TB4-05082

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-05082 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision September 17, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Prasanna Balasundaram Petra Molnar Diop Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted new evidence in support of his appeal. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the decision of the RPD and either substitute its own positive determination or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that he fears harm or death at the hands of his stepbrother in Nigeria, who has demanded possession of the Appellant's property. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on April 8, 2014. By a decision of May 15, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim. The panel cited various credibility problems with the Appellant's testimony, and it also found that he has a viable internal flight alternative (IFA) in Port Harcourt. [5] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in finding no nexus between his claim and a Convention ground, based its credibility findings on irrelevant and microscopic observations, and failed to engage in a reasonable analysis of the IFA. He also asks the RAD to consider new evidence in support of his appeal. ANALYSIS Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [6] Section 110(4) of IRPA provides that the Appellant may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of his claim or that was not reasonably available, or that he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. [7] The following evidence was submitted by the Appellant to the RAD and must meet the test described above in order to be admissible: a. Identity and education documents;1 b. Photographs relating to an alleged break-in at the Appellant's home;2 c. Two letters, one from the Appellant's brother and one from his sister-in-law; 3and d. Various objective documents about country conditions in Nigeria.4 [8] The Appellant concedes that the documents in (a) are not new, nor do they prove current affairs in Nigeria, and that they were known to him at the time of his hearing.5 In his submission, he could not have reasonably been expected to provide school records, given the "tangential nature of this personal characteristic to his claim for protection". [9] The difficulty with the Appellant's argument here is that Section 110(4) deals with evidence in relation to the rejection of the claim, not the hearing. That is, "new" evidence is not that which could not have reasonably been expected at the hearing, but that which he could not reasonably have been expected to present at the time of the rejection of the claim. It may well be that, as he attended his refugee hearing on April 8, 2014, the Appellant was not aware that he should produce these identity documents. However, this matter was raised in the hearing, and the decision was not issued until more than a month later. The Appellant has failed to explain to the RAD why he did not provide these identity documents to the RPD after the hearing, in which they were discussed, but prior to the rejection of the claim. [10] The documents in (a) do not meet the test in Section 110(4) and are not admissible as new evidence in this appeal. [11] The documents in (b) are photographs, purportedly of the aftermath of a break-in at the Appellant's house in XXXX of 2013. The Appellant concedes that these documents are not new, and alleges that they were provided to a former counsel. The Appellant argues that he did not know that former counsel failed to provide these to the RPD, as he was represented by different counsel during his RPD hearing. [12] Again, the provisions of Section 110(4) contemplate circumstances at the time of the rejection of the Appellant's claim, not at the time of the hearing. Even if the Appellant was unaware prior to the hearing that the photographs were not submitted, he nevertheless had approximately a month to submit these to the RPD between the hearing and the rejection of his claim. These documents did not arise after the rejection of the claim; they were available to the Appellant, and he could reasonably have been expected to present them to the RPD. [13] The documents in (b) do not meet the requirements of Section 110(4) and are not admissible in this appeal. [14] The documents in (c) are letters from two of the Appellant's relatives, corroborating the allegations in his refugee claim. They are dated XXXX of 2014, after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. As such, they appear to meet the Section 110(4) test, in that they arose after the rejection of the claim. This does not, however, require the RAD to admit the documents into evidence without any further consideration. In Raza,6 the Federal Court of Appeal endorsed the principle that a document's "newness" cannot be tested solely by its date of creation; what is important is the event or circumstance sought to be proved by the evidence. These documents are not new; they are simply a recounting of information predating the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim, incorporated into letters with more recent dates. [15] The content of these documents did not arise after the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. He has not established that he could not have obtained such documents at an earlier date, and as they purport to corroborate his claim, the RAD finds that he could reasonably have been expected to present such documents to the RPD. [16] The documents in (c) do not meet the test in Section 110(4) and are not admissible in this appeal. [17] The documents in (d) include various articles that have been researched by the