TB4-02213

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-02213 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision June 10, 2014 Date de la décision Panel C. Forbes Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal N/A Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of the People's Republic of China, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) rejecting her claim for refugee protection. The Appellant does not submit new evidence. The Appellant asks that the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) set aside the negative decision of the RPD and accept her as a protected person. DETERMINATION OF THE APPEAL [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD, namely, that XXXX XXXX is neither a Convention refugee, pursuant to s. 96 of IRPA, nor a person in need of protection, pursuant to s. 97 of IRPA. The appeal is dismissed. BACKGROUND [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that she began to practice Falun Gong in XXXX 2008 because of poor health. She was arrested and detained in XXXX 2012 because of her involvement in Falun Gong. She was forced to give up Falun Gong and was released from detention in XXXX 2012 after her family paid $25,000 RMB. She was monitored and visited daily by a government inspector to ensure she was not practicing Falun Gong. The Appellant decided to escape from China. With the assistance of a smuggler, she attempted to acquire a United States (US) visa, but she was refused. The smuggler advised her to travel to improve her chances of obtaining a U.S. visa. She travelled to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand from XXXX XXXX, 2012 to XXXX XXXX XXXX 2012. The Appellant alleges that, during her travels, she telephoned her family who informed her that the police were looking for her since she was not present for monitoring. She returned home and signed a guarantee declaring to the police that she would not exit China. The smuggler was able to secure a Canadian visa for the Appellant in XXXX 2013. The Appellant left China on XXXX XXXX, 2013, travelling on her genuine Chinese passport. She arrived in Canada on the same date and made a claim for refugee protection on XXXX XXXX, 2013. [4] The Appellant's application for refugee protections was heard on November 29, 2013. In a decision of February 19, 2014, the RPD rejected the claim, finding that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. The RPD found that the Appellant's evidence concerning her identity as a true Falun Gong practitioner was not credible and that, on a balance of probabilities, she is not wanted in China for any reason. [5] The Appellant challenges and denies all of the RPD's credibility findings. The Appellant has also submitted a plethora of case law to support her argument, yet she provides no submissions on the bulk of the jurisprudence. The RAD notes and is mindful that the Appellant is not represented by counsel for her appeal. The RAD has thoroughly reviewed the Appellant's submissions and finds them somewhat unclear but has gone on to assess the arguments. [6] The Minister did not intervene in this application. STANDARD OF REVIEW [7] Although IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. The Appellant makes no submissions on the standard of review; however, she challenges the RPD's decision to reject her claim based on credibility, risk of persecution, sur place claim issues and the RPD's failure to consider country condition evidence [8] In Dunsmuir,1 the Supreme Court of Canada considered the foundations of judicial review and the applicable standards of review, concluding that there are two standards of review, correctness and reasonableness. In assessing and selecting the appropriate standard of review, the RAD considered the factors outlined in Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association,2 which take into account the list of factors in Dunsmuir.3 The Newton factors are applied to determine the standard of review for any issue of fact, mixed fact and law, or law. [9] The Newton factors deal with the standard of review to be applied by an appellate administrative tribunal to the decision of an administrative tribunal of first instance, and given the relationship between the RPD as a tribunal of the first instance and the RAD as an appellant administrative tribunal, the Newton factors are highly relevant. [10] These factors are: a) the respective roles of the tribunal of first instance and the appellate tribunal, as determined by interpreting the enabling legislation; b) the nature of the question in issue; c) the interpretation of the statute as a whole; d) the expertise and advantageous position of the tribunal of first instance, compared to that of the appellate tribunal; e) the need to limit the number, length and cost of appeals; f) preserving the economy and integrity of the proceedings in the tribunal of first instance; and g) other factors that are relevant in the particular context. [11] In considering the factors in Newton, the RAD has considered which factors are most relevant. In assessing the relationship between