TB7-24394

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB7-24394 TB7-24395 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision December 12, 2018 Date de la décision Panel G. Erauw Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal Jacqueline Swaisland Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated representative XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXthe "principal Appellant") and her minor daughter XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the "minor Appellant") are citizens of Iraq. The Appellants claim that if they return to Iraq they will be persecuted due to their inter-sect Islamic beliefs, on account of their gender, and because the minor Appellant could be forced into marriage or sold into sexual slavery. [2] The Appellants appeal a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying their refugee claims. As a preliminary issue, the Appellants submit new evidence and ask for an oral hearing. They argue that they were denied a fair hearing due to inadequate interpretation, and submit that the RPD erred by finding them not credible, and also allege the RPD erred by failing to assess their risk on the basis of gender and the minor Appellant's status as a child. [3] I have rejected the Appellants' new evidence and I deny their request for an oral hearing. I also find the Appellants have failed to establish the interpretation was inadequate, find they are not credible in their allegations, and I find that their profile does not place them at risk upon return to Iraq. As a result, I confirm the RPD's decision that the Appellants are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. Their appeal is denied. SCOPE OF THE RAD REVIEW [4] For questions of fact, mixed fact and law, and law, the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) applies the standard of correctness. In assessing findings involving the credibility of oral testimony, I may defer if I find that the RPD had a meaningful advantage in the circumstances.1 Reasons will be provided in my analysis if I find that the RPD had a meaningful advantage. [5] The issues in this appeal are whether the Appellants received inadequate interpretation, whether the RPD erred in its credibility assessment, and whether the Appellants' profiles place them at risk upon return to Iraq. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE SUBMITTED ON APPEAL [6] In support of their appeal, the Appellants propose four documents as new evidence: 1) Letter from the principal Appellant's Husband, dated XXXX XXXX 2017;2 2) Letter from the principal Appellant's Mother, dated XXXX XXXX 2017;3 3) Transcript of the RPD Hearing, undated;4 and, 4) Interpreter's Affidavit, dated XXXX XXXX 2018.5 [7] New evidence will only be admitted where that evidence: (1) arose after the rejection of the claim by the RPD; (2) was not reasonably available; or (3) was reasonably available, but that the claimant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence, at the time of the rejection.6 If one of these conditions is met, the RAD will then consider if the evidence is credible, relevant, and new.7 The RAD finds the letter from the husband and mother are inadmissible as new evidence The Appellants' Argument on the Admissibility of the Husband's and Mother's Letters Husband's Letter [8] The principal Appellant argues that the letter from her husband ought to be accepted because it is dated XXXX XXXX, 2017, after the RPD hearing. The Appellants submit that the letter from her husband states that her husband forced them to travel to Iraq in 2013. Her husband further clarifies that in 2009, when he had a visa to come to Canada, there was no intention for the principal Appellant to come to Canada in order to have a child. [9] The letter also states that her husband recently learned that his brother was threatened by the principal Appellant's uncles in Iraq after their visit in 2013. The Appellants argue that the husband's letter is important because it goes to the heart of the claim, and that this information was not known until XXXX 2017 because her husband's brother feared that the principal Appellant's husband would return to Iraq and retaliate. Mother's Letter [10] The Appellants submit that the letter from her mother provides additional details that were omitted from her previous letters. It mentions that the principal Appellant's mother and her father sought refugee protection in Sweden in 2006 because they were under threat from the same uncles as the principal Appellant. The letter further states that they received threats in 2006 from the principal Appellant's uncles after the principal Appellant married her Shia husband. The RAD's Assessment on the Admissibility of Husband's and Mother's Letters [11] In considering whether the evidence arose after the rejection of the claim, the RAD will not restrict its analysis to the date on the proposed new evidence. A document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by the date of its creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence.8 Old evidence remains old evidence, even if it is placed in a new document with a recent date. Furthermore, the new evidence provisions are not the appellants' opportunity to complete a deficient record submitted to the RPD; rather, it allows for the correction of errors of fact, errors in law, or mixed errors of fact and law.9 In addition, an appellant cannot offer new evidence "every time he or she is surprised by the RPD's decision".10 Husband's Letter [12] I find the husband's letter is inadmissible as new evidence. With respect to the husband's statements that he forced his wife to travel to Iraq in 2013 and that there was no intention for the principal Appellant to give birth in Canada in 2009, this evidence repeats evidence that is already in the record and was available prior to the RPD's rejection of the Appellants' claim. The Appellants provide no explanation, in compliance with Rule 3(3)(g)(iii) of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules for why this evidence could not have been provided at the time of rejection. Without any information regarding dates on which the evidence became available to the Appellants, how it came to their attention, or why it was not available until after the rejection of their claim, it is impossible for the RAD to determine whether the requirements for the admissibility of new evidence are met. The Appellants were questioned on this issue at the first sitting of their RPD hearing, and the RPD's findings in this respect would not have caught the Appellants by surprise. The Appellants had nearly three months between the first RPD sitting when these questions were asked, until the RPD rendered its decision. By providing such information in this appeal, the Appellants attempt to repair a defective record and bolster their appeal. Therefore, the content of the husband's letter about why they returned to Iraq in 2013 and their travel to Canada in 2009 is inadmissible as new evidence. [13] In regard to the husband's allegation that he learned from his brother on XXXX XXXX, 2017 that his brother was threatened by the principal Appellant's uncles after the Appellants visited Iraq in 2013, I find this to be lacking in credibility. The timing of this information coming to light is too fortuitous to be true. The principal Appellant testified that after she was threatened by her uncles in 2005 for marrying her husband, her family had no further difficulties. The RPD also asked whether her husband's family remains in Iraq and if they have had any contact with the uncles considering their dissatisfaction with their inter-sect marriage, to which the Appellant said they do not have contact with the husband's family. In its decision, the RPD made credibility findings due to the principal Appellant's testimony about the interest of her uncles in her and her family. In this context, I also observe that the RPD's decision was mailed out by the RPD registrar on November 30, 2017, meaning it would have been deemed received seven days after it was sent from the RPD. As such, it would have been received by December 6, 2017. A week after the Appellants would have received the RPD's decision, and during the time they were preparing for their appeal, the Appellant's husband happened to call his