TB5-01490

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01490 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Redetermination of the Appeal Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision August 10, 2016 Date de la décision Panel M. Pettinella Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Godwin Oware Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant has submitted new evidence in support of her appeal however does not request an oral hearing. She asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to substitute the decision of the RPD and declare her to be a Convention refugee. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that, upon return to Nigeria, she will be harmed by her parents because she refused to marry a man they had selected for her. The claim for refugee protection was heard on December 2, 2014. By a decision dated December 15, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim finding that the Appellant had failed to establish her identity. It also found that the Appellant's testimony with respect to her allegation of a forced marriage was not credible. The RPD also drew a negative credibility inference with respect to the Appellant's subjective fear based on her delay in departing Nigeria. [4] On appeal to the RAD, the Appellant submitted that the RPD erred in finding that she failed to establish her identity and nationality as a citizen of Nigeria. She further submitted that the RPD erred in its finding that she was not credible. On May 22, 2015, the RAD dismissed the appeal and confirmed the determination of the RPD. [5] On XXXX XXXX, 2016, the Federal Court issued a judgment indicating that the Appellant's application for judicial review was granted and the matter was to be returned to the RAD for redetermination by a different panel. The Court found that the RAD's treatment of the Appellant's new documents was unreasonable therefore its assessment of the Appellant's identity was also necessarily unreasonable. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD [6] What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD? [7] The Appellant submits that, in light of the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Dunsmuir,1 the applicable standard of review is reasonableness. [8] The Federal Court of Appeal, in Huruglica,2 indicated that the role of the RAD is to intervene when the RPD is wrong in law, in fact or in fact and law; and this translates into an application of the correctness standard of review.3 The Court held that, with respect to findings of fact (and mixed fact and law), which raises no issue of credibility of oral evidence, the RAD is to review RPD decisions applying the correctness standard. It went on to indicate that after carefully considering the RPD decision, the RAD is to carry out its own analysis of the record to determine whether the RPD erred. The Court also stated that having done the above, the RAD is to provide a final determination, either by confirming the RPD decision or setting it aside and substituting its own determination of the merits of the refugee claim. It is only when the RAD is of the opinion that it cannot provide such a final determination without hearing the oral evidence presented to the RPD that the matter can be referred back to the RPD for redetermination.4 [9] Considering the recent jurisprudence, the RAD will conduct its own analysis of the record to determine whether, as submitted by the Appellant, the RPD erred. Where the credibility of the oral evidence before the RPD was not a determinative issue, the RAD will apply a standard of correctness when assessing RPD findings of fact or of mixed fact and law. Where the credibility of the oral evidence before the RPD was a determinative issue, the RAD will defer to certain findings of the RPD where the RPD enjoyed an advantage over the RAD in assessing the oral evidence of witnesses who appeared before it. The extent of this deference will be assessed on a case-by-case basis dependent upon the particular circumstances of the matter and in conjunction with the RAD's own analysis of the record as a whole. In addition, the standard of correctness will be used for any error of law including a breach of natural justice or procedural fairness found in the RPD decision on appeal to the RAD. Admissibility of evidence submitted on appeal [10] Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim or was not reasonably available, or she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. It is for the Appellant to make full and detailed submissions in her Memorandum of Argument about how any proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) and how that evidence relates to her.5 Assessment of evidence that meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) [11] Where a document meets the test in subsection 110(4) the RAD will conduct a further assessment of that evidence. In Singh,6 the Federal Court of Appeal held that there is no valid reason the RAD cannot apply the criteria set out in Raza7 to the assessment of new evidence. While Raza predates the introduction of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA, it is based on nearly identical wording of subsection 113(a). In Raza, the Federal Court of Appeal held that new evidence should be considered for its credibility, relevance, newness, and materiality, in addition to any express statutory provisions.8 In Singh, the Court found that three of the criteria from Raza are necessarily implied in the wording of subsection 110(4).9 The Federal Court of Appeal has also found materiality to be redundant, as it is also found in subsection 110(6) of the IRPA, which describes when the RAD may hold an oral hearing.10 Newness is implicitly incorporated into subsection 110(4) and does not require additional analysis. [12] For these reasons, the RAD will apply the following factors to considering the Appellant's proposed new evidence. It will first consider whether the evidence passes the test in subsection 110(4). If not, the RAD has no discretion to admit the evidence. If the evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), the RAD will assess its credibility and relevance in order to determine whether it is admissible. [13] The Appellant tendered the following items as proposed new evidence in support of her appeal. (a) Ondo State of Nigeria Certificate of Registration of Birth, issued XXXX XXXX, 2015; 11 (b) Owo Local Government Certificate of Origin, issued XXXX XXXX, 2015; 12 and (c) Rufus Giwa Polytechnic Notification of National Diploma (ND) Examination Result, dated XXXX XXXX, 2012. 