TB4-04953

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-04953 TB4-04954 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX(a.k.a. XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX) Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision September 15, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Daniel McSweeney Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Ochiemuan Okojie Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) XXXX XXXX XXXX Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX, (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria, and her minor son, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, a citizen of Italy, have appealed a negative determination of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) issued orally on May 1, 2014. The Appellant was designated the (designated representative (DR) for her son, as per Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) Rule 23. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection, as she is excluded based on Article 1E of the Convention. The Appellant's minor son is a citizen of Italy, which is a Designated Country of Origin (DCO), and therefore he is precluded from making an appeal to the RAD. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleges that her father forced her into an early marriage with a chief who physically and sexually abused her. The Appellant came into contact with a woman (XXXX XXXX) who told her that she could give the Appellant a job in Italy as a XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX. When the Appellant arrived in Italy, she was forced into prostitution. The Appellant ran away in 2000. The Appellant alleges that Ms. XXXX started to look for her, threatened her family members in Nigeria, and set fire to her father's house in Nigeria. The Appellant married and gave birth to her son. The Appellant alleges that, in XXXX of 2012, she met one of Ms. XXXX friends in a mall. The friend wanted the Appellant's address, but the Appellant did not provide it to her. The Appellant and her family moved out of fear. The Appellant alleged that, after the move, Ms. XXXX and some boys came looking for her and questioned people regarding the Appellant's whereabouts. Three months before leaving Italy, the Appellant alleges that Ms. XXXX and some thugs came to threaten the Appellant. [4] The Appellants left Italy on XXXX XXXX, 2013 and arrived in XXXX, New Jersey. After their arrival, the Appellant's sister telephoned her and indicated that Ms. XXXX and her gang had traced her, and they threatened to harm her if she did not tell them the Appellant's whereabouts. [5] The Appellant and her son came to Canada through the assistance of an agent on XXXX XXXX, 2013. The Appellants made their claims for refugee protection on January 14, 2014. [6] The Appellants had a refugee determination hearing on May 1, 2014, at which time oral reasons were issued. The Minister intervened1 at the hearing on the issue of exclusion under Article IE based on the following: 1. The Appellant holds an Italian residence permit which was renewed on XXXX XXXX, 2013, which now confers permanent residence status on the Appellant, as she is married to a citizen of the European Union. 2. The Appellant has status in Italy which is substantially similar to nationals of Italy, including government social welfare, health care, and employment benefits. 3. The Appellant enjoys basic rights which are substantially similar to those of nationals of Italy. 4. The Minister has put forward prima facie evidence that section E of Article 1 of the Convention applies to the Appellant, and therefore she should be excluded from protection. [7] In its decision, the RPD decided the claim on issues of credibility and state protection especially as they relate to the issue of exclusion under Article 1 E of the Refugee Convention. This determination was based on the following individual findings: 1. The Appellant is a permanent resident of Italy which confers her similar benefits to those of citizens of Italy. 2. The Appellant did not provide sufficient credible or trustworthy evidence to support her fear to return to Italy based on omissions in her Basis of Claim (BoC) narrative of multiple threats at her place of work. The Appellant's explanation for this material omission was not reasonable. 3. The Appellant's failure to seek protection in the United States on two occasions was not consistent with that of a person who faces a risk to her life, or a risk of cruel or unusual treatment of punishment. The Appellant's explanation for her failure to claim was not persuasive. 4. The Appellant did not seek state protection in Italy, and her explanation for not seeking protection, "I cannot; it is the same thing; they cannot arrest them" did not rebut the presumption of state protection. 5. The documentary evidence before the RPD indicated that the Italian government has criminalized various acts of violence against women and the trafficking of women. 6. Italian officials are providing adequate protection to its citizens, and the Appellant has not provided clear and convincing evidence that protection would not be forthcoming. 7. No persuasive evidence was adduced to substantiate the claim of the minor, and therefore his claim must also fail. 8. The Appellants are excluded from refugee protection as per Article 1E. [8] Appeal pleadings were received on June 16, 2014. In the appeal, counsel argued that the RPD erred in its findings of fact and its findings of mixed law and fact, as it relates to state protection. Specific errors included: 1. The RPD erred in assigning a negative credibility inference to the omission of any mention that the Appellant was threatened at her work in her BoC, as the Appellant provided an explanation for the omission at the hearing. 