TB9-13152

RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-13152 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person who is the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXa.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, ON Appel instruit / entendu à Date of decision January 18, 2021 Date de la décision Panel Joseph W. Richards II Tribunal Counsel for the person who is the subject of the appeal Johanna J. Dennie Conseil de la personne en cause Designated representative N/A Représentant(e) désigné(e) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION OVERVIEW [1] I dismiss this appeal. [2] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant) is a citizen of Jordan. [3] The Appellant fears persecution and section 97 harm by her relatives in Jordan on account of her religious conversion and gender. The Appellant was born in Kuwait and grew up in Saudi Arabia. She has never lived in Jordan. She recounts that she was sexually assaulted in 1994, while studying in Egypt. She managed to escape to Bahrain and began working as a XXXX XXXX. She claims to have enjoyed freedoms in Bahrain that women are not allowed to have in Jordan and Egypt. Moreover, she took an interest in Christianity as she felt uncomfortable with the restrictions placed on women in Islam. In 2013, her employment was terminated because of her age. Not wanting to return to Jordan, she stayed in Bahrain as a temporary resident retiree and did volunteer work in hopes of finding a new job. Her brothers discovered that she was no longer working in the XXXX XXXX, and they questioned her about why she had not returned to Jordan. They also expressed their desire that she return, get married and start a family of her own. Fearing she would be forced to marry or be subjected to an honour killing by her brothers because of her adopted Western lifestyle, she decided to apply for an American student visa. She travelled to the United States on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018. When her arrangements with the American university fell through, she ventured to Canada. She arrived in XXXX XXXX Ontario using a legitimate visitor's visa, on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018. [4] The Refugee Protection Division (RPD) found that although the Appellant provided candid testimony, there was insufficient evidence that she would face harm, if returned. The Panel also found a lack of subjective fear of persecution. [5] The Appellant contends that the RPD's analysis was unduly microscopic and that there was an overall failure to examine the Appellant's risk of harm based on her profile as a Christian convert from Islam. The Appellant maintains that the country documentation corroborates her subjective fear. [6] The determinative issue in this appeal is the prospective risk of harm. After reviewing the evidence, I find that the Appellant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, section 97 harm. The Appellant failed to adduce sufficient credible evidence of a forward-facing risk of harm. DECISION [7] I dismiss the appeal. The RPD was correct in finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. NEW EVIDENCE The evidence presented by the Appellant is mostly rejected [8] According to the law,1 I can only accept evidence that: (i) arose after the RPD's decision; or (ii) was not reasonably available at the time of the decision; or (iii) that the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to bring to the RPD before the decision. [9] If none of these criteria are satisfied, the inquiry ends there; the evidence cannot be admitted. If the evidence meets one or more of these requirements, I must then decide if the evidence is credible, relevant, and new.2 The evidence will not be considered if it lacks credibility as to its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence or if it is incapable of proving or disproving a relevant fact to the refugee claim.3 The evidence will also be excluded if it fails to prove a new fact, event, or circumstance arising after, or unknown at the time of, the RPD hearing. [10] The Appellant bears the responsibility of making full and detailed submissions about how the proposed new evidence meets the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and how that evidence relates to the claim. [11] The Appellant has requested that eight documents be admitted. My findings are as follows: (a) Appellant's affidavit, XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019: I find that this document is mostly inadmissible. The document reviews, in detail, the Appellant's background, the relationship with her family in Jordan, and her conversion to Christianity. The substantive content of the document arose prior to the RPD's decision. The Appellant explains that she did not provide these details to the RPD because her previous Counsel failed to inquire about them; her Basis of Claim (BOC) narrative was erroneously translated (it was originally written in Arabic); she lacks fluency in English (so she did not recognize any misinterpretations); and she trusted the judgment of her previous Counsel in signing the BOC form.4 I find that these explanations are unreasonable and without merit. First, the tribunal has a detailed practice note that applies to claimants who are making allegations against former Counsel.5 The Appellant has not followed it, and her Counsel explicitly asserts that the Appellant is not alleging that her former Counsel acted incompetently.6 Secondly, the Appellant's BOC form was signed on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018, and the RPD hearing occurred on May 1, 2019, thereby giving the Appellant almost ten months to review her narrative and make corrections or modifications, as required. Thirdly, and most importantly, at