brother in Iraq asking whether he should visit him. During this call, the husband learns that his brother was threatened by the principal Appellant's uncles after their visit in 2013 even though the principal Appellant and her husband's family have had no threats or problems since 2005. I find the timing of the disclosure of this information from the husband to be so coincidental as to render it implausible given the principal Appellant's testimony at the RPD and considering the RPD decision makes a specific reference to the fact that the husband's family in Iraq has not experienced any difficulties. [14] The Federal Court has upheld findings that new evidence is not credible for the purposes of admissibility when the timing is suspicious and based on chance encounters with individuals at the time that an Appellant's refugee claim was rejected.11 It is also not unreasonable for the RAD to infer that the events are improbable when they are "suspiciously convenient"12 and "too fortuitous in nature to be believed."13 Given the timing of the disclosure that the husband's brother was threatened after the Appellants visited him in 2013, and considering the principal Appellant's testimony about the lack of difficulties after 2005, I find this incident to be lacking in credibility. I find it unlikely that, had this incident occurred, the principal Appellant's brother-in-law would have kept it a secret for more than five years and only disclosed it after the RPD makes a specific credibility finding due to the lack of difficulties faced by her husband's family in Iraq. As a result, I find the principal Appellant's new evidence is inadmissible. Mother's Letter [15] I reject the mother's letter as new evidence because the Appellants have not established that this letter could not have been provided at the time the RPD rejected the claim. The principal Appellant's mother refers to events that occurred in 2006, including that the principal Appellant's father made a refugee claim in Sweden based on the same grounds as the Appellants. However, this information pre-dates the RPD's rejection of her claim by more than 12 years and she does not explain why such evidence could not have been presented to the RPD. Information that the principal Appellant's father made a claim on the same basis as her was clearly available prior to the RPD's decision and could have been presented to the RPD. As such, I find the mother's letter does not meet the requirements of 110(4) and is inadmissible as new evidence. The RAD finds the affidavit from the interpreter is inadmissible as new evidence The Appellants' Arguments on the Admissibility of Transcript and Interpreter's Affidavit [16] The Appellants argue that there were issues with interpretation that occurred throughout the hearing, which prejudiced the Appellants because it adversely affected their ability to understand and respond to questions. The Appellants submit that they raised the concern with the translation before the RPD, but the RPD failed to acknowledge those concerns and ignored them. In addition, they submit that they could not have been raised until the hearing was transcribed and heard by another interpreter, so they are not barred from raising these concerns on appeal. [17] The Appellants argue that the interpreter at the hearing commonly failed to translate the RPD member or the principal Appellant, which led to a serious miscarriage of natural justice, particularly at the beginning of the proceedings when the RPD stated "as long as the claimant tell us if there is any issue [with translation]...she tell us right away", but this was interpreted incorrectly and was not complete, so the principal Appellant did not understand the RPD's instructions. As a result, the principal Appellant was not aware of her right to raise concerns with the interpretation immediately after they occurred. Furthermore, when the second sitting began, the principal Appellant stated that "I expect I'm anticipating that I am more lucky this time with the Interpreter" for which the RPD was dismissive and saying "ok, alright so I guess you are a good interpreter [addressing the interpreter at the second sitting], and if you need a break at any point please let me know." It was incumbent on the RPD to address this issue before the closing of proceedings, but failed to do so. Therefore, the Appellants submit that the problems with the interpretation mentioned in the interpreter's affidavit show that the interpreter mistranslated and omitted to translate items that tarnished the Appellants' credibility. The RAD's Assessment on the Admissibility of Transcript and Interpreter's Affidavit [18] I reject the Appellants' argument and find the Appellants failed to raise the issue of interpretation at the earliest opportunity. As a consequence, they fail to meet the statutory requirements for admissibility of new evidence. [19] Complaints about the quality of interpretation must be raised at the earliest opportunity;14 failure to do so results in a waiver of the right to object to the interpretation on judicial review,15 and by analogy also on appeal to the RAD. In this case, the alleged issues in interpretation occurred during the first RPD sitting. However, at that time, no objections were made regarding the interpretation. While the principal Appellant argues on appeal that she was not properly instructed to raise concerns about interpretation during the first sitting, this is not credible. The RPD did tell the principal Appellant to inform it if she had any difficulty communicating with the interpreter.16 There is no indication at this point in the transcript, or the interpreter's affidavit, that this was not fully and accurately interpreted to the principal Appellant. I also note that moments earlier the principal Appellant confirmed with the RPD that she had no issues understanding the interpreter.17 Therefore, I find the principal Appellant knew to raise her concerns at the earliest opportunity. [20] The principal Appellant's statement at the beginning of the second sitting that "I expect I'm anticipating that I am more lucky this time with the Interpreter", does not explain why, if she had problems with the interpreter, she did not raise these concerns about the interpretation during the first sitting. The principal Appellant's statement that she was "unlucky" is also vague as to the issues she had during the first sitting. That said, the principal Appellant's statement that she was "unlucky" with interpretation she received at the first sitting is in the record and was heard by the principal Appellant's counsel. The principal Appellant also speaks some English. As such, her counsel could reasonably be expected to have been aware of the interpretation concerns of the principal Appellant in order to canvas them during the RPD hearing, as well as to investigate the quality of the translation during the first hearing and request an audit before the RPD rendered its decision. There is an obligation on the part of counsel to draw such matters to the attention of the tribunal so that it can be remedied at the hearing itself. Counsel and their clients cannot hedge their bets by ignoring the issue and then raising it in the event of an unfavourable result.18 Therefore, the Appellants have not explained why the affidavit from the interpreter, including the interpreter's examination of the RPD transcript, could not have been provided at the time the RPD rejected the claim. Since the Appellants do not explain why such information could not be provided at the time of rejection, the affidavit of the interpreter and the interpreter's comments in the transcript do not meet the statutory requirements and are inadmissible as new evidence. The Appellants were not denied a fair hearing owing to poor interpretation [21] Even if I accepted the Appellants' new evidence about the quality of interpretation before the RPD, and assume the Appellants did not waive their right to object to interpretation, the evidence shows they received adequate interpretation and that they were able to adequately express themselves and tell their story to the RPD. [22] Interpretation should be continuous, precise, impartial, competent and contemporaneous. Although the standard of interpretation is high, it need not be so high as to be perfect. If a breach