TB5-01654

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01654 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision May 12, 2015 Date de la décision Panel L. Favreau Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Johnson Babalola Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (Appellant) a citizen of Nigeria, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) and substitute a decision with its own determination that the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. In the alternative, the Appellant requests that the RAD refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to ss. 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD and dismisses the appeal. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is perceived to be gay by his wife and her family in Nigeria because he had attended the Gay Pride Parade in Toronto in June 2013. He alleges he cannot return to Nigeria because his father-in-law who is connected to a high-ranking official in the Nigeria police is intent on finding him in Nigeria and force him to attend the Oracle and swear at the Ogun Shine or face death. He also fears the police will prosecute him. [4] The Appellant's refugee claim was heard over two days on December 18, 2013 and June 27, 2014. In a decision of December 12, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim, finding that the Appellant was not a credible witness and that he had a viable Internal Flight alternative (IFA). [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in its finding by mischaracterizing, misstating and ignoring relevant evidence that directly contradicts the conclusions reached relying instead on conjecture to guide its decision making process. In particular, the Appellant identified the issues as: 1. Whether the RPD was capricious in its determination that the Appellant was not credible; 2. Whether the RPD conducted a thorough Internal Flight Alternative analysis; and, 3. Whether the Panel erred by failing to conduct a thorough section 97 IRPA analysis. ROLE OF THE RAD [6] Counsel has made submissions in regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision. However, the RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,1 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by the RAD to decisions of the RPD. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision.2 [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error".3 [7] While there has been some conflict in the case law from the Federal Court regarding the standard of review to be applied by the RAD when reviewing RPD decisions, Justice Martineau in Alyafi (Alyafi, Aghiad v. M.C.I. (F.C. No. IMM-1091-14), Martineau, October 8, 2014; 2014 FC 952) has said that, in the face of this conflict, the Federal Court should allow the RAD to apply either approach as long as the question of the scope of the appellate review of the RPD's decisions has not been settled by a final judgment by the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court of Canada. [8] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Deference will be afforded to the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. ADMISSIBILITY OF NEW EVIDENCE PRESENTED ON APPEAL [9] As provided for in s. 110(3) of the IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and refugee claimant. Subsection 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person who is the subject of the appeal may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [10] The Appellant has tendered the following proposed new evidence in support of his appeal. 1. Affidavit from the Appellant's wife in Nigeria dated March 9, 2015; 2. a Divorce Decree Dated September 15, 2014; and 3. An opinion paper on the Labour Market in Nigeria. (undated) [11] The RAD's analysis of the admissibility of the proposed new evidence must begin first with the test set out in s. 110(4). In assessing whether the proposed new evidence meets the statutory provisions of s. 110(4), the RAD considered the following: 1. First, did the evidence arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim? Here, the RAD may consider whether the evidence is capable of proving the current state of affairs in the country of feared persecution, or an event that occurred, or a circumstance that arose after the rejection of the refugee claim. 2. The RAD will consider not only the date on which the document came into existence but the timing of the event or circumstance which the document seeks to prove. For example, an affidavit or newspaper article may have been created after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, but the information in the document may be several years old, and the RAD may therefore find that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the claim, despite the date of the document. 3. It is important to note here that s. 110(4) does not contemplate whether the evidence arose after the RPD hearing, but rather after the rejection of the Appellant's claim. Where a document arose after the hearing but before the rejection of the refugee claim, it is necessary for the RAD to consider whether the Appellant could have presented the document to the RPD by way of a post-hearing submission. 4. If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered, and the RAD will proceed to assess the probative value of the evidence. 5. Second, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, it must consider the next factor in s. 110(4). If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the rejection, has the Appellant established that the evidence was not reasonably available for presentation to the RPD before it rejected the claim, or that it proves a fact that was unknown to the Appellant at the time of the hearing? If so, the RAD will proceed to assess the probative value of the evidence. 