the RPD hearing itself, the Panel Member specifically noted the fact that the BOC form was completed without the use of an interpreter and then asked the Appellant whether the BOC form was complete, true, and correct. The Appellant's response, through an interpreter, was unequivocal: "Yes, correct".7 The Appellant is not alleging that any interpretation errors occurred at the RPD hearing. For these reasons, I find that the Appellant has not reasonably explained why the contents of this affidavit could not have been provided before the date of the RPD's decision. The exceptions to this finding are paragraphs 49 and 50, which indicate that the Appellant was baptized on XXXX XXXX XXXX2019. The Appellant goes on to describe her feelings since the baptism. These events arose after the date of the RPD's decision. They are credible as to source and circumstances given their inclusion in a sworn declaration that is signed and dated by the Appellant. They are relevant in that part of the Appellant's claim involves a fear of religious persecution. They are new in that they respond to a specific credibility finding made by the RPD. Accordingly, I find that paragraphs 49 and 50 of the affidavit are admissible. (b) Appellant's prescription lists, XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 and XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017: I find that these documents are inadmissible. The prescriptions both arose before the date of the RPD's decision. The Appellant contends that she was unaware that they were in her possession and that her former Counsel did not ask for any medical documentation that corroborated the purpose for her 2017 trips to Jordan. I find that the Appellant's explanations are unreasonable. As noted above, the Appellant is not alleging that her previous Counsel acted incompetently. Refugee claimants have a duty to bring forward all credible and trustworthy evidence in support of their claim, at the earliest opportunity. An appeal to the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) is not an opportunity to correct a deficient record. I note the almost ten-month period between the filing of the refugee claim and the RPD's decision. The Appellant, therefore, had ample time to search for relevant documents in her possession and retrieve additional evidence as needed. At the very least, the Appellant could have alerted the tribunal of the existence of said evidence and that it was in her possession (though misplaced). Under these circumstances, the mere assertion of ignorance does not suffice. Accordingly, I find that the prescription lists were reasonably available at the time of the decision, and it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided them to the RPD before that date. None of the criteria set out at subsection 110(4) of the IRPA are satisfied. (c) Three articles pertaining to XXXX XXXX: I find that these documents are inadmissible. The first article is from Wikipedia and was last edited on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018. The second comes from the periodical, Venture, and was published XXXX 2015. The third is undated. On a balance of probabilities, I find that none of these articles arose after the date of the RPD's decision. The articles seek to establish that the Appellant has high-profile relatives in Jordan. The Appellant argues that her former Counsel failed to ask her about her family or tribe and that the Appellant did not know that evidence relating to the profile of her relatives would be relevant. I reject these explanations, relying on substantially the same reasons outlined for the Appellant's affidavit and prescription lists, above. An appeal to the RAD is not an opportunity to correct a deficient record. Accordingly, I find that the articles were reasonably available at the time of the decision, and it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided them to the RPD before that date. None of the criteria set out at subsection 110(4) of the IRPA are satisfied. (d) New translation of an excerpt of the Appellant's narrative: This document is inadmissible. The substantive content of this evidence - the Appellant's BOC narrative - arose before the RPD's decision. The Appellant argues that the interpreter used by her former Counsel failed to accurately translate the Appellant's Arabic version of the BOC narrative. The original narrative states that the Appellant "forgot" to claim asylum immediately upon entering Canada, whereas the new translation omits that term. The Appellant apparently did not recognize the discrepancy until it was raised at the hearing. For the same reasons regarding the Appellant's affidavit, above, I reject the Appellant's explanations. I further note that the determinative date for the assessment of new evidence is the date of the RPD's decision and not the day of the hearing; the Appellant did not attempt to notify the tribunal of any inaccuracies in the translation of her narrative, by way of an application pursuant to RPD Rule 43. (e) Baptismal certificate, XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019: This document is admissible. The Appellant was baptized on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. The certificate arose after the date of the RPD's decision. I further find that it is credible, relevant and new. It is signed by a minister, XXXX XXXX, who also provided a statement in support of the Appellant's claim, which is included in the RPD Record.8 Relevance is established by the fact that the Appellant's claim involves a fear of religious persecution, and the certificate corroborates the Appellant's Christian beliefs. (f) Photograph of the Appellant's baptism: This document is inadmissible. The image is of such poor quality that it is unclear what is actually