aware that detainees were being tortured in the detention facility in his compound. He knew that the detainees were undergoing investigation and that long-term detention without due process or review was taking place. [5] The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ("the Minister") intervened in the Appellant's claim on the basis of Article 1F(a) exclusion. The Minister argued that there were serious reasons for considering that the Asayish were engaged in crimes against humanity during the Appellant's period of time of employment, and that the Appellant was complicit in these crimes. [6] The RPD heard the Appellant's claim over the course of two sittings, which took place on January 15, 2018 and May 30, 2018. The RPD determined that the Appellant was excluded from refugee protection for his complicity in crimes against humanity. The RPD pointed to two particular crimes under Article 7 of the Rome Statute, which constitute crimes against humanity when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population: torture; and imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law. These were incorporated into domestic law under section 6 of the Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act3. There was no dispute between the parties that the crimes committed by the Asayish constitute crimes against humanity. [7] There were two main issues with respect to Article 1F(a) exclusion: 1) Whether the RPD could rely on the transcript of an interview that had taken place on November 28, 2016 between the Appellant and a Canada Border Services Agency ("CBSA") officer, which the Appellant alleges suffered from interpretation issues; and 2) Whether the Appellant is complicit in the crimes against humanity committed by the Asayish. [8] The RPD placed full weight on the interview transcript, which was largely consistent in material areas with the testimony given at the Appellant's hearing. The RPD applied the test for complicity as set out in the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Ezokola4. The RPD considered and weighed the various factors. The RPD concluded that the factors weighed in favour of finding that the Appellant had made a voluntary, significant, and knowing contribution to crimes against humanity that were committed by the Asayish during his period of employment with them. Role of the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) [9] The jurisprudence establishes that the RAD is required to undertake an independent assessment of the evidence and reach its own determination. Deference is owed to the RPD only where the RPD held a meaningful advantage in assessing evidence.5 [10] In the present case, I see no reason to show deference to any of the RPD's findings. I have applied a correctness standard and arrived at independent findings based on the evidence before me. ANALYSIS [11] The Appellant argues the following on appeal: a) That the RPD erred by relying on the transcript of the CBSA interview that had been tainted by interpretation problems; and b) That the RPD erred in its application of the test for complicity. [12] For the reasons that follow, I see no error in the RPD's analysis of these issues. I reach the same conclusion on an independent assessment. a) Whether the RPD erred by relying on the transcript of the CBSA interview that had been tainted by interpretation problems [13] The RPD relied on the contents of an interview that was conducted by a CBSA hearings advisor on November 28, 2016. The Appellant continues to dispute the use of this transcript on appeal. However, I find that the RPD did not commit an error in relying on the transcript. [14] The Appellant relies on the very same arguments outlined by his previous counsel at the RPD. In written submissions to the RPD, the Appellant had argued that the transcript of the interview should be given little to no weight, since there were significant misunderstandings that occurred in the interview. In particular, the Appellant believed that those issues had caused the Minister to misconstrue his evidence about whether he had received weapons training and whether he had participated in conducting any arrests. [15] Though the Minister pointed to the interview transcript to say that the Appellant had participated in arrests, the Appellant says that he had only gone with Asayish officers on a single occasion during a night shift, and he was only asked to go as part of a show of numbers. There was a fight between two intoxicated groups who were carrying weapons. The arrested individuals were taken to the Asayish building, where they appeared before a night judge, who released them. At his hearing, the Appellant did not consider this to be an arrest. The Appellant emphasized that he had no uniform, he was not issued a weapon, and he was not trained to conduct arrests. He did not even leave the vehicle on the one occasion in question. [16] As for the training he received, the Appellant again pointed out how the transcript was misleading. Contrary to what was interpreted at the CBSA interview, the Appellant clarified that he did not receive formal training. He attended a 10-day program that everyone took, to learn how to open and clean a pistol. He clarified that he was never issued a firearm. Although the Appellant was in possession of a pistol, this was his own personal weapon, which had not been issued to him by the Asayish. [17] The RPD addressed these arguments, and I see no error in the RPD's reasons on this issue. The RPD correctly gave a number of reasons for assigning full weight to the interview transcript. The panel noted that a Kurdish Sorani interpreter had been used, that the Appellant and the interpreter confirmed that they understood each other, and there was no indication that there were any communication