TB4-04619

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-04619 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision September 17, 2014 Date de la décision Panel L. Favreau Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Raoul Boulakia Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a Palestinian resident of Egypt, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) allow his appeal and return the claim for redetermination by the RPD. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection pursuant to sections 96 and 97(1) of the IRPA. His appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is Palestinian who was born and raised in Egypt. He has specific status as a Palestinian in Egypt. As a person with this status, he must renew his citizenship in Egypt every three years, and, if he travels abroad, he must return to Egypt to renew his status. [4] The Appellant traveled to Canada in 2012, as his wife was studying here. He returned to Egypt in 2013 to renew his residency status as required by the provision of his status there. Two days after his arrival there, he was assaulted by men who swore at him and referred to Palestinians as traitors. The Appellant sought the assistance of the police, but they refused to help him telling the Appellant that Egypt is not his country. The Appellant was hospitalized due to the extent of the injuries he sustained in the attack. Shortly after his release from hospital, the Appellant returned to Canada and made a refugee claim. In XXXX, 2014, the Appellant's brother was assaulted by the same men who were angry that the Appellant has complained to the police. The Appellant fears that the men would kill him if he returned to Egypt. The Appellant also fears that, as a result of the military coup in Egypt in the summer of 2013, as a Palestinian, he would be at risk in Egypt. [5] The Appellant's refugee claim was heard on April 23, 2014. In a decision of May 2, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim finding that the Appellant was not credible on material aspects of his claim and that he did not have a well-founded fear of persecution. [6] The Appellant submits that the RPD's credibility findings should be set aside and that regardless of the RPD's credibility findings, he is at objective risk of persecution and discriminatory denial of state protection amounting to persecution in Egypt. The Appellant further submits that the human rights situation in Egypt is worsening for Palestinians. The Appellant frames his submissions under three issues: 1. Whether the RPD's credibility findings should be set aside? 2. Whether the RPD's analysis of objective risk should be set aside and whether the RAD substitute its own analysis based on the evidence before the RPD and the new evidence. 3. Whether the RPD applied an incorrect standard of risk? ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [7] As provided for in s. 110(3) of IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and refugee claimant. Subsection 110(4) of IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [8] The Appellant has tendered the following proposed new evidence in support of his appeal. 1. Statement by Amnesty International, June 5, 2014; 2. Joint statement of human rights organizations, May 30. 2014; and 3. Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Appellant's affidavit. [9] Statement by Amnesty International, June 5, 2014: The Appellant submits that the RPD compartmentalized its analysis of the documentary evidence with respect to the objective situation for Palestinians in Egypt. The Appellant argues that the RPD treated the indicators of increasing hostility towards Palestinians in isolation when it erroneously concluded that he will face discrimination not persecution. [10] The Appellant submits that the Amnesty International document provides updated and more comprehensive information on the condition of Palestinian in Egypt which confirms the objective risk. The Appellant further argues that the evidence is admissible under s. 110(4), as it was not available to the public prior to its submission in this appeal [11] The RAD finds that, although the report was produced following the rejection of the claim, it was a largely historical perspective on the situation in Egypt. The report provides little in the way of detail on events which have occurred since the rejection of the Appellant's claim. As such, this report could have been requested by the Appellant's counsel prior to the rejection of the claim. [12] The RAD notes that the Appellant has not provided any explanation why this was not done. The Appellant argues that it is time for Amnesty International to respond to the request from his counsel; however, this does not explain when it was requested or why it was not requested for the purposes of his hearing. The RAD also notes that the Appellant was represented by the same counsel at his RPD hearing. [13] The RAD finds that this document does not meet the requirements of s. 110(4), and, as such, it is not admitted as evidence in this appeal. [14] Joint Statement of Human Rights Organizations, May 30, 2014: Unlike the Amnesty International document, the Appellant makes no submissions on the admissibility of this document. [15] Regardless, the document appears to meet the requirements of s. 110(4) in that it was not available prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim. However, the RAD finds that further analysis of these documents is required before the RAD can accept it as new evidence. In this regard, the RAD has turned to the four factors in Raza.1 While the RAD finds that while Raza provides guidance on the application of the analysis