Appellant's present counsel. They speak to family violence, local traditions, inheritance rights, land transfers, and other conditions in Nigeria that, in the Appellant's submission, relate to his refugee claim. The Appellant argues that these documents should be admitted under Section 110(4), as he could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented these at the time of the rejection of his claim. [18] Once again, the Appellant's argument in support of his proposed new evidence focuses on the circumstances at the time of his hearing. As discussed above, Section 110(4) contemplates the circumstances at the time of the rejection of the refugee claim. None of these documents post-dates the rejection of that claim: in fact, some are from the 1990s, and one is dated 1975. The documents are indeed relevant to the subject matter of the claim, and, as such, the Appellant could reasonably have been expected to present these to the RPD. He has not established that they were not reasonably available at the time of the rejection of the claim. Even if the Appellant did not anticipate the need for such documents prior to his hearing, he could reasonably have seen this need during the hearing, and made an effort to submit the documents to the RPD post hearing. [19] The documents in (d) do not meet the test in Section 110(4). [20] For the reasons set out above, none of the Appellant's proposed new evidence is admissible in this appeal. Request for an Oral Hearing [21] The Appellant asks that an oral hearing be held, pursuant to Section 110(6) of IRPA. [22] Section 110(3) of IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present "only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [23] According to Section 110(6), upon which the Appellant relies, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. In this appeal, where there is no evidence from or in response to the Minister, the documentary evidence referred to in Section 110(3) must be understood in relation to Section 110(4). [24] When read together, Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [25] The RAD has not admitted any of the new evidence submitted by the Appellant in support of this appeal. As such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, and the Appellant's request for an oral hearing is denied. Role of the RAD What is the role of the RAD in considering an appeal against a decision of the RPD? [26] While IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard by which the RAD is to review the decision of the lower tribunal. [27] The Appellant submits that the RAD owes no deference to the findings of the RPD, due to the greater expertise and independence of the RAD, as well as the expansive jurisdiction provided by legislation to the RAD. [28] Although the RAD is a relatively new body, it now has the benefit of some Federal Court jurisprudence which speaks to the appellate tribunal's role in relation to that of the RPD. [29] In Iyamuremye, the Court found itself "...entirely in agreement with the RAD that the standard of review to be applied to findings of fact made by the RPD is reasonableness. It is well established that an appellate body must review the findings of a trial court by applying a correctness standard to findings that involve questions of law and by applying a reasonableness standard to those involving questions of mixed fact and law...."7 The Court went on to hold that the RAD must review the evidence that was before the RPD and conduct its own, independent assessment of that evidence to determine whether the lower tribunal had properly considered the evidence and "reasonably justified its conclusion".8 [30] In the subsequent case of Alvarez, the Court clarified the role of the RAD in relation to the RPD.9 It held that the RAD is not to undertake a process of judicial review, but rather must perform its own assessments of the facts in order to determine whether the RPD made an error of law or mis-assessed the facts to the point of making a "palpable and overriding error".10 In the Court's view, the lower tribunal's ability to hear evidence viva voce makes it better situated than the RAD to make findings of fact, and therefore the appeal tribunal should show deference to the RPD's findings of fact and mixed fact and law. In contrast to its ruling in Iyamuremye, here the Court found that the RAD erred by assessing the decision of the RPD against a standard of reasonableness-but then required the use of a higher standard. [31] In Malhotra,11 issued after Alvarez and Eng, the Federal Court considered another decision of the RAD, in which the tribunal applied a standard of reasonableness to the RPD's decision under appeal. Although the Court did not specifically address the RAD's selection of the standard of review, it observed that the RAD had applied a standard of reasonableness and concluded that the RAD's decision did not contain any error which justified the intervention of the Court. [32] Most recently, the Court, in Huruglica, considered the appropriate relationship between the RAD and the RPD.12 It found that the RAD erred in simply reviewing the RPD's decision on a standard of reasonableness, rather than conducting its own independent assessment of the Appellants' refugee claims. The Court held that the RAD's application of a reasonableness standard curtailed the tribunal's appellate role, contrary to the purpose of the RAD and the provisions of IRPA. In the Court's view, the RAD should not even engage in a standard of review analysis; rather, it should consider the purpose of the appellate tribunal, the statutory provisions, comparable expertise, and comparative appellate regimes.13 [33] While the Court had