the RAD and the RPD with respect to the Newton factors, the RAD considered the following three most significant factors: * the respective roles of the RPD and the RAD in the context of IRPA; * the expertise and advantageous position of the RPD member compared to that of the RAD; and * the nature of the question in issue. [12] Both the RPD and the RAD derive their jurisdiction from the same statute: IRPA. The Act gives each Division similar powers, although their roles are not the same. It is the primary role of the RPD as a tribunal of first instance to hear testimony, review evidence and determine a claim on its merits; while the RAD reviews those determinations based on questions of law, fact, or mixed fact and law. However, the fact that the RAD may, where appropriate, substitute a different determination than that made by the RPD does make its role similar to the RPD in that each Division is engaged in refugee determination. [13] The RAD decides appeals of RPD decisions related to refugee protection on questions of law, of fact, or of mixed law and fact.4 The RPD is a tribunal of first instance which has been given the authority in IRPA to make a decision to accept or reject a claim for protection.5 RPD members have expertise in interpreting and applying IRPA and as well are experts in assessing claims based on country conditions. The RPD, in most cases, must conduct a hearing6 and assess the totality of the evidence, including evidence related to the credibility of the Appellant and witnesses, after it has had an opportunity to see the claimants, hear their testimony and question them. The RPD has expertise in making findings of fact after evaluating, first hand, the testimony of witnesses. [14] In contrast to the RPD's authority to assess a claim for protection, IRPA places some limitations on the RAD's ability to consider evidence. For instance, persons who are the subject of the appeal are limited in their ability to present evidence to the RAD. The RAD is not a tribunal of first instance but exists primarily to review the decision made by the RPD and, in the cases where new evidence is considered, to review those decisions in the context of that new evidence. The RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the record, submissions by the parties, and new evidence.7 The RAD's authority to consider new evidence is also limited by the conditions set out in IRPA. Oral hearings are limited to circumstances where the new evidence raises a serious credibility issue.8 [15] It is the RAD's view that, given the limitations imposed on the role of the RAD by IRPA, the presence of a right of appeal in and of itself does not warrant a correctness standard on all issues. Rather, given that the RPD has held a hearing on the totality of the evidence, and given that the RPD has heard from the Appellant directly at a hearing, and given that the RAD's authority to consider new evidence is limited in IRPA, the RPD will be, in most cases, in the best position to assess the credibility of the Appellant and to make findings on issues of fact, and mixed law and fact related to the claim. This position is consistent with Newton, at paragraph 82, where it indicates with respect to the appellate division that: "The Board is not a tribunal of first instance, and cannot simply ignore the proceedings before the presiding officer, and the conclusions reached by him".9 [16] Dunsmuir also states that most questions of law are to be interpreted on a standard of reasonableness, except for certain narrow categories, such as constitutional questions, true questions of jurisdiction, questions of law that are of central importance to the legal system and outside the specialized area of expertise of the tribunal, and questions about the jurisdictional lines between tribunals. [17] However, unlike the situation in Dunsmuir, both the RAD and the RPD have similar expertise in the interpretation of the IRPA. Although the RAD and the RPD have similar expertise in interpreting the enabling legislation, the RAD is given the ability to set aside a determination of the RPD and substitute a determination that, in its opinion, should have been made. This is a remedy that a court does not have in exercising judicial review of an administrative tribunal and tends to support a standard of correctness for questions of law. Also, both the RPD and the RAD are considered to have specialized knowledge. Therefore, errors of law within the expertise or mandate of the tribunals as well as questions of law of more general interest to the legal system are to be reviewed for correctness. Furthermore, the RPD's advantage of holding hearings in all cases does not seem to provide a reason for the RAD to show deference on questions of law. [18] Additionally, under s.171(c) of IRPA, Parliament has given the RAD authority to review decisions of the RPD. Section 171(c) provides that decisions of a three-member RAD panel have "the same precedential value as a decision of an appeal court has for a trial court" for "the Refugee Protection Division and for a panel of one member of the Refugee Appeal