TB4-03355

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-03355 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXX XXXX XXXXXXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision June 24, 2014 Date de la décision Panel Edward Bosveld Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Sina (Bolanle Olusina) Ogunleye Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du (de la) ministre Reasons and Decision [1] XXXX XXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Nigeria, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying her claim for refugee protection. In support of her appeal, she has submitted evidence which was rejected by the RPD. The Appellant asks the Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) to set aside the decision of the RPD and either substitute a positive determination or refer the matter back to the RPD for redetermination. DETERMINATION [2] This appeal is allowed. Pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), the Refugee Appeal Division refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for redetermination by a differently-constituted panel. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that her husband died in XXXX of 2012, and his family demanded that she perform traditional widowhood rites, including drinking a concoction to prove that she was not responsible for his death. The family also insisted that she marry her late husband's brother, which she viewed as a scheme to take control of the properties she and her husband owned together. She fled to Canada, entering this country using a Temporary Resident Visa (TRV), and she made a refugee claim in May of 2013. [4] The Canada Border Services Agency (the Minister) intervened in the Appellant's claim before the RPD. Among other things, the Minister pointed out that the Appellant did not seek protection immediately upon arrival in Canada, and there were significant inconsistencies between the Appellant's TRV application and her refugee claim. The Minister argued that there was no nexus between the claim and a Convention ground, and asked the RPD to find the Appellant to be neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. [5] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on July 26, September 5, and September 20, 2013. On October 7, 2013, the Appellant provided post-hearing disclosure to the RPD, in the form of an affidavit from her son, in which he explained his role in obtaining the Appellant's TRV. The Minister objected to the admission of this document, as in the Minister's submission it should have been provided before the hearings were concluded. [6] By a decision of March 25, 2014, the RPD rejected the Appellant's refugee claim. It found that she was generally lacking in credibility, and it based this finding largely on inconsistencies between the TRV application and the refugee claim. In the alternative, the RPD found that the Appellant could avail herself of a viable internal flight alternative (IFA). In reaching its decision, the RPD did not consider the Appellant's post-hearing disclosure; it declined to admit that evidence, finding that the Appellant could have provided it prior to the conclusion of the hearing, and that the document did not provide new evidence. [7] The Appellant submits on appeal that the RPD erred in rejecting her post-hearing evidence, misapplied jurisprudence relating to the TRV, failed to consider the Chairperson's Guideline on Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution (the Gender Guideline),1 unreasonably found that she could avail herself of an IFA, and reached a determination which does not fall within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes. AnalysisStandard of Review [8] Although IRPA sets out grounds for appeal as well as possible remedies, it does not specify the standard of review to be applied by the RAD. [9] The Refugee Protection Division's principal role is to hold hearings to determine whether refugee claimants are Convention refugees or persons in need of protection. The RAD must, conversely, proceed without a hearing except in certain circumstances.2 The Courts have consistently held that triers of fact are better situated to make findings of fact at first instance.3 The RPD has an opportunity to see and question the refugee claimant, while the RAD is infrequently in a position to do so. An appeal body normally should not substitute its own reasoning for that of the first-level tribunal which had the benefit of hearing oral testimony.4 The RPD is therefore in an advantageous position when it comes to assessing credibility and making findings of fact. [10] One of the purposes of IRPA is to "establish fair and efficient procedures that will maintain the integrity of the Canadian refugee protection system...."5 In Newton, the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that a failure to show deference to the first-level decision-maker could undermine the integrity of such hearings, which would in effect be reduced to a type of preliminary inquiry.6 A failure to show deference to the RPD on questions of fact would have a similar effect on the first-level refugee hearing, and this is not consistent with the purpose of IRPA or its specific provisions in respect to appeals. 