endorsed the standard of reasonableness in Iyamuremye, and accepted it in Malhotra, it found in Huruglica that the application of such standard was in error. In contrast to Alvarez and Eng, the Court held that the RAD is not restricted to intervening only in the event of a palpable and overriding error. In Huruglica, the Court determined that the RAD is to conduct a "hybrid appeal". The RAD will therefore review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of the Appellant's refugee claim, deferring to the RPD only where the lower tribunal enjoys a particular advantage in reaching a conclusion. Where the RAD's assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own determination. The RPD's Findings [34] The Appellant argues that the RPD made various errors in rejecting his claim. [35] Nexus: The RPD listed each Convention ground, and it asked the Appellant whether he feared persecution on such bases. The Appellant testified that he did not; the RPD found that there was no nexus between the claim and a Convention ground, and proceeded to assess the claim under Section 97 of IRPA. [36] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to properly consider the risk he faces, and erred by failing to find a nexus between the claim and a Convention ground, membership in the particular social group of a family. [37] The RAD has reviewed the evidence. Here, the RPD questioned the claimant on whether he was pursued on the basis of religion, race, nationality, political opinion, or particular social group, and in each case he answered in the negative. The RAD notes that a refugee claimant can hardly be expected to understand the definition of "particular social group", and thus asking whether the claimant belongs to such a group is not a particularly useful exercise. In the end, though, it was for the RPD, not the claimant, to determine whether his claim engaged a particular social group. [38] In Serrano, the Court wrote The applicant is asking me to hold that everyone who fears persecution solely because of a family connection may be entitled to the protection of the Convention. I think that would stretch the category of "particular social group" far beyond its proper limits. I do not accept that family connection is an attribute requiring Convention protection, in the absence of an underlying Convention ground for the claimed persecution.14 [39] In Zefi,15 the Federal Court considered precisely the type of argument being made by the Appellant here-that a fear based on membership in a family had a nexus to the Convention ground of particular social group. The Court cited previous jurisprudence which held that a family does not always constitute a particular social group, and it held that a family fearing criminality does not belong to a particular social group, as the persecution is related to criminality, not a Convention ground. [40] The Appellant fears criminality. There is no connection between his claim and a Convention ground, and thus his claim cannot succeed under Section 96 of IRPA. [41] Failure to provide proof of ownership: The RPD expected the Appellant to show documentary proof that he owned the disputed land, particularly since he testified that his father held the deed to the land. The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD applied Canadian standards by expecting such documentation, as Nigerian land transfers between family members occur through oral and customary transactions. He submits further that the RPD erred by concluding that the land would go to his wife upon his death. [42] The RAD has reviewed the evidence, and notes that the Appellant testified that "my father has a deed, there is an original deed..."16 In this context, it was not wrong for the RPD to expect the Appellant to present a document showing that the disputed land exists and is in the possession of his family. The evidence also shows that the Appellant, when asked whether the land would go to his wife after his death, replied that, "It supposed to go to the wife and children but that is what [the stepbrother] is after, it is not going to go to them stepbrother wants the land for himself, to confiscate it."17 When asked again about the legal rights of his wife, he replied that on his death "the land is supposed to go to my children."18 [43] It is clear that the Appellant testified both that the land would go to his wife and children, and that it would only go to his children. While this inconsistency was not pursued further in the hearing, it can hardly be said that the RPD erred by stating that the land would go to the Appellant's wife upon his death. Even if this was an error, it would not change the substance of the finding: the RPD wondered why the agent of persecution would be motivated to kill the Appellant, as this would only cause the disputed land to pass into someone else's hands. Even had the RPD chosen the Appellant's other answer, it could and likely would have reached the same conclusion, as does the RAD upon a review of the evidence. [44] Credibility analysis: The Appellant alleges that the RPD's credibility analysis was unsubstantiated and often incorrect. He challenges the RPD's negative findings with respect to the "possession" of the disputed land and with respect to information given to immigration officials about the nature of his fear and his type of employment. He also submits that the RPD was "probing for information that was not mentioned in the decision" and failed to discuss injuries suffered by the Appellant's wife or a forced entry into the Appellant's home. He argues that the panel did not deal with the issue of the ties between the agent of persecution and local politicians, and it erred by