2. The RPD erred in law in its statement of the test for state protection, as state protection must be efficient without being perfect. 3. The RPD erred in is finding of fact regarding the Appellants' subjective fear, as the Appellant's sister reported threats to the police; her sister had to flee for her life, and the Appellant was allowed to seek refuge in Canada, as they felt that they would not be protected in Italy. 4. The RPD erred in its finding that authorities in Italy can provide adequate protection to the Appellants. [9] The Appellant did not provide any new evidence and did not request an oral hearing. The Appellants request that the RAD set aside and substitute the negative determination with a positive one, or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. ANALYTICAL APPROACH [10] In assessing the appeal, the RAD is guided by the recent Huruglica2 decision which outlines the approach that the RAD should take as an appellate body in reviewing the first-level decisions of the RPD. Justice Phelan has indicated that the RAD conducts a hybrid appeal and is required to review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. This authority comes from the broad remedial powers of the RAD, including the power to set aside and substitute the RPD's determination that, in its opinion, should have been made, as per s. 111(b) of IRPA. The RAD can recognize and respect the conclusions of the RPD on issues such as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching its conclusion; however, the RAD has equal or greater expertise than the RPD in the interpretation of country condition evidence. The RAD is not restricted to intervening on facts where there is a palpable and overriding error. It is not necessary for the RAD to find an error on some standard of review basis in order to trigger its remedial power. [11] The RAD focused on four issues in assessing this appeal: a) Does the RAD have jurisdiction to hear the claim of the minor Appellant? b) Is the Appellant excluded from refugee protection, as per Article 1E? c) Were the Appellant's allegations of persecution or harm at the hands of Ms. XXXX credible? d) Has the Appellant rebutted the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing evidence of Italy's inability to protect her? Jurisdiction to hear Claim of the Minor [12] The nationality of the minor, XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX, as a citizen of Italy has not been challenged by any party before the RPD and before the RAD. The Appeal is silent on the jurisdiction of the RAD to hear an appeal of a national from Italy. Section 109.1(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) provides that the Minister may, by order, designate a country for the purposes of Section 110(2) of IRPA. Section 110(2)(d.1) of IRPA provides that no appeal may be made of a decision of the RPD allowing or rejecting a claim for refugee protection made by a national of a country that was, on the day the decision was made, designated under Section 109.1(1). [13] The minor Appellant is a citizen of Italy. The Minister has, by order effective December 15, 2012, designated Italy under Section 109.1(1) of IRPA. According to the Appellant's Notice of Appeal filed to the RAD, his claim was rejected by the RPD on May 1, 2014. As such, no appeal of the decision as it relates to the minor may be made to the RAD. Exclusion [14] The Appellant's permanent resident status in Italy and the fact that this status is substantially similar to that of Italian nationals was not challenged in the appeal. At the time of the hearing, the Appellant had permanent resident status in Italy,3 and therefore she is excluded based on the test in Zeng.4 Given the Appellant's status, and the direction in Zeng, the RAD concurs with the RPD that the Appellant is excluded, pursuant to Article IE. [15] In addition to the direction in Zeng (cited above), the preponderance of the case law suggest that the risk in the 1E country should be assessed. For example, in Kroon5 Justice MacKay suggested that, if a claimant faced a threat of persecution in the putative Article 1E country, then that country would not be an Article 1E country. In Olschewski,6 the Federal Count considered the findings related to the claimant's fear in the Article 1E country which amounted to an implicit agreement with the Convention Refugee Determination Division (CRDD) could assess a claim against the Article 1E country. The Federal Court upheld a negative decision which focused on the adequacy of state protection in the Article 1E country in Feimi.7 Given this case law, the RAD finds that the risk in the Article 1E country should be considered. As such, the RAD considered the risk of persecution or harm to the Appellant in Italy. Credibility of Allegations [16] The RPD found that the Appellant's allegations were not credible based on the omission of the visits by Ms. XXXX gang to her workplace and on her failure to make a claim during the two occasions that she was in the United States. A review of the evidence presented by the Appellant in support of her claim and of the recording of the hearing have revealed additional credibility concerns which undermine the credibility of the Appellant's allegations and her overall credibility as a witness. [17] The RPD found that the Appellant's omission of visits by the gang members to the Appellant's place of work was a material omission. The Appellant testified that gang members came several times to threaten her at her place of work. When asked to explain the omission of these in-person visits in her BoC narrative, the Appellant explained that she wrote that she was XXXX XXXX. This explanation was not reasonable, as it did not explain the omission. The Appellant's pleadings indicate that the Appellant provided a reasonable explanation for the omission at the hearing. The RAD concurs with the RPD