Division." Decisions of appeal courts are binding on questions of law. That is why this provision suggests a correctness standard. The provisions of IRPA suggest that the RAD is empowered to bring finality to the refugee protection process and, as such, is entitled to show less deference to the RPD in matters of errors of law. [19] For these reasons, the standard of correctness will be applied to errors in law. When applying the correctness standard, a reviewing court will not show deference to the decision maker's reasoning process; it will rather undertake its own analysis of the question. The analysis will bring the court to decide whether it agrees with the determination of the decision maker; if not, the court will substitute its own view and provide the correct answer. From the outset, the court must ask whether the tribunal's decision was correct.10 [20] In the case at hand, the Appellant alleges: 1) The RPD erred in law in ignoring and/or misinterpreting the evidence before it when it determined that the Appellant was not a Falun Gong practitioner and did not have a credible basis for her claim. 2) The RPD erred in law in ignoring and/or misinterpreting the evidence before it when it determined that the Appellant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution if she was a Falun Gong practitioner. 3) The RPD erred in refusing to consider country conditions evidence relevant to the general human rights situation in China. They are relevant to the Appellant's fear of persecution. The RPD erred in law in misinterpreting the Convention definition. 4) The RPD erred in law in applying section 96 and section 97 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2 and in its finding that the Applicant had no credible basis for her claim. The RPD erred with regard to her sur place claim. [21] These errors alleged by the Appellant would constitute an error in law which must be assessed under the standard of correctness and errors of fact and mixed fact and law that must meet the reasonableness test. [22] With regards to the RPD's determination that the Appellant is not a Falun Gong practitioner and did not have a credible basis for her claim, the RAD finds that these alleged errors deal with issues of fact and the RPD's treatment of the evidence before it. [23] For these reasons, the RAD concludes that, in considering this issue, it must show deference to the factual and credibility findings of the RPD. The appropriate standard of review is one of reasonableness. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and intelligibility with the RPD's decision making process, and with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.11 Application for an Oral Hearing [24] The Appellant requests an oral hearing, pursuant to Section 110(6) of IRPA, but she does not provide any argument in her submissions for this request. [25] Section 110(3) of IRPA requires that the RAD proceed without a hearing, on the basis of the RPD's record, while allowing the RAD to accept documentary evidence and submissions from the Minister and the Appellant. The person who is the subject of the appeal may, pursuant to Section 110(4), present "only evidence that arose after the rejection of their claim or that was not reasonably available, or that the person could not reasonably have been expected in the circumstances to have presented, at the time of the rejection." [26] According to Section 110(6), upon which the Appellant relies, the RAD may hold a hearing if, in its opinion, there is documentary evidence referred to in 110(3) that raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, that is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [27] When read together, Sections 110(3), (4), and (6) establish that the RAD must not hold a hearing in an appeal such as this unless there is new (Section 110(4)) evidence, in which case, the RAD may hold a hearing if that new evidence raises a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the Appellant, is central to the RPD's decision, and that, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [28] The Appellant has submitted no new evidence in support of her appeal. As such, the RAD must proceed without a hearing on the basis of the RPD's record, and her application for an oral hearing is denied. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL The RPD's Findings [29] The determinative issue in the RPD's reasons was credibility. Falun Gong Practice in China [30] The RPD drew a negative inference regarding the credibility of the Appellant's allegations that she is a Falun Gong practitioner. [31] The RPD asked the Appellant questions about her practice and knowledge of Falun Gong. The RPD found the Appellant's knowledge of Falun Gong to be "basic and vague and is what she has been able to memorize." The RPD considered the Appellant's age and cultural factors, background, education and employment history prior to finding "it is not what would reasonably be expected from someone who has been practicing since 2008." [32] The Appellant was given an opportunity to explain what she had heard about Falun