requiring unnecessary corroborating documents, such as his school identity card and other school records. Finally, the Appellant submits that the RPD engaged in a microscopic parsing of his evidence. [45] The RPD asked the Appellant, "Is anyone in possession of those five plots of land right now", and the Appellant answered in the negative. He later testified that the land was being cultivated by two farmers. The RPD found a contradiction in this testimony. The RAD agrees with the Appellant that any contradiction here was minor. It is not clear whether the panel's use of "possession" meant ownership of the property or use of the land, and the RPD was therefore wrong to find a contradiction. [46] It was not wrong, however, for the RPD to make a negative credibility finding with respect to information given by the Appellant to immigration officers. He told officers that his reason for coming to Canada was that he feared his family and that there are no jobs where he comes from. The RPD did not accept his explanation that he was tired and anxious and therefore failed to mention his fear of his stepbrother. The RAD recognizes that refugee claimants are commonly anxious when speaking to immigration officials; it is difficult to see, however, how this can explain the omission of the agent of persecution whose actions form the basis for the Appellant's refugee claim. The RAD must recognize and respect the finding of the RPD here; however, even if the RAD would show no deference, it would reach the same conclusion based on the evidence in the record. [47] As for the allegation that the RPD was probing for information that was not mentioned in the decision, the RAD notes that the RPD process is an inquisitorial one, where the panel is expected to inquire into anything that it considers relevant.19 There is no requirement that the answer to every question be discussed in the RPD's decision, and there is no error in the RPD probing for information that does not, in the end, appear in its reasons. [48] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to discuss injuries to his wife, a forced entry into his home, or the alleged ties between the agent of persecution and persons of influence. The RPD provided a summary of the claim, and there is no requirement for the panel to set out each allegation. The RPD is presumed to have considered all of the evidence before it.20 However, having reviewed the evidence, the RAD notes that further credibility concerns arise out of the Appellant's testimony with respect to the alleged injuries to his wife. Only a few days after he signed his Basis of Claim form, he learned she was injured; although he later amended the form to change dates, he did not seek to include the new allegations concerning his wife. It may therefore have been in the Appellant's favour that the RPD did not discuss this matter. [49] The RAD does agrees that the RPD engaged in a microscopic analysis of some evidence and erred in expecting certain corroborating documents. It is difficult to see how an adverse credibility finding could be based on the Appellant's failure to present his student card or school transcripts, when he had established his identity with other documents and when his school documents were of little import to the heart of his claim. The Appellant testified that he worked as a XXXX XXXX before leaving Nigeria; while he did not provide this information to immigration officials when completing forms in Canada, it is difficult for the RAD to see how this relates to the substance of his claim. However, the RAD notes that the Appellant told immigration officials that one reason for coming to Canada was that there were no jobs where he came from; this is inconsistent with his testimony that he was employed prior to fleeing. [50] While the RPD erred in some of its credibility findings, this in itself does not require the RAD to allow this appeal. The RAD is to conduct its own assessment of the evidence. Here the Appellant allegedly fled his stepbrother, but he failed to tell immigration officials this key element of his claim. He claimed he was afraid because of a land dispute, but he did not produce a document to show that the land exists, or that his family owns it. He gave inconsistent evidence about where the land would go upon his death, and he could not explain why he feared being killed by his stepbrother if the land would remain in his own immediate family upon his death. He gave conflicting evidence about where he lived when allegedly being pursued by his stepbrother. He claimed that his stepbrother is politically influential, but he could not even say whether the man had ever been elected to a position or to office. Even if the RAD deferred to none of the RPD's findings, it would conclude, based on its own review of the evidence, that the Appellant is generally lacking in credibility. [51] Internal Flight Alternative (IFA): The RPD found that the Appellant can avail himself of an IFA in Port Harcourt. The Appellant submits that this city is no farther from his home city of XXXX than is XXXX, where the agent of persecution was able to track him. If his stepbrother was able to find him in XXXX, he argues, it is not unreasonable to conclude that he will also be located in Port Harcourt. Further, he submits that the RPD erred by considering whether he would "likely" be located in the proposed IFA, rather than applying the correct test of "serious possibility". Finally, he argues that it is unreasonable to expect him to go to Port Harcourt, as his stepbrother has influence with local politicians and heads of police. [52] The RAD has reviewed the evidence. The Appellant was unable to provide the RPD with