TB4-01883

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-01883 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision June 17, 2014 Date de la décision Panel S.S. Kular Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Jeffrey L Goldman Barrister & Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXX XXXX, (the Appellant), a citizen of Albania, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the decision of the RPD, and either determine him to be a refugee or refer his refugee claim to the RPD for re-determination by a differently-constituted panel. DETERMINATION [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA or the Act),1 the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that his family, the XXXX family, is involved in a blood feud with the XXXX family in Albania. These two families have been involved in a conflict over land. On XXXX XXXX, 2011, a member of the XXXX family murdered a member of the XXXX family in court in Albania. The perpetrator was caught and was in jail in Albania. The Appellant, his wife and sons were in Greece at the time of this incident. In XXXX 2012, the Appellant was terminated from his job in Greece. Thereafter, the Appellant returned to Albania as he was unable to secure employment in Greece. [4] The Appellant's family (the XXXX family) met with the XXXX family for a discussion. The XXXX family demanded the land that the XXXX family owned in lieu of the lost income from the person who had been killed. At the end of XXXX 2013, the XXXX family was told that they had two weeks to comply with the XXXX family's demands. The XXXX family was told that if they were not to comply with the XXXX family's demands, the conflict would escalate to a full blood feud. [5] The XXXX family sought assistance from the Blood Reconciliation Committee and the police. The police refused to assist in order to avoid problems for themselves, and the Blood Reconciliation Committee was unsuccessful in its attempts to resolve the conflict. Therefore, the blood feud continued. [6] Out of fear of harm, the Appellant fled Albania, travelling through Greece he went to the U.S. and then came to Canada. The Appellant filed his claim for refugee protection in July 2013. [7] On August 21, 2013, the Minister submitted a Notice of Intent to Intervene and supporting documentation.2 The Minister had submitted the Appellant's fingerprints to the U.S. Homeland Security, and received a match. The Appellant's fingerprints matched with the person with the following identity: Family Name: XXXX Given Name(s): XXXX Date of Birth: XXXX XXXX, 1972 [8] The U.S. authorities indicated that the above-mentioned individual had been fingerprinted on XXXX XXXX, 2013 at JFK International Airport upon his entry to the U.S. The Minister's evidence also shows that the same passport that was used by the Appellant to enter the U.S. was used on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013 to enter Canada. [9] The Minister argued that the RPD find the claimant not to be credible, as he was not in Albania when some of the alleged events of persecution took place. [10] The Appellant, in his original Basis of Claim form, hereinafter referred to as BoC, and his immigration intake forms stated that he left Albania in XXXX 2013, entered the U.S. on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and thereafter entered Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013. The Appellant, however, updated his BoC after the Minister submitted evidence received from the U.S. Homeland Security. The Appellant's updated information was consistent with the Minister's evidence, i.e., he left Albania in XXXX 2013, entered the U.S. on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and entered Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013. In the amended BoC, the Appellant stated that he was approached by an unknown man in a grocery store in XXXX, 2013, not in XXXX, 2013, as stated in his original BoC. [11] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on December 13, 2013. In the decision of February 7, 2014, the RPD rejected his refugee claim. The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness, and that the alleged events of persecution, on a balance of probabilities, did not happen as outlined in the Appellant's evidence.3 [12] The Appellant submits that the RPD's decision is patently unreasonable. The Appellant submits that the RPD in making its credibility findings ignored relevant evidence, misinterpreted evidence, made erroneous findings of fact, and placed reliance on irrelevant evidence.4 [13] In support of his Appeal, the Appellant has submitted new evidence that was not presented at the RPD. Admissibility of Evidence Presented on Appeal [14] The Appellant provided the following two affidavits as new evidence:5 * Affidavit of XXXX XXXX [15] Affidavit of XXXX XXXX XXXXAs provided for in Section 110(3) of the IRPA, with certain exceptions, the RAD must proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the record of the proceedings of the RPD and may accept documentary evidence and written submissions from the Minister and person subject to the appeal. Section 110(4) of the IRPA provides that the person may present only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. The RAD assesses the Appellant's proposed new evidence, the two affidavits, as per Section 110 (4) of the IRPA and in the context of the totality of the Appellant's evidence adduced at the RPD, including the recording of the RPD proceedings. [16] The Appellant argues that the above evidence did not exist until after the RPD hearing; therefore, it satisfies the criteria set out in Section 110(4) of the IRPA.6 The Appellant provided reasons why XXXX XXXX and XXXX XXXX could not provide the affidavits before the rejection of the Appellant's claim; the RAD