of this standard is shown, it is not necessary to show actual prejudice.19 What is important is whether the Appellant understood the interpretation and was able to adequately express himself through the interpreter.20 To put it another way, persons who do not speak and understand one of the official languages must be able to tell their story, and the interpretation must be of such quality that they are not impeached in their ability to make their case.21 Was the principal Appellant able to adequately express herself and tell her story? [23] Not every interpretation error identified by the Appellant's evidence constitutes a breach of natural justice. In this case, there are not enough serious errors to cause the RAD to doubt the fairness of the Appellants' RPD hearing, and the errors are not material to the RPD's findings.22 I base this conclusion on the following. [24] First, while it is true that at the beginning of the first sitting many things were not interpreted, this is because the RPD and counsel were going through the exhibits and confirming the evidence in the record. This is a procedural matter that is regularly not interpreted for claimants as it is more efficient to do so. Nothing turned on the lack of interpretation of these preliminary matters. [25] Second, throughout the transcript, and the interpreter's affidavit, the interpreter generally and vaguely mentions that some questions and responses were incorrectly interpreted, incompletely interpreted, and that certain words were not interpreted. However, the interpreter provides no translation for what the accurate interpretation should have been. Without any evidence about what the full and proper interpretation should have been I am unable to conclude that the principal Appellant was unable to adequately express herself and tell her story to the RPD. [26] Third, none of the issues raised in the interpreter's affidavit, or in the transcript itself, changes the meaning of the RPD's questions or the principal Appellant's responses with respect to the RPD's credibility findings. Although the principal Appellant gives an example about whether or not her husband received a phone call or a letter from the Ministry in Jordan about her residence status, this is not material to the RPD's findings. The RPD found the principal Appellant was not excluded under Article 1E due to her Jordanian status. Therefore, this confusion is immaterial to the RPD's credibility findings that are core to the Appellants' claim. [27] Finally, I note that the interpreter mentions that there were no discernable issues with the interpretation at the second RPD sitting. [28] For the above reasons, I find the Appellants were able to express themselves and tell their story to the RPD. None of the interpretation issues are material to the RPD's findings. Therefore, this argument is rejected and the Appellants have not established that the interpretation they received at the RPD was inadequate. Application to Submit Additional Documents (Rule 29 Application) [29] The Appellants submit an application under Rule 29 of the Refugee Appeal Division Rules for the admission of documents not previously provided. The Appellants request to submit the following documents: 1) Letter from the principal Appellant's Brother-in-Law, dated XXXX XXXX 2017;23 2) Letter from the principal Appellant's Sister, dated XXXX XXXX 2017;24 and, 3) The principal Appellant's Parents' Swedish Refugee Documents, dated XXXX XXXX 2006.25 [30] Rule 29 allows the Appellants to make an application to provide a document not previously provided. Such an application must include an explanation of how the document meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA and how that evidence relates to the Appellants.26 In determining the application, the RAD must consider any relevant factors, including: the relevance and probative value of the document, any new evidence the document brings to the appeal, and whether the Appellants could have, with reasonable effort, provided the document with the Appellants' Record. The Appellants' Argument on the Rule 29 Application [31] The Appellants provide an affidavit from a legal assistant at counsel's office stating that these documents could not be provided with the Appellants' Record because the Appellants did not provide counsel with the documents until the day after the Appellants' Record was "compiled". The legal assistant states that there "appears" to have been a delay in the translation of the Swedish refugee documents from the principal Appellant's parents. The RAD's Assessment on the Rule 29 Application The Brother-in-Law's Letter and the Sister's Letter [32] The Appellants do not provide full and detailed submissions about how this evidence meets the factors of Rule 29(4), and for that matter, the criteria under 110(4). Specifically, the Appellants have provided no explanation for why the letter from the brother-in-law and the principal Appellant's sister was submitted late. While the affidavit from the legal assistant states that they were submitted late to counsel, there is no explanation from the Appellants about why they were submitted late. No delays in translation are mentioned or corroborated with respect to the brother-in-law's letter or the sister's letter. Nonetheless, the Appellants had approximately three weeks to get these documents translated in order to submit them with the Appeal Record, and these letters submitted with the Rule 29 application pre-date other documents that the Appellants were able to have translated and submitted as new evidence with their Appeal Record. In addition, the affidavit from the legal assistant states that they were submitted after the Appellants' Record was "compiled", indicating that the Appellants' Record was not yet submitted to the RAD. Therefore, I find the Appellants could have, with reasonable effort, provided the letters from the brother-in-law and sister with the Appellants' Record. As such, I reject the Appellants' Rule 29 application for the admission of the letters from the principal Appellant's brother-in-law and sister. [33] Even if I accepted the Appellants' Rule 29 application with respect to the brother-in-law's and sister's letter, they do not meet the statutory requirements under subsection 110(4), and in the case of the letter from the brother-in-law, the factor of credibility. The Sister's Letter [34] With respect to the letter from the principal Appellant's sister, the Appellants do not explain why this letter could not have been provided at the time of rejection. It is clear from the RPD hearing that the level of communication between the principal Appellant's sister and her cousin in Iraq, as well as the level of communication between the principal Appellant and her sister, was an issue during the hearing. The Appellants had nearly three months from the time of the first sitting when this was discussed, until the RPD rendered its decision, to clarify the issue of the principal Appellant's sister's communication with her cousin and whether her alleged agents of persecution are after her. In fact, the principal Appellant's sister provided a letter to explain her level of communication with her cousin in Iraq prior to the second RPD sitting. It is only upon receiving the RPD's decision on these specific issues that the Appellants attempt to remedy their deficient evidence at the RPD with new evidence at the RAD. This is not the purpose of the new evidence provisions and the Appellants do not explain why this letter from the sister, which further explains the circumstances of her communication with her cousin, could not have been provided at the time of rejection. For these reasons, I find the letter from the principal Appellant's sister does not meet the statutory criteria for admissibility and is rejected as new evidence. The Brother-in-law's Letter [35] I also find that the circumstances in which the brother-in-law's evidence came about is lacking in credibility. I again note that the timing of the brother-in-law's disclosure is too fortuitous to be true. The letter from the principal Appellant's brother-in-law is submitted to rebut a specific credibility concern of the RPD, even though the RPD questioned the principal Appellant at the first sitting about the last time she had contact with her paternal uncles