that the omission was significant, as the Appellant alleged in her oral testimony that the gang members approached her at her place of employment on several occasions and that this was the only in-person interaction that the Appellant has had with Ms. XXXX or her gang members since the Appellant fled Ms. XXXX in 2000. The RAD finds that the omission was significant, as the allegation was the only in-person threats received by the Appellant at her place of work. The omission and the unreasonable explanation undermined the credibility of the allegations. [18] The RAD noted another significant inconsistency in the Appellant's allegations. The Appellant's BoC indicated that, in XXXX 2012, she met one of Ms. XXXX friends in a mall which caused her to become so scared that she relocated. The Appellant was questioned at the hearing regarding this incident. She was unable to remember the month that she saw XXXX friend, despite this being the catalyst for her having to move and for her being located by Ms. XXXX in XXXX. [19] The Appellant testified that she had fear when she left to the US but that later the threats became more serious. The Appellant testified that the threats became worse after she returned from the US in XXXX of 2013. The RAD noted that this explanation was not supported by the BoC narrative which indicated that the Appellant was forced to move in XXXX of 2012 and that, two weeks later, the gang members came looking for her. The Appellant's BoC did not contain any incidents of persecution after these events in XXXX XXXX XXXX of 2012. The RAD finds that the Appellant's explanation that the threats became worse after her return from the United States was an embellishment and were stated to explain her failure to claim in the United States. This embellishment, and the failure to mention any additional threat in her BoC after XXXX XXXX XXXX 2012 undermined the credibility of the Appellant's allegations. [20] Further, the Appellant testified that the threats became worse after she returned from the United States, as Ms. XXXX learned that the Appellant had travelled to the US and therefore had money to pay her. This explanation for the increase in threats was not included in the Appellant's BoC narrative. The Appellant travelled to the US for the first time in XXXX of 2013. This was after she was forced to move and after she received word of visits to her former home by members of Ms. XXXX gang. The BoC did not contain any further threats. The RAD notes that the Appellant's explanation for not seeking protection in the US (threats became worse) were not supported by her BoC narrative. [21] The Appellant testified that she remained in hiding (tried not to show herself, did not come out) after she moved. This allegation was not included in the BoC narrative. [22] Finally, the RAD noted that the Appellant's explanations for her failure to claim in the US evolved. When questioned by the RPD as to why she failed to make a claim in the US, the Appellant indicated that she was informed by the agent as well as someone in XXXX, whom she thought was a lawyer, that she would be put in prison if she made a claim for protection. Later, when questioned by her counsel, the Appellant indicted that she feared making a claim in the United States, as Ms. XXXX had told her that she had people all over America. This is a further example of the Appellant's evolving testimony which undermined the credibility of the Appellant as a witness and the credibility of her allegations as a whole. [23] The RAD considered the remaining evidence presented in support of the claim. The RAD finds that there were inconsistencies between the Appellant's father's affidavit8 and the Appellant's oral testimony. The Appellant's BoC indicated: "Madam XXXX XXXX started looking for me and when she did not find me, she started threatening my family members in Nigeria and her thugs then set fire on my father's house". In response to a question by her counsel, the Appellant testified that it was XXXX XXXX who was responsible for burning the Appellant's father's home. In the affidavit, the Appellant's father indicates that his land was taken away from him, and he was beaten by XXXX XXXX, and that Ms. XXXX thugs burned down his house. The RAD finds that reprisals against the Appellant's family in Nigeria was a significant allegation, and that the inconsistent evidence provided by the Appellant regarding who was responsible for the burning of her father's house undermined the allegation. The RAD also finds that the inconsistency in who burned down the house undermined the credibility of the affidavit in support of the Appellant's allegations and therefore cannot be provided weight. [24] The RAD considered the affidavit from the Appellant's husband.9 The Appellant testified that her husband remained in Italy after she and her son left. The RAD noted that, in line 10 of the affidavit, the Appellant's husband indicates that: "I make this affidavit in good faith and in accordance with the XXXX XXXX Oath Laws, Nigeria". The RAD noted the affiant indicates at the beginning of the affidavit that he is residing in XXXX, Italy. The Italian version of the affidavit has stamps from XXXX XXXX10 The RAD finds that it is highly irregular to have an affidavit that is confirmed in Italy to be sworn under the XXXX XXXX Oath Laws. The RAD also noted that the affidavit is not dated. Given these concerns, the RAD finds that it could not place significant weight on the affidavit in support of the Appellant's allegations. [25] The RAD considered the police report11 submitted by the Appellant's sister. The RAD noted that the report solely recounts the alleged threats received from Ms. XXXX. These allegations were not confirmed by the police, and no evidence of any police follow-up on the complaint was presented to the RPD. Given the concerns with