accepts the Appellant's explanation in this regard. In view of the criteria set out in Section 110(4) of the IRPA, the RAD finds since this evidence, i.e., the two affidavits submitted, arose after the rejection of the Appellant's claim, they could not have been available before the rejection of the claim. As such the RAD finds the submitted evidence was not reasonably available to the Appellant before the rejection of the claim, and the RAD finds the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented this evidence to the RPD prior to the rejection of his claim. Based on these reasons, the RAD finds the evidence submitted to the RAD meets of the requirements of Section 110(4) of the IRPA. [17] The RAD finds although the Appellant's proposed new evidence meets the test set out in Section 110(4) of the IRPA, this does not require the RAD to admit the document into evidence without any further consideration. Section 110 (4) of the IRPA is worded in a similar manner to Section 113 of the IRPA that deals with pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA). Section 113(a) provides that an applicant whose claim for refugee protection has been rejected may present only new evidence that arose after the rejection or was not reasonably available, or that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection. The PRRA is not an appeal of the RPD decision as is the situation for the RAD; however, guidance can be obtained from the jurisprudence interpreting Section 113 of the IRPA. [18] The leading case on "new" evidence for PRRA, Raza,7 was decided by the Federal Court of Appeal. While Raza predates the introduction of the IRPA Section 110(4), it is based on the very similar wording of Section 113(a). [19] In Raza, the Court outlined factors to be considered in determining what constitutes new evidence. These factors were: 1. Credibility: Is the evidence credible, considering its source and the circumstances in which it came into existence? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 2. Relevance: Is the evidence relevant to the PRRA application, in the sense that it is capable of proving or disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for protection? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 3. Newness: Is the evidence new in the sense that it is capable of: (a) proving the current state of affairs in the country of removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance that arose after the hearing in the RPD, or (b) proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee claimant at the time of the RPD hearing, or (c) contradicting a finding of fact by the RPD (including a credibility finding)? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 4. Materiality: Is the evidence material, in the sense that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded if the evidence had been available to the RPD? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 5. Express statutory conditions: (a) If the evidence is capable of proving only an event that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the RPD hearing, then has the applicant established either that the evidence was not reasonably available to him or her for presentation at the RPD hearing, or that he or she could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented the evidence at the RPD hearing? If not, the evidence need not be considered. (a) If the evidence is capable of proving an event that occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD hearing, then the evidence must be considered (unless it is rejected because it is not credible, not relevant, not new or not material). [20] The RAD finds the two affidavits submitted post-date the rejection of the Appellant's refugee claim. In consideration of the Raza factors, a document's "newness", however, is not to be tested solely by its date of creation but by the date of the events or circumstances it seeks to prove.8 The RAD finds both affidavits include details of the land dispute, leading to murder, escalating to blood feud between the XXXX and XXXX families. The RAD finds the new evidence upon which the Appellant seeks to rely did not arise after the rejection of his refugee claim; all of this information was reasonably available to the Appellant and largely presented to the RPD before the rejection of his claim, and is part of the RPD record. Therefore, the RAD finds the affidavits add nothing new to that which was already on the record at the RPD. Further, the affidavits would not be admissible, as the evidence is not material, in the sense that it would not have changed the outcome of the Appellant`s refugee claim if this evidence had been available to the RPD at the XXXX of the claim. The focus in both affidavits is the land dispute between the XXXX family and the Zefi family; and the killing of a member of the XXXX family by a member of the XXXX family due to the XXXX family's attempts to steal land from the XXXX family. The RPD found the Appellant to be not credible regarding his alleged problems in Albania. These affidavits are not material in that they do not provide corroborating evidence in support of the Appellant's alleged problems in Albania. Based on these reasons, the RAD determines that even though the affidavits submitted to the RAD by the Appellant meet the requirements of Section 110(4) of the IRPA, the RAD would not accept these as new evidence based on the Raza factors, newness and materiality. [21] These two affidavits are not admitted as evidence at the RAD. [22] The Appellant is not requesting a hearing. The Minister is not intervening in the Appeal. ANALYSIS [23] The Appellant argues that the RPD made errors in assessing his credibility, which are questions of fact. Standard of Review [24] Although the IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [25] In