7 In the RAD's view, IRPA clearly signals that an appeal is not to be a de novo hearing of the refugee claim, as the RAD is restricted in accepting new evidence and holding an oral hearing, and this too suggests that deference be shown to the findings of fact made at the first level. [11] For these reasons, the RAD will show deference to the RPD on findings of fact, including credibility, and on findings of mixed fact and law.8 The notion of deference to administrative tribunal decision-making requires a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in support of the decision made. Even if the reasons given do not seem wholly adequate to support the decision, the RAD must first seek to supplement them before it substitutes its own decision.9 [12] The appropriate standard of review for questions of fact and of mixed fact and law is one of reasonableness. Reasonableness is concerned mostly with the existence of justification, transparency, and intelligibility within the RPD's decision-making process, but also with whether the decision falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law.10 In considering the reasonableness of the decision, the RAD must review and independently assess the evidence that was before the RPD, and determine whether the RPD properly considered that evidence and reasonably justified the conclusions drawn from it.11 [13] The RAD will not show deference to the RPD, however, on questions of law. 12 Here, the lower and appellate tribunals have similar expertise with respect to questions of law, including those arising from their shared home statute, and this suggests that no deference is warranted. It is an appropriate function for the RAD to ensure that the RPD is applying the correct law; this approach promotes just decisions and avoids inconsistent application of the law.13 A correctness standard on questions of law ensures universality in the application of the law.14 [14] For these reasons, the RAD will review questions of law on a standard of correctness. The RAD will not show deference to the RPD's reasoning process on such issues, but will undertake its own analysis of the question to determine whether it agrees with the RPD on the matter.15 [15] Questions of procedural fairness will also be reviewed on a standard of correctness. Procedural fairness plays a role in ensuring that proper decisions are made. A fair procedure has been described as the handmaiden of justice, and the need for procedural safeguards is obvious.16 The requirements of procedural fairness at the RPD are "at the high end of the continuum of procedural fairness," in part because Charter rights are at stake in refugee cases.17 While the requirements of procedural fairness are variable,18 here the RAD and the RPD are divisions of the same tribunal, with similar expertise in the application of their governing statute and governed by many of the same procedural guidelines. In this context, the RAD sees no reason to show deference to the RPD on matters of procedural fairness. In fact, it is incumbent on the RAD, as an appeal tribunal, to ensure that procedural fairness is respected. The RPD's Findings [16] The RPD's decision is fatally flawed, for the following reasons. [17] Rejection of post-hearing evidence: The RPD has no duty to accept post-hearing evidence or submissions thereon.19 Where an application has been made for the submission of post-hearing documents, however, the RPD must consider that application under Rule 43 of its Rules, and must provide an explanation if it declines to accept that evidence.20 [18] During the September 20, 2013 sitting of the Appellant's refugee hearing, the RPD asked the Appellant about her TRV application, and she explained that it was brought to her by her son, who obtained it from a friend. The panel member responded that, "I have no statement from either your son or this friend relating to any of this about these forms. Why is that?" The Appellant asked, "You're asking for the reason they fill it for me?" and the RPD replied, "No, why she hasn't provided any statements from them explaining this from their point of view, if you like." The Appellant then testified that she did not have such a document.21 [19] On October 7, 2013, the Appellant's counsel provided written submissions, along with an application for the admission of a post-hearing document, an affidavit from the Appellant's son. That affidavit addresses some concerns raised in the hearing, including those about the religion of the Appellant's deceased husband, and states that "a friend helped me to get visa that my mother used to escape from Nigeria to Canada."22 The Appellant's counsel before the RPD argued that the affidavit was "relevant and corroborative of many critical aspects of the claimant's claim. Most importantly it addresses directly the concern of the Member... about 'having no statement from' claimant's son."23 [20] The Minister's written submissions to the RPD objected to the consideration of the post-hearing disclosure. The Minister argued that, "if counsel wished to rely on such evidence, it should have been provided in accordance with RPD rules, before the RPD hearings were concluded. It would have been available."24 [21] The RPD considered the application under the heading "Unsolicited Post-Hearing Evidence." It noted that there had been no request during the hearing for the late disclosure of the document. The panel then considered the provisions of Rule 43. It found the document to be "somewhat relevant," though it was uncertain of its probative value. It also noted that the document was provided in response to a concern raised by the panel during the last sitting of the hearing. In the RPD's view, however, the panel's concern at the hearing was in respect to the Appellant's lack of knowledge about the information in the TRV application, and the manner in which that application was made. The RPD also found