Gong. She stated that it was good for curing and effective on healing. The RPD noted that in the text, Zhuan Falun, Master Li specifically indicates that Falun Gong practitioners do not do healing. When this was pointed out to the Appellant, she responded that, if Falun Gong does not heal, how was it possible that she got better. The RPD was not satisfied with this response and found that, after five years of practice, she would be aware that Falun Gong is not meant to heal one's ailments. This is particularly troubling given that the Appellant alleged before the RPD that she joined Falun Gong due to her respective health concerns. It is reasonable to expect that aspects of Zhuan Falun dealing with "health" would resonate with the Appellant. As such, the RAD finds the RPD's finding in this matter is reasonable. [33] The RPD asked the Appellant what Master Li says about doing exercises. The Appellant provided incorrect answers regarding how to do the exercises. When this was pointed out to the Appellant, she explained how she practiced and that this was for the beginner. The RPD noted that the level of experience was not mentioned by Master Li and drew a negative inference on her knowledge and practice of Falun Gong given the Appellant's answer. The Appellant stated that she had allegedly been practicing since 2008, yet the Appellant was unable to demonstrate that she held the level of knowledge she alleged she possessed. The RPD found, "reasonably, she would have known what Master Li stated about the exercises and would be able to accurately recite what he had said." Given the length of time the Appellant alleges she has been practicing Falun Gong, it would be expected that she would be able to provide more comprehensive and accurate testimony. The RAD finds the RPD's adverse credibility findings on this issue were reasonable. [34] The Appellant indicated that she had read (the text) Zhuan Falun, and Lecture 4 was her favourite. However, when questioned by the RPD, she was unable to recollect a story recited by Master Li in Lecture 4. When this was put to the Appellant, she stated she had read the book but because of her age, she could not remember the story. The RAD finds the RPD reasonably noted that the Appellant did not seem to have any issues with her memory in other parts of her testimony. The RPD went on to acknowledge that, while the Appellant only recently acquired her own copy (of Zhuan Falun), she has been practicing and studying Falun Gong since 2008. As such, the RPD determined that the Appellant would be able to recall some parts of the story from the Lecture she described as her favourite. The Appellant put forth evidence that she received instruction once a month from her Falun Gong instructor and taught her from the book, Zhuan Falun, yet the Appellant was unable to speak of the story that was of particular interest to her. In addition, the Appellant was unable to demonstrate the knowledge that would reasonably be expected of someone who had just read the text. [35] The RPD drew a negative inference regarding the credibility of the Appellant's assertion that she is a true Falun Gong practitioner. In coming to its determination, the RPD recognized the significant length of time the Appellant had been practicing Falun Gong. The questions posed by the RPD were intended to assess the credibility of the Appellant's allegations of her knowledge and understanding of the practice of Falun Gong. It was open to the RPD to test the credibility of these allegations. The Falun Gong principles are a fundamental aspect of Falun Gong and central to her ability to practice Falun Gong. The Appellant testified that she received instruction once a month from her Falun Gong instructor and taught them from the book, Zhuan Falun. Her evidence was that she regularly practiced Falun Gong. Based on the evidence concerning the Appellant's knowledge of Falun Gong, the RAD finds the RPD was reasonable in its treatment of the Appellant's knowledge of Falun Gong. Treatment of Family Members in China [36] The RPD asked the Appellant whether any of her family members in China had been experiencing problems with the Public Security Bureau (PSB). She indicated that they had not experienced any problems or consequences because the PSB were looking for her. [37] The RPD determined that, if the PSB truly had interest in the claimant as she alleges, the PSB would pressure the Appellant's parents or child, as the evidence suggests is their practice. [38] The RPD found that, given the claimant alleges she was arrested and detained for her Falun Gong practice, she was then released and signed a decree that she would never leave the country; reasonably, the PSB would be pressuring or harassing the Appellant's family as they are known to do. The RPD found the Appellant not to be credible. The RPD relied on documentary evidence12 to support the negative credibility finding regarding her family's lack of reprisals from the PSB. As such, the RAD finds the RPD did not err in addressing the treatment of the Appellant's family in its assessment of the credibility of the