depicted. The photograph is also undated. The Appellant has thus failed to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that any of the statutory criteria set out at subsection 110(4) of the IRPA are satisfied. (g) Letter from XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019: This statement is inadmissible. In this updated correspondence, XXXX XXXX seeks to explain a technical error in the original letter; the original is dated XXXX XXXX XXXX 2017 instead of XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. He also explains that he did not mention the Appellant's intent to convert to Christianity in his original letter because he was unaware that the Appellant had filed for refugee protection. The subject matter of this updated letter arose before the date of the RPD's decision (May 7, 2019). Counsel argues that the Appellant could not have expected to provide these updates to the RPD because the Appellant's former Counsel focussed primarily on the Appellant's gender-based risk of harm, and former Counsel believed that the original letter from XXXX XXXX combined with the letter from XXXX XXXX would be sufficient to demonstrate the Appellant's church attendance and acceptance of the Christian religion.9 I reject the Appellant's explanations for the same reasons outlined above regarding the Appellant's affidavit. An appeal to the RAD is not an opportunity to correct a deficient record. Indeed, Counsel's submissions focus on the sufficiency of the actions of the Appellant's previous Counsel. As a result, I find that the content of XXXX XXXX updated letter was reasonably available at the time of the RPD's decision, and it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided it to the RPD before that date. None of the criteria set out at subsection 110(4) of the IRPA are satisfied. (h) Articles on Muslims who convert to Christianity: These documents are inadmissible. The articles are dated September 4, 2009 (Australian Refugee Review Tribunal), May 12, 2018 (The Globe and Mail), April 29, 2008 (John Mark Ministries), and May 1, 2013 (Washington Post). Moreover, the article from Open Doors USA is undated. The Appellant has not established that, on a balance of probabilities, these articles arose after the date of the RPD's decision. Counsel argues that this evidence has become "more relevant" since the Appellant has become a baptized Christian and that the Appellant's former Counsel focussed primarily on the Appellant's gender-based risks.10 I reject these explanations, for the reasons pertaining to the Appellant's affidavit, above. An appeal to the RAD is not an opportunity to correct a deficient record, and the requirements of subsection 110(4) of the IRPA do not fluctuate because the Appellant's new Counsel decides to pursue a different legal strategy. The Appellant disclosed her affinity to Christianity and her disdain for Islam both in her BOC and in her testimony. The Appellant's fear of religious persecution was therefore a live issue from the beginning of her refugee claim. Under those circumstances, I find that the articles were reasonably available at the time of the RPD's decision, and it would be reasonable to expect the Appellant to have provided them to the RPD before that date. None of the criteria set out at subsection 110(4) of the IRPA are satisfied. Summary of findings regarding the new evidence [12] The Appellant's baptismal certificate and a small portion of the Appellant's affidavit (paragraphs 49 and 50) are admissible. The remainder of the submitted evidence is inadmissible. An oral hearing is not permitted [13] Since I have not admitted any new evidence that raises a serious credibility issue, I am not permitted to hold a hearing, pursuant to subsection 110(6) of the IRPA. ANALYSIS The role of the RAD [14] The RAD reviews the RPD's decision and comes to an independent assessment of the refugee claim.11 In providing a final determination, the RAD will intervene if it finds that the RPD erred, unless the RPD's decision can be confirmed on another basis.12 The standard of correctness applies.13 If the RPD has a meaningful advantage in assessing the credibility of oral testimony, then the RPD's finding may be accorded deference.14 [15] In this case, the RPD did not have a meaningful advantage. Accordingly, I have conducted an independent assessment of the oral and documentary evidence using the correctness standard. The Appellant possesses subjective fear [16] The RPD found that the Appellant lacked subjective fear.15 The Appellant submits that the RPD erred by ignoring the numerous behaviours exhibited by the Appellant which demonstrate her subjective fear of persecution in Jordan.16 After reviewing the evidence, I find that the RPD erred and that the Appellant possesses subjective fear. [17] The RPD's analysis with respect to subjective fear references the Appellant's life in Bahrain, her decision to study in the United States, and her decision to come to Canada. However, these events are not suggestive of a lack of subjective fear, contrary to the RPD's findings. Rather, they are compatible with the Appellant's claim that, after her employment ended with XXXX XXXX in 2013, she expressly avoided spending any significant amount of time in Jordan. I further note that, per the RPD, the Appellant provided "candid" testimony, and I generally agree with that determination.17 [18] In contrast, the Appellant travelled to Jordan twice in 2017 and delayed in making a refugee claim upon arriving in Canada. The Appellant disclosed her trips to Jordan in her BOC form, stating that she spent a total of eight days there for medical reasons.18 Though Counsel refers to the Appellant's "serious health concerns", the Appellant provided insufficient evidence that these travels were compulsory.19 