TB5-05249

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-05249 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision September 21, 2015 Date de la décision Panel Luis F. Agostinho Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Ceri P. Forbes Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), who claims to be a citizen of Somalia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted no new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD and find him to be a Convention refugee; in the alternative, he requests that the RAD set aside the decision and refer the claim back to the RPD for redetermination by a differently-constituted panel. Application for an Oral Hearing [2] The Appellant does not request an oral hearing pursuant to section 110 (6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). DETERMINATION [3] Pursuant to Section 111(c) of IRPA, the RAD refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. Background [4] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he is a national of Somalia and a member of a minority clan. The Appellant further alleged that he and his father were kidnapped by the terrorist group al-Shabaab as a result of their refusal to financially support them, and held for a period of ten days sometime in March 2013. The Appellant and his father were released and upon arriving at home, discovered that the group Al Shabaab had taken fifteen heads of cattle. The Appellant fled Somalia in May 2013 to the Sudan and later arrived in the United States in November 2013 where he made an asylum claim. The claim was rejected and he then travelled to Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2014 and made a claim for refugee protection. [5] The Appellant's refugee claim was heard on February 24, 2015. The RPD, in a written decision issued on May 07, 2015, concluded that the Appellant had failed both to establish his identity as one of the key elements of his claim, and further he had failed to establish that he was a credible witness. [6] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in basing its decision on negative inferences regarding his credibility. In the Appellant's submission, the RPD misconstrued and misstated the documentary evidence and reached conclusions that are contrary to the evidence. The Appellant also submits that the RPD made unreasonable inferences, erroneous plausibility findings, and relied upon trivial inconsistencies to make credibility findings. ANALYSIS Role of the RAD What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD?1 [7] While the IRPA sets out grounds for an appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [8] The Appellant makes submissions on the role of the RAD as it applies to the review of the RPD decision. The Appellant cites Huruglica as of one of the case law it relies upon. The Federal Court, in Huruglica, considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.2 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes. The Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error.3 [9] The Appellant makes no submission on the Role of the RAD in reviewing this Appeal; however the RAD will follow Huruglica, and engage in its own assessment of the evidence in order to determine whether the RPD has committed an error. [10] In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal". The RAD will therefore review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. Should the RAD Show Deference to the RPD? [11] The Singh decision of the Supreme Court was a landmark ruling for Canada's refugee determination system.4 In that judgment, the Court held that refugee claimants in Canada have the right to an oral hearing of their refugee claims. The Court recognized the importance of an oral hearing to determine credibility: [12] I should note, however, that even if hearings based on written submissions are consistent with the principles of fundamental justice for some purposes, they will not be satisfactory for all purposes. In particular, I am of the view that where a serious issue of credibility is involved, fundamental justice requires that credibility be determined on the basis of an oral hearing. Appellate courts are well aware of the inherent weakness of written transcripts where questions of credibility are at stake and thus are extremely loath to review the findings of tribunals which have had the benefit of hearing the testimony of witnesses in person: see Stein v. The Ship "Kathy K", [1976] 2 S.C.R. 802, at pp. 806-08 (per Ritchie J.) I find it difficult to conceive of a situation in which compliance with fundamental justice could be achieved by a tribunal making significant findings of credibility solely on the basis of written submissions."5 [13] The Supreme Court clearly recognized the importance of an oral hearing in determining the credibility of a refugee claimant. Today that hearing takes place before the RPD, while the RAD is, in most cases, limited to listening to an audio recording or reading a written transcript. If the RAD were to show no deference to credibility findings of the RPD, and were to make its own credibility findings on the basis of a transcript or recording, it would do so in disregard of the Supreme Court's words and rationale in Singh. [14] The Supreme Court has also observed, in another matter, that the trier of fact is "in a privileged position to assess the credibility of witnesses' testimony at trial. . . ."6 The RPD sees, hears, and questions the refugee claimant, while the RAD must not normally hold a hearing. The RAD now has considerable experience in reviewing the testimony of Appellants before the RPD, both through audio recordings and written