Dunsmuir,9 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the foundations of judicial review and the applicable standards of review, concluding that there are two standards of review, correctness and reasonableness. Dunsmuir has limited applicability to the RAD, however, which is not a reviewing court but rather an administrative appellate body. In Khosa,10 the Supreme Court gave broad deference to a tribunal's interpretation of its own statute, but, again, this was not specifically in the context of an appeals tribunal reviewing the decision of a tribunal of first instance. As the RAD is a statutory creation, the standard of review must be extracted from the legislation. [26] In Newton,11 the Alberta Court of Appeal, having considered Dunsmuir and other jurisprudence, considered the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to a decision of a lower tribunal. The Alberta Court's analysis is therefore relevant in the context of the RAD, which has considered the factors set out in Newton: (a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; (b) the nature of the question in issue; (c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; (d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; (e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; (f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and (g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context. [27] The respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation: The RPD's principal role is to hold hearings to determine whether refugee claimants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection.12 An appeal to the RAD may be made by the subject of the RPD proceedings or by the Minister against certain decisions of the RPD. An appeal may be made on a question of law, of fact, or of mixed law and fact, and the RAD is able to determine questions of law and of fact, including questions of jurisdiction. After considering the appeal, the RAD must confirm the RPD's decision, set aside that determination and substitute another, or refer the matter back to the RPD for re-determination. [28] In the RAD's view, these respective roles suggest deference is owed to findings of fact, or findings of mixed law and fact, that can be traced back to evidence given at the RPD hearing. Where the RAD has new evidence before it, either through documents or from an oral hearing, less deference may be owed, as the RPD will not have considered this evidence. [29] The nature of the question in issue: This appeal raises questions of fact. Such questions have generally, in both appellate court and judicial review contexts, attracted a deferential standard of review.13 The Appellant submits that the RPD made erroneous findings of fact by ignoring relevant evidence, misinterpreting evidence, and placing reliance on irrelevant evidence, in the judicial review context, whether the RPD ignored evidence has been held to be question of mixed fact and law, also subject to a deferential standard of review.14 [30] The interpretation of the statute as a whole: The purpose and provisions of the IRPA, when considered together, suggest a legislative intent to provide a fair and efficient adjudicative process which leads to finality. [31] Canada's refugee system is in the first instance about saving lives and offering protection to the displaced and persecuted.15 Section 3(2)(e) of the IRPA identifies as one of the objectives of the Act with respect to refugees: (e) to establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system, while upholding Canada's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all human beings. [32] In the context of an appeal to the RAD, this objective can be understood as ensuring that appellants receive a fair and efficient adjudication of their appeals and are given refugee protection when appropriate. This is consistent with Section 111(1)(b) of the IRPA, which allows the RAD to set aside the determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that, in the RAD's opinion, should have been made. Further, Section 111(2) of the IRPA places restrictions on the RAD's referral of matters back to the RPD. [33] Section 171(c) provides that a decision of a three-member RAD panel has precedential value for the RPD and for single-member RAD panels. Section 162(2) of the IRPA requires that each Division of the IRB "deal with all proceedings before it as informally and quickly as the circumstances and the considerations of fairness and natural justice permit." [34] The provisions set out above, when considered together with the "fair and efficient" reference in the Act's objectives, suggest that the RAD is empowered to bring finality to the refugee protection process and, to do so, may be entitled to show less deference to the RPD. [35] The expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal: Both the RPD and the RAD are specialized tribunals dealing with refugee protection. Neither is bound by legal or technical rules of evidence,16 and each can take notice of information and opinion within its specialized knowledge.17 In the area of fact finding and credibility assessment, however, the RPD holds a significant advantage. It must hold a hearing,18 while the RAD must, except in certain circumstances, not hold a hearing and must instead proceed on the basis of the record of the RPD proceeding.19 The effect of these provisions is that the RPD has the chance to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD will infrequently have this opportunity. Despite other similarities between the RPD and the RAD, this difference suggests that the RAD show deference to the RPD on findings of fact and particularly in respect to credibility,20 other than in situations where the RAD holds an oral hearing and therefore has an opportunity to consider evidence