that should be carried out, the analysis as set out in Raza is not entirely appropriate for the purpose of assessing evidence submitted to the RAD. Accordingly, the RAD has adapted the analysis in Raza to the assessment of evidence submitted to the RAD. [16] Express statutory provisions: The RAD's analysis of the new evidence must begin with the test set out in Section 110(4). [17] First, did the evidence arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim? Here, the RAD may consider whether the evidence is capable of proving the current state of affairs in the country of feared persecution, or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the rejection of the refugee claim.2 [18] The RAD will consider not only the date on which the document came into existence but the timing of the event or circumstance which the document seeks to prove.3 For example, an affidavit or newspaper article may have been created after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, but the information in the document may be several years old, and the RAD may therefore find that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, despite the date of the document. [19] It is important to note here that Section 110(4) does not contemplate whether the evidence arose after the RPD hearing but rather after the rejection of the Appellant's claim. Where a document arose after the hearing but before the rejection of the refugee claim, it is necessary for the RAD to consider whether the Appellant could have presented the document to the RPD by way of a post-hearing submission. [20] If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered, and the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document.4 [21] Second, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, it must consider the next factor in Section 110(4). If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the rejection, has the Appellant established that the evidence was not reasonably available for presentation to the RPD before it rejected the claim,5 or that it proves a fact that was unknown to him at the time of the hearing?6 If so, the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document. [22] Third, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim and that it was reasonably available at the time of the rejection, it must consider the final part of the Section 110(4) test: could the Appellant reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence prior to the rejection of his refugee claim? If so, the evidence need not be considered.7 If the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to present the evidence to the RPD, the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document. [23] In the case at hand, the document appears to meet the requirements of s. 110(4) in that it was not available prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim. As such, the RAD will proceed to assess the credibility, relevance, and materiality of the document.8 The factors set out below need not be considered in any particular order; however, the evidence must logically meet all of the factors, in addition to having met one of the statutory criteria, to be admissible.9 [24] Credibility: Section 171(a.3) of IRPA allows the RAD to receive and base a decision on evidence that is adduced in the proceedings and considered credible or trustworthy in the circumstances. Evidence that passes the test in Section 110(4) must therefore be assessed for credibility. The RAD must determine whether the evidence is credible, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence. If not, the evidence need not be considered.10 [25] Relevance: The RAD must consider whether the evidence is relevant to the appeal, in the sense that it is capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection. If not, the evidence need not be considered.11 [26] Materiality: Is the new evidence capable of showing that the decision or reasons of the RPD are in error, or might the evidence affect the appropriate disposition of the appeal? If not, the evidence need not be considered. [27] After review, the RAD finds that the Appellant's proposed new evidence is not admissible in this appeal. Although the Appellant has not made any submissions on the credibility, relevance or materiality of this document, the RAD finds that it has no reason to doubt the credibility of this document. The RAD finds that the document tendered as proposed evidence in this appeal is not material. The document provides information of the humans rights violations over the last four years in Egypt and some evidence of ongoing human rights abuses in Egypt. However, the RAD finds that the document does not provide any evidence on the situation for Palestinians in Egypt. While the proposed evidence may establish a generalized risk of human rights abuses in Egypt, it does not establish that the Appellant is specifically at risk due to his Palestinian heritage. [28] It is the view of the RAD that materiality is the measure of the estimated effect that the presence or absence of an item of information may have on the accuracy or validity of a statement. That evidence has to have a certain threshold effect to be material, namely, that the evidence is capable of showing that the decision or reasons of the RPD are in error, or might the evidence affect the appropriate disposition of the appeal. [29] The RAD notes that the Appellant has not provided a persuasive argument to demonstrate how this document is capable of showing that the decision or reasons of the RPD are in error or how the evidence might affect the appropriate disposition of the appeal. [30] The RAD finds that this document