transcripts. While the RAD may have comparable or greater expertise than the RPD in matters of refugee determination, it finds itself at a significant disadvantage when considering credibility through a recording or transcript. For example, a long pause by a claimant in response to a question from the RPD may be interpreted as uncertainty or evasiveness when considered via an audio recording; however, the RPD member may not have made a negative credibility finding because the pause is in fact caused by the interpreter consulting his dictionary, or by counsel making a hand gesture for the witness to wait while counsel finishes her notes of the previous answer. This would not be apparent to the RAD member listening to a recording. Similarly, the RPD might find the emotional state of a visibly distraught claimant to be consistent with and corroborative of her testimony; the RAD is unable to consider this important factor when reading a transcript. Further, having the benefit of seeing and hearing the claimant, the RPD has the advantage of deciding whether to further probe an area of evidence, while the RAD is unable to ask the questions it would like to have answered based on its review of the transcript. [15] Finally, deference is warranted because the legislation suggests that Parliament viewed the RPD as having expertise in determining certain matters. Where the RPD finds that a refugee claim has no credible basis, or is manifestly unfounded, the failed refugee claimant has no right of appeal to RAD.7 In the RAD's view, this signals a recognition of the RPD's advantage in determining credibility, as does the fact that a decision in respect to a vacation or cessation proceeding also cannot be appealed to the RAD.8 The provisions of Section 111(2) - that the RAD may refer an erroneous decision back to the RPD only if it cannot confirm it or substitute "without hearing evidence that was presented to the Refugee Protection Division" - also suggest that some level of deference is to be accorded to the findings of the RPD, as evidence heard by the RPD is not to be re-heard by the RAD. [16] While it is clear that some level of deference is warranted, it is less obvious how much deference is owed, and to what findings. As the Federal Court observed in Akuffo, "With that said, there also appears to be a consensus that when no hearing is held before the RAD, the latter owes deference to the RPD's credibility findings. The opinions rather diverge on: i. the level of deference that is owed or its exact definition; and ii. the scope of the questions of fact and questions of mixed fact and law for which deference is owed."9 Scope of Deference [17] Having established that it owes some deference to the RPD, the RAD must consider the extent to which that deference applies to findings of the lower tribunal, after which it will consider the appropriate level of deference. [18] In the judicial review and appellate court context, a distinction is made between questions of fact, questions of law, and questions of mixed fact and law, and the appropriate standard of review is selected on the basis of this distinction. In some decisions, the Federal Court has found that these issue categories are applicable to the determination of the scope of the RAD's deference.10 [19] However, other decisions of the Court have, instead of determining deference by issue categories, instead considered evidentiary categories. In Huruglica, the Court held that the RAD could show deference "on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion."11 The concept of deference based on categories of evidence, rather than issue categories, is also reflected in subsequent cases.12 [20] The RAD is well aware that IRPA provides for an appeal on a "question of law, of fact or of mixed law and fact,"13 and has considered whether such a provision requires that the scope of deference be determined on the basis of such questions. The Supreme Court noted in Khosa that a distinction can be made between grounds of review and standards of review.14 Here an appeal to the RAD may be made on certain grounds, but those grounds are not necessarily the basis for determining where deference begins and ends. [21] In fact, in light of the Federal Court's jurisprudence to date, it would be difficult for the RAD to determine, using issue categories, where deference is warranted. This would be particularly awkward in considering the category of mixed fact and law. In the refugee law context, this category is often applied to matters such as state protection and internal flight alternative (IFA), where the RPD is required to apply a legal principle to the specific facts of a refugee claim. [22] In the RAD context, this "mixed" category presents difficulties when it comes to determining the scope of deference. As the Courts have noted, the RAD has similar or greater expertise to the RPD in matters of refugee law. While the RPD has an advantage in making findings relating to oral testimony, that advantage does not extend to objective information, such as country conditions evidence. A "mixed" category issue such as state protection might consist of a finding by the RPD based entirely on objective documentary evidence about the availability of such protection; conversely, it might be entirely based on the refugee claimant's oral testimony about efforts to seek state protection. Similarly, a finding of an internal flight alternative might be based largely on objective evidence - where deference is not warranted - or on a claimant's testimony, which would attract deference. [23] To put it simply, it is not helpful in the RAD context to determine the scope of deference on the basis of issue