problems. The Appellant's answers were responsive to the questions. The Appellant had not requested an audit of the interview recording. [18] Importantly, the Appellant's former counsel had not directed the RPD to any specific errors made by the interpreter. Although the Minister's Counsel had construed the Appellant's interview statements in a way that was unfavourable to the Appellant, in fact the contents of the interview and the testimony at the hearing were generally consistent. It seems that out of an abundance of caution, where there were still facts that were unclear from the interview, the RPD tended to accept the version of the facts that had been described in oral testimony at the hearing. For instance, in relation to the night arrest, the RPD accepted that the Appellant was not physically involved in the arrest, and that he had merely remained in the vehicle for the entirety of the incident. The RPD did not cite the Appellant's training and possession of a firearm as a factor in its decision. [19] The credibility of the Appellant's testimony and interview statements is not at issue here. I accept the Appellant's evidence on these matters. For the purposes of the exclusion analysis, I accept that the Appellant was not issued a firearm by the Asayish, that he did not receive formal weapons training as a result of his employment, and that his involvement in the night arrest was exactly as described by him at his hearing. b) Whether the RPD erred in its application of the test for complicity [20] The principal issue in this appeal is whether the RPD erred in its application of the test for complicity as set out in Ezokola. The Appellant conceded that there were elements of the Asayish that were involved in crimes against humanity, including torture and lengthy pre-trial detention without review or due process. However, he argues that he did not make a knowing and significant contribution to those crimes. Although I have carefully considered the Appellant's arguments on this issue and his reply to the Minister's submissions, I reach the same conclusion as the RPD. The test for complicity [21] In Ezokola, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the applicable test for complicity. The test requires that there are serious reasons for considering that the refugee claimant has voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to the organization's crime or criminal purpose.6 This replaced the 'personal and knowing participation' test that had previously been adopted by the Federal Court of Appeal, which the Supreme Court in Ezokola considered had sometimes been overextended to capture individuals on the basis of complicity by association.7 [22] In assessing whether an individual has voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to a crime or a group's criminal purpose, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider. These include: i. The size and nature of the organization; ii. The part of the organization with which the refugee claimant was most directly concerned; iii. The refugee claimant's duties and activities within the organization; iv. The refugee claimant's position or rank in the organization; v. The length of time the refugee claimant was in the organization, particularly after acquiring knowledge of the group's crime or criminal purpose; and vi. The method by which the refugee claimant was recruited and their opportunity to leave the organization.8 [23] The Supreme Court emphasized that the analysis of the factors is highly contextual, and that the focus must always remain on the individual's contribution to the crime or criminal purpose. The Appellant has challenged the RPD's assessment of the Ezokola factors, which will be addressed below. Factors (i) and (ii): Size and nature of the organization and part of the organization [24] The RPD acknowledged that the Asayish is a relatively large and multi-faced organization that carries out legitimate investigatory and law enforcement activities. The panel noted that there were different directorates for the various governorates, as well as a General Security Directorate that oversaw and coordinated their functions. The Asayish was not an organization with a limited and brutal purpose. The size and nature of the organization was not a weighty factor in the assessment. [25] However, factor (ii) did weigh in favour of exclusion. As for the part of the organization with which the Appellant worked, the RPD noted that the Appellant had testified that he worked for the XXXX XXXX XXXX in Erbil in the XXXX XXXX, which was part of the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. He indicated that XXXX suspects were brought to the section. He was aware that torture and long-term detention were taking place without any form of review. His office was located in the same compound as the detention facility, where such abuses were taking place. The RPD considered that the Appellant was proximate to the commission of crimes against humanity, and that he worked as part of the detention apparatus as someone who was involved in supervising visits to detainees. The Appellant's arguments [26] The Appellant submits that the RPD made erroneous findings of fact in relation to these factors. He emphasizes that the Asayish have different offices and branches belonging separately to the KDP and PUK. The Appellant says that he never worked for the PUK Asayish or even with the KDP Asayish in other governorates, and therefore cannot have been complicit in any of the abuses committed by them. [27] In addition, the Appellant submits that he did not have proximity to the location where crimes against humanity were committed by the Asayish. His office was not even located in the detention facility. Detainees were brought from the detention facility