MC1-02387

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / No de dossier de la SAR : MC1-02387 MC1-02388 / MC1-02389 / MC1-02390 MC1-02391 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and Decision ? Motifs et décision Persons who are the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personnes en cause Date of decision October 14, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Me Ezzeddine Saidi Tribunal Counsel for the persons who are the subject of the appeal Susan Ramirez Conseil des personnes en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the male appellant), his spouse XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the female appellant), and their minor children XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXand XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the minor appellants) are citizens of Mexico. They are appealing the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) decision rejecting their refugee protection claim based on the lack of credibility as to the events relating to section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and the lack of a serious possibility of persecution as to the allegations relating to section 96 of the IRPA. The appellants allege that they fear reprisals by the Sinaloa cartel and a certain XXXX, a criminal with ties to that cartel, who have threatened to kill the male appellant. They also state that they fear the Mexican authorities, who wrongly accuse the male appellant of having ties to the Sinaloa cartel. The appellants, who are Mormons, allege that they fear persecution due to their religion should they return to Mexico. In their appeal memorandum, the appellants submit that their testimony was spontaneous and did not contain any ambiguity or digressions. They state that the RPD confused the sales transactions, which confused the male appellant. The appellants argue that, contrary to the RPD's position, the male appellant was not adding to his story when he recounted a first transaction concluded with XXXX, but rather, in the appellants' terms, [translation] "elaborated" and provided "details to the question."1 The appellants add that the RPD used passages that it considered untrustworthy to find other parts of the appellants' testimony not credible. With regard to the allegations based on their Mormon religion, the appellants submit that the RPD erred in its assessment of the events on which their fears are based. They argue that these events constitute persecution. The appellants did not submit any new evidence. The determinative issue for the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) is whether the RPD erred in its assessment of the appellants' credibility with regard to the events relating to section 97 of the IRPA and its assessment of the serious possibility of persecution related to their Mormon religion should they return to Mexico. I find that the male appellant is not credible with regard to the events related to the Sinaloa cartel, XXXX and the Mexican authorities. I am also of the opinion that the appellants did not establish a serious possibility of persecution should they return to Mexico. I therefore conclude that the RPD's decision is correct. The appeal is dismissed. FACTUAL BACKGROUND The male appellant alleges that he worked as a XXXX in the XXXXof XXXX XXXX. He stated that he purchased an SUV (camionnette) from XXXX XXXX a member of the Sinaloa cartel, who had apparently used it to commit crimes. He alleges that, while driving the SUV, he was intercepted by the police, who suspected him of ties to that cartel. XXXX and the cartel allegedly wanted to ensure that the male appellant would not provide information to the police that could link that member of the cartel to the SUV. The appellants state that they fear for their lives because of these threats. The appellants also state that they are members of the Mormon religion. They allege that they experienced persecution because of their beliefs. They claim that returning to Mexico would subject them to persecution once again. ROLE OF THE REFUGEE APPEAL DIVISION The RAD's role in an appeal against an RPD decision is defined by the Federal Court of Appeal in Huruglica.2 The RAD reviews RPD decisions applying a standard of correctness after conducting an independent assessment of the evidence before it. The RAD may apply a deferential standard in certain circumstances. I conducted my own review of the RPD record and the appellants' record. I applied the correctness standard in this case. ANALYSIS Risk associated with the sale of the Mazda X9 SUV: allegations analyzed under section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act The RPD found that the male appellant was not a credible witness concerning the events associated with the sale of the Mazda X9 SUV. Since the other appellants' claims are based on the male appellant's allegations, it made the same finding about them. The RPD noted contradictions between the adult appellants' testimony and their written account with regard to the sales transaction for the SUV, which is the source of their fear. According to the original account, the male claimant alleges that in late XXXX 2019, he received a call from XXXX regarding the purchase of one of the vehicles the male appellant had put up for sale. As payment for the vehicle to be purchased, XXXX allegedly offered a sum of money as well as a 2011 Mazda X9 SUV to round out the transaction. The sale was concluded on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, in accordance with the conditions mentioned. The male appellant allegedly took possession of the 2011 Mazda X9 SUV. In his testimony, the male appellant stated that on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, he XXXX XXXX a blue 2010 Mazda X9 SUV and accepted, in consideration