6. Third, if the RAD finds that the evidence did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, and that it was reasonably available at the time of the rejection, it must consider the final part of the s. 110(4) test: could the Appellant reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence prior to the rejection of his refugee claim? If so, the evidence need not be considered. If the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to present the evidence to the RPD, the RAD will proceed to assess the probative value of the evidence. [12] Affidavit - The Appellant argues that the Affidavit of his wife meets the criteria of Section 110(4) IRPA because it describes a meeting between senior police officers and her father which occurred after the determination of the RPD in February 2015. [13] The Appellant argues that this evidence is important as it establishes that his father-in-law and the police have more than a professional relationship. [14] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument. First, the RAD notes that although the Appellant seems to argue that this evidence arose after the rejection of the Appellant's claim by virtue of the last meeting having occurred in February 2015, the affidavit is clear that these types of meetings had occurred several times previously. The RAD notes that the affidavit is silent on when these previous meetings took place however; the Appellant has alleged that his father-in-law maintained these relationships at least since the time he was falsely accused of being homosexual in June 2013. Given the Affidavit's statement that the meeting occurred several time previous to February 2015 it is reasonable to expect that these meetings occurred prior to the rejection of the Appellant's claim in January 2015. The RAD finds that under these circumstances, the Appellant has an obligation to explain why an affidavit describing these several previous meetings was not tendered prior to the rejection of his claim. [15] As stated previously, Section 110(4) does not contemplate whether the evidence arose after the RPD hearing, but rather after the rejection of the claim and it is necessary for the RAD to consider if the Appellants could have tendered the documents to the RPD by way of a post-hearing document. The RAD notes that there was a period of over six months from the date of the last hearing to the rejection of the claim in which the Appellant could have tendered this evidence. He had not provided any explanation why he was unable to do so. In addition, the RAD notes that the issue of the Appellant's father-in-law's connection to the police was raised at the first sitting of the hearing. As such, the Appellant ought to have known that evidence of his father-in-law's influence and power was an important issue in his claim. [16] Secondly, the RAD notes that the information about the relationship between her father and police contained in this Affidavit was already before the RPD. The Appellant had alleged before the RPD that his father-in-law had a close relationship with senior police officials. The fact that the last meeting occurred in February 2015 adds little to the information already before the RPD. [17] Thirdly, the RAD finds that the information provided in the affidavit was information that was available to the Appellant at the time his wife prepared her first affidavit for the purposes of the RPD hearing. The Appellant has not provided any explanation why this information was not or could be provided at the time or at least before the rejection of his claim. [18] The RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided sufficient explanation as to why this affidavit could not have been tendered prior to the rejection of his claim. The RAD notes that the Appellant was represented by a competent counsel at the RPD hearing and that the Appellant's wife had prepared an affidavit in support of the Appellant's RPD claim. Accordingly, the RAD finds that the Affidavit does not meet the statutory requirement of the section 110(4) IRPA. [19] Divorce Decree - The Appellant argues that the Divorce decree could not have been tendered prior to the last sitting of the hearing because it was not finalized until September 2014. He argues that the evidence is important because it demonstrates the extreme measures his father- in-law would go to ensure that he suffered for his perceived actions. [20] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD finds that the Appellant is misguided on the statutory requirements of Section 110(4) IRPA. As noted above, Section 110(4) does not contemplate whether the evidence arose after the RPD hearing, but rather after the rejection of the claim and it is necessary for the RAD to consider if the Appellant could have tendered the documents to the RPD by way of a post-hearing document. The Appellant had over three months to tender this document after it was received as post-hearing evidence; however the Appellant has not provided any explanation as to why he could not do so. [21] The RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided sufficient explanation as to why the divorce decree could not have been tendered prior to the rejection of his claim. Accordingly, the RAD finds that the divorce decree does not meet the statutory requirement of the section 110(4) IRPA. [22] Opinion on Labour Market in Nigeria - The Appellant argues that this is an important evidence which shows the employment reality and conditions in the proposed IFA