is not material in that it is incapable of showing that the decision or reasons of the RPD are in error and, as such, rejects it as new evidence. [31] Paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Appellant's affidavit: The Appellant has also tendered an affidavit in support of his appeal and relies on paragraphs 3 and 5 of the affidavit as new evidence in this appeal. [32] Paragraph 3 of the affidavit provides an explanation for a perceived testimonial failing from which the RPD drew an adverse credibility finding. The Appellant submits that, when the RPD asked him if his collar bone had been broken, he answered no because he thought the RPD was referring to a different bone. The Appellant states he was unfamiliar with the medical term used by the interpreter. [33] The Appellant makes no submissions on how this proposed evidence meets the statutory requirements of IRPA nor does the Appellant make any submissions on the credibility, relevance and materiality of this proposed evidence. The RAD finds that paragraph three of the affidavit is not "new evidence" within the meaning of s. 110(4). Rather, it is a misguided attempt to enter additional testimony in an effort to undermine the credibility finding of the RPD. The RAD finds that the evidence offered in paragraph 3 does not meet the requirements of s. 110(4), and, as such, it is not admitted as evidence in this appeal. [34] Paragraph 5 of the affidavit refers to information that the Appellant states he received after the rejection of his claim. The Appellant states that he learned that a cousin had his status in Egypt denied in XXXX 2014 and that another relative who had married a Gaza Palestinian was denied renewal of her status and ordered to leave Egypt. The Appellant also states that his brother advised him that he has been having difficulty renewing his status and now believes his status will not be renewed. The Appellant argues that this evidence shows that the Egyptian government has acted in an arbitrary way towards Palestinians. The Appellant further argues that this evidence adds support to his arguments that his status in Egypt is in jeopardy and that he will not be able to bring his wife to Egypt because she is a Gaza Palestinian. [35] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that paragraph 5 of the Appellant's affidavit does not meet the requirements as set out in Raza to be admitted as evidence in this appeal. The RAD finds that the affidavit does not provide persuasive evidence of the reason his relatives had their status in Egypt revoked or denied. Although the Appellant argues in his pleadings that the government acted arbitrarily, his affidavit is silent on the reasons their status was revoked or denied. Clearly, the record reflects that there are requirements placed on Palestinians to seek the renewal of their status every three years and, if out of the country, to return to Egypt once every year to renew their status. It is quite possible that the Appellant's relatives had their status revoked or denied due to reasons other than an unjust and arbitrary act on the part of the government as suggested by the Appellant. [36] The RAD notes that the Appellant learned of this information in May; however, the Appellant has not tendered any documentary evidence from this relatives to support his affidavit. It is reasonable to expect that, if the Appellant's relative's status was revoked, there would be some documentary evidence to verify this. However, no such evidence was tendered. The RAD also notes that the Appellant has not provided any explanation why this documentary evidence was not available to him. [37] The RAD finds that paragraph five of the Appellant's affidavit lacks materiality. The RAD notes that the Appellant has not provided a persuasive argument to demonstrate how the information contained in his affidavit is capable of showing that the decision or reasons are in error or how the evidence might affect the appropriate disposition of the appeal. [38] The Appellant has not requested an oral hearing under s. 110(6) of IRPA unless the RAD has credibility concerns with the Appellant or his documents. ROLE OF THE RAD [39] Counsel has made submissions in this regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision which is consistent with the recent Federal Court decision in Huruglica.12 The RAD finds that the Huruglica13 decision provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error". ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL Should the RPD's Credibility Findings be Set Aside? [40] The Appellant submits that, while the RPD's findings are based on an accurate summary of the evidence, the RPD's conclusions are not reasonable. [41] The RPD drew an adverse credibility finding from the inconsistency between the Appellant's testimony and the hospital report14 he tendered in support of his claim regarding the injuries he sustained as a result of the attack in XXXX 2013. The Appellant provided a hospital report in which it was stated that he had been treated for a XXXX XXXX. When asked by the RPD if he had been treated for a XXXX XXXX, the Appellant responded that he was not treated for that injury. The Appellant submits that the perceived inconsistency was merely a misunderstanding because the interpreter used a term for XXXX which was "more sophisticated" and that he was unaware of its meaning. As such, the Appellant submits he believed the RPD was referring to some other XXXX injury. The Appellant argues that is an innocent and irrelevant misunderstanding and that there was no reason for him to want to falsely deny that he suffered this injury. [42] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's