for that Mazda X9 SUV, a sum of money and a white 2008 Jetta from XXXX. When asked about the transaction price, the male appellant stated that the agreed-upon price for the Mazda X9 was XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos. The Jetta was allegedly appraised by the parties at XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos. The male appellant testified that he received the remainder of the purchase price, XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos, in cash from XXXX. The male appellant added that he later XXXX the Jetta. The RPD confronted the male appellant with this contradiction. He replied that he had received the Mazda X9 as a deposit as part of the transaction. He added that he had XXXX a grey 2007 Nitro SUV to XXXX for XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos. When questioned on that contradiction and on what the RPD considered to be hesitations regarding the Nitro SUV, its value, its colour and its manufacture year, the male appellant replied that he owned many vehicles. The RPD considered this explanation unreasonable and indicated that it expected the male appellant to faithfully describe the transaction that is the source of his fear at the first opportunity.3 The RPD was of the opinion that the female appellant contradicted the male appellant's testimony and the written account when she testified that XXXX was her spouse's client and that there were two transactions between them. She testified that XXXX first arrived with a car, the make and model of which she did not remember, which he exchanged for the Mazda X9 that her spouse owned. She added that three weeks later, XXXX returned the Mazda X9 in order to acquire the Nitro.4 When asked to explain this omission, she replied that she thought she had provided the information that there were two transactions during the examination and also that they had several clients. The RPD was of the opinion that this explanation was unreasonable. It was of the view that the female appellant wished to mitigate the credibility problems by adding a second transaction in the chain of events. The RPD added that in response to questions from his lawyer, the male appellant testified again that he had XXXX a blue Mazda X9 to XXXXon XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. He was confronted with this new contradiction, and the RPD was of the opinion that the male appellant corrected his testimony by stating that he had received the Mazda X9 as a deposit. Then, he testified that he had purchased that Mazda X9 when he had sold a property, and then XXXX that car to XXXX XXXX who later called him late in the day and insisted that he take back the Mazda X9 SUV in exchange for another. The RPD confronted the male appellant again about his omission of that late call from his written account, and in response, he acknowledged that it was not in his written account and stated that he was nervous, but that was indeed what had happened.5 The RPD was of the view that the male appellant was adding other information to mitigate his credibility problems. It found that his credibility was undermined. The RPD added that the male appellant contradicted himself concerning the Mazda X9's manufacture year, stating that it was 2009, 2010 and 2011. The male appellant explained that it was 2009 and that he owned another SUV from 2011. The RPD did not accept the male appellant's explanation and was of the opinion that, since he is a vehicle professional, and because that Mazda X9 was related to his fear, it expected him to provide the main characteristics of the vehicle. The RPD concluded that the appellants did not provide sufficient explanations to outweigh the contradictions and inconsistencies that it had identified. It was of the opinion that the appellants did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they had acquired a Mazda X9 vehicle from XXXX or that they were threatened by the authorities or the Sinaloa cartel in connection with the sale of that car. The appellants argue that it is the RPD that was confused about the transactions, which confused the male appellant. Also, the appellants state that the male appellant was nervous. The appellants argue that the details of the transaction should not be considered an omission, but rather an elaboration by the male appellant, who felt obligated to reply when the RPD asked him questions. The appellants submit that the male appellant was not making an addition when he mentioned the first exchange between him and XXXX but was instead elaborating and providing details. The appellants specify that when the business was starting up, the male appellant purchased the Mazda X9, which he XXXX to XXXX in exchange for money and another car. A few weeks later, XXXX noticed another SUV and returned the Mazda X9 to the male appellant in exchange for the other SUV.6 They consider this omission to be incidental and state that it has no impact on the persecution experienced on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, as described in the Basis of Claim Form (BOC Form). The appellants criticize the RPD for using untrustworthy passages as a premise to find the male appellant not credible with regard to other aspects of his testimony. They add that the RPD [translation] "mounted a case" to undermine the male appellant's credibility by discussing incidental and exaggerated factors.7 I do not agree with the appellants. The RPD did not err in its findings. The reasons are as follows: First, the appellants' supposed fear is based on the transaction associated with the Mazda X9. The case law recognizes that all refugee protection claimants must indicate all of the important details and information concerning the basis of their fear in their BOC Form, such as the events at the basis of their