13 Item (a) [14] It is important to note that the Appellant fails to explain how item (a) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), simply indicating that it was not available at the time of her hearing on December 2, 2014. Nonetheless, the RAD notes that, while item (a) was issued subsequent to the rejection of the Appellant's claim for refugee protection, the information contained within the document does not postdate the rejection. It is not evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim. [15] Item (a), Certificate of Registration of Birth, confirms that the Appellant was born on XXXX XXXX XXXX 1986. It would be reasonable to expect that the certificate would have been reasonably available prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. One would expect functioning governments to routinely issue birth certificates to its citizens, as they are vital records kept under governmental authority. The Appellant even indicated at her hearing that she used her birth certificate, given to her by the local government, to obtain her passport in Nigeria. She has failed to establish that item (a) was not reasonably available at the time her claim was rejected. Also, she fails to explain why the document could not have been presented to the RPD post hearing, prior to the rejection of her claim. [16] Since identity is an issue in all claims for refugee protection, it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided a document such as her birth certificate to establish her identity prior to the rejection of her claim. Furthermore, the RPD expressed concern regarding her identity documents, or lack thereof, at the Appellant's hearing. For these reasons, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented her birth certificate at the time of the rejection. [17] Since item (a) does not meet the statutory requirements of 110(4), it will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. Item (b) [18] The Appellant also fails to explain how item (b) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), simply indicating that it was not available at the time of her hearing. The RAD notes that, while item (b) was issued subsequent to the rejection of the Appellant's claim for refugee protection, the information contained within the document does not postdate the rejection. It is not evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim. [19] Item (b), Certificate of Origin, confirms that the Appellant is a native of the city of Owo and that her parents were born and bred in Owo. The RAD notes that the Appellant was able to obtain the Certificate of Origin after the rejection of her claim. It would be reasonable to assume that she could have obtained it prior to the rejection of her claim. She indicated at her hearing that she never had a certificate of origin therefore her ability to obtain one post hearing suggests that it was reasonably available prior to the rejection of her claim. [20] Since identity is an issue in all claims for refugee protection, it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided a document such as a certificate of origin to establish her identity. Furthermore, the RPD expressed concern regarding her identity documents, or lack thereof, at the Appellant's hearing. For these reasons, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented her certificate of origin at the time of the rejection. [21] Since item (b) does not meet the statutory requirements of 110(4), it will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. Item (c) [22] The Appellant fails to explain how item (c) meets the requirements of subsection 110(4), simply indicating that it was not available at the time of her hearing. The RAD notes that item (c) is dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2012, over two years prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim for refugee protection. It is not evidence that arose after the rejection of her claim. [23] Item (c) confirms that the appellant was awarded a diploma in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX on XXXX XXXX, 2012. The Appellant fails to explain why item (c) was not reasonably available at the time her claim was rejected; however, considering it is a letter from an educational institution confirming that the Appellant was awarded a diploma, even if the Appellant was not in possession of the letter prior to her hearing with the RPD, it would be reasonable to expect the educational institution to reissue a letter confirming the awarding of the Appellant's diploma if it was requested from them. There is even a reference number on the notification that the Appellant could refer to in requesting a copy or the reissuance of the letter. The Appellant has failed to establish that item (c) was not reasonably available at the time her claim was rejected. [24] Since identity is an issue in all claims for refugee protection, it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided a document such as the letter from the school she attended in Nigeria to establish her identity. Furthermore, the RPD expressed concern regarding her identity documents, or lack thereof, at the Appellant's hearing. For these reasons, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented documents