the two affidavits outlined above, and given that the police report was based on the unsubstantiated self-reports of the Appellant's sister, the RAD assigned little weight to the self-reported allegations of the Appellant's sister. [26] The RAD finds that the documents presented by the Appellant in support of the alleged threats were not credible based on the concerns identified above. The Appellant was found not to be credible given the serious omission of in-person threats and other omissions in her BoC, given that the Appellant's testimony evolved as she provided it, and inconsistencies between her BoC and her oral testimony. For all of these reasons, the RAD finds that the Appellant's allegations of being threatened by Ms. XXXX were not credible. Adequacy of State Protection in Italy for the Appellants [27] The RAD finds that the Appellant's allegations were not credible. In the alternative, the RAD considered whether the Appellant provided clear and convincing evidence of the inability of Italian authorities to provide protection to the Appellant. [28] The RAD implemented a contextual approach in its assessment of state protection, as per Avila Ortega,12 which included an examination of the following factors: a) The nature of the human rights violation; b) The profile of the alleged human rights abuser; c) The efforts that the victim took to seek protection from authorities; d) The response of the authorities to requests for assistance; and e) The available documentary evidence. [29] The Appellant testified that she feared death threats by Ms. XXXX and her gang members. The Appellant alleged that Ms. XXXX had influence in Nigeria, Italy, and America. The Appellant did not make any efforts to seek protection and explained that she was afraid to seek the protection of the police. She indicated that police could not stop them. Police would not be with her on the street. She indicated that a person could not be arrested twice for the same thing. Finally, she indicated that she did not want to go to the police; she did not want to die. When asked by the RPD if she returned to Italy and was threatened, would she go to the police, the Appellant indicted that she would not go, as she was scared. When asked to explain why, the Appellant indicated that the police could not arrest them. The RAD is cognizant that a claimant cannot rebut the presumption of state protection in a functioning democracy by asserting only a subjective reluctance to engage the state.13 Doubting the effectiveness of the protection offered by the state when one has not really tested it does not rebut the existence of a presumption of state protection.14 [30] The Appellant and her appeal counsel indicated that the police report of the Appellant's sister was evidence of the police's inability to provide protection to the Appellant, as the Appellant's sister is a similarly-situated person. The RAD noted that the Appellant's sister did not provide any evidence attesting to the police's refusal to follow-up the report, or any actions by police after the report was made. It is significant to note that the report was made after the Appellant and her son had left Italy for the United States. If the Appellant's sister fled XXXX, as the Appellant maintained, it would be impossible for the Appellant to know what steps were taken by police as the complainant was no longer available for follow-up with authorities. [31] What the RPD and the RAD had before it was a complaint which did not comment on the police's capability to respond to the complaint. As such, the report does not support the Appellant's allegations that police were incapable of providing protection to her sister and, therefore, to her as a similarly-situated person. Even if the police in XXXX did not follow-up on the report, the RAD noted that local failures to provide effective policing do not amount to a lack of state protection unless they are part of a broader pattern of the state's inability or refusal to provide protection15 especially given that no evidence was before the RPD or the RAD to attest to the fact that authorities in XXXX had failed to provide protection or that there was a pattern of Italy's inability or refusal to provide protection to the Appellant. [32] Furthermore, the RAD finds that the Appellant is not a similarly-situated person as her sister. The Appellant alleged that she was a victim of human trafficking and that she was forced into prostitution by Ms. XXXX. The Appellant was threatened in person, rather than threats over the telephone, as was her sister. The RAD noted that the Appellant had been victimized by Ms. XXXX in the past (trafficked and forced into prostitution) and was subject to telephone threats, as was her sister. As such, the situation of the Appellant is substantially different than the situation of her sister, and therefore the RAD finds that the experience of the Appellant's sister cannot support an argument of inadequate protection for the Appellant, a victim of human trafficking, forced prostitution, and in-person threats. [33] The RPD considered the documentary evidence regarding state protection in Italy. Italy is a member of the European Union and is a democracy where authorities are in control of its institutions, including its police. The February 2014 Department of State (DOS) Report16 cites the human rights problems in Italy as follows: Principal human rights problems included substandard living conditions in detention centers for undocumented mixed migrant populations, governmental corruption, societal prejudice, and municipal government policies permitting the mistreatment of Roma, which exacerbated their social exclusion and restricted their access to education, health care, employment, and other social services. Other human rights problems included excessive and abusive use of force by police in some