claim, dates, and names of people associated with their fear. In his written account, the male appellant states that XXXX called him in late XXXX 2019 to see the cars that the male appellant had put up for sale. A few days later, XXXX allegedly chose a vehicle to purchase and, in consideration for the purchase price, offered to the male appellant a Mazda X9 SUV plus a sum of money. At the outset of the hearing, the RPD asked the appellants if they wanted to add anything to their BOC Form and whether their BOC Form was complete, true and correct. They replied that they did not wish to add anything and that the BOC Form was complete, true and correct.8 One would expect that the male appellant, after confirming the accuracy of the written account, would provide the same version of that account, unless there were a satisfactory explanation. After the male appellant explained his role as a XXXX XXXX XXXX and stated that he accepted cars in consideration for the purchase price of his vehicles, the RPD merely asked him simple and straightforward questions. It asked which vehicle interested XXXX. The male appellant replied that it was a Mazda X9. He added that it was a 2010 vehicle.9 The RPD went on to ask him which vehicle XXXX had purchased, and the male appellant replied that it was a Mazda X9. He added of his own accord that it was blue.10 These answers contradict the version in the appellants' written account, according to which XXXX purchased another car and traded in the Mazda X9. This was not a slip of the tongue or an error on the part of the male appellant, since he continued to give details of the transaction and the characteristics of the vehicles sold and accepted in exchange, their respective prices, the colours and the manufacture years. The male appellant would be expected to provide a version that does not contradict the one in his written account. Second, the male appellant continued with the version that contradicts his written account by providing precise answers to the RPD's questions about the sale of the Mazda X9 to XXXX. Thus, when the RPD asked him [translation] "which SUV he gave you as a deposit" (for the purchase of the Mazda X9), he replied that it was a Jetta. When questioned about the prices of the vehicles, he stated that there was a price difference between the two vehicles, namely that the Jetta was worth XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos while the Mazda X9 was worth XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos.11 He added that he believed the Jetta was from 2008, that it was white and that he had sold it without remembering who the buyer was.12 He added that XXXX gave him XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos to match the value of the Mazda X9 that he bought. The male appellant specified that the exchange with XXXX took place on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. It must be noted that until that question, the RPD had not confronted the male appellant with any contradictions or inconsistencies between his testimony and his written account. Until that question, the male appellant also presented a story that was different from his written account. I listened attentively to the recording of the hearing, and the RPD's questions were clear, direct and simple: which car did XXXX purchase, what was the agreed-upon price, which car did he give you in exchange, what was the value of the car the male appellant accepted in exchange for the car sold to XXXX and what remaining sum of money was paid. Until that stage of the testimony, the male appellant had replied assuredly and precisely, without hesitation. He was not confused or affected by any of the RPD's remarks, as the appellants argue. The RPD only asked questions. He provided the precise prices of the vehicles, the colours and the manufacture years, as well as the date of the transaction. All of these details and this information contradict the male appellant's written account. Third, the male appellant provided even more contradictory versions. He testified that on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, he was intercepted by the police, who suspected him of ties to a cartel and asked him questions about the car he was driving. He informed the RPD that he was driving the blue Mazda X9.13 That is when the RPD confronted him with the fact that he had testified that XXXX had purchased the blue Mazda X9 SUV worth XXXX XXXX XXXX dollars14 and that he had accepted, as a deposit, a white Jetta, perhaps from 2008, worth XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos, to which the male appellant replied in the affirmative.15 The RPD asked him to explain how he could say that he still had the blue Mazda X9. He explained that he had taken the Mazda X9 as his own deposit. The RPD once again confronted him with the fact that he had testified the opposite a few minutes previously. It repeated the terms of his testimony to him: that he had sold the Mazda X9 and accepted a Jetta as a deposit, which contradicts the version that he accepted a Mazda X9 as a deposit. The male appellant apologized. He explained that he had made a mistake and was a bit nervous. He added that he had taken the Mazda X9 as the deposit. He acknowledged the significance of his error. The RPD confronted him again with the details he had provided, mainly that the value of the Mazda X9 was higher, according to his testimony, so he changed his testimony to state that he had taken the Mazda X9 as a deposit, which implies that its value was lower than that of the car that XXXX purchased, as well as the fact that he had traded the Mazda X9 for the Jetta and a sum of money. The RPD asked him again to explain where the error was. Fourth, to explain what he considered errors in his testimony, the male appellant provided a new version