cities. He argues that the report shows the feasibility of finding gainful employment in Nigeria today. [23] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD notes that the Appellant has not provided any explanation or argument of why this report could not have been tendered prior to the rejection of his claim. The RAD notes that on the first hearing date in December 2013, the Appellant and his counsel were put on notice that IFA in the proposed IFA cities was an issue in this claim. The Appellant had six months to tender the opinion prior to the second sitting and an additional six months prior to the rejection of the claim to tender this evidence as post-hearing documents. [24] The RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided sufficient explanation why this opinion document could not have been tendered prior to the rejection of his claim. Accordingly, the RAD finds that the document does not meet the statutory requirement of the section 110(4) IRPA. [25] On the basis of the foregoing, the RAD finds that the proposed new evidence does not satisfy the statutory requirements of section 110(4) of the IRPA, and, as such, it is not admitted as evidence in this appeal. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL [26] After a review of the complete record, including the transcript of the hearing, the RAD finds that there was evidence before the RPD of the existence of the determinative issue of an accessible and reasonable internal flight alternative (IFA). [27] Therefore, because the RAD is able to fairly dispose of this appeal by making a decision on the IFA issue, it is unnecessary to address the other issues raised by the Appellant. However, in making a determination on the viability of an IFA, the RAD will review and assess the credibility findings made by the RPD, which have applicability to this determination. [28] In assessing an IFA, the RPD must apply a two-pronged test cited in Rasaratnam4 suitably modified to take account of section 97 of the IRPA. 1) the Board must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there is no serious possibility of the claimant being persecuted in the part of the country to which it finds an IFA exists and/or the claimant would not be personally subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture in the IFA. 2) moreover, the conditions in the part of the country considered to be an IFA must be such that it would not be unreasonable, in all the circumstances, including those particular to the claim, for him to seek refuge there. [29] Both prongs must be satisfied to find that the claimant has an IFA. The burden of proof rests with the Appellant to show that she does not have an IFA. The finding of an IFA must be based on a distinct evaluation of a region for that purpose taking into account the Appellant's identity. An IFA must be a realistic and attainable option. An Appellant cannot be required to encounter great physical danger or to undergo undue hardship in traveling there or staying there.5 [30] The RAD considered whether it would be unreasonable to expect the Appellant to relocate in the proposed IFA's. The test for reasonableness is whether it would be unduly harsh to expect the claimant to move to another, less hostile part of the country before seeking status abroad, as per Thirunavukkarasu.6 This requires an evaluation of the conditions in the IFA as well as the Appellant or similarly-situated persons. Thirunavukkarasu sets a very high threshold for what makes an IFA unreasonable in all the circumstances. The hardship associated with dislocation and relocation is not the kind of undue hardship that renders an IFA unreasonable.7 However, it is not enough for the Appellant to say that he or she does not like the weather there, or that he or she has no friends or relatives there, or that he or she may not be able to find suitable work there.8 [31] The RAD finds that there is a reasonable and viable internal flight alternative available to the Appellant in Abuja, Port Harcourt or Ilorin in Nigeria. First Prong [32] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred when it failed to properly consider the evidence adduced by him regarding his father-in-law's ability to locate him in Nigeria. The Appellant argues that the evidence before the panel was that regardless of where he was, he would not be able to escape detection in Nigeria, even if residing in Abuja, Ilorin and Port Harcourt. [33] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. Unfortunately, the Appellant relies on the second Affidavit (submitted as new evidence in this appeal) of the Appellant's wife that was not before the RPD. In addition, for reasons articulated earlier in these reasons, the RAD has not admitted this affidavit as evidence in this appeal. [34] Accordingly, the RAD has reviewed the RPD's analysis of the evidence that was before it and agrees with the RPD's findings in this regard. The transcript of the hearing reveals that the RPD questioned the Appellant extensively about his father-in-law's relationship with the police. The RPD noted that the Appellant did not provide evidence that his father-in-law has influence and power in Nigeria. Rather, the Appellant's fear of his father-in-law focused on his alleged relationship with an unknown high-ranking officer of the police. However, the RPD noted there was no supporting evidence of this relationship. Furthermore, the Appellant has not tendered any corroborating evidence which establishes that his father-in-law is a man of considerable wealth and influence throughout Nigeria. [35] In addition, the RPD found that the Appellant was unable to provide sufficient persuasive