Appellant's allegations. Furthermore, given that the PSB visited the Appellant's home without finding the Appellant and given the documentary evidence concerning reprisals, the RAD finds that it was reasonable for the RPD to conclude that the Appellant was not credible. Appellant's Exit from China [39] The RPD noted that the Appellant was in possession of a valid Chinese passport and used this passport to travel to Canada. The Appellant indicated that she had no trouble leaving the country. The RPD noted that the Appellant alleges that she was being closely monitored after allegedly being arrested and detained in a labour camp for three months. Furthermore, she signed a decree promising that she would never leave the country. [40] The RPD found, on a balance of probabilities, if the Appellant was being monitored by the PSB for her illegal activities and had been prohibited from leaving the country as alleged, she would not have been able to leave the country on her own passport. [41] The Appellant argues that the RPD ignored or misinterpreted the Appellant's oral testimony that she had used a "snakehead" (smuggler) to assist her in leaving the country. The Appellant submits that it is plausible that the snakehead could have bribed officials at the airport. [42] The Appellant points to the decision of the Federal Court in Zhang13 to support her argument. In that case, the reviewing court took exception to the RPD's findings when it concluded that possibly hundreds of officials had to be bribed to facilitate undetected departure from China. [43] The RAD is not persuaded by the Appellant's argument that these cases are similar. The RAD notes that, in Zhang, the RPD engaged in the speculation that hundreds of officials would have to be bribed. Such was not the case in this matter, as the facts of this case are distinguishable in this appeal given that the RPD did not make such a finding. [44] More importantly, the decision in Zhang was based on the documentary evidence that made no reference to the Golden Shield Project,14 which was relied upon by the RPD in this case. Country documents state that the PSB have established a national policing database, which includes "criminal fugitive information" and "information on passports and exit and entry".15 [45] The Appellant alleges that she has been identified as a practitioner of Falun Gong and that she was closely monitored by the PSB after allegedly being arrested and detained in a labour camp for three months. She alleges that the PSB in China continue to look for her. In addition, the Appellant was required to sign a decree promising that she would never leave China. The RAD noted that the Appellant has not provided any evidence through testimony or in the record before the RPD that the smuggler had the ability to circumvent the extensive security at the Beijing airport which would allow her to exit China without being detected. [46] Furthermore, in the Zhang matter, the reviewing court made reference to a 2001 Response to Information Request (RIR) which addressed security and exit control procedures at Chinese airports. The documentary evidence before and relied on by the RPD on issues of security and exit control is contained in Response to Information Request CHN102869.E, dated July 2008. [47] The RAD finds, based on the documentary evidence, it is clear that security practices have become increasingly stringent in recent years in China and that there are systems in place to identify persons leaving the country. The RPD's findings with regard to the Appellant's departure from China are reasonable under the circumstances. The RPD is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and it may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole.16 Where the RPD finds a lack of credibility based on inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence, there must be a basis in the evidence to support such inferences.17 In this case, there is an evidential foundation for the RPD's findings. The RAD finds that the RPD's credibility finding on this issue was reasonable. Falun Gong Practice in Canada [48] The RPD considered the Appellant's evidence that she practices Falun Gong in Canada and exercises at a park. The RPD considered photographs of the Appellant engaging in Falun Gong exercises in Toronto. Although the RPD did not specify what weight it was giving to the photographs, the RPD found, based on the negative credibility findings, that the Appellant was not a Falun Gong practitioner in China. The RAD noted that a photo cannot attest to a person's motivation to practice, or the genuineness of any practice. It was reasonable for the RPD to assess the photos in light of the entirety of the evidence before it and to conclude that the Appellant engaged in these activities in Canada solely to bolster her claim. [49] The RPD acknowledged that the Appellant provided a letter from her husband stating she was arrested for her practice of Falun Gong and that the PSB continue to look for her. In this instance, the RPD applied no weight to the letter. Given that the RPD found the Appellant was not