of the events. To answer the RPD with regard to where the error was, he told the RPD, with hesitation, that he had purchased the Mazda X9 from XXXX and that he had sold him a grey Nitro SUV. He stated that he did not remember the price of the Nitro or its manufacture year, but he believed it was of a lower value. The RPD was correct to confront him again, reminding him that he had recalled the value of the Jetta, its manufacture year and its approximate value. He explained that he had several cars and, after a hesitation, that the Nitro was worth around XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos and that, if he remembered correctly, it was a 2007.16 I am of the opinion that the RPD was correct to deduce that the male appellant's credibility was undermined. Contrary to the appellants' arguments, the male appellant's testimony was not influenced by a question or any information from the RPD. The male appellant himself, in answering the clear, direct questions about the vehicle that XXXX had purchased, replied that it was a Mazda X9. He then provided versions that contradicted the one in his written account, and which contradicted each other as well. The female appellant, the male appellant's spouse, stated that XXXX concluded two transactions with the male appellant: first, XXXX traded in a vehicle of a lower value, the type of which she stated she does not remember because she had other things on her mind. She added that they had the Mazda. She explained that since they received a car of lower value, her husband went to get money from XXXX for the Mazda. A short time later, around three weeks, the female appellant added, XXXX returned to exchange the Mazda for the Nitro. The female appellant's addition contradicts that of the male appellant. The male appellant did not testify that XXXX made two transactions. This testimony from the female appellant also leaves out the Jetta from the exchange with the Mazda, which further contradicts the male appellant's testimony. According to the evidence presented by the appellants, it is the male appellant who works in XXXX XXXX, not the female appellant. Furthermore, the new version that XXXX is a client of the male appellant and that he concluded two transactions with him does not appear in the appellants' written account, which the male appellant signed. The female appellant's explanation that they wished to provide details of these two transactions during the hearing is insufficient. Her explanation implies that they deliberately did not mention this important information from their written account. In addition to the fact that it is not a satisfactory explanation, it is not in keeping with the teachings of the case law stating that all of the important facts that are the basis of the refugee protection claim must be included in the first account. Even in the refugee protection claim forms, it is clearly indicated that all of the important details must be mentioned in the initial account. The appellants were expected to indicate all of the details and information having to do with XXXX. They present this person as one of their agents of harm. It is therefore reasonable to expect them to provide all of the details about the transaction or transactions, as applicable, that they allegedly carried out with their agent of harm. The appellants did not provide satisfactory explanations regarding the versions they presented. On the one hand, the male appellant provided fairly precise details concerning the Jetta exchanged for the Mazda X9, on its colour, price and manufacture year. However, when he was informed that his version contradicted his written account, he changed versions and spoke of another transaction and another car, for which he was unable to provide the manufacture year or the trade-in value. Only after the RPD reminded him that he had given those details concerning the Jetta did he provide the information, after a hesitation and in imprecise terms. Even the information concerning the Nitro was inconsistent with the information given concerning the Mazda X9. The male appellant appraised the Mazda X9 at 140,000 pesos, but he stated that he accepted it as a deposit from XXXX for a Nitro that he had sold to him with a value of approximately XXXX XXXX XXXX pesos. It is also important to mention that these events alleged by the appellants took place in the middle of 2019, which was recent when they were writing their written account on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2020. Fifth, after a break during the hearing, the male appellant replied to his lawyer that he had XXXX the blue Mazda X9 on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, to XXXX and that he had accompanied him to his home for the remainder of the sale price.17 However, his lawyer confronted him with the fact that he states the opposite in his written account and showed him lines 31 and following of his written account, indicating that on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, it was he, the male appellant, who accepted the Mazda X9 as partial payment for another vehicle that XXXX had purchased. He replied to his lawyer that he took the C X9 SUV. He explained to the RPD that this information was not in the written account but that he had purchased that Mazda X9 at the beginning with other cars when he had sold a property. Later, he XXXX it to XXXX, and then XXXX traded that Mazda X9 back to him for another car. These explanations are insufficient. As I mentioned above, if these events were true, they would have taken place in XXXXand XXXX 2019. These events, if established, were recent, even with respect to the date of the hearing. I am of the opinion that these events should have been described with precision and spontaneity from the outset of the refugee protection claim. Furthermore, this