that the late document did not explain the source of the information in the TRV or provide a reason why that information was incorrect. The panel noted that its concerns about the TRV application were clear at the conclusion of the July 26, 2013 sitting, and the Appellant could therefore have provided this document prior to the September 20, 2013 sitting. Finally, the RPD found that the document does not provide new evidence, as the information therein was already known to the parties prior to the commencement of the refugee hearing and could, with reasonable effort, have been provided in advance of the hearing. [22] The Appellant argues on appeal that the RPD erred in failing to accept the affidavit, which speaks to various credibility concerns raised by the RPD in the hearing and cited in its decision. [23] Whether the RPD properly considered the post-hearing evidence and correctly applied Rule 43, is a question of procedural fairness, to be reviewed on a standard of correctness.25 [24] It is clear from the wording of Rule 43(3) that the RPD must consider each of the factors set out there, in addition to any other relevant factors, in deciding whether to allow an application for additional documents. The panel did consider each factor; it found the affidavit was somewhat relevant, had uncertain probative value, did not bring new evidence to the proceeding, and it could have been provided by the Appellant in advance of the hearing. [25] The RAD has difficulty with the RPD's reasoning here. How could this affidavit be only "somewhat" relevant, when it speaks directly to significant credibility issues relied upon by the RPD in rejecting the claim? The affidavit refers to the religious views of the Appellant's husband, an area in which the RPD made an implausibility finding,26 and also to the TRV application, which was central to the RPD's credibility determination. [26] The RPD was required by the Rules to assess the probative value of the affidavit; instead, it found "the probative value is difficult to determine" as the affiant was not called as a witness, and the affidavit was provided after the hearing. In the RAD's view, a sworn affidavit might indeed have probative value,27 and the RPD was obligated to consider this. [27] The RPD found that the Appellant could have provided this evidence, in accordance with the RPD Rules, prior to the refugee hearing. In the RAD's view, this is an unfair expectation. The Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to anticipate that the RPD would have credibility concerns about the religious nature of her husband's funeral, nor could she have known that the RPD would make a negative credibility finding with respect to her TRV application. For reasons set out below, the RAD concludes that both of these credibility findings were unreasonable, and therefore the RPD should not have expected the Appellant to anticipate these concerns and to present her son's affidavit before the last sitting of her refugee hearing. [28] The RPD asked about the lack of a statement from the Appellant's son during the last sitting of her refugee hearing, but when this document was subsequently supplied, the panel refused to accept it and went on to make negative credibility findings on matters addressed in the affidavit. The document was highly relevant, and the Appellant could not reasonably have been expected to present it at an earlier date. [29] The RPD erred in failing to accept the Appellant's post-hearing disclosure. [30] TRV application: The Appellant travelled to Canada on a temporary resident visa. She told the RPD that she signed a blank TRV application provided by her son, and she returned it to her son. She did not know who completed the document and therefore could not explain why it contained incorrect information about important aspects of her life, including the date on which her husband died. [31] The RPD found the Appellant to be generally lacking in credibility, and it wrote that "many of the inconsistencies in the evidence arose from a comparison between the information in her application for a TRV and that which she provided in oral and written documents provided in support of her refugee claim."28 The panel found that the Appellant failed to provide a cogent explanation of why she signed a blank form. It stated that: ...the jurisprudence is clear that applicants are held responsible for the contents of applications that they sign, and also must take responsibility for the negligence associated with signing a blank document while being unaware of its content.... The panel therefore does not accept the claimant's abdication of any responsibility for the content of the TRV form which she signed, and draws a negative inference as to her credibility as a consequence. The panel finds the claimant fully responsible for the content of her TRV application...and therefore holds her responsible for the numerous discrepancies between the information provided in her application in support of her refugee claim...her TRV application...and her testimony at the hearing.29 [32] The cases the RPD cites in support of its contention that "applicants are held fully responsible for the contents of applications that they sign" are easily distinguishable from the Appellant's refugee claim. In Shahin,30 the applicant sought permanent residence in Canada as a skilled worker, while Radji31 addressed the matter of an applicant who, while in Canada and represented by counsel, signed a blank form making a claim on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. It is difficult for the RAD to see