arguments in this regard for a number of reasons. First, the RAD notes that the Appellant relies on his affidavit to support the argument that it was a misunderstanding between him and the interpreter. Unfortunately, the affidavit was not admitted as evidence in this appeal. [43] Secondly, the RAD notes that, if the Appellant did not understand the terminology used, he had the opportunity in the hearing to ask for clarification of the term. The RAD notes that the transcript reveals that the RPD advised the Appellant in this regard at the commencement of the hearing. [44] Thirdly, the RAD notes that the Appellant could have sought to obtain an affidavit from the interpreter regarding the terminology used to describe the injuries identified in the hospital report; however, no such effort was made. [45] Fourthly, the RAD notes that the record reflects that the Appellant testified that the only injuries he sustained in the attack were to his XXXX XXXX XXXX. If the Appellant was aware that his XXXX was injured, it is reasonable to expect that he would have described this in his testimony. Furthermore, had the Appellant testified that his XXXX was broken and that the Appellant would have used terminology that was not "sophisticated", it is reasonable to expect that the interpreter would have understood the term. [46] The RAD finds little in the way of persuasive reason why it should not afford deference to the credibility findings of the RPD. Accordingly, the Appellant's argument in this regard fails. [47] The RPD drew an adverse credibility finding from the inconsistency between his oral testimony and his narrative regarding where he went following the attack. In his testimony, the Appellant testified that, following the attack, he went to his home (as his home was nearby) and called his friend, a lawyer, to take him to the police station. However, in his Basis of Claim (BoC) narrative, the Appellant stated that he was attacked on XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX and that, after the attack, he crawled to the nearest house and called a friend. When confronted with the inconsistency, the Appellant's explanation was that his home was the nearest house. The Appellant's argument in regard to this finding is very limited. The Appellant submits that the finding is unreasonable, but he does not provide an argument to support this submission. The Appellant seems to suggest that his explanation ought to be accepted. [48] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's explanation. The RAD finds that it was open to the RPD to reject his explanation and to draw an adverse credibility finding from the inconsistency. The RAD finds that there is a vast discrepancy between "crawling to the nearest house" and "going to home". The RAD finds that this incident is central to the Appellant's reason for seeking refugee protection. It is reasonable to expect that he would be able to recall and report the details consistently and accurately. [49] The RAD finds little in the way of persuasive reason why it should not afford deference to the credibility findings of the RPD. Accordingly, the Appellant's argument in this regard fails. [50] The RPD drew adverse credibility findings from contradictions between the Appellant's oral testimony and the information in his BoC narrative regarding the identification of the Appellant's attackers. The Appellant submits that the narrative implies that she simply told the police he could recognize [his attackers]; however, his testimony was that he identified his attackers after the police showed him photographs. The Appellant submits that the perceived inconsistency is no more than the adding of detail to the narrative which the Appellant argues ought to be expected. [51] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The record reflects that the Appellant's testimony is inconsistent with his BoC narrative. The Appellant's BoC narrative states quite clearly: I told the police I would be able to identify the men who attacked me, but they didn't listen to me. They refused to help me. ...they wrote in the report that I could not identify my attackers even though I told them I could describe and recognize them.15 [52] The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony goes beyond adding additional detail and changes the nature of his interaction with the police. In his BoC, he alleges that the police refused to listen to him and refused to help him. Yet, in his testimony, he alleges that the police showed him photographs of suspects, which allowed him to identify his attackers. The RAD finds that the Appellant's testimony and BoC are clearly inconsistent in this regard. [53] The RAD finds little in the way of persuasive reason why it should not afford deference to the credibility findings of the RPD. Accordingly, the Appellant's argument in this regard fails. [54] The RPD drew an adverse credibility finding from contradictions between the Appellant's testimony and the contents of the police report tendered by the Appellant in support of his claim. In particular, the RPD noted that the police report was inconsistent with regard to alleged injuries, date of the attack, and injuries he sustained and whether he could identify his attackers. The Appellant alleged that the police deliberately entered wrong information in the report to undermine his credibility in the event that he had to "tell his story again to the Attorney General's office". However, the RPD rejected the Appellant's explanation. The RPD found that the Appellant's explanation lacked plausibility. The Appellant submits that the RPD findings are flawed. The Appellant argues that the RPD's finding is based