evidence to establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant's father-in-law has connections to the police in Lagos or in any other cities in Nigeria. [36] The Appellant testified that his father-in-law is a XXXX trader and travels to Abuja for his business, however, the RPD found there was insufficient evidence to establish he has the power and means to locate him there in a city of nearly two million. [37] As noted by the RPD, the Appellant has not provided persuasive evidence of any connection between the police and his father-in-law, however the Appellant has inferred through his testimony that his father-in-law has the ability to influence the police in Lagos. The RAD agrees with the RPD that little weight can be given to the Appellant's testimony in this regard because he has been unable to provide persuasive evidence which establishes a connection to the police. [38] The Appellant submits that the RPD's findings in this regard cannot stand because an absence of corroborative documentary evidence does not necessarily mean the Appellant is not credible. [39] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument in this regard. The RAD notes that the burden rests with the Appellant to demonstrate that IFA is not reasonable for him. He has alleged that his father-in-law has the ability to find him anywhere in Nigeria which suggests that he has the means and power to influence officials including the police in order to facilitate his detection. The RAD finds that the Appellant did not provide any persuasive evidence that his father-in-law has the influence he alleges. The RAD further finds that given the alleged profile of this individual, it is reasonable to expect that the Appellant would also have been able to tender media reports, photographs or public documents to verify his profile. The RAD finds there is no persuasive evidence to support the Appellant's statement that his father-in-law can find him anywhere in Nigeria. [40] The RAD has considered the documentary evidence which suggests that the police in Nigeria are corrupt and that people can be bribed. The RAD considered the profile and influence of the agents of persecution in relation to the IFA. The RAD notes that while the Appellant alleges he is friends with a high ranking police officer in Lagos, there is no persuasive evidence in the record which suggests that he or his police friend have the ability to influence the police actions in the proposed IFA cities, and/or have the interest to access resources in order to locate the Appellant if he were to move elsewhere in Nigeria, a country of 170 million people. [41] As noted by the RPD the RAD finds find that based on the objective evidence in the record, the Nigerian police force lacks the resources and is unequipped to conduct a nation-wide search for the Appellant for the reasons alleged. There is no credible evidence that the Appellant is currently being sought in Nigeria, for any reason and that the police force in Lagos is not conducting a national search for the Appellant in other Nigerian states on behalf of his father-in-law. [42] The Appellant further argues that the RPD erred when it ignored the affidavit of his wife which stated that her father and the police attended his parents' home in Ibadan in search of him. The Appellant argues that the police extract she tendered corroborates her father's influence over the police. [43] While it is true that the RPD reasons do not address this aspect of the affidavit, the RAD notes there is sufficient reason to give this affidavit little weight. The RAD notes that although the affiant alleges in her affidavit that the police and her father attended the Appellant's parent's home she had not provided any explanation of how she learned that information or from whom. Furthermore, the RAD notes that the affidavit is inconsistent with the police report. Although the affiant alleges in the affidavit that the police attended her home and caused a "scene" such that the neighbours all became aware, the police report does not state that the police attended her home. Rather the report suggests that the affiant was complaining about the actions of her father. The reports states that her father wanted to have her husband declared a wanted person and have the police attend her home. [44] Regardless, the RAD finds that the Affidavit does not overcome the RPD's numerous findings with regard to the Appellant's allegations that his father-in-law has the power to influence the actions of the police. [45] The RAD also finds that the problems faced by the Appellant with his father-in-law and neighbours are local in nature. The RAD finds that the Appellant has failed to provide persuasive evidence that his father-in-law or neighbours in Lagos has means or interest to locate and pursue him elsewhere in Nigeria. [46] In addition, he has not provided any persuasive evidence how his father-in-law or his neighbours would come to know that he was living elsewhere in Nigeria. The Appellant does not have a high profile in Nigeria, and the RAD finds that he could live in the proposed IFA cities. Second Prong [47] The Appellant submits that the RPD failed to properly consider the evidence adduced by him concerning the reasonableness of relocating in Nigeria. The Appellant argues that it is difficult to obtain employment in Nigeria. [48] As noted by the RPD, the United Kingdom Home Office Operational Guidance Note for Nigeria9 states that the Nigerian constitution provides for the right to travel within Nigeria. The report also states that internal relocation to escape ill-treatment from non-state agents is almost always an option and, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it would not be unduly harsh for any individual to internally relocate. [49] The RAD notes the record confirms the Appellant is a sophisticated individual with twelve years of formal education. As noted by the RPD he has operated his own XXXX business for ten years. The RAD agrees with the RPD that these skills are transferable to employment in the proposed IFA cities. The Record reveals that the Appellant has relocated and established himself in Canada, learning a new culture and establishing a support network. The RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant may be able to resume his former business or find some other form of employment to support himself. [50] The Appellant provided no persuasive evidence that he would be unfamiliar with cultural issues and norms in these cities. Therefore, the RAD is satisfied that it would be reasonable for the Appellant to adapt to new surroundings in any of the cities identified and be able to obtain employment. In addition, although most Nigerians depend upon their family, relying on immediate and extended family is not the only option10. Many Nigerians try to establish other support networks that may complement or in some cases replace the extended family. Examples of such support networks are religious congregations, religious organizations, age grades/sets, political organizations, charities, secret societies and guilds. Many such organizations are expected to aid their members in ways that would be fairly unusual in a western context. The Appellant has alleges that he is a Christian. The documentary evidence states that the southern states of Nigeria (in which Port Harcourt is located) are predominantly Christian. For this reason, the RAD is satisfied that the Appellant will have sources of moral and spiritual assistance and support available to him in Nigeria. [51] The RAD is aware of the fact that an individual has to remain in hiding to avoid problems is not evidence of an IFA11 and that large urban areas cannot be assumed to be an IFA by virtue of their population size alone.12 The RAD finds that the RPD's finding of an IFA is not dependent on the size of these cities but is made in consideration of the totality of the evidence. The RAD finds that the Appellant did not adduce persuasive evidence to indicate that he would have to live in hiding in these cities. [52] Therefore, the RAD finds that the Appellant could live in any of the proposed IFA cities without fear or the need to hide. The RAD notes that the cities are large and located at a substantial distance from his home state. [53] Based on the totality of the evidence, the RAD finds that the record contains sufficient evidence to support a finding that an IFA in the proposed cities is accessible to the Appellant. In Conclusion [54] Once the issue of an internal flight alternative is raised, the onus is on the refugee claimant to show that the option does not exist, by establishing that either of the two tests cited in Rasaratnam13 criteria is not met. The Federal Court of Appeal in Thirunavukkarasu stated that an applicant need to only show that there is a serious possibility of being persecuted in the new location or that their removal to Nigeria would not subject them personally to a risk to life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture. The RAD finds that the Appellant has failed to show that the IFA option is not available to him. [55] The RAD finds that the Appellant could live in any of the cities proposed as IFA locations in Nigeria. Given the finding above that the Appellant has an internal flight alternative in Nigeria, the RAD finds that the Appellant does not face a serious possibility of persecution there and also finds that his removal to Nigeria would not subject him personally to a risk to his life, or of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a danger, believed on substantial grounds to exist, of torture. Disposition [56] The RAD finds that there is an IFA for the Appellant, and since IFA is a determinative issue, the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. CONCLUSION [57] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD . (signed) "L.Favreau" L. Favreau May 12, 2015 Date 1 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 2 Ibid. para 54. 3 Ibid. para 55. 4 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no. A-232-91), Mahoney, Stone, Linden, December 5, 1991; [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. 5 Thirunavukkarasu v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.) at 596-599. 6 Thirunavukkarasu v. M.E.I., [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.), at 596-599. 7 Ranganathan, Rohini v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no A-348-99), Létourneau, Sexton, Malone, December 21, 2000. 8 Thirunavukkarasu v. M.E.I., [1994] 1 F.C. 589 (C.A.) at 596-599. 9 Exhibit RPD-1, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (December 21, 2012), item 1.7, United Kingdom Home Office, UK Border Agency, Operational Guidance Note: Nigeria, 4 October 2012. 10 Exhibit RPD-1, NDP for Nigeria (December 21, 2012), item 2.2, United Kingdom, 6 January 2012, Home Office. United Kingdom, 6 January 2012, Home Office. Country of Origin Information (COI) Report: Nigeria, para. 24.60. 11 Sabaratnam, Thavakaran v. M.E.I. (F.C.A., no A-536-90), Mahoney, Stone, Robertson, October 2, 1992. 12 Reynoso, Edith Isabel Guardian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-210-94), Muldoon, January 29, 1996. 13 Rasaratnam, Sivaganthan v. M.E.I., [1992] 1 F.C. 706 (C.A.), at 710. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-01654