testimony from the male appellant clearly contradicts his written account, in which he indicates that on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, he sold a car and accepted the Mazda X9 in consideration for it. Sixth, he added that he took back the Mazda X9 after a call late in the day from XXXX, who insisted on concluding a new transaction in which the male appellant would take back the Mazda X9. This information is not mentioned in the appellants' written account. By way of explanation, the male appellant stated that is what happened and that he was nervous. This explanation is not sufficient. The appellants' fear is based on the transaction or transactions with XXXX involving the Mazda X9 and the implications of that transaction or those transactions. The appellants do not explain why they mention only one transaction in their written account. They do not provide a satisfactory explanation as to why relatively important information such as the late call from XXXX, and his insistence on exchanging the Mazda X9 again, if true, was not mentioned from the start. Even at the beginning of the hearing, the appellants had the opportunity to add information to their BOC Form, but they declared that it was complete and correct. They were represented by an experienced lawyer from the outset of the proceedings. I am of the opinion that the appellants attempted to mitigate the credibility problems identified by the RPD. Contrary to the appellants' position, the only aim of the additions they made to their testimony was to repair their credibility, which had been undermined. Calling the failure to mention the second transaction with XXXX an omission, the appellants wrongly argue that it is of no significance in the matter at hand. I do not accept this argument. It is reasonable to wonder, if the first transaction was the transaction concluded on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019, in which the male appellant allegedly sold the Mazda X9 to XXXX, according to his replies to his lawyer, why he did not mention that there was a second transaction concerning that Mazda, which seems to have been the more important one, since it is after that alleged second transaction that he allegedly kept the Mazda with him and was suspected by the police of having ties to XXXX and the Sinaloa cartel. It is also after that second transaction that he stated that he was threatened by the cartel and XXXX. Contrary to the appellants' arguments, the appellants' answers were never influenced by any of the RPD's remarks. All of the questions it asked were clear, simple and relevant. They were based on the circumstances of the appellants' testimony. Contrary to the appellants' arguments, the RPD did not use untrustworthy passages as a premise to find the male appellant not credible on other aspects of his testimony. It did not [translation] "mount a case" to undermine the male appellant's credibility by discussing incidental and exaggerated elements, either. The appellants' contradictions and inconsistencies are established. I note that the appellants acknowledge the existence of untrustworthy passages in their evidence, without specifying which ones they are. I am of the opinion that the RPD's findings are based on the contradictions and inconsistencies in the appellants' testimony. The appellants were unable to provide satisfactory explanations. The male appellant did not make a mistake concerning a single piece of information or for a limited time of his testimony and then correct himself or correct his testimony. Rather, he gave several versions that contradicted each other as well as his written account. He had several chances to explain himself, but his explanations were insufficient. I do not agree that the RPD mounted a case undermining the appellants. In addition to the fact that the appellants do not explain where or how the RPD mounted a case undermining them, after an independent review of the record, I am of the opinion that the appellants did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they acquired a Mazda X9 from XXXX and that they were targeted by the authorities, by the Sinaloa cartel, and by XXXX because of that vehicle. All of the other allegations regarding their risk under section 97 of the IRPA arise from that supposed transaction. I find that the appellants' credibility is undermined concerning those allegations. I am of the opinion that the RPD's finding is correct. Fear relating to religion: allegations analyzed under section 96 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act The RPD concluded that the appellants established their Mormon religion. The female appellant alleges that she experienced discrimination due to her religion. She cites examples that she considers to be persecution on the basis of her religion, such as problems at her work, and stated that she changed her doctor for the same reason. She cites an incident during which her child was allegedly insulted and mocked in connection with his religious affiliation. She testified that he became shy but that he is more confident since he arrived in Canada because he can now practise his religion freely. The RPD was of the opinion that the evidence on the record does not establish a serious possibility of persecution should they return to Mexico. According to the RPD, the alleged incidents and fears do not reach the threshold of gravity or persistence to be considered persecution under the Convention. The RPD was of the opinion that the acts of discrimination alleged by the appellants are not actions that deny human dignity in any key way or demonstrate a sustained or systemic denial of core human rights.18 The RPD added that the evidence on the record does not reflect events of persistent harassment or affliction or a particular course