from the school she attended in Nigeria at the time of the rejection. [25] Since item (c) does not meet the statutory requirements of 110(4), it will not be accepted as new evidence in this appeal. Request for an oral hearing [26] Although the Appellant does not request an oral hearing, the RAD considered if one was warranted in this case. [27] When read together, subsections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new 110(4) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. The Appellant's proposed new evidence has been rejected by the RAD. It does not meet the statutory requirements of 110(4). As no new evidence has been accepted in this appeal, the RAD must proceed without a hearing. MERITS OF THE APPEAL Identity [28] The RPD found that the Appellant had failed to establish her identity. It noted that the Appellant first indicated that she did not have a birth certificate and then subsequently indicated that she had provided a birth certificate to obtain her passport. It noted that the objective evidence in the record indicated that several documents were needed to obtain a passport in Nigeria; however, the Appellant indicated that she only presented a birth certificate. The RPD concluded that the Appellant's passport was likely obtained fraudulently and gave it no weight. The RPD also found that the Appellant's credibility was undermined by the presentation of a fraudulent passport. [29] On appeal to the RAD, the Appellant submits that the RPD erred by not accepting her passport which is a genuine document issued by the government of Nigeria as proof of her citizenship, when there is no contrary evidence to disprove its validity. The Appellant further submits that the RPD perversely erred and committed a reviewable error by engaging in microscopic examination of the method she used to obtain her identity document rather than the validity of the passport. She argues that the RPD reasons do not amount to proof that her passport is not valid or genuine. The Appellant further submits that her knowledge or lack of knowledge about the passport process should not have impugned her credibility. [30] The Appellant's argument has merit. Although the Appellant alleges to have obtained her Canadian visa by making false statements and by using false documents, there is insufficient evidence to establish that she obtained her Nigerian passport by fraudulent means. The Appellant indicated that she provided her birth certificate to obtain her passport. When she had been asked by the RPD if she had a birth certificate, she indicated that after she obtained her passport, the passport was all she carried with her as an identity document. She had not indicated that she did not have a birth certificate as the RPD indicated in its reasons; she indicated that she did not carry it with her as identification after she obtained her passport. The RPD was wrong to draw a negative inference from an inconsistency that did not exist. [31] The Appellant's Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)/Federal Republic of Nigeria passport14 is sufficiently reliable to establish the Appellant's identity. It was sufficiently reliable for Canada to issue the Appellant a visitor/business visa in 2014. As indicated above, although the Appellant admitted to making false statements and using false documents to obtain her Canadian visa, there was no indication that she made false statements or used false documents to obtain her ECOWAS/Federal Republic of Nigeria passport. Her use of a birth certificate to obtain her ECOWAS/Federal Republic of Nigeria is credible as documentary evidence indicates it is required.15 [32] The RAD finds that the Appellant's ECOWAS/Federal Republic of Nigeria passport is acceptable documentation to establish her identity. The RAD further finds that the Appellant has established her identity with her ECOWAS/Federal Republic of Nigeria passport on a balance of probabilities. For the reasons that follow, the RAD finds that the error of the RPD on identity is not fatal to its decision. Credibility Inconsistency in the Appellant's evidence regarding who she fears in Nigeria [33] The RPD noted an inconsistency or omission in the Appellant's evidence regarding who she fears in Nigeria. It noted that the Appellant indicated at the port of entry that she feared Boko Haram and no one else whereas she indicated in her Basis of Claim Form (BoC) and at her hearing that she feared her parents because she refused to marry a man they had selected for her. The RPD found the Appellant's explanations for the inconsistency or omission unreasonable and led it to disbelieve that the Appellant fears being forcefully married if she was to return to Nigeria. [34] The Appellant argues that since the RPD did not examine her on her basis of claim nor did it question her to verify the credibility of her claim, it was not in a position to find her not to be credible on the issue of the forced marriage. She submits that the basis of her claim has not been contradicted and she has established both her subjective and objective fears. [35] The RAD concurs with the RPD's finding noted above. The Appellant alleges a fear of harm from her parents who demanded that she marry a man they selected for her. However, at the port of entry, when asked who or what she was afraid of, the Appellant indicated that she feared Boko Haram and bombings and that she had narrowly escaped a bombing.16 When asked by a immigration official if there was any other reason that she feared going back to Nigeria, the Appellant said that she had tried to escape for her life and that it was Boko Haram and Ebola.17 The RAD notes that the Appellant indicated in her BoC narrative18 and at her hearing that she feared her parents because they verbally and physically abused her and threatened to harm her after she refused to marry a man they had selected for her. When asked about the inconsistency at her hearing, the