first hand. [36] The need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals, and preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance: In Newton, the Court noted that it is "singularly inefficient" for a first-level hearing to be repeated at the appellate tribunal.21 The Court observed that failure to show deference to the first-level decision-maker undermines the integrity of those hearings, which would in effect be reduced to a type of preliminary inquiry. In this respect, it is important to consider that one purpose of the IRPA is to "establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system...." [37] The Newton factors are better authority than those in Dunsmuir for the purpose of determining the appropriate standard of review in this appeal, as they address a situation which is more similar to the context of the RAD and the RPD. There remains the matter of the interpretation of the legislation as a whole, and the conclusion that intended finality might lead the RAD to consider the refugee claim on its merits, showing little or no deference to the findings of the RPD. However, this is outweighed by other factors which favour a more deferential approach on questions of fact. The RAD is restricted in ways that the RPD is not, specifically in admitting evidence and holding oral hearings. The question in issue is one of fact, and the Courts have consistently held that triers of fact are better situated to make findings of fact at first instance.22 The RPD has the opportunity to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD may not. Failure to defer to the RPD on matters of fact and credibility would be singularly inefficient, would undermine the integrity of the RPD process, and would do nothing to limit the length and cost of appeals to the RAD, as the RPD proceedings would be reduced to little more than preliminary inquiries. [38] For these reasons, the RAD concludes that, in considering this appeal, it must show deference to the factual and credibility findings of the RPD. The notion of deference to administrative tribunal decision-making requires a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of the decision made. Even if the reasons given do not seem wholly adequate to support the decision, the RAD must first seek to supplement them before it substitutes its own decision.23 [39] The appropriate standard of review in this appeal is one of reasonableness, for questions of fact and credibility. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and intelligibility within the RPD decision-making process, but also with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.24 Merits of the Appeal The Appellant's pleadings25 [40] The Appellant argues that the RPD's decision is patently unreasonable. The Appellant submits that the RPD made erroneous findings of fact by ignoring relevant evidence, misinterpreting evidence, and placing reliance on irrelevant evidence. [41] The Appellant submits that the RPD in rejecting his explanation for why he had not provided correct information in his original BoC regarding when he fled Albania, entered the U.S., and made his way to Canada, the RPD did not address mental health issues identified in the psychological report in assessing his credibility. The Appellant argues that the law requires the Board to consider whether the psychological circumstances help explain an omission, lack of detail, or confusion regarding the events if these are the exact cognitive errors referred to in the psychologist's report. The Appellant submits that the RPD never addressed the psychological report for what it said regarding professionally-tested, calibrated criteria that proves mental health issues that account for the credibility concerns. The Appellant submits that the RPD never squarely addressed the issue that the applicant could not testify as well as the member (RPD) required. The RPD's Findings26 [42] The Appellant filed his claim for refugee protection in Canada in July 2013. On or around July 24, 2013, he submitted his BoC27 to the RPD. The Appellant completed his BoC with the aid of counsel. He signed a declaration, stating that the information contained within the BoC was true, complete and correct and that his declaration had the same effect as if he had made it under oath. [43] The Appellant alleged the following in his original BoC: (a) On XXXX XXXX, 2013, he returned to Albania from Greece after he was unable to secure work. (b) In XXXX 2013, he had an encounter with an unknown man in a grocery store. (c) He had personally gone to the prosecutor's office to make a complaint against the XXXX family. (d) He was present in Albania when his car was shot at in XXXX 2013. (e) He went into hiding with his family and his wife in XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX (f) He left Albania on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013. [44] The Appellant stated in his immigration intake forms28 that he entered the U.S. on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and traveled to Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013 with the aid of a smuggler. [45] On XXXX XXXX, 2013, the Minister submitted a Notice of Intent to Intervene and supporting documentation.29 The Minister's evidence shows that the Appellant left Albania in XXXX 2013, entered the U.S. on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013, and entered Canada on XXXX XXXX, 2013. [46] Subsequent to receiving the above evidence from the Minister, the Appellant updated his BoC on or around October 15, 2013.30 The updated information was consistent with the Minister's evidence, i.e., he left Albania in XXXX 2013, entered the U.S. on XXXX XXXX, 2013, and entered Canada on XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013. In this amended BoC, the Appellant stated that he was