to a visitation room located in his building. The RAD's independent assessment [28] I am not persuaded that there is any error in the RPD's analysis of these factors. [29] The RPD was aware that the KDP and PUK maintained their own Asayish. I do not read the RPD's reasons to mean that it was considering the Appellant's complicity in crimes pertaining to the PUK Asayish directorates. Both the PUK and KDP Asayish were responsible for committing torture and detention without review or due process in their respective zones of control. The objective evidence indicates that torture and pre-trial detention without due process occurred in the KDP Asayish detention facility in Erbil. The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq ("UNAMI") reported that it had visited detention facilities in Kurdistan, including the KDP Asayish detention facilities in Erbil in the first half of 2007.9 In the vast majority of cases in Kurdistan, Asayish detainees remained held in pre-trial detention for prolonged periods, some for over three years.10 UNAMI received consistent allegations of ill-treatment or torture in detention, particularly during interrogation. The majority of those interviewed by UNAMI had alleged torture by officials.11 [30] The Appellant does not deny that torture and imprisonment without due process or review occurred with respect to the detainees in the compound where he worked. His statements at his hearing and in the CBSA interview are very much consistent with the objective documentary evidence on this issue. As the Appellant indicated, it was common knowledge that those who were taken to the Asayish (including the compound where he worked) would be subjected to torture. The Appellant testified that when he started working for the Asayish, he was aware that they were torturing detainees. Though his office was not located inside the detention facility, it was in the same compound. He saw first-hand, on at least two occasions, that detainees were beaten. He indicated that detainees could not be visited if they had visible injuries. He stated that people in the detention facility who were being investigated were being held from six months to three years, depending on the situation. [31] The RPD correctly considered that the Appellant was proximate to the commission of crimes against humanity, which were occurring in the very same compound where the Appellant worked. The Appellant worked as part of the detention apparatus that was responsible for these crimes, as someone who was involved in supervising visits to detainees. I agree with the RPD that this factor weighs in favour of finding that the Appellant made a knowing and significant contribution to crimes against humanity. Factors (iii) and (iv): The Appellant's duties, activities, and position in the Asayish [32] The RPD found that the Appellant's relatively low position in the Asayish weighed against a finding of complicity. This was not in dispute. The Appellant was a part-time worker who only worked at the Asayish XXXX days a week, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX each time. He had no uniform or weapon, and always worked under the supervision of one particular Asayish officer. [33] However, the Appellant's duties and activities with the Asayish weighed heavily in favour of exclusion. The RPD noted that the Appellant was responsible for supervising visits between family members and detainees. He was tasked with explaining the visitation rules, which prohibited discussion around sensitive topics, such as the circumstances around the arrests and detention. The significant contribution, from the RPD's perspective, lay in the Appellant's role in restricting the flow of information from the detainee to the outside world. As a result of the Appellant's work, the detainee was unable to communicate any information about any torture, mistreatment, or lack of due process. The relaying of such information might have ameliorated their situation. The RPD considered that the Appellant's presence in the room during the visits and his directions to the detainees and visitors furthered the Asayish's ability to perpetrate the abuses. The panel noted how the Appellant had described in his CBSA interview that injured prisoners could not receive visits from family or from human rights organizations. He knew that the Asayish had an interest in concealing evidence about torture and ill-treatment from the public. The Appellant's arguments [34] The Appellant argues that the RPD was wrong in finding that his main duty was to supervise prison visits. The Appellant says that he did not have a role in closing off the detainees' outlet to communicate the conditions of their detention to their visitors. Though he was involved in the visits, he was not a "supervisor" in the sense that he had supervisory authority. [35] The Appellant emphasizes that he was not an officer or agent of the Asayish. He was merely a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX worker who had an extremely low-ranking position. He says that his duties were such that he could not have been knowledgeable of all the Asayish's activities. [36] The Appellant points to a number of facts that are indicative of his low rank and influence. When his supervisor, Mr. XXXX, was not present, he was not allowed to attend to any visits. The Appellant had to be searched whenever he went to his workplace. He was never issued an ID card. He had no influence on the actions taken by the Asayish or their policies. He did not have any discretion with regard to the visit. Though he was present in the room, it was Mr. XXXX who supervised the visits. It was Mr. XXXX who provided the lead in giving instructions to family members. The Appellant describes that his role was passive. He would merely state to