Appellant indicated that she was very afraid and nervous on the day she gave her statements to immigration officials. She also indicated that she was not herself and had to say something so that she would not be sent back home. [36] The RAD finds the Appellant's explanation for the major inconsistency unreasonable. The Appellant alleges to have come to Canada to seek refugee protection.19 She indicated in her BoC narrative that when she arrived in Canada she sought asylum at the airport explaining that she was in need of protection from persecution.20 One would expect a refugee claimant who is coming to Canada to seek protection to tell immigration officials at the port of entry the truth about the reason they are seeking refugee protection. If the Appellant's true intention was to seek refugee protection in Canada because she feared harm for refusing to marry a man her parents had selected for her in Nigeria, it would be reasonable to expect her to tell immigration officials in Canada about this. It is counterintuitive for the Appellant not be truthful to the individuals who would assist her in seeking protection. If the Appellant was afraid and nervous and feared being sent back to Nigeria as she alleges, it is unlikely that she would tell immigration officials that she feared Boko Haram and Ebola if she actually feared her parents. The Appellant is well educated and ought to have known that what she told immigration officials regarding who she feared in Nigeria would likely form the basis of her claim for refugee protection. [37] The RAD finds that the inconsistency in the Appellant's evidence regarding the reason she was seeking protection, without a reasonable explanation, seriously undermines her credibility, especially the credibility of her allegation that her parents abused her and threatened her with harm for refusing to marry an individual they had selected for her. The RAD notes that the Board had been upheld when rejecting major evidence which has been omitted at the port of entry.21 In Chen,22 the Federal Court indicated that, according to case law,23 inconsistencies between an applicant's statements at the port of entry and testimony about crucial elements of a claim are sufficient to taint an applicant's credibility. [38] The credibility of the evidence presented by the Appellant is undermined by a fundamental contradiction that goes to the very heart of her refugee protection claim. This discrepancy was not reasonably explained. The RAD finds that the contradiction removes all credibility from the Appellant's refugee protection claim. Delay in departing Nigeria [39] The RPD noted the Appellant's delay in departing Nigeria. It found the Appellant's explanations for the delay unreasonable. The RPD drew a negative credibility inference on the Appellant's subjective fear based on her delay in departing Nigeria. [40] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by basing its decision on the fact that she delayed in departing Nigeria irrespective of the reasonable explanations she offered. [41] On the one hand, the Appellant claimed to fear for her life in Nigeria. On the other hand, she waited five years (2009 to 2014) to leave Nigeria, after she refused to marry a man her parents had selected for her and after her parents verbally and physically abused her and threatened to harm her. She waited an additional two months to depart Nigeria after she obtained her visitor visa for Canada. This is a major inconsistency within the Appellant's own evidence-she said she was afraid, but she certainly did not act like she had such a fear. Her explanations that she had to keep hiding and was not feeling well are not reasonable. If a person could flee potential harm to a safe country, it would be reasonable to expect them to leave their hiding place to flee the country, even if they are not feeling well. [42] The RAD concurs with the RPD drawing an adverse inference with respect to the Appellant's overall credibility and the truthfulness of her allegations from her delay in leaving Nigeria. Having reviewed the evidence, the RAD reaches the same conclusion: the Appellant's actions are highly inconsistent with her alleged fear. The Appellant's explanations that she had to keep hiding and was not feeling well are not reasonable, considering her alleged fear. [43] The RAD does not accept as reasonable that the Appellant would wait for four years after her parents threatened to harm her, if in fact the threat to her safety was genuine. The RAD finds that the Appellant's delay in departing Nigeria, after she was threatened with harm by her parents, undermines her credibility and the credibility of her allegations. Supporting documents [44] The RPD gave little weight to a police report and the affidavits of two relatives after noting irregularities with the police report, the lack of accompanying identity documents for the signatories of the affidavits, and the prevalence of fraudulent documents in Nigeria. The RPD gave no weight to a letter from a trauma and settlement counsellor as the report was based on the Appellant's declarations which were found to be not credible. [45] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its treatment of the other documents she presented as there was no assessment of the veracity or authenticity of the documents. [46] The RAD concurs with the RPD's assessment of the Appellant's corroborating documents. Although evidence of widespread availability of fraudulent documents in a country is not, by itself, sufficient to reject foreign documents as forgeries,24 it may be relevant if there are other reasons to question the documents or a refugee claimant's credibility.25 Not only did the RPD note the prevalence of fraudulent documents from Nigeria in rejecting or giving little or no weight to the Appellant's supporting documents, it drew conclusions on the documents also in light of its finding of the Appellant's general lack of