on an assumption which projects her values on the police. [55] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD notes that the RPD's findings in this regard cannot be seen in isolation from the numerous significant credibility findings of the RPD. These credibility findings significantly undermine the credibility of the Appellant's explanation for the discrepancies in the police report. Furthermore, the RAD notes that the RPD found that the Appellant's explanation of why the police would alter his allegations makes little sense in light of the Appellant's own testimony that there is no way to complain about the police in Egypt. Furthermore, the RAD finds it makes little sense for the Appellant to have signed an inaccurate report. The RAD notes that the record reflects that, although the Appellant testified that he was forced to sign the inaccurate report, he makes no such mention of this important fact in his BoC narrative. The RAD finds that it was open to the RPD to find that the actions of the police are significant to the risk the Appellant alleges he faces upon his return to Egypt, and, as such, this was a significant event which ought to have been included in his BoC. [56] The Appellant submits that the RPD states that he changed his testimony by stating that he felt compelled to sign the report. However, the RAD finds that the record reflects that the RPD did not make this finding. The Appellant cites page 4 of the Appellant's Record to support his submission; however, a careful review of the page 4 and, in fact, of the entire reasons does not substantiate this submission. Accordingly, this argument must fail. [57] The RPD placed little weight on the police report given the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions with the Appellant's testimony. The Appellant argues that this is an unclear finding. The Appellant submits that "the [police' report] ought to be given weight in that it is part of the Appellant narrative as what happed when he went to the police but asks that all the details of the report not to be taken at face value".16 [58] The RAD finds that the Appellant's submission in this regard makes little sense. If all of the details of the report are not to be taken at face value, how can any weight be given to the police report? The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument in this regard must fail. [59] The RPD found that it could give little weight to the medical report tendered by the Appellant in support of his allegations. The RPD found the report inconsistent with the Appellant's testimony and the police report filed by the Appellant. Furthermore, the RPD found that the Appellant's testimony that he was admitted to hospital for several days was not supported by the medical report. [60] The Appellant submits that it is self-contradictory for the RPD to both rely on the medical report to undermine the Appellant's testimony and yet afford the report little weight. [61] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD notes that the Appellant's testimony, his BoC narrative, the medical report and the police report were all inconsistent with one another in varying degrees. The RAD finds that the RPD's findings which undermine the Appellant's credibility and the weight it can afford documents are not mutually exclusive findings. In light of all the evidence, the RAD finds that it can give little weight to the medical report [62] The RPD also found that it afforded little weight to the medical report of the Appellant's brother. The Appellant argues that the RPD gave the report little weight simply because she disbelieved the Appellant. The Appellant further argues that the RPD's finding makes little sense given that she believes that his brother was injured and that there is no reason why the RPD should disbelieve or place little weight on the medical report. [63] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the Appellant has taken the RPD's findings out of context. The record reflects that the RPD gives the brother's report little weight in respect of the Appellant's allegations. The RAD finds that it was open to the RPD to find that in light of the numerous and significant credibility findings and in respect of the Appellant's own circumstances, the brother's medical report has no relevance and, as such, can be afforded little weight. [64] The RPD concluded from the totality of its credibility findings, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant was not attacked in Egypt in XXXX 2013 because he was a Palestinian and that police did not refuse to help him because he was Palestinian. [65] The Appellant argues that the RPD's finding in this regard means that "in other words she does believe he was attacked and injured." The Appellant submits that, given this, it is plausible to believe that the attack could have been accompanied by anti-Palestinian sentiment and that he would be at risk of further attacks. [66] The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument in this regard lacks merit. The Appellant's conclusion that, somehow in disbelieving the material allegations of the Appellant, the RPD found that the Appellant was attacked is absent sound reasoning and is a leap of logic. The RAD finds there is absolutely no basis in the record for the Appellant to have come to the conclusion that the RPD had made such a finding. The RAD finds that the Appellant's argument fails. Whether the RPD's analysis of objective risk should be set aside and whether the RAD should substitute its own analysis based on the evidence on the record. [67] The RPD found, after a review of the documentary evidence, that the objective evidence does not