categories. Instead, the RAD will determine deference based on categories of evidence. [24] The RAD will show deference to the RPD's findings where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach such findings. The RPD's advantage comes from seeing claimants and witnesses and hearing oral testimony. As such, credibility findings arising from that oral testimony are deserving of deference, as are other findings of fact based on oral evidence, as are findings based on the RPD's specialized knowledge of a particular matter where the RAD does not have its own specialized knowledge with respect to the same factual issue. The RPD's advantage may even extend to personal documents in situations where it has questioned the claimant or witness about such documents and where the resulting testimony gives rise to credibility concerns. [25] Not every finding relating to credibility warrants deference. Where the RPD has made a finding of implausibility, for example, it has no advantage where that determination of plausibility is based on the RPD's own reasoning, or on objective documents, and does not arise directly from the oral evidence.15 Similarly, where the RPD draws an inference - a credibility finding based on deduction and reasoning, rather than a contradiction in evidence - the RAD may see no reason to show deference, as the appellate tribunal can be expected to have equal expertise in the inferential process.16 [26] Where the RPD was in an advantageous position to reach a conclusion, the RAD will recognize and respect that finding. Where the RPD did not enjoy such an advantage, the RAD will apply a standard of correctness. Degree of Deference [27] How much deference is owed by the RAD to findings of the RPD? There is considerable jurisprudence, reviewed above, which has determined that the RAD should not employ "reasonableness" as a standard, and perhaps should not consider whether an error is "palpable and overriding." There is very little in the legislation or jurisprudence, however, to indicate what degree of deference the RAD can and should apply. [28] As an aside, the RAD notes that the difference between the various standards may not make much of a practical difference in the determination of a RAD appeal. It is difficult to conceive of a finding that is determined by the RAD to be unreasonable but is yet not a palpable and over-riding error.17 It is nevertheless important that the RAD employ the appropriate language in describing the standard to be applied - and such language must not reflect that of judicial review. [29] In Huruglica, the Court held that the RAD can "recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is a 'palpable and overriding error'."18 This passage has subsequently been endorsed by other decisions of the Court. [30] What level of deference does "recognize and respect" establish? Unfortunately, this was not explained in Huruglica or in subsequent jurisprudence. [31] In a number of cases, the Federal Court has upheld decisions in which the RAD applied a reasonableness standard to decisions of the RPD. While the use of the judicial review standard was an error, this was not fatal, as it was not an error for the RAD to show deference to certain findings of the RPD.19 In the RAD's view, this suggests that "recognize and respect" is indeed somewhat similar to reasonableness. [32] How then is "recognize and respect" to be defined? In Dunsmuir, the Supreme Court discussed two elements of a deferential review: process and outcome.20 Despite the difference between judicial review and a RAD appeal, it seems appropriate for the RAD to adopt those elements. [33] Even where the RAD is to show deference to findings of the RPD, those findings must still be the result of a comprehensible reasoning process. The RAD must be able to read the RPD's decision and understand how the RPD's conclusions were reached. [34] Further, the outcome of that process must be a result that is based on and supported by the evidence that was before the RPD. For this reason, it is particularly important, as repeatedly noted by the Federal Court, that the RAD engage in its own review of the evidence in the RPD's record, in order to determine whether the RPD's finding is supported by that evidence. [35] "Recognize and respect" is therefore a level of deference that will not interfere with the RPD's findings where such conclusions result from the RPD's distinct advantages or from a comprehensible reasoning process whose premises are rooted in such advantages. If either the process or the outcome does not meet these requirements, the RAD will determine the findings to be in error or, in the language of Section 111(2), "wrong." [36] On matters where the RAD owes no deference, it will consider the RPD's findings and conclusions on a standard of correctness: it will conduct its own review of the evidence and undertake its own analysis of the question. If this does not lead the RAD to the same conclusion as the RPD, the RPD's finding is wrong. The RAD's Approach [37] The RAD will take the following approach in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD. It will assess all of the evidence, both that in the RPD's record and any admissible new evidence. It will consider questions of law, fact, and mixed law and fact raised by the Appellant and, where applicable, the Respondent. [38] Where the proceeding is a true appeal-that is, where there is no admissible new evidence - the RAD will consider the decision of the RPD, the submissions in respect of that decision, and determine whether the RPD's determination is wrong. As a true appeal is founded on the record, the RAD must conduct an independent assessment of the evidence