approached by an unknown man in XXXX 2013, not on XXXX XXXX, 2013 as stated in his original BoC. [47] The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness, and that the alleged events of persecution, on a balance of probabilities, did not happen as outlined in the Appellant's evidence. [48] The RPD's credibility findings relating to incorrect information in the original BoC: In this regard, the RPD's adverse credibility findings relate to the timing of the Appellant's BoC update and his explanation for not including correct information in his original BoC in the first place, and the alleged events relating to his problems in Albania.31. [49] The Appellant's explanation for the wrong dates in his original BoC was that people from the Albanian community advised him to misrepresent the date of entry to Canada.32 He testified that his friends informed him that this misrepresentation was not serious and that the consequences of his sojourn in Canada without legal status would have more serious repercussions for him.33 [50] The RPD found the Appellant's explanation for including wrong dates in his original BoC not satisfactory. The RPD cited that the Appellant had a competent counsel, whom he could have asked for advice regarding information to be included in his BoC. The RPD found it not reasonable for a refugee claimant to prefer the advice of people within the community when he/she has access to legal advice.34 [51] The Appellant testified that he did not know the consequences of his misrepresentation.35 The RPD stated that the consequences of misrepresentation are clearly explained on the first page of the BoC.36 Moreover, the RPD stated that by signing the declaration on the BoC, the Appellant confirmed that all information entered in it was true, complete and correct.37 The RPD noted that the Appellant is not an unsophisticated individual. He has completed high school, though he was not good in school, because he saw the benefits in having a high school diploma. Further, the RPD noted that the Appellant obtained his status in Greece and subsequent renewals on his own efforts (without legal assistance). He took upon himself to read and write Greek, as he realized that this would help him.38 The RPD record shows that the Appellant corrected the information in BoC after the minister submitted evidence showing the correct dates relating to the Appellant's departure from Albania, and his entry to the U.S. and to Canada. [52] The RPD found that the claimant's misrepresentation, of dates in the original BoC, i.e., when he left Albania (XXXX XXXX, 2013), entered the U.S. (XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013), and entered Canada (XXXX XXXX XXXX 2013), taints his evidence and calls into question the whole account of the alleged events of persecution.39 The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness; the RPD stated, "I find that the claimant is not a credible witness and that the alleged events of persecution, on a balance of probabilities, did not happen as outlined in the claimant's evidence."40 The RAD finds the RPD provided clear, intelligible and transparent reasons, based on the evidence adduced, for its adverse credibility findings, as per Sheikh41 in which Justice MacGuigan indicated: ...even without disbelieving every word [a claimant] has uttered, a...panel may reasonably find him so lacking in credibility that it concludes there is no credible evidence relevant to his claim...In other words, a general finding of a lack of credibility on the part of the [claimant] may conceivably extend to all relevant evidence emanating from his testimony. [53] The Appellant's submission relating to the RPD's failure to consider the psychological report: The Appellant argues that the RPD did not address issues identified in the psychological report42 in assessing his credibility. He added that the RPD never addressed the psychological report for what it said regarding professionally-tested, calibrated criteria that proves mental health issues that account for the credibility concerns. In this case, the RAD finds the RPD did not ignore any relevant aspect(s) of the Appellant's psychological report in making its credibility findings. The RPD found the Appellant's allegations to be lacking in credibility. In this respect, the RPD stated, ".... the psychological report is afforded little weight in terms of establishing the allegations as described by the claimant."43 In view of the RPD's adverse credibility findings relating to the Appellant's allegations, the RAD finds it reasonable that the RPD would give little weight to the self-reported events in the Appellant's psychological report in establishing the credibility of the Appellant's allegations. [54] The Appellant argues that the RPD never squarely addressed the issue that the applicant could not mentally testify as well as the member (RPD) required. In reviewing the Appellant's psychological report,44 the RAD finds the Appellant's psychologist refers to details of the Appellant's narrative and his reasons for misrepresentation of his date of entry to Canada in the report.45 The Appellant's psychologist, as part of the psychological assessment, reported that the Appellant's scores on the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) test showed severe levels of depression and anxiety, respectively.46 The psychologist attributes the Appellant's symptoms of depression and anxiety primarily to his fear of returning to his country of origin and his unsolved immigration status.47 The RAD finds that the Appellant's psychologist does not suggest that the Appellant would have difficulty testifying at the RPD. Moreover, in reviewing the RPD record, including the recording of the proceedings, the RAD finds that at no time, the Appellant alluded to in his testimony or the Appellant's