the visitor and detainee that they had three to five minutes and that they should use their time wisely. The RAD's independent assessment [37] Although the Appellant argues that the RPD made errors of fact, in truth the RPD accepted the facts as alleged by the Appellant. The Appellant misconstrues the RPD's reasons and points to some finer details about his low position that were not specifically mentioned in the decision, and which are not in dispute. [38] At no point in time did the RPD indicate that the Appellant had supervisory authority as an Asayish officer. The RPD clearly indicated that the Appellant's position in the Asayish was low, and that this weighed against a finding of complicity. I am not satisfied that the RPD ignored the fact that he was not provided a uniform or an ID card; that he had to be searched whenever he entered his workplace; or that Mr. XXXX was his superior, who was also present during the visits. [39] The RPD stated that the Appellant's duties related primarily to supervising visits between family and detainees. This is accurate. Though the Appellant argues that it was actually Mr. XXXX who supervised visits, the RPD's description of the Appellant's duties is entirely supported by the information he gave both during the CBSA interview and in his RPD hearing. The Appellant attempts to diminish his role, by reiterating just how little power and discretion he had in his job. He questions whether he was truly an "employee", or just XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX worker. The Appellant attempts to depict his function as being no more than a room ornament during visits that were actually being supervised by another individual. [40] I am unpersuaded by this characterization. There was a reason and purpose behind the Appellant's presence in the room during detainee visits. He was unquestionably paid and employed by the Asayish in order to aid in the supervision of the visits. His job, and his function, were to monitor what was being discussed during the visit. In fact, during the hearing, when questioned about the room in which the visits took place, the Minister's Counsel asked whether the room was small enough for the Appellant to hear everything that was being said between the detainee and the visitor. The Appellant's response was as follows: Yes, that was exactly our job was that, like, that there were limits about the speaking, like some - there were some stuff that they were not allowed to speak.12 [41] In his CBSA interview, the following exchange took place: Q: Okay. So you started in Investigations, supervising the prisoners visiting - like in visiting their family members? A: Yes. Yes. We had to be there because there was limitations for the - limits for the conversations going on between the prisoner and the family.13 [42] The Appellant's role, and the very fact of his presence, meant that visitors and detainees would not discuss any matters considered by the Asayish to be sensitive. This aided in the furtherance of the crimes against humanity that were being perpetrated in the detention facility. The Appellant was not alone in doing this, and he clearly fell low in rank in the organization, but this does not eliminate his contribution. The RPD's words on the significance of this factor are persuasive: While the claimant's actions may not have made a significant contribution to the world's general awareness of human rights violations, they would have made a significant contribution to the particular detainees the claimant and other people in his position were supervising. A detainee whose rights have been violated through lengthy detention, torture, or other forms of mistreatment would have had no prospect of getting a remedy without being able to communicate the circumstances of their detention to a visitor. By enforcing the silence of detention conditions, the claimant was perpetuating the human rights abuses committed in detention by Asayish officials. I find that this contribution is significant.14 [43] I agree entirely with the RPD's reasons. Although the Appellant may not have been aware of every instance of torture or detention that went against fundamental rules of international law, the Appellant was aware that these were occurring in the detention facility. He admitted as much, but was not overly concerned about these violations of human rights. He even testified about a visit from the XXXX XXXX that caused staff at his facility to make arrangements in order to conceal certain individuals from view of the XXXX XXXX XXXX. He was aware that his conduct would assist in the furtherance of torture, which he knew was being committed in the detention facility. [44] I agree with the RPD that the Appellant's duties and activities with the Asayish weigh strongly in favour of finding a significant and knowing contribution. Factors (v) and (vi): Length of time in organization and opportunity to leave [45] The RPD also found that the Appellant's length of time in the organization, voluntarily conducting his duties despite the opportunity to leave, weighed in favour of complicity. The Appellant worked for the Asayish from 2003 to 2009. The RPD considered this to be a relatively lengthy period of time. He was aware of the mistreatment of detainees when he began his work there. He continued to work for the organization even after he graduated from university and no longer needed the money to fund his studies. In fact, by 2006, the Appellant already had another job as an XXXX XXXX, yet he continued working for the Asayish until 2009.15 Though he initially took the Asayish job due to his financial circumstances, there was nothing to indicate that he was compelled to take that particular job, or that there were no alternatives to working for the Asayish. The Appellant