how this jurisprudence is at all relevant to a refugee claimant obtaining a false document in order to flee persecution in her country. The Federal Court has repeatedly and consistently held that a claimant's use of false documents to travel to Canada should not be the basis for a negative credibility finding: "where a claimant travels on false documents, destroys travel documents or lies about them upon arrival following an agent's instructions, it has been held to be peripheral and of very limited value to a determination of general credibility."32 [33] It was an error of law for the RPD to hold the Appellant responsible for the contents of her TRV application when this document was completed by an agent to assist her in fleeing alleged persecution in her country. [34] As the bulk of the RPD's credibility findings are based on inconsistencies between the TRV application and the refugee claim, this error is fatal to the RPD's general credibility finding. [35] Implausibility: The Federal Court has cautioned that the RPD "...must be careful when rendering a decision based on a lack of plausibility because refugee claimants come from diverse cultures, and actions which appear implausible when judged from Canadian standards might be plausible when considered from within the claimant's milieu." Plausibility findings should only be made in the clearest of cases.33 [36] The RPD is entitled to make reasonable findings based on implausibilities, common sense and rationality, and it may reject evidence if it is not consistent with the probabilities affecting the case as a whole.34 Where the RPD finds a lack of credibility based on inferences concerning the plausibility of evidence, there must be a basis in the evidence to support such inferences.35 [37] In addition to its erroneous findings with respect to the TRV application, the RPD also made findings of implausibility. Although the Appellant had alleged that her deceased husband was a "traditional man", the RPD noted that documents showed "a lot of Christian content to his funeral rites". The Appellant explained to the RPD that the funeral was planned by her and her children, who wanted to celebrate his life in a church. Her husband's family did not object, as the children had told them that this type of funeral was what the children wanted. The RPD did not find this plausible, as the Appellant had alleged that her husband's family held traditional beliefs, demanded that she undergo traditional rituals, and could not be persuaded otherwise by the Appellant or the children. The RPD wrote: The panel finds it implausible that on the one hand, the claimant's late husband's family are so powerful that they were able to take over his properties, would have forced her to do traditional rituals had she not fled and gone into hiding, and would have killed her children had they attempted to intercede on her behalf (and have already been verbally abusive to them), but on the other hand did and said nothing about the Christian nature of the funeral simply because the children told them that is what they wanted, and further apparently allowed the "Christian wake-keep" to take place at XXXX XXXX XXXX, one of the properties they are alleged to have seized. The panel finds that such implausibilities undermine the credibility of the claimant's evidence, which was neither clear nor convincing as a consequence.36 [38] Findings of implausibility are inherently subjective assessments which are largely dependent on the individual RPD member's perception of what constitutes rational behaviour.37 Here, the RPD ventured into the minds of the alleged agents of persecution and apparently concluded that they would or should be opposed to Christian content in the funeral of the Appellant's husband, despite the wishes of the children. [39] This is not the clearest of cases, nor does the RPD provide a basis in the evidence to support its conclusion. The Appellant's Basis of Claim (BoC) form does not indicate that her husband's family was opposed to the practice of Christianity, and it in fact states that her husband "allowed me to be a good Christian even though he was more into traditional religion than Christianity, but he let me be."38 Objective evidence indicates that religious intermarriage is common among the Yoruba, of whom the Appellant is one, and lacks the religious conflict found amongst other groups.39 Another objective report indicates that, in some areas of Nigeria, traditional rites are practiced in tandem with Christianity.40 Here, the RPD appeared to assume that the husband's family would not tolerate Christian rituals, or allow the deceased's wake to take place at his own property. These are not reasonable conclusions. [40] The RPD found the Appellant to be generally lacking in credibility, and this finding rested in large part upon discrepancies involving the TRV application, as well as findings of implausibility. For reasons set out above, the RAD concludes that these findings were in error. The RPD's global credibility finding therefore cannot stand. [41] Internal flight alternative: In the alternative to its credibility finding, the RPD concluded that the Appellant could find a viable IFA in Lagos, Abuja, Ibadan, Port Harcourt, or Ilorin. The RPD wrote, "The panel acknowledges that it is possible that her late husband's family might find her at one of the suggested locations at some time in the future should they seek her, but finds that the claimant has not established this on a balance of probabilities."41 [42] The RPD did not analyse whether there was a nexus between the