support that there is a serious possibility that the Appellant would be persecuted if he were to return to Egypt because he is Palestinian. The Appellant submits that there was sufficient documentary evidence of hostility towards Palestinians in Egypt that was before the RPD that established that the Appellant would be persecuted if he returned to Egypt. The Appellant further argues that the June 5, 2014 Amnesty International report substantiates this argument. [68] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. Unfortunately, the Appellant relies in large part on evidence that was not admitted in this appeal. Insofar as the Appellant's arguments rely on this evidence, his arguments fail. The RAD has reviewed the evidence contained in the record. The RAD finds that the documentary evidence does reveal that there is evidence of human rights abuses occurring in Egypt. However, the evidence reflects that those at risk are political activists and active supporters of opposition leaders. The Appellant has not established that he has such a profile or that he is in any way connected to any political movement or party. [69] Furthermore, although the Appellant alleges that Palestinians traveling in and out of Egypt face far more restrictions, the RAD finds that does not apply to those Palestinians who have legal status in Egypt. The Appellant's evidence is that he returned to Egypt in XXXX 2013 and did not have any difficulty whatsoever renewing his residency status. As such, the Appellant has not established that he would face any difficulty returning and maintaining his status. [70] After a review of the record, the RAD finds that the documentation describes a current backlash against foreigners in Egypt and that Palestinians may face discrimination. However, the RAD finds that he Appellant has not demonstrated with persuasive evidence that he has faced discrimination which rises to the level of persecution The Appellant also submits that the RPD's finding that "there is insufficient evidence to support the Appellant's fear that his wife will not be able to acquire residency in Egypt" is unreasonable. The Appellant argues that the RPD has failed to assess how living with a Gaza Palestinian could impact on the Appellant's security. The Appellant further argues that his fear is supported by the evidence of his affidavit in which he describes the arbitrary denial of his relatives' status in Egypt. [71] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument. Unfortunately, the Appellant again relies on evidence that was not admitted in this appeal. Insofar as his augments rely on that evidence, and in light of all the evidence in the record, the RAD finds that those arguments fail. Furthermore, the RAD finds that the Appellant's argument is at best speculative. He has not provided persuasive evidence that his wife would be denied entry into Egypt when she completes her studies in 2017. The RAD also finds that there is no evidence in the documentation that substantiates that Palestinians are being arbitrarily denied residency permits. [72] The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities and in light of the assessment of the evidence before the RAD in this appeal, that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution due to his Palestinian heritage upon his return to Egypt. Did the RAD apply an incorrect standard of risk? [73] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to apply the correct standard of risk. The Appellant argues that the RPD refers to the test as being whether there is a serious possibility of persecution but then restates this as being whether he would be persecuted. The Appellant further argues that the RPD went on to conclude that he has failed to establish that he would be persecuted. The Appellant argues that the RPD does not articulate and apply the appropriate standard: whether a person in the Appellant's circumstances would fear that there is a reasonable chance of persecution. [74] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the Record reflects that the Appellant applied the appropriate standard in its assessment of the evidence before it. Nonetheless, the RAD finds, on the basis of the totality of the evidence in this appeal, that the Appellant has not satisfied his burden of establishing a serious possibility that he would be persecuted or that he would be personally subjected to a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture by any authority in Egypt. SUMMARY AND DETERMINATION [75] The RAD finds that the RPD's credibility findings are absent any error which prevents the RAD from affording deference to those findings. The RAD reviewed the evidence on the record and finds that is insufficient evidence to find that the Appellant faces a well-founded fear of persecution or a risk to his life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger of torture by any authority in Egypt. [76] . Accordingly, the Appellant's appeal fails. DISPOSITION [77] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "L. Favreau" L. Favreau September 17, 2014 Date 1 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007; 2007 FCA 385. 2 Raza, para. 13.3(a). 3 Raza, para. 16. 4 Raza, para. 13.5(b) 5 Raza, para. 13.5(a) 6 Raza, para. 13.3(b) 7 Raza, para. 13.5(a) 8 Raza, para. 13.5(b) 9 Raza, paras. 14, 15 10 Raza, para. 13.1 11 Raza, para. 13.2. 12 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 13 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 14 Appellant's Record, p. 43. 15 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, p. 22. 16 Appellant's Record, Memorandum, p. 227, para. 27. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-04619