cases, overcrowded prisons, the continued incarceration of pretrial detainees with convicted criminals, an inefficient judicial system that did not always provide speedy justice, violence, and harassment against women, sexual exploitation of children, and anti-Semitic vandalism. Trafficking for sexual and labor exploitation occurred. Observers also reported cases of violence against lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons and labor discrimination based on sexual orientation. Child labor and labor exploitation of irregular workers were also problems, especially in the service sector and the southern agricultural region. [34] Despite these concerns, the DOS report does not indicate that authorities are incapable of providing adequate protection to people who are victims of forced prostitution and threats as is the Appellant. The Appellant is not a migrant or a Roma, and she is a permanent resident of Italy. A review of the remaining documents in the National Documentation Package (NDP) cannot support the Appellant's and/or her counsel's argument that authorities in Italy are unable or unwilling to provide protection to the Appellant. There is little or no evidence on the record that the police efforts in Italy do not have a certain degree of effectiveness, as per Burgos,17 or that efforts have not been translated into adequate state protection at the operational level, as per Park.18 [35] Other than the Appellant's subjective fear and belief that police could not help her, the Appellant did not provide a reasonable explanation for why she did not seek police protection while still in Italy. The Appellant was required to approach the state for protection if protection might reasonably be forthcoming.19 The Appellant's failure to seek protection, in the absence of a compelling explanation, will usually be fatal to a refugee claim.20 [36] Based on the evidence before it and an analysis of the factors outlined above, the RAD concurs with the RPD and finds that authorities in Italy are providing adequate state protection and that the Appellant has failed to rebut the presumption of state protection with clear and convincing evidence of Italy's inability to protect her. SUMMARY [37] The RAD finds that the Appellant is excludable under Article 1E, given that she has permanent residence status in Italy, which affords her substantially the same rights and obligations as nationals of Italy. The Appellant's allegations were found not to be credible based on inconsistencies, omissions, and concerns with her evidence. The Appellant's testimony was found to evolve as she provided it, which undermined her credibility as a witness. The Appellant has not rebutted the presumption of state protection in Italy with clear and convincing evidence of Italy's inability to protect its citizens. The RAD finds that Italy is providing adequate protection to its citizens. As such, the RAD finds that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection and that she is excluded, as per Article 1E of the Convention. [38] The RAD also finds that it does not have jurisdiction to consider the appeal of the minor Appellant, given that he is a citizen of Italy which is a Designated Country of Origin. DISPOSITION [39] Based on a review of the totality of the evidence, the RAD confirms the RPD's determination that the Appellant is excluded from refugee protection, as per Article 1E of the Convention, and therefore she is not a Convention refugee nor is she a person in need of protection, as per s. 111(1)(a) of IRPA. [40] The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Daniel McSweeney" Daniel McSweeney September 15, 2014 Date 1 RPD's Record, Minister's Notice of Intent to Intervene and Evidence, pp. 171-182. 2 Huruglica, Bijar et. al. v. M.C.I. (F.C. no., IMM-6362-12), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799. 3 RPD's Record, Notice of Intent to Intervene, paragraph 17, p. 173. 4 Zeng, Guanqiu v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-275-09), Noël, Layden-Stevenson, Stratas, May 10, 2010; 2010 FCA 118. 5 Kroon, Victor v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3161-93), MacKay, January 6, 1995; (1995), 28 Imm. L.R. (2d) 164 (F.C.T.D.), at paragraphs 167-168. 6 Olschewski, Alexander Nadirovich v. M.E.I. (F.C.T.D., no. A-1424-92), McGillis, October 20, 1993 at paragraph 11. 7 Feimi, Jani Ardian v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2934-98), Teitelbaum, June 11, 1999. 8 RPD's Record, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX, pp. 148-149. 9 RPD's Record, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, pp. 150-151. 10 RPD's Record, Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXX, pp. 152-153. 11 RPD's Record, Police Report, pp. 156-159. 12 Avila Ortega, Lucia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2183-09), Zinn, October 16, 2009; 2009 FC 1057. 13 Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. 14 Ramirez, Leticia Lizet Del Rio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1301-08), Lagacé, October 31, 2008, 2008 FC 1214. 15 Zhuravlvev, Anatoliy v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3603-99), Pelletier, April 14, 2000. Reported: Zhuravlvev v. M.C.I., [2000] 4 F.C. 3 (T.D.). 16 RPD's Record, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Italy (30 May 2014), item 2.1, US Department of State, Italy: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, 27 February 2014. 17 Perez Burgos, Gerson Alejandr v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-2028-06), Blanchard, December 21, 2006; 2006 FC 1537. 18 Park, Insun v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1944-10), O'Keefe, December 9, 2010; 2010 FC 1269. 19 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, at 724. 20 Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-04953 TB4-04954