in that record in order to determine the appeal. [39] Where an appeal includes admissible new evidence that speaks to an error in the RPD's decision, it is a hybrid appeal, where the RAD must consider the RPD's reasons in light of the new evidence, which may establish that the decision of the RPD is wrong.21 [40] Where an appeal presents admissible new evidence which establishes a new, changed, or heightened risk, or otherwise changes the overall nature of the claim, this will result in a limited de novo appeal. In some such cases, the decision of the RPD may be less relevant in light of the new evidence-that is, the new evidence establishes a risk or degree of risk, or other potentially determinative matter not considered by the RPD. Unlike a true de novo proceeding, however, the RAD will not ignore the RPD's record or the findings of the lower tribunal, as these may remain relevant to the appeal. [41] The RAD will recognize and respect findings which the RPD was in an advantageous position to make, which will normally include credibility findings and other findings of fact. Where such deference is to be shown, the RAD will not intervene unless the RPD's reasoning process is not comprehensible or the outcome of that process is not based on and supported by the evidence. [42] Where the RPD's determination is entirely based on findings which warrant deference - such as an overall lack of credibility, based on oral testimony - the RAD will, having conducted its own assessment of the evidence, consider whether the RPD's reasoning process is comprehensible and whether the determination is based on and supported by the evidence. [43] On matters where the RPD has no advantage, the RAD will show no deference and will apply a standard of correctness, engaging in its own analysis of the evidence and reaching its own conclusion to determine if the RPD was wrong. Where the RAD finds that its conclusion does not agree with that of the RPD, the RAD will substitute its own finding and determination or, if it is unable to substitute, will refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. Issues of this Appeal [44] Did the RPD err in deciding that the applicants are neither Convention refugees nor persons in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA? [45] Has the Panel erred by making adverse credibility findings that were unjustified? [46] The Appellant argues that the RPD erred in its credibility and failed to provide adequate reasons for its findings.22 The RPD's Findings [47] Upon reading of section 96 of the IRPA is clear that to be considered a Convention refugee, a refugee claimant must have a well-founded fear "...of persecution for reason of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion". The existence of a nexus between the alleged persecution and one of the five grounds listed in the definition of "Convention refugee" under section 96 of the IRPA is principally a question of mixed fact and law. Mr. Justice Blanchard in La Hoz23, following a pragmatic and functional analysis, found that the appropriate standard of review for such an issue is reasonableness simpliciter. At paragraph 44 of La Hoz, supra, Blanchard J. states the following: After reviewing the criteria of the pragmatic and functional analysis, I find that, with respect to determining whether there is a nexus between a refugee claim and the persecution grounds under section 96 of the Act, the appropriate standard of review is reasonableness simpliciter. This was Gibson J.'s finding in Jayesekara v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2001 FCT 1014. [48] The Appellant argues that the acts to which he was subjected in Somalia, and he fears if he returned to Somalia are political in nature because, in the context of his business, he did business with opponents of the terrorist group Al Shabaab. The RPD did not agree and found that these acts and his fears if he returned to Somalia are not related to his political opinion, but rather did not provide adequate reasons for this finding. In other words, the RAD interprets that the RDP found that there was no nexus between the fears alleged by the Appellant and the five grounds set out in the Convention. The RPD also found that the Appellant was not a person in need of protection under section 97 of the IRPA. [49] The RPD decision in the case at bar was delivered in a written context and not orally. Oral decisions are not in and of themselves problematic. That being said, procedural fairness requires that decision-makers provide adequate reasons to justify their decisions. In VIA Rail Canada Inc. v. National Transport Agency et al., [2001] 2 F.C. 25 (C.A.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1685, the Federal Court of Appeal explained the obligation to provide adequate reasons at paragraph 22: [22] The obligation to provide adequate reasons is not satisfied by merely reciting the submissions and evidence of the parties and stating a conclusion.... Rather, the decision-maker must set out its findings of fact and the principal evidence upon which those findings were based.... The reasons must address the major points in issue. The reasoning process followed by the decision-maker must be set out...and must reflect consideration of the main relevant factors.... [50] This case was cited with approval by Mr. Justice Pinard in Zarghami v. Canada (Minister of Citizenshp and Immigration), 2006 FC 151, [2006] F.C.J. No. 215 (QL), to explain the obligation on the IRB to provide adequate reasons. Based on VIA Rail Canada Inc., supra, and Zarghami, supra, the RPD in this case had a duty to set out its findings of fact and the principal evidence upon which those