credible, it was open for the RPD to find that it could give the letter from the Appellant's husband no weight. The RPD's finding in this regard is reasonable. CONCLUSION [50] The RPD found the entire allegations of the Appellant not credible. The RPD found that there is insufficient credible and trustworthy evidence to establish, on a balance or probabilities, that the Appellant is wanted in China for any reason. The RPD further found that, on a balance of probabilities, the Appellant has not established that she is a true Falun Gong practitioner. The Appellant's evidence about her knowledge of Falun Gong is flawed, in that she was unable to articulate central concepts associated with Falun Gong. The RAD notes that the RPD's finding about the Appellant's identity as a Falun Gong practitioner was based on significant credibility issues and findings. The RPD's strong credibility findings apply not only to the Appellant's alleged practice of Falun Gong in China but also to Falun Gong activities in Canada. [51] There is no persuasive evidence before the RAD to find that the RPD ignored or misinterpreted the evidence before it in coming to its determination that the Appellant had no credible basis for her claim. In addition, the RPD did not misinterpret the Convention definition nor fail to conduct an analysis on the country conditions. [52] The Appellant argued that the RPD erred in fact by refusing to consider country conditions evidence relevant to the general human rights situation in China and the impact that this evidence had on her fear of persecution. The RAD finds that the RPD did not err in not addressing the general human rights situation in China given that the Appellant did not indicate in her BoC narrative or her testimony that there were any other bases to her fear in China, other than her Falun Gong practice. The RPD reasonably found that the Appellant's fear related to her Falun Gong practice was not credible. Given the RPD's finding that the Appellant was not a genuine Falun Gong practitioner in China or Canada, and the Appellant's failure to identify any other bases to ground a well-founded fear of persecution or harm in China, the RAD finds that the RPD did not err in fact in not addressing the evidence on the record related to the general human rights situation in China. [53] The RPD did not fail to apply section 96 and 97 in its finding that the Appellant had no credible basis for her claim. The RAD finds the RPD did address the legal principle of sur place and the central issue of the Appellant's identity as a practitioner of Falun Gong. [54] The RPD was guided by the Federal Court in Jiang18 that indicates that the RPD is entitled to import its credibility findings into its assessment of an Applicant's sur place claim. The RPD's findings, together with the record, are sufficient to establish that the Appellant has no sur place claim. [55] The RPD's finding that the Appellant is not a true Falun Gong practitioner is reasonable. Therefore, the RAD finds that it need not address the remaining issues identified by the Appellant, as they depend on a finding that the Appellant is a Falun Gong practitioner. [56] The RPD's finding that the Appellant is not a true Falun Gong practitioner was justifiable, intelligible, transparent, and falls within the range of acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. DETERMINATION [57] Based on the analysis above, the RAD confirms the determination of the RPD's decision, as per s. 111(1)(a) of IRPA, that the Appellant is not a Convention refugee, nor is she a person in need of protection. The appeal is dismissed. (signed) "C. Forbes" C. Forbes June 10, 2014 Date 1 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9. 2 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, paragraph 44. 3 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9. 4 IRPA, s. 110 (1). 5 IRPA, s. 107. 6 IRPA, s. 170. 7 IRPA, s. 110(3). 8 RAD Rule 57. 9 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, paragraph 82. 10 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, 2008 SCC 9, at para 50. 11 Dunsmuir, para. 47; in Khosa, para. 4, the "range of reasonableness outcomes". 12 RPD's Record, Item 3, National Documentation Package (NDP) for China (31 October 2013), Item 2.3, United Kingdom (U.K.) Home Office, Country of Origin Information (COI) Report: China, 12 October 2012. 13 Zhang, Xiu Jie v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3703-07), Dawson, April 23, 2008; 2008 FC 533. 14 RPD's Record, Item 3, NDP for China (31 October 2013), Item 14.3, RIR CHN102869.E, 8 July 2008. 15 RPD's Record, Item 3, NDP for China (31 October 2013), Item 10.3, RIR CHN103133.E, 2 July 2009. 16 Numbi, Gaston Kipa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-92-12), Boivin, August 30, 2012; 2012 FC 1037, at 19. 17 Miral, Stefnie Dinisha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3392-97), Muldoon, February 12, 1999. 18 Jiang, Sumei v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-13-12), Zinn, September 11, 2012; 2012 FC 1067. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-02213