and whether her husband's family in Iraq is known to her family and had any difficulties. The principal Appellant testified that there were no difficulties after the 2005 threats and said her husband's family had no contact with her uncles. Considering this was an issue during the first sitting of her RPD hearing, the principal Appellant could have corroborated this by contacting her brother-in-law prior to the rejection of her claim. She did not do so, even though whether or not her alleged agents of persecution were still interested in her is a material aspect of her claim. [36] It is also an extraordinary coincidence that a week after receiving the RPD's decision, where the RPD specifically found there was no reliable evidence that the uncle's sons belong to armed groups and that the husband's family in Iraq have had no contact with the uncles or the principal Appellant's family, the brother-in-law informed the Appellants that he has had such contact. Specifically, he discloses that the day after they left Iraq in 2013, which is more than five years ago, he was threatened and attacked at his home by unknown people from militias or gangs looking for the principal Appellant. While the brother-in-law explains that he did not mention this incident to his brother because he thought the principal Appellant's husband would return to Iraq to confront the assailants, I find this is unlikely given the letter states that the assailants were unknown and there is no indication that they told the brother-in-law information about who they are or who they are working for. [37] Moreover, I find it unlikely that if the assailants told the brother-in-law that they would eventually take their revenge on the principal Appellant and her family, the brother-in-law would not warn them of the threats to their lives prior to XXXX 2017. Particularly in light of the brother-in-law's statement that when the principal Appellant visited him from XXXX XXXX to XXXX XXXX, 2013, she did not leave the house and they blamed her for her "exaggerated fear". Surely, if the brother-in-law learned that individuals were searching for the Appellants the day after they left Iraq, this would have demonstrated that her fear was not exaggerated and he would have warned the Appellants immediately of the risk to her life. In this regard, I further note that the brother-in-law informed the alleged assailants where they resided and that they returned to Jordan. One would expect the brother-in-law to inform the Appellants of the threats against them, so that they could be alert to avoid any incidents in Jordan, especially considering a letter in the record from the principal Appellant's sister states that she was threatened and told the uncles could find them outside Iraq, including in Sweden. For the brother-in-law to not have warned the Appellants of the threat to their lives prior to the RPD rejecting their claim undermines the credibility of the allegation that he was threatened and attacked as alleged. [38] With regard to the information about individuals searching the brother-in-law's home looking for the principal Appellant's mother, the brother-in-law is vague as to when this incident occurred. He simply states that it occurred a "few weeks ago", which does not assist the RAD in determining whether such evidence could have been provided at the time of rejection. I also note that the principal Appellant's mother's letter in the RPD record mentions that the last time she was threatened was in 2005. She does not mention any incidents since then from the principal Appellant's uncles. I find it unlikely that 13 years after the last incident and a lack of further threats from the uncles, that the principal Appellant's mother would suddenly be targeted. [39] Finally, the brother-in-law's letter states that the principal Appellant "broke down and started sobbing; she blamed me for not telling them about this incident because it might have assisted her case". To me, this indicates that the brother-in-law knew that the Appellants made a refugee claim. As such, I doubt that the brother-in-law, having learned on XXXX XXXX, 2013 that the principal Appellant's fears were not exaggerated and that he was also targeted by unknown men from militias or gangs, would not have provided corroborating evidence to support her refugee claim prior to rejection. [40] For the above reasons, I find the brother-in-law's letter is lacking in credibility. In my view, it was carefully concocted in order to address specific findings made by the RPD, and the Appellants have not established that they could not have provided such information at the time the RPD rejected their refugee claim. Therefore, notwithstanding the denial of their Rule 29 application, the brother-in-law's letter is also inadmissible as new evidence owing to lack of credibility and failure to meet the statutory criteria for admissibility. Swedish Refugee Document [41] I reject the Appellants' Rule 29 application regarding the Swedish refugee documents for the principal Appellant's parents. While the Appellants submit evidence that it could not be provided with the Appellants' Record due to translation issues, it is not relevant and probative. The Appellants contend that it shows the principal Appellant's parents were granted asylum in Sweden due to the threats they received from the principal Appellant's uncles, but there is no information on the face of the Swedish refugee document confirming on what basis they applied for refugee status in Sweden, or upon what basis it was granted. Therefore, I do not accept the Rule 29 application for the Swedish refugee documents of the principal Appellant's parents. [42] Even if I accepted the Rule 29 application, I would find that the Appellants have not established that this document could not have been provided at the time of rejection. The document is from 2006 and if her parents claimed refugee status in Sweden on the same basis as her own claim, she should have provided it to the RPD prior to rejection. The Appellants provide no explanation for why this document could not have been provided at the time of rejection. Therefore, notwithstanding the denial of their Rule 29 application, the Swedish refugee documents also do not meet the statutory requirements for new evidence and are inadmissible on this basis. Request for an oral hearing is denied [43] As there is no new evidence being accepted by the RAD, there can be no oral hearing.27 Therefore, the application for an oral hearing is dismissed. ANALYSIS The Appellants have not credibly established their allegations on a balance of probabilities The Appellants' Return to Iraq in 2013 Undermines their Credibility The Appellants' Arguments [44] The Appellants submit that they provided a reasonable explanation for concealing information from the RPD about their return to Iraq in 2013. The principal Appellant explains that it was at the behest of her husband who wanted the family to visit his gravely ill brother. The Appellants only travelled there the one time and stayed for seven days. The Appellants argue that the RPD confused their explanation about the impact of their return to Iraq and the impact of its concealment on the claim by stating that the concealment of their return to Iraq seriously undermines their credibility, but also states that the evidence does not suggest that the Appellants have returned so often, or for such a long period, as to render the claim that they hold a fear of return to Iraq completely incredible. The Appellants allege that this reasoning by the RPD is faulty and inconsistent because it is confusing how the trip to Iraq both "seriously" undermines the Appellants' credibility and at the same time support the claim of fear of persecution in Iraq. Therefore, it is not clear to what extent this factor has impacted the decision to deny the claim. [45] The Appellants further contend that the act of misrepresentation in and of itself is not sufficient to discard the claim, and the RPD has a duty to assess additional evidence, such as the objective evidence from numerous family members that point to persecution. Based on this one misrepresentation, the RPD appears to have dismissed the rest of the sworn testimony. The RAD's Assessment [46] I reject the Appellants' argument and find the Appellant's