credibility, irregularities found on the face of the police report and the lack of identity documents attached to the affidavits of relatives. [47] The police report,26 the affidavit of XXXX XXXX,27 the affidavit of XXXX XXXX,28 and the letter from the Canadian Centre for Victims of Torture29 were all presented to confirm aspects of a story that has been found to be not credible. The RAD finds that the documents do not make the Appellant's story credible. As noted in Gomez, corroboration does not make an incredible story credible.30 The RAD gives no weight to the Appellant's corroborating documents as evidence of her allegations. Disposition [48] The Appellant has alleged that the RPD erred in finding that she had failed to establish her identity and in its finding that she was not credible. The RAD has found that the RPD did err in its finding on the Appellant's identity; however, the RAD has also found that the RPD did not err in its credibility findings. Upon review of the evidence, the RAD has reached the same conclusion as the RPD. [49] As a result of the above-noted anomalies, the RAD finds that the Appellant lacks credibility. The RAD does not accept, on a balance of probabilities, that the events, as described by the Appellant in her Basis of Claim Form and at her hearing with the RPD, occurred as described. The RAD finds the Appellant's evidence lacking in credibility with respect to the events material to her refugee claim. [50] On the basis of the findings noted above and after its own assessment of all the evidence in the record, including the transcript of the hearing, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not established, on a balance of probabilities, that she was harmed or threatened with harm by her parents in Nigeria because she refused to marry someone they selected for her. Therefore, the RAD finds that there is not a serious possibility of persecution should the Appellant return to Nigeria. The RAD therefore concludes that the Appellant has failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution under section 96 of the IRPA, and, for these same reasons - the lack of credibility - the RAD finds that the Appellant is not a person in need of protection or at a risk to life, or at risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or in danger of torture as set out in section 97 of the IRPA. CONCLUSION [51] Pursuant to subsection 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the Refugee Appeal Division confirms the decision of the Refugee Protection Division and dismisses the appeal. (signed) "M. Pettinella" M. Pettinella August 10, 2016 Date 1 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. 2 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93. 3 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 93, para. 78. 4 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, para. 103. 5 Refugee Appeal Division Rules, Section 3(3)(g)(iii). 6 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder (F.C.A., No. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, De Montigny, March 29, 2016; 2016 FCA 96. (F.C., No. IMM-6711-13), Gagné, October 28, 2014; 2014 FC 1022. 7 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007; 2007 FCA 385. 8 Raza, 2007 FCA 385, paras. 13-15. 9 M.C.I. v. Singh, Parminder, 2016 FCA 96, para. 64. 10 Singh, 2016 FCA 96, para. 48. 11 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 40. 12 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 41. 13 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 42. 14 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 85-88. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 97-118, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria dated 14 March 2014, item 3.2, at p. 4. 16 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 59. 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 59. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 14. 19 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 60. 20 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 15. 21 Bozsolik, Ferenc v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5301-11), Rennie, April 13, 2012, 2012 FC 432. 22 Chen, Xue Jun v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-8473-04), Blanchard, May 30, 2005, 2005 FC 767. 23 Nsombo, Bébé v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-5147-03), Harrington, March 31, 2004, 2004 FC 505; Sahota, Sukhman Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6792-03), Noël, September 16, 2004, 2004 FC 1256; Neame, Nora Cathia v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-847-99), Lemieux, March 23, 2000. 24 Ismaylov, Anar Ibrahim v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1232-01), Gibson, January 11, 2002, 2002 FCT 30; Papaskiri, George v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6179-02), O'Keefe, January 16, 2004, 2004 FC 69; Cheema, Munawar Ahmad v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-615-03), von Finckenstein, February 11, 2004, 2004 FC 224. 25 Uddin, Nizam v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-895-01), Gibson, April 26, 2002, 2002 FCT 451; Nasim, Babar v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-6455-00), Tremblay-Lamer, November 2, 2001, 2001 FCT 1199; Petrova, Olga v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4743-00), Dawson, March 14, 2002, 2002 FCT 286; Gasparyan, Sos v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3496-02), Kelen, July 10, 2003, 2003 FC 863. 26 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 120. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 123-126. 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at pp. 127-129. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Record, at p. 132. 30 Gomez, Hector Cisneros v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5741-04), Harrington, June 16, 2005, 2005 FC 859. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01490