Voluntarily returning to Jordan - where the Appellant fears persecution - detracts from her subjective fear even if the trip was for a short duration. [19] Moreover, the Appellant came to Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018 with the intent of seeking refugee protection but instead entered as a tourist; she did not assert a refugee claim until XXXX XXXX XXXX 2018. The Appellant explained at the RPD hearing that the delay was caused by exhaustion. She was unable to focus because of all that she went through in the failed attempt to pursue her education in the United States.20 I find that the Appellant did not provide a reasonable explanation for not seeking asylum at the port of entry; she would not have had to exert more effort to tell border officials that she was afraid of returning to her country of origin. Accordingly, the Appellant's behaviour warrants a negative credibility finding. [20] Nevertheless, after analyzing the evidence globally, I find that, since her employment ended with XXXX XXXX, the Appellant mostly acted in a manner consistent with subjective fear; in her mind, she fears persecution in Jordan.21 Therefore, the RPD erred. There is insufficient evidence of prospective harm [21] The RPD's decision turned on the lack of evidence of prospective harm. The Appellant contends that the RPD failed to analyze her risk of persecution as a Muslim woman who converted to Christianity. I find that the RPD did not err in its ultimate conclusion. [22] The Appellant failed to establish prospective harm. The RPD reached that conclusion based on three principal findings: (i) insufficient evidence that the agents of harm have the means and motivation to coerce the Appellant into marriage or otherwise harm the Appellant, if returned to Jordan, (ii) the profile of the Appellant would not place her at a risk of harm in Jordan, and (iii) the lack of evidence of an intent to convert to Christianity. [23] I find that this third finding cannot stand in light of the admitted new evidence; the Appellant was baptized on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2019. In any event, I find that the RPD erred in emphasizing the Appellant's intent to formally convert to Christianity rather than focussing on the Appellant's professed beliefs and their impact on her risk of harm. Much of the Appellant's Memorandum centres on her profile as a Christian convert, and so I will assess whether her baptism, in conjunction with the rest of the evidence, is sufficient to establish a forward-facing risk of persecution or section 97 harm. [24] At the outset, I note that the Appellant's refugee claim is based on intersectional grounds: gender and religion. It is therefore especially important to view the evidence cumulatively. I am particularly mindful of the Gender Guideline, which recognizes the special challenges women face in putting forward credible and trustworthy evidence.22 [25] My independent assessment leads me to the following observations and findings: (a) The Appellant's family as agents of harm: The Appellant fears that if she returned to Jordan, her life would be in jeopardy. Her BOC describes a fear of honour killings because the Appellant has adopted a Western lifestyle. The evidence reveals that the Appellant has received telephone calls from her brothers and some of her cousins about her employment status. Her relatives have asked why she has not returned to Jordan and started a family.23 These inquiries have not gone beyond normal family conversation, and I therefore find that they are insufficient to establish that her family has any motivation to pursue and/or harm her. The Appellant has not seen her brothers or her mother for over 25 years, around the time that her father died. She has lived independently in Bahrain, working as a XXXX XXXX from 1995 to 2013. From 2013 until her departure from Bahrain in 2018, she volunteered as an XXXX to gain work experience. She chose to go to the United States and pursue studies in XXXX XXXX and, when that failed, she entered Canada using her visitor's visa. As mentioned above, the Appellant travelled briefly to Jordan on two occasions in 2017, without notifying or being detected by her relatives. On these facts, the evidence demonstrates, on a balance of probabilities, that for over 25 years, the Appellant has lived independently without any threatened or actual harm from the alleged agents of harm. Counsel's contentions that the Appellant's family would control her, that she could not avoid her family on a long-term basis, and that, through word-of-mouth, her family would necessarily be informed of her return are simply unsupported by the evidence. (b) The Appellant's conversion to Christianity: The Appellant candidly discussed her reasons for identifying with Christianity. I have taken into consideration her baptismal certificate, which corroborates her allegations. The fact that the Appellant is a Christian does not establish, on its own, that she has a well-founded fear of persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, faces section 97 harm. Given that the Appellant has spent limited time in Jordan in addition to the general challenges facing female claimants as referenced in the Gender Guideline, the objective country documentation becomes all the more important in evaluating the Appellant's circumstances. (c) The country documentation: The RPD recognized the deep-rooted discrimination against women that prevails in Jordan, but it determined that women with the Appellant's profile can safely live independently.24 The RPD Record includes articles describing honour killings committed by relatives who believe that a female relative has shamed the family. The authorities are known to place women in protective custody to avoid such harm. Moreover, the