clear answers when asked how his stepbrother could find him in Port Harcourt-he simply said it is very easy to trace people in Nigeria, and that it would be easy for his stepbrother, with his connections, to find him.21 Given that Nigeria has a population well in excess of one hundred million people, such vague explanations are not, in the RAD's view, sufficient to establish the alleged risk in the proposed IFA. [53] Did the RPD apply the wrong test for the risk of harm in the proposed IFA? The Appellant points out that the RPD used the word "likely" and argues that the correct test is "serious possibility". [54] The test for whether a refugee claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution, pursuant to Section 96, was set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Adjei.22 While a claimant must establish his case, on a balance of probabilities, the likelihood of persecution is subject to a different test: whether there is a reasonable chance of persecution. This test can also be described as "good grounds", a "reasonable possibility", a "serious possibility", or "more than a mere possibility" of persecution. [55] Here, the claim was found to have no nexus to a Convention ground and was therefore analyzed under Section 97 of IRPA. The test for Section 97 is different, and higher, than the Adjei test for Section 96. The RPD is required to consider whether it is more likely than not that a refugee claimant would be subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. As such, the risk under Section 97 is to be assessed on a balance of probabilities.23 [56] Where a claim falls under Section 96, the RPD must consider whether there is a reasonable chance or serious possibility of persecution, including in any proposed IFA. If the claim falls under Section 97, the RPD must assess whether it is more likely than not that the claimant would be subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.24 To put it simply, the test for the probability of harm in the IFA must match the test for such probability outside the IFA. To accept the Appellant's argument here would lead to an anomaly-there would be one test of harm for the proposed IFA and a different test for the rest of the claimant's country. [57] The Appellant argues that the RPD should have applied the Section 96 test but failed to. In fact, the RAD's review of the reasons finds that the RPD should have applied the Section 97 test but incorrectly applied the Section 96 test. The panel wrote that "the claimant always bears the burden of proof to show that there is a reasonable chance that persecution will occur in the entire country and specifically in the IFA named."25 After first setting out too low a test, the RPD then failed to make a clear finding of risk. Instead, it wrote that "it is mere speculation to suggest this claimant would likely be located by the purported persecutor in Port Harcourt." 26 [58] The RAD owes no deference to the RPD when it comes to the application of the proper test for the risk of harm in an IFA. Having considered the evidence, the RAD finds, on a balance of probabilities, that the Appellant would not be personally subjected to a risk to life, a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment, or a risk of torture in the proposed IFA. [59] The RAD has already concluded that the Appellant is generally lacking in credibility. It finds, in the alternative, that he can access a viable internal flight alternative in Port Harcourt. [60] The Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. CONCLUSION [61] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld September 17, 2014 Date 1 Appellant's Record, pp. 31-48. 2 Appellant's Record, pp. 49-53. 3 Appellant's Record, pp. 54-57. 4 Appellant's Record, pp. 59-142. 5 Appellant's Record, p. 158, Memorandum, para. 33. 6 Raza, Syed Masood v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-11-07), Linden, Sharlow, Ryer, December 6, 2007; 2007 FCA 385; [2008] 1 F.C.R., para. 16. 7 Iyamuremye, Oscar v. M.C.I. (F.C., No. IMM-5282-13), Shore, May 26, 2014; 2014 FC 494, para. 2 8 Iyamuremye, para. 3. 9 Alvarez, Ismael Garcia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7218-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 702; the same reasons are given in Eng, Sengloem v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-7281-13), Shore, July 17, 2014; 2014 FC 711. 10 Alvarez, para. 33. 11 Malhotra v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 768. 12 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C. no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014; 2014 FC 799. 13 Huruglica, para. 45. 14 Serrano, Roberto Flores v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2787-98), Sharlow, April 27, 1999. 15 Zefi, Sheko v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1089-02), Lemieux, May 21, 2003; 2003 FCT 636. 16 Appellant's Record, p. 20, Transcript. 17 Appellant's Record, p. 20, Transcript. 18 Appellant's Record, p. 20, Transcript. 19 IRPA, Section 170(a). 20 Hassan v. M.E.I. (1992), 147 NR 317, [1992] FCJ no. 946 (CA). 21 Appellant's Record, p. 22, Transcript. 22 Adjei, Joseph v. M.E.I., [1989] 2 F.C. 680; (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 169 (C.A.), 57 D.L.R. (4th) 153 (C.A.). 23 Li, Yi Mei v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-31-04), Rothstein, Noël, Malone, January 5, 2005; 2005 FCA 1, [2005] 3 FCR 239, at para 14. 24 Estrada Lugo, Regina v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1166-09), O'Keefe, February 18, 2010; 2010 FC 170, para. 35. 25 RPD's Reasons, para. 29, emphasis added. 26 RPD's Reasons, para. 31. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-05082