misrepresentation about returning to Iraq in 2013 significantly detracts from the credibility of their allegations. [47] With respect to the Appellants' argument that the RPD's reasoning is confusing and contradictory, I disagree. In effect, the RPD's finding is in accordance with the Appellants' second argument. The RPD's finding that the misrepresentation seriously undermines the Appellants' credibility, but that the evidence does not suggest that the Appellants have returned so often, or for such a long period, as to render the claim completely incredible, means that the RPD found this misrepresentation was not determinative of the claim. This is why the RPD continued to make additional credibility findings in its decision about the Appellants' allegations, including the principal Appellant's testimony. Contrary to the Appellants' submission, the RPD does not make a finding that because they returned to Iraq only one time and for one week in 2013, this supports their claim of fear of persecution in Iraq. [48] Having reviewed the record, I agree with the RPD's assessment of the Appellants' misrepresentation and that it seriously undermines the credibility of their allegations. The principal Appellant stated in her Basis of Claim (BOC) and her testimony that she never returned to Iraq. The RPD noted that one of her passports was not disclosed to the RPD, and asked whether she had that passport. The Appellant testified that she did not have that passport anymore. However, the RPD observed that there were Iraqi stamps in the record from a photocopy of a passport when the Appellants applied for a Canadian visa showing a return trip to Iraq in 2013. Once confronted with this fact, the principal Appellant confessed to misleading the RPD in her BOC and her testimony about having never returned to Iraq and that she intentionally withheld one of her Iraqi passports. [49] The principal Appellant explained that she returned to Iraq at her husband's request because her brother-in-law was ill and wanted to see them before he lost his sight. The principal Appellant alleges that she was afraid to return, but her husband wanted her to return to Iraq. The principal Appellant claims that she did not leave the house during her seven day stay so as to avoid any risk from her uncles. I do not accept the principal Appellant's explanation for the misrepresentation. Her explanation is an attempt to explain her return to Iraq, but does not explain her intent to deceive the RPD. Furthermore, if her brother-in-law's poor health was her explanation for returning to Iraq, she could have provided this explanation in her BOC, as well as the many purported precautions she took. [50] With respect to the Appellants' explanation for her return to Iraq, her submissions also mislead the IRB. In her memorandum, she states that her brother-in-law was "gravely ill", but this is not supported by the evidence. Rather, the evidence is that he was losing his eyesight, not that he was dying. Furthermore, as stated by the RPD, alternative arrangements could have been made so that her brother-in-law could have seen the Appellants before losing his sight. This includes alternative travel options and technology that would have allowed them to see each other before he allegedly lost his sight. I do not see how the Appellants returning to Baghdad in 2013, in light of the alleged risk to them from the Appellant's uncles, warranted a return trip to Iraq. Alternative plans would have achieved the same goal without the risk. I note that the Appellants do not contest the RPD's suggestion that technology or other travel options could have been arranged to visit the brother-in-law and mitigated any risk to the Appellants instead of returning to Iraq. [51] For the above reasons I find the Appellants' misrepresentation and return to Iraq seriously undermines the credibility of their allegations and that the principal Appellant's uncles are not targeting them as alleged. Childbirth in Canada The Appellants' Argument [52] The Appellants argue that the RPD erroneously concluded that the purpose of the principal Appellant's trip to Canada in 2009 was to give birth. They submit that not only is this irrelevant to the claim, but is unsupported by the evidence. The Appellants argue that it is inconsequential to the claim and the purpose of her trip to Canada should have no bearing on the principal Appellant's credibility. Moreover, the Appellants submit that the RPD's conclusion that the principal Appellant was untruthful is unsupported by the evidence, as there is nothing in her testimony or the evidence to suggest the Appellant visited Canada to have her child. The principal Appellant submits that she was pregnant long before she applied for her visa to come to Canada in 2009, that her husband needed to come to Canada for work, and she decided to come along. The principal Appellant also states that her husband told her that there was no point to submit the application, because the visa takes time and that he may already be gone and she will deliver in Jordan. There was nothing else in the evidence that she came to Canada for the purposes of having a child. The Appellants argue that the RPD was influenced by the visa officer's notes when she applied for a Canadian visa after 2009 about her intention to give birth in Canada. They submit that the visa notes from 2015 state that she was never asked if she was pregnant when she was permitted to come to Canada in 2009, so it was erroneous for the RPD to be influenced by the speculative information in the notes. The RAD's Assessment [53] I disagree with the Appellants' submission. The RPD's finding is relevant and supported by the evidence. [54] With respect to relevance, the RPD specifically noted that, although "unrelated to her claim", the principal Appellant's willingness to mislead authorities about her pregnancy and intention demonstrated that she is generally untrustworthy. This is relevant to her overall credibility. [55] In regard to whether the RPD's assessment was based on the evidence, this is supported by the record. The RPD did not believe the principal Appellant when she testified that it was unintentional when she came to Canada in the advanced stages of pregnancy and had a child. The RPD found the principal Appellant unbelievable because she engaged in multiple international travels for many years, it was not her first pregnancy, she is an intelligent and educated person, so she would have known that travelling very late in the pregnancy (at eight months pregnant) was likely to result in her having her child while in Canada. It is a plausibility finding and it is based on the evidence. There is no indication that the RPD based its assessment on any of the visa officer's notes. In my view, the RPD did not err in noting that given her advanced pregnancy, and her personal circumstances, that it was likely that she was going to have her child in Canada. This is a plausibility finding that is based on the evidence in the record. [56] Although the RPD did not comment on it, the RPD's finding is supported by the visa officer's interview notes in 2012, when the principal Appellant applied for a visa again. During the interview, the principal Appellant acknowledged that it is true that when at eight months pregnancy, airlines often do not allow women to travel so late in their pregnancy. In addition, the principal Appellant stated that she travelled to Canada when she was eight months pregnant and that she was going to be in Canada for two weeks. The officer asked her if she intended to travel back to Jordan at eight and a half months of pregnancy, to which she said it's "possible". Given her acknowledgement that the lateness of her pregnancy could lead to her being unable to board a plane to return to Jordan, I find on a balance of probabilities that the principal Appellant knew that she would likely give birth in Canada when she boarded the plane to Canada. As such, I agree with the RPD that it is not believable that she did not intend to give birth to her child in Canada. [57] I further note that the Appellants' submission that her husband told her that there was no point to submit her visa application in 2009 in order to accompany him on a business trip, because the visa takes time and that he may already be gone and she will