country documentation indicates that apostate women - especially those who are married or have children - can be treated harshly. However, the Appellant's particular profile must be considered. She is highly educated, with post-secondary qualifications in XXXX XXXXandXXXX XXXX. She also has an extensive work history as a XXXX XXXX. She has never lived in Jordan and did not convert to Christianity there. She is unmarried and does not have any children. Her father is deceased. I accept that she is now a baptized Christian. However, the evidence does not reveal that she feels compelled to proselytize or to openly and publicly express the details of her conversion, behaviour which could put her at risk of persecution or section 97 harm. I note that in her BOC form, the Appellant identified her religion as "Muslim-Sunni", but in parentheses, she noted that she is "non-practicing".25 After reviewing the evidence, I thus conclude that her religious beliefs are deeply personal and would not be affected if Jordanian authorities continued identifying her as Muslim.26 Relations between Christians and the Muslim majority in Jordan are generally good, and religious minorities are able to practice their religion freely, particularly outside of the conservative rural parts of the country.27 Converts to Christianity do not face harm from the authorities, unless they are engaged in proselytizing.28 The threat of honour killings is largely dependent on sentiments expressed within one's family. The Appellant does not rely on any communication from her relatives that even remotely hints at that possibility. [26] For all of the reasons set out above, I find that the risks of harm raised by the Appellant are not applicable; the country documentation does not reveal a serious possibility that a woman in the Appellant's circumstances would face persecution or, on a balance of probabilities, section 97 harm. The Appellant has failed to provide sufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to prove her refugee claim. CONCLUSION [27] I dismiss the appeal and confirm the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. (signed) Joseph W. Richards II Joseph W. Richards II January 18, 2021 Date 1 Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA. 2 Singh, Parminder v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-512-14), Nadon, Gauthier, de Montigny, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 96, at para. 64; Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385. 3 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007, 2007 FCA 385, at para. 13. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 7-8 (paras. 35-36). 5 See Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), "Practice Notice - Allegations Against Former Counsel", September 10, 2018, https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/procesdures/Pages/allegations-former-counsel.aspx. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, at para. 50. 7 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, May 1, 2019, at p. 3 (lines 30-38). 8 See Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 155. 9 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, Memorandum, at paras. 16-17. 10 Ibid., at para. 23. 11 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, November 7, 2014, 2014 FC 799, at paras. 54-55; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 103. 12 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at paras. 78, 103. See IRPA, s. 111. 13 M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 78, 103. 14 Rozas Del Solar, Paola v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2645-17), Diner, November 14, 2018, 2018 FC 1145, at para. 105; M.C.I. v. Huruglica, Bujar (F.C.A., no. A-470-14), Gauthier, Webb, Near, March 29, 2016, 2016 FCA 93, at para. 70. 15 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para. 14. 16 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, at p. 60 (para. 53). 17 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD's Reasons and Decision, at para. 8. 18 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 17. 19 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Memorandum, at para. 76. 20 Transcript of the RPD Hearing, May 1, 2019, at p. 16. 21 See Rajudeen v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1984] F.C.J. No. 601, 55 N.R. 129 (F.C.A.) at p. 136 (cited to N.R.). 22 Chairperson's Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (Gender): Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson, pursuant to Subsection 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 13, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in paragraph 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. https://irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/legal-policy/policies/Pages/GuideDir04.aspx , "D. Special Problems at Determination Hearings". 23 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 13 (paras. 9-10). 24 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, RPD's Reasons and Decision, at p. 20. 25 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, at p. 11. 26 For instance, Sharia courts would still have jurisdiction over converts from Islam with respect to personal status issues. See National Documentation Package (NDP) for Jordan (March 29, 2019), item 12.3, IRB, "Situation and treatment of Christians...", August 4, 2015, at pp. 7-8. 27 NDP for Jordan (March 29, 2019), item 12.3, IRB, "Situation and treatment of Christians...", August 4, 2015, at pp. 3-4. 28 Ibid., at p. 7. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File / Dossier de la SAR : TB9-13152 RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français 2 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD.25.02 (January 2020) Disponible en français