or period of systematic infliction of punishment against the appellants on the basis of their religion. The appellants argue that the alleged acts constitute persecution. They state that 80 percent of the Mexican population is Catholic. They submit that several acts were repeated and that these acts affect important aspects for them like work, education and healthcare. They state that they have an objective fear corroborated by a subjective fear. They cite a definition of discrimination in the Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the Handbook). The appellants submit that the RPD erred in its assessment of the issue of persecution due to their religion. I do not agree with the appellants. The Federal Court of Appeal defines persecution as follows: ...the Federal Court of Appeal defined persecution in terms of: to harass or afflict with repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance; to afflict persistently; to afflict or punish because of particular opinions or adherence to a particular creed or mode of worship; a particular course or period of systematic infliction of punishment directed against those holding a particular belief; and persistent injury or annoyance from any source.19 I accept the following from the appellants' evidence concerning the issue of the supposed persecution based on religion. I will assess each of the allegations separately and then analyze whether, cumulatively, they constitute persecution: In the written account signed by the male appellant, the appellants state that they led very stable lives in Mexico. According to that written account, the female appellant had worked as a XXXX since 2008. She worked for the XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX from 2009 to XXXX 2016. After that, she worked as a XXXX at the XXXX XXXX XXXX until XXXX 2019. In the written account signed by the female appellant, she writes that she did not attend the monthly ceremony organized by the clinic where she worked. She mentions that her employer just asked why she did not attend the ceremonies, without indicating that he took a position or made a decision against her that would have the effect of restricting her right to work. She explained to her employer that the reason was that she is not Catholic. Before the RPD, the appellants testified that they did not lose their jobs due to their religion and that they were not refused access to a job because of their religious beliefs. The female appellant testified that she was excluded from a major project because she did not attend the monthly meetings organized by her employer in the presence of a Catholic priest, but she had not lost her job.20 Contrary to the appellants' arguments, the evidence on the record shows that the female appellant was not forced by her employer to participate in the religious ceremonies. The evidence submitted by the appellants clearly indicates that the female appellant always worked. The male appellant testified that he did not experience discrimination at his work due to his religion or for other reasons. However, that incident did not prevent the female appellant from working and from leading a very stable life. With regard to the right to healthcare, the RPD asked the female appellant if she had been refused access to healthcare due to her religion. The female appellant testified that she did not give birth at a clinic where there were [translation] "Catholic nuns" because they "make the sign of the cross, pray for you, that kind of thing."21 She stated that because of this, she had to change doctors three weeks before the birth because the only hospital where her doctor worked was run by nuns who performed Catholic rites on newborns. Although it is regrettable that the female appellant had to experience changing doctors only three weeks before giving birth, this incident, as described, implies that she was able to give birth in a place where there were no religious practices she disagreed with. I am of the opinion that this answer from the female appellant implies that this situation occurred for only one birth, given that she describes changing doctors three weeks before the birth. The female appellant has three children. I also deduce that it is not established that the female appellant was forced to submit to or accept the practices she does not agree with. From this answer, it can be concluded that the female appellant was able to give birth at another institution that was more in line with her beliefs. With regard to the incidents that the appellants allege, such as mockery and insults against their son because he did not know how to properly make the sign of the cross and the events that the female appellant herself experienced when she was a child, as well as reduced family activities due to their religious beliefs, the evidence establishes the following facts. The appellants testified that their child was registered at school. They filed in evidence statements that their children were registered at and attended schools in Mexico. It is established in this case that the appellants' families are Catholic on one side and Mormon on the other. The appellants clearly stated that they led very stable lives in Mexico, such that they did not consider leaving their country before the events they allege under section 97 of the IRPA, which are analyzed above. They did not allege that their lives were afflicted by comments from the male appellant's family members, who are Catholic. The RPD was of the opinion that these acts alleged by the appellants were not repeated, persistent or systematic. The appellants are of the opinion that they are repeated and cumulative. I am of the opinion that the acts mentioned by the appellants are not repeated22 within the meaning of the case law and the doctrine on the subject that