counsel in his submissions that the Appellant would have or was having or have had difficulty in providing testimony at the RPD. Therefore, the RAD finds that the Appellant's argument that the RPD did not address the issue of psychological impairment when assessing his credibility is without merit. [55] The Appellant's argument that the RPD has violated principles of natural justice: The Appellant argues that the panel (RPD) has violated natural justice, the duty to provide clear, understandable, transparent reasons.48 The Appellant submits, "No one reading the reasons can be sure the panel isn't double or triple counting the same issues in coming to its credibility findings."49 The Appellant submits that for this reason alone the ruling should be overturned. While the RAD agrees with Appellant's counsel that the RPD's reasons contain repetitious content; the RAD finds this in and of itself does not render the RPD's decision unreasonable. The Appellant does not provide reasons why and how the repetitious content in the RPD's reasons would make the RPD's decision unreasonable. Therefore, the RAD finds the Appellant's argument is without merit. [56] Having considered the totality of the evidence in this case, including the recording of the RPD proceedings, the RAD finds the RPD provided justifiable, intelligible, and transparent reasons. The RPD's findings were supported by the evidence adduced at the RPD, and the findings were reasonable. Therefore, the RAD finds the RPD's determination that the Appellant has not established that there is a serious possibility of persecution on a Convention ground, nor, on a balance of probabilities, that he would be subjected to a danger of torture, or to a risk to life or to a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment upon return to Albania falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of the facts and the law. [57] The Appellant also argues that state protection for blood feuds does not exist in Albania.50 The RPD found that the Appellant was not a credible witness, and thus found that "the alleged events of persecution, on a balance of probabilities, did not happen as outlined in the claimant's evidence". Since the RAD finds the RPD's determination, that the Appellant was not a credible witness stands in quashing this appeal, the RAD does not find it necessary to address the state protection aspect of the Appellant's pleadings. CONCLUSION [58] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [59] This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "S.S. Kular" S.S. Kular June 17, 2014 Date 1 Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27, as amended. 2 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 8, Minister's Notice of Intent to Intervene and supporting documentation. 3 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons, para. 55. 4 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 5, Applicant's Memorandum of Argument, para. 6. 5 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 3, New Evidence for the RAD, pp. 21-40. 6 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 5, Applicant's Memorandum of Argument, paras. 38-39 and 45-46. 7 Raza, Syed Masood v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 2007 FCA 385. 8 Raza, para. 16. 9 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. 10 Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Khosa, 2009 SCC 12, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 339. 11 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, para. 43. 12 IRPA, Sections 96 and 97. 13 Khosa, para. 89. 14 Macias v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2010 FC 598, para. 16. 15 IRPA, Section 3(2)(a). 16 IRPA, Sections 170(g) and 171(a.2). 17 IRPA, Sections 170(i) and 171 (b). 18 IRPA, Section 170(b). 19 IRPA, Section 110(3). 20 Khosa, para. 89. 21 Newton, para. 80. 22 Khosa, para. 89. 23 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 708, para. 12. 24 Dunsmuir, para. 47; Khosa, para 4, the "range of reasonable outcomes". 25 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 5, Applicant's Memorandum of Argument. 26 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons. 27 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 2, Basis of Claim Form (BoC) 28 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 7. 29 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 8. 30 Exhibit RPD-1, RPD Record, Exhibit 6. 31 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons. 32 Ibid, paras. 38. 33 Ibid, paras. 40. 34 Ibid, para. 48. 35 Ibid, para. 45. 36 Ibid, paras. 43-45. 37 Ibid, para. 45. 38 Ibid, para. 49. 39 Ibid, para. 54. 40 Ibid, para. 55. 41 Sheikh, Abdulhakim Ali v. M.E.I., [1990] 3 F.C. 238 (C.A.), at 244, per MacGuigan, J.A. 42 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 2, Psychological Report, entered as Exhibit 16 at the RPD. 43 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 1, Notice of Decision and Reasons, para. 61. 44 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 2, Psychological Report, entered as Exhibit 16 at the RPD. 45 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 2, Psychological Report, also entered as evidence at the RPD, pp. 1-2. 46 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 2, Psychological Report, also entered as evidence at the RPD, p. 2. 47 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 2, Psychological Report, also entered as evidence at the RPD, p. 3. 48 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 5, Applicant's Memorandum of Argument, paras. 34-35 49 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 5, Applicant's Memorandum of Argument, para. 35. 50 Exhibit P-2, Appellant's Record, item 5, Applicant's Memorandum of Argument, paras. 51-57. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-01883