findings were based. [51] With regard to the analysis involving section 97 of the IRPA, the RPD's decision does not appear to meet the duty of procedural fairness to provide adequate reasons. However, the analysis of section 96 of the IRPA leaves something to be desired also as the RPD does not provide fulsome and adequate reasons for its findings. [52] The Appellant further argues that in regard to numerous credibility findings, the Panel erred when it failed to provide adequate reasons for its findings. The Appellant sets out numerous examples where they allege the errors were made by the Panel.24 The RAD has reviewed the evidence in these areas and concludes after listening to the audio of the hearing, that the RPD has not provided fulsome and adequate reasons in regards to these findings. It would have been better if the Panel had provided fulsome reasons for why it did not accept or did not find some of the explanations provided by the Appellant that were not credible. As stated above, the RPD has a duty to provide adequate reasons as such in the case at bar, where it has not. The RAD finds the Appellant's argument in this area to be supportable. [53] The RAD after reviewing the totality of the evidence in this area finds that the appropriate standard of review for issues of procedural fairness is correctness as set out in Sketchley.25 Since the duty of procedural fairness to provide adequate reasons was breached in this case, as such the RAD sets aside in part the decision of the RPD and refer the matter for a rehearing addressing the issue of credibility. Disposition [54] The Appellant takes issue with other findings in the RPD's decision. In the RAD's view, the failure to provide adequate reasons findings set out above are sufficient to dispose of this appeal. [55] The Appellant asks that the RAD find the Appellant to be a Convention refugee, submitting that it has sufficient credible evidence to determine that he has demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution. The RAD notes that credibility was and remains a key issue in the Appellant's refugee claim. Despite the lack of adequate reasons discussed above, there remain credibility concerns that have been raised by the Appellant. The RAD has not seen or questioned the Appellant and therefore is not in a good position to make a credibility determination. For these reasons, the RAD will not substitute its own determination for the RPD's unsupportable decision but will instead refer the matter back to the RPD. CONCLUSION [56] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to Section 111(c) of IRPA, the Refugee Appeal Division refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. (signed) "Luis F. Agostinho" Luis F. Agostinho September 21, 2015 Date 1 I adopt the same reasoning as RAD Member E. Bosveld which has been used in previous RAD decisions, X (Re), 2015 CanLII 19235 (CA IRB). 2 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 3 Ibid., para. 45. 4 Singh (Harbhajan): v. M.E.I., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177, 50 N.R. 1, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422, 12 Admin. L.R. 137. 5 Singh, SCC, pp 213-214. 6 Schwartz v. Canada, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 254, at page 278; see also Bui, para. 23, and Allalou, paras 17-19. 7 IRPA, Section 110(2)(c). 8 IRPA, Section 110(2)(e) and (f). 9 Akuffo, paras. 34-35; see also Meilina v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), (F.C., no. IMM-642-14), Gagné, December 18, 2014, 2014 FC 1233 at para. 11. 10 For example, Alvarez at para 33; Kurtzmalaj at para. 33 and in Certified Question at para 43. 11 Huruglica, para. 55. 12 For example: Njeukam, para 14; Yetna, para. 17; Akuffo, para 39; Allallou, para. 17-19. 13 IRPA, Section 110(1). 14 (Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339, paras. 3, 50, 51. 15 See Ghannadi, Vahid v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1458-14), Manson, September 15, 2014, 2014 FC 879, para. 32; also Yu v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 FC 167, para. 10. 16 An inference is "a conclusion reached by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them" (Black's Law Dictionary, 7th ed., page 781); the Federal Court has described an inference as a legal concept with the same meaning as a plausibility finding (para. 58, K.K. v. M.C.I., IMM-11142-12, which decision contains a thorough discussion of the drawing of inferences.) 17 See Akuffo, para. 38; Alvarez, para. 29; but also see Aloulou, at para. 67. 18 Huruglica, para. 55. 19 See Yin, para. 36, citing Njeukam, Akuffo, Allalou, and Sajad; also Bui. 20 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9 [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at para. 47: "A court conducting a review for reasonableness inquires into the qualities that make a decision reasonable, referring both to the process of articulating the reasons and to outcomes. In judicial review, reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency and intelligibility within the decision-making process. But it is also concerned with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and law." 21 Reference to this type of evidence is made in Singh, (FC), para. 55. 22 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at p. 24, paras 2.01, 2.02, 2.03. 23 La Hoz v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2005 FC 762, [2005] F.C.J. No. 940 (QL) 24 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, at pp. 28 - 29, paras. 3.13 to 3.17. 25 Sketchley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404, [2005] F.C.J. No. 2056 (QL) --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB5-05249