defines the notion of persecution.23 Therefore, in the circumstances, it is not established that the appellants suffered from repeated, persistent acts. For example, only one incident relating to work is alleged. It is the same for the right to access healthcare and education. I am of the opinion that the cumulative effect of these acts is not sufficient to conclude that there was persecution. The definition that the appellants themselves referred to in order to circumscribe the notion of discrimination and persecution, which arises from the Handbook, states that the consequences of the acts alleged to be discriminatory must be of a substantially prejudicial nature for the person concerned, such as serious restrictions on the right to earn a livelihood, the right to practise a religion, or access to normally available educational facilities.24 As analyzed above, these incidents were not serious in and of themselves. In the past, they did not compromise or restrict the enjoyment, expression or exercise of the appellants' rights, which are recognized for all Mexican citizens. I am of the opinion that the appellants did not establish that, in the future, due to their religion, their rights will be compromised or restricted. The appellants did not establish that they suffered a major denial of their rights because they are Mormon. These incidents do not reflect acts of harassment or persistent affliction for the appellants. It is not established that these events afflicted them with repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance. The evidence shows that the appellants always enjoyed their rights without restriction. The male appellant did not report any act of differential treatment based on his religion. It is mentioned in the written account signed by the male appellant that they led very stable lives. This statement is inconsistent with the allegations that they experienced persecution in Mexico due to their religion. The appellants argue that these acts of discrimination were repeated and cumulative, which constitutes persecution. I am of the opinion that the acts alleged by the appellants do not have enough of a cumulative effect to reach the level of persecution. I am of the opinion that they are isolated acts and that, even cumulatively, they do not meet the definition of persecution, which requires repeated acts of cruelty or annoyance to punish a person for their beliefs or ideas and involves a particular course or period of systematic infliction of punishment of the appellants due to their religion. The evidence on the record demonstrates that the appellants always enjoyed their rights. I am of the opinion that should they return to Mexico, they will not be subjected to a serious possibility of persecution based on their religion. I am of the opinion that the appellants did not demonstrate a serious possibility of persecution due to their religious beliefs. The RPD did not err in its assessment of this issue. Its conclusion is correct. CONCLUSION After reviewing the RPD record, the appellants' record and all of the evidence, I conclude that the RPD did not err in its assessment of the appellants' allegations. The appellants did not establish, on a balance of probabilities, that they would be personally subjected to a risk to their lives or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment by XXXX, the Sinaloa cartel or the Mexican authorities, since they did not demonstrate a serious possibility of persecution based on their religious beliefs, as alleged, should they return to Mexico. I conclude that the RPD's decision is correct. DECISION The RAD dismisses the appeal and, pursuant to paragraph 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, confirms the RPD's determination that the appellants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection. (signed) Ezzeddine Saidi Me Ezzeddine Saidi October 14, 2021 Date IRB translation Original language: French 1 P-2, Appellants' record, appellants' memorandum, para. 13. 2 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Huruglica, 2016 FCA 93 (CanLII). 3 SPR-1, Refugee Protection Division (RPD) record, RPD decision, para. 14. 4 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) from minute 68 to minute 71. 5 SPR-1, RPD record, RPD decision, paras. 15 to 20. 6 P-2, Appellants' record, appellants' memorandum, paras. 7 to 14. 7 P-2, Appellant's record, appellant's memorandum, paras. 15 to 29. 8 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minute 17. 9 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minute 53. 10 Ibid no. 9. 11 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minute 55. 12 Ibid no. 11. 13 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minute 61. 14 The RPD mentioned dollars rather than pesos, the currency of Mexico. I consider this to be a slip of the tongue on the part of the RPD. I heard the interpreter mention pesos to the male appellant. 15 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minutes 61-62. 16 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minutes 65-68. 17 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (2nd part 0746) at minutes 3-5. 18 SPR-1, RPD record, RPD decision, para. 35. 19 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Munderere, 2008 FCA 84, para. 41. 20 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minutes 73-80. 21 Audio recording of the hearing on February 23, 2021, (1st part 0546) at minute 82. 22 It is not necessary to meet this criterion in every case of allegations of persecution. 23 See Chapter 3-Persecution: Interpretation of Convention Refugee and Person in Need of Protection in the Case Law, March 2019, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/legal-concepts/Pages/RefDef03.aspx. 24 P-2, Appellants' record, appellants' memorandum, para. 45.