deliver in Jordan, is inconsistent with her interview response. In her 2012 interview, the principal Appellant stated that her husband was afraid that she would be in Jordan alone and that it would hurt the baby, "so destiny gave us the birth in Canada". This inconsistency further demonstrates that the principal Appellant is generally untrustworthy with regard to her attempts to establish herself or her children in Canada. Therefore, I find the RPD did not err. Threats from Uncles The Appellants' Argument [58] The Appellants argue that the RPD made an erroneous plausibility finding by concluding that her uncles would not have the same amount of power to persecute the Appellants and that the uncles must be a similar age as the principal Appellant's father, who died in 2014. The RPD assumed that the uncles must be in their sixties or seventies, and therefore, there was a significant difference in the ability of younger and politically connected persons to affect persecution than her uncles at the present time. The RPD's conclusion that her uncles are not politically connected and would not have the same amount of power due to their older age is based on conjecture and generalizations. Simply because her uncles are not politically connected does not mean they are unable to persecute the Appellants. Nothing, including their political connections, would prevent the uncles from harming them. In addition, the RPD's findings are ageist, as the RPD never determined the actual age of the uncles and just because a person is in their sixties and seventies, it does not mean the uncles would be unable to harm a woman and her child, especially in a place such as Iraq where mixed marriages are "frowned upon". The RAD's Assessment [59] While I agree that the principal Appellant's uncle's age and political connections do not mean they cannot harm another person, the principal Appellant's own BOC emphasizes that her uncles were committed Ba'athists and that they had some position in the Iraqi government. This information is provided in order to emphasize their power and reach so as to establish she faces a serious possibility of persecution upon return to Iraq.28 As a result, it was not an error for the RPD to highlight that the objective documentary evidence shows that Ba'athists no longer hold significant power in Iraq due to extensive "De-ba'athification" in Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime.29 Former Ba'athists are subject to arbitrary arrests, job loss, and have been politically marginalized and that simply accusing someone of membership can cause them great difficulties.30 The RPD's finding is correct and based on the evidence in the record. [60] With respect to the Appellants' argument about speculating about their age, this was not speculation. The RPD asked the principal Appellant during the hearing about the age her uncles are now. The RPD asked whether they were around the same age as the principal Appellant's father, which would make them in their sixties or seventies. The principal Appellant confirmed that her uncles would be around that age. The RPD did not speculate. Therefore, I concur with the RPD that the diminished power of Ba'athists in Iraq and her uncles increased age reduces the ability of her uncles to harm her and her family. I also agree with the RPD that the Appellants provide no reliable evidence that the uncle's sons belong to armed militia groups, this was not contested by the Appellants in this appeal. Since the Appellants do not contest it, I see no reason to interfere with it, it is correct and based on the evidence in the record. [61] However, most significant is the fact that the principal Appellant testified during the first sitting that she has not been in contact with her uncles since 2005. The RPD asked the last time the uncles that caused her problems were in contact, to which the principal Appellant said after she married her husband in 2005. The RPD asked if anyone from her family had any contact with these uncles since her marriage, and the principal Appellant said no, but that the uncles initiated contact from her sister in Sweden, to her and her father. In addition, her husband's family, who reside in Iraq, have experienced no difficulties due to the principal Appellant's inter-sect marriage.31 The principal Appellant's mother also makes no reference to continuing threats or difficulties to their family following the threat in 2005 after they got married.32 One would expect that if the principal Appellant's uncles were so opposed to her and her mother's inter-sect marriages, they would have faced difficulties over the past 13 years. For these reasons, I find the Appellants have not established that her uncles have a continuing interest in harming the Appellants and their allegations of risk upon return to Iraq are lacking in credibility. The Sister's Letters and Other Letters The Appellants' Arguments [62] The Appellants argue that the RPD erred in finding her sister's letters were insufficiently detailed and internally inconsistent. In examining the letters, the Appellants contend that the RPD was overzealous in dismissing them. The Appellants submit that other than noting the sister stated in one letter that she kept in contact with her cousin "from time to time", while another letter said her contact with the cousin was "constant", there were no other inconsistencies. The Appellants argue that the letters are sufficiently detailed and that the difference between "time to time" and "constant" is too minuscule and inconsequential to warrant undermining the letters. The Appellants also argue that the RPD ignored the letters from the principal Appellant's husband and her mother, which speak to the risks to them in Iraq. The RAD's Assessment [63] I reject the Appellants' argument and find the RPD did not err. [64] First, I note that aside from the inconsistency between the sister's first letter and second letter, the RPD found the principal Appellant's testimony about the nature and consistency of the conversations between her sister and cousin was undetailed and inconsistent. I agree with the RPD's assessment in this regard. At the first sitting, the RPD asked the principal Appellant whether anyone from her family had heard from these uncles since she was married; she said no but that they initiated contact from her sister in Sweden, to her and her father. The RPD asked whether her uncles were still alive, and the principal Appellant said they were alive. The RPD then asked how she knew they were still alive and the principal Appellant's testimony evolved to say it was because one of her cousins contacted her sister in Sweden and she knows they are still alive. [65] The RPD mentioned to the principal Appellant that her sister's letter, submitted prior to the RPD hearing, states that it was through a cousin that her uncles learned that the principal Appellant married a Shia. The RPD put to the principal Appellant that even though this cousin was spreading the details of her family to the uncles, which resulted in threats, the principal Appellant's sister continued speaking with the cousin. In response, the principal Appellant stated "no, not now". The RPD then confirmed that her sister has not been in contact with her cousin in Iraq since 2005, and the principal Appellant confirmed that it was not since 2005, but then immediately after, the principal Appellant's testimony evolved to say they were in contact in an "intermittent way because they wanted to know everything about us". As a result of this response, the RPD stated that it was confused and clarified whether the principal Appellant's sister was still communicating with her cousin, to which the Appellant's testimony evolved again and stated she did not ask her exactly. The RPD then asked if the principal Appellant knows when the last contact was, and the principal Appellant changed her testimony and said "no". The RPD then asked if she knows whether her sister broke-off contact with her cousin as a result of the threats that occurred in 2005, and the principal Appellant now stated that she was not sure. The RPD put to the principal Appellant why she said she knew that her uncles were alive because her sister was talking to her cousin, if she was not sure, and the principal Appellant's testimony evolved again to say