indicated that he was relatively well-paid for a university student. His only reason for leaving his job was to devote himself full-time to his job as an XXXX XXXX, which was better aligned to his studies and professional training. The Appellant's arguments [46] The Appellant concedes that he worked for the Asayish from 2003 to 2009, but he submits that the RPD ignored evidence about his absences from work. He says that there were times when he would not attend work because of examination commitments. In addition, there were times when he did not work because Mr. XXXX was not present. There were also other times when the Appellant would not show up for work at all, despite collecting his salary. [47] The Appellant also describes that the RPD ignored evidence that he was recruited under a campaign that had the purpose of changing the Asayish's poor reputation. The Appellant says that he was clearly motivated to join because he intended to make positive changes in the organization's image. The RAD's independent assessment [48] There is no merit to these arguments. I am not satisfied that the RPD ignored evidence. Minor details about some absences from work do not alter the outcome of the exclusion analysis. The fact remains that the Appellant typically worked XXXX days a week at the Asayish from 2003 to 2009 with the responsibilities discussed above. This was his testimony. This was a significant period of time during which the Appellant voluntarily conducted his duties without objection, while being aware of the human rights abuses being committed against the detainees with whom he worked. [49] The fact that the Appellant might have had the intention of effecting positive change in the Asayish also has no impact on the assessment. The Appellant testified that he was aware of the torture that was occurring in the detention facility upon beginning his work with the Asayish. Whatever his intentions may have been initially, he apparently had no power to change what he knew was happening in the compound, raised no objections, and voluntarily continued to conduct his duties for six years despite this knowledge. [50] For the same reasons given by the RPD, I find that the Appellant's length of time with the Asayish is a relevant factor, and that his voluntary long-term employment with the organization despite the opportunity to leave weighs in favour of a finding of complicity. Interplay of Ezokola factors [51] The factors set out in Ezokola are not exhaustive, and they are only meant to provide guidance to the decision-maker in making the determination. The focus must always remain on the individual's contribution to the crime.16 [52] The Appellant says that the RPD's failure to consider certain facts places significant doubt on its conclusion with respect to complicity. He argues that the RPD's approach was more akin to complicity by mere association than the correct test set out in Ezokola. [53] I disagree. For the same reasons given by the RPD, I find that there are serious reasons for considering that the Appellant voluntarily made a significant and knowing contribution to crimes against humanity that were committed by the KDP Asayish. This is not complicity by mere association. As a worker in the XXXX department of the XXXX XXXX XXXX in Erbil, the Appellant worked within the very same detention apparatus, and even the same compound, where abuses were occurring. He was aware of the abuses, even witnessing beatings first-hand, and yet he continued to work for the same organization for a lengthy period of time. He left only to pursue professional opportunities. Despite the Appellant's low position in the Asayish, his contribution is nonetheless significant, in that the fulfilment of his job duties meant that detainees were unable to communicate the conditions of their detention during the few minutes they had for each visit. The Appellant's role in the visits aided in the furtherance of the abuses that were being committed by the Asayish in the detention facility. [54] I am satisfied that the test for complicity has been met. The Appellant is excluded from refugee protection pursuant to Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention. CONCLUSION [55] As I agree entirely with the RPD's exclusion analysis, I confirm the RPD's decision to exclude the Appellant under Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention. The appeal is dismissed, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA. (signed) M. Oh M. Oh October 13, 2020 Date 1 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 3, National Documentation Package ("NDP") for Iraq (October 31, 2016), item 1.4, at section 2.2.14; and item 1.7, at p. 19. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 9, at p. 300. 3 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act (S.C. 2000, c. 24). 4 Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 678. 5 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII), [2016] 4 FCR 157; see also Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1145. 6 Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 678, at para. 84. 7 Ibid., at para 9. 8 Ibid., at para 91. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 9, at pp. 281-282. 10 Ibid., at p. 283. 11 Ibid. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 22. 13 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 9, at p. 247. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD Reasons, at p. 18. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 1, Schedule A form, at p. 46. 16 Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40 (CanLII), [2013] 2 SCR 678, at paras. 92, 100. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : VB8-05811 RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January, 2020) Disponible en français