that her sister has a good heart and contacted them when she heard that an uncle died. I find the principal Appellant's testimony about the nature and consistency of the conversations between her sister and cousin to be inconsistent and evolving. I draw a negative inference with respect to the Appellants' allegations as a result of this inconsistent and evolving testimony. [66] Second, I do not agree with the Appellants that the inconsistency between the sister's first and second letter is minuscule.33 The sister's first letter, submitted prior to the RPD hearing, states that she was in contact with her cousin from "time to time". However, the sister's second letter indicates that their communication was much more intense, such that she states in the second letter that she was in "constant contact" with the cousin in Iraq, and that her sister even spoke to her cousin days before drafting the letter. Conveniently, the sister's second letter was drafted after the first RPD sitting and addresses several concerns raised by the RPD about the level of contact between the principal Appellant's sister and her cousin in Iraq, and about whether the Appellants' family in Iraq is still interested them. Considering the principal Appellant testified at the first sitting that she was last threatened in 2005 and stated that her family faced no other contact or threats after 2005, the sister's second letter appears to be drafted for the sole purpose of remedying her deficient first letter and bolstering the Appellants' refugee claim. Given the inconsistencies between the two letters, and the principal Appellant's inconsistent and evolving testimony about her family's contact with her agents of persecution in Iraq, I give the letters no weight to establishing the Appellants' allegations. [67] With respect to the Appellants' support letters from the principal Appellant's husband, I give these no weight to establishing their risk upon return to Iraq. The husband's first letter,34 mainly speaks to the issues the principal Appellant experienced in Jordan, which is not relevant to the issues in this appeal. The husband's second letter35 discusses the reasons why the Appellants returned to Iraq in 2013 and that the principal Appellant was afraid during this trip to Iraq. However, the second letter does not explain why the principal Appellant was afraid of returning to Iraq, only that she was afraid. One would expect that the letter would describe the reasons for her fear of returning to Iraq in 2013 since her claim is based on alleged threats from her uncles who reside in Baghdad. I further note that the husband's second letter corroborates that the Appellants had no difficulties in Iraq when they returned there in 2013. [68] In regard to the letter from the principal Appellant's mother,36 I give this little weight to establishing the risk to the Appellants upon return to Iraq. The mother's letter refers to events that occurred more than 13 years ago. There is insufficient credible and trustworthy evidence that the Appellants have experienced any difficulties or threats from the principal Appellant's father's family since 2005, despite having travelled there and an allegation in the principal Appellant's sister's first letter that the uncles could find and harm the Appellants and her family members outside Iraq.37 Even if these threats occurred as alleged, given the time that has elapsed, the lack of contact with her uncles, the lack of difficulties faced by the Appellants and her husband's family in Iraq since 2005, I find the Appellants have failed to establish with sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence her allegations on a balance of probabilities. [69] Therefore, due to the above credibility concerns, I find the Appellants do not face a serious possibility of persecution upon return to Iraq from the principal Appellant's father's family in Iraq. The Appellant's have not established an objective basis of risk as a woman and child The Appellants' Argument [70] The Appellants argue that the RPD ignored evidence of the risk to women and children in Iraq, which was referred to in their BOC and in counsel's submissions to the RPD. In her BOC, the principal Appellant states that she fears the minor Appellant could be forced into marriage by militias in Iraq or sold into sexual slavery, or that her daughter will be kidnapped, raped, or killed in Iraq by Shia militias, and they could be targeted because of their moderate beliefs, gender and the minor Appellant's age. The Appellants submit that the country conditions documents show a risk to women and children, and that there is a risk of torture, rape and sexual violence to women at the hands of extremists, and the risk of conscription of children. They submit that documents state that the situation of women and girls has severely deteriorated as a result of the current conflict with ISIS, including widespread rape in Iraq, sexual harassment, harmful traditional practices, and female genital mutilation (FGM), and lawlessness in Baghdad. The evidence also supports that the situation in Baghdad is unsafe for interfaith marriages. The RAD's Assessment [71] I agree that it was an error for the RPD to not assess whether the Appellants possess an objective risk upon return to Iraq. However, for the reasons that follow, I find the Appellants have not established an objective basis to their risk if they returned to Iraq. Risk on the Basis of Gender [72] First, I have considered that the principal Appellant is a woman and the minor Appellant is a child. I note that the UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines states that "[w]omen without support and protection provided by their family or tribal network are particularly vulnerable to being harassed, kidnapped or sexually assaulted. In order to ensure livelihoods for themselves and their children, women without a breadwinner may be compelled to engage in prostitution, begging or marriage to elderly men, including in so-called temporary or 'pleasure marriages' (muta'a)."38 However, in the principal Appellant's circumstances, she is a married woman who continues to be in a committed relationship with her husband. He is also financially well-established according to various visa applications and operates a successful business. Her husband continues to be supportive, having provided letters in support of her refugee claim. Although he currently lives and works in Jordan, there is no evidence before me that he is unwilling or unable to accompany the Appellants to Iraq should they return there. Moreover, the principal Appellants' husband indicated that he has been mindful of their safety when they returned to Iraq in 2013. The Appellants also have supportive adult family members in Iraq, including the principal Appellant's brother who has welcomed them to his home in Baghdad. [73] I also observe that there is no evidence that the principal Appellant is politically active, was ever involved in any armed conflict in Iraq, and has assumed a public role as a politician, government official, rights activist or professional that would heighten her profile of risk as a woman in Iraq.39 While the objective documentary evidence indicates that serious problems exist in Iraq, including in Baghdad where the principal Appellant was born and resided as a child, as well as problems faced specifically by women, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that such problems are in many cases significantly decreased by the fact that the Appellants have a supportive male bread-winner. [74] The Appellants also fear FGM, but there is no evidence before me that the Appellants are under pressure to have FGM performed on the minor Appellant. In addition, the National Documentation Package (NDP) indicates that FGM is most prevalent amongst the Kurdish population, in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and amongst poorly educated women and girls. This is not the Appellants' circumstances. There is also no evidence in the record to support that the minor Appellant's parents would force her into an early or non-consensual marriage.40 Therefore, for the above reasons, I reject the Appellants' allegation that they face a serious possibility of persecution on the basis of their gender if they returned to Iraq.41 Risk as a Child [75] With respect to the minor Appellant's alleged fear as a child returning to Iraq, I have reviewed the UNHCR document cited by the Appellants and agree that it discusses the risk of torture, rape and sexual violence against women, and the alleged conscription of children and that the situation of women and children has deteriorated due to the current conflict with ISIS and that Iraq is considered one of the most dangerous places in the world for children. However, I note that this document discusses this in the context of ISIS controlled areas, but the principal Appellant was born in Baghdad and resided there until she left to live in Jordan.42 Baghdad is not under ISIS control, so I am not convinced that the difficulties faced by children in Iraq are those faced by the minor Appellant should she return to Iraq. The UNHCR's Eligibility Guidelines state that children with the profiles or in the specific circumstances of child labour, forced recruitment, victims of domestic and sexual violence and harmful traditional practices, and children in detention are likely in need of protection. None of these apply to the minor Appellant, and therefore, I reject this submission. As mentioned above, the minor Appellant's father is a supportive and capable bread-winner, who has demonstrated an ability and an intent to care for his family wherever they reside. This includes during a recent trip to Iraq. [76] In regard to the Appellants' submission about the risk to them based on lawlessness in Baghdad, I find that this is general criminality experienced by the population broadly in Baghdad. I reject this argument.43 [77] Finally, the NDP indicates that there is no significant risk for mixed sect couples and families in urban areas of Iraq, such as Baghdad.44 There are neighbourhoods in Baghdad where mixed-couples are able to reside and where sectarian violence is minimal and security is considered generally good.45 The principal Appellant is also a practicing Shia, like her husband, thereby creating the perception that she is part of the majority in Iraq. The Appellants' lack of credibility about having been targeted, mistreated, or threatened, by her father's family in Iraq further reduce the likelihood of the Appellants facing such problems in the future on the basis of honour based crimes, as well as religion for having married a Shia man. Therefore, I find the principal Appellant's mixed marriage would not create problems for them upon returning to Iraq. I also note that the Appellants provide no corroborative evidence for their bald assertion that they are moderate Muslims, which would place them at risk in Iraq. As a consequence, I reject this submission as well. [78] For all of the above reasons I find that the Appellants have not provided sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence that they would face more than a mere possibility of persecution if they returned to Iraq. For these same reasons, I find on a balance of probabilities that the Appellants would not face a risk to life, or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger of torture, if they were to return to Iraq. CONCLUSION [79] After conducting its own analysis of the record, the RAD finds that the Appellants were not denied adequate interpretation and the RPD did not err in its credibility assessment. While the RAD has concerns over the RPD's failure to assess whether the Appellants face a risk on account of their gender and because the minor Appellant is a child, as well as other alleged profiles, I was able to assess the documentary evidence and find their personal circumstances do not place them at a forward-looking risk upon return to Iraq. Therefore, the RPD's determination that the Appellants are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection is correct. This appeal is dismissed. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [80] The RAD dismisses the appeal and confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellants are not Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.46 (signed) "G. Erauw" G. Erauw December 12, 2018 Date 1 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, paras. 70 and 103. 2 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Letter from the Principal Appellant's Husband, at pp. 36-37. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Letter from the Principal Appellant's Mother, at p. 41. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at pp. 45-103. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Interpreter's Affidavit, at pp. 105-107. 6 Subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). 7 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96. 8 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, at para. 16. 9 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 54. 10 Marin v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 847, at para. 27; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Desalegn, 2016 FC 12, at para. 23; Ozomba v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 1418, at para. 18. 11 Tuncdemir v. M.C.I., 2016 FC 993, at para. 37; and Li v. M.C.I., 2018 FC 877, at para. 10. 12 Meng, Renxian v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1102-14), de Montigny, March 23, 2015, 2015 FC 365, at para. 22. 13 Ankrah, Bismark v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. T-1986-92), Noel, March 16, 1993. 14 Mohammadian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 FC 371, at para. 27. 15 Bal, Tarlok Singh v. M.C.I (F.C., no. IMM-1472-08), de Montigny, October 17, 2008, 2008 FC 1178, at para. 31. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Transcript of the RPD Hearing, at p. 53. 17 Ibid. 18 Mohammadian v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 3 FC 371, at para. 22. 19 Sohal, Manwinder Singh v. M.P.S.E.P. (F.C., no. IMM-1078-11), Harrington, October 18, 2011, 2011 FC 1175, para. 18, citing R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 SCR 951. 20 Lawal, Kayode Fasasi v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3534-07), de Montigny, July 10, 2008, 2008 FC 861, at para. 26. 21 Dhaliwal, Hardial Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-978-11), de Montigny, September 26, 2011, 2011 FC 1097, at para. 18. 22 Aseervatham v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 1006, at para. 23. 23 Exhibit P-3, Appellants' Record, Rule 29 Application, Brother-in-Law's Letter, at pp. 11-12. 24 Exhibit P-3, Appellants' Record, Rule 29 Application, Sister's Letter, at p. 16. 25 Exhibit P-3, Appellants' Record, Rule 29 Application, Parents' Refugee Documents, at pp. 19-20. 26 Rule 29(3), Immigration and Refugee Board, Refugee Appeal Division Rules, SOR/2012-257. 27 Subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Appellants' BOC Narrative, at pp. 24-30. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Iraq, 31 March 2017, at item 1.4, at pp. 26-27. 30 Ibid. 31 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Audio Recording of the RPD Hearing (1st Sitting). 32 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Mother's Letter, at p. 825. 33 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Sister's First Letter (Undated), at p. 830; Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Sister's Second Letter (XXXX XXXX, 2017), at pp. 757-758. 34 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Husband's First Letter (XXXX XXXX 2016), at pp. 836-837. 35 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Husband's Second Letter (XXXX XXXX 2017), at p. 760. 36 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Mother's Letter (XXXX XXXX 2016), at p. 825. 37 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, Sister's First Letter (Undated), at p. 830. 38 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, NDP for Iraq (31 March 2017), at item 1.7, at p. 36. 39 Ibid., at p. 35. 40 Ibid., at p. 39-40. 41 Ibid., at item 1.22, at p. 6. 42 Ibid., at item 1.12, at p. 4. 43 Ibid., at item 2.11. 44 Ibid., at items 2.3, 2.15, and 1.4. 45 Ibid., at item 1.17, at pp. 31-33. 46 Paragraph 111(1)(a), Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27. [IRPA]. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB7-24394 TB7-24395 RAD.25.02 (September 18, 2018) Disponible en français 2 RAD.25.02 (September 18, 2018) Disponible en français