Appellant's refugee claim and a Convention ground, nor did it specify whether it considered the claim under Section 96 of IRPA, Section 97, or both. It was not necessary for the panel to make this distinction in considering credibility, as credibility findings are equally applicable to both sections. However, the lack of a nexus determination is problematic for RPD's IFA finding. [43] The test for whether a refugee claimant has a well-founded fear of persecution, pursuant to Section 96, was set out by the Federal Court of Appeal in Adjei.42 While a claimant must establish her case, on a balance of probabilities, the likelihood of persecution is subject to a different test: whether there is a reasonable chance of persecution. This test can also be described as "good grounds", a "reasonable possibility", a "serious possibility", or "more than a mere possibility" of persecution. The test for Section 97 is different, and higher, than the Adjei test for Section 96. The RPD is required to consider whether it is more likely than not that a refugee claimant would be subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment. As such, the risk under Section 97 is to be assessed on a balance of probabilities.43 [44] It is difficult for the RPD to consider the probability of harm in a proposed IFA without having determined whether the claim falls under Section 96 or Section 97. Where the claim falls under Section 96, the RPD must consider whether there is a reasonable chance or serious possibility of persecution, including in any proposed IFA. If the claim falls under Section 97, the RPD must assess whether it is more likely than not that the claimant would be subject to a risk to life or a risk of cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.44 To put it simply, the test for the probability of harm in the IFA must match the test for such probability outside the IFA. [45] Here, the RPD applied the higher Section 97 test-whether the Appellant would, on a balance of probabilities, face harm in the proposed IFA-without having explained why the Appellant was not entitled to an assessment of potential harm under the lower test associated with Section 96. Had the RPD found that there was absolutely no risk of harm, its incorrect articulation of the test might not be of any practical import. However, it acknowledged that "it is possible" that the agents of persecution might find the Appellant in the proposed IFA. This suggests that, had the RPD applied the lower test, it might have found the proposed IFA to be unsafe. [46] There may or may not be a nexus between the Appellant's refugee claim and a Convention ground. Her counsel before the RPD argued that she belongs to a particular social group,45 while the Minister submitted that there is no nexus between her claim and a Convention ground.46 The RAD observes that there is a religious element to her fear of persecution, as she is afraid of being forced to participate in traditional rituals which violate her Christian beliefs. In this context, it was an error for the RPD to apply the Section 97 test for the likelihood of harm without first explaining why the Appellant cannot benefit from the lower threshold which is to be applied to claims falling under Section 96. [47] The RPD erred in law in finding that the Appellant has not established her fear of harm in the proposed IFA, on a balance of probabilities, and its IFA finding therefore must be set aside. Admissibility of Evidence Submitted on Appeal [48] For reasons set out above, the RAD has found that the RPD erred in rejecting the Appellant's post-hearing evidence. The Appellant asks the RAD to admit that evidence in this appeal. [49] As the RPD erroneously rejected the evidence in question, it could be appropriate for the RAD to admit it as evidence here. However, the RAD declines to do so in the particular circumstances of this case. Although the RPD made errors in rejecting the Appellant's refugee claim, the RAD is unable to substitute its own positive determination, as there remain concerns with the Appellant's credibility and with the possibility of a viable IFA. The Appellant's proposed new evidence cannot resolve these concerns, and therefore it is unnecessary for the RAD to admit that evidence. DISPOSITION [50] The RPD erred in rejecting the Appellant's post-hearing evidence, in basing negative credibility findings on the TRV application, in its finding of implausibility, and in its application of the test for the probability of harm in the proposed IFA. The RPD's decision to reject the Appellant's refugee claim therefore cannot stand. [51] The Appellant asks the RAD to find that she is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RAD is in no position to do so. Although the RPD made some unreasonable credibility findings, other evidentiary inconsistencies remain, such as the Appellant's contradictory testimony about her employment and about the information she initially provided to immigration officials about the purpose of her travel to Canada. While the RPD made an error in its consideration of IFA, this does not in itself mean that a viable IFA is not available to the Appellant. Further, although the RPD identified state protection as an issue at the outset of the hearing, the Appellant was only questioned on this subject briefly, and the RPD did not analyse the issue in its reasons. For these reasons, this matter requires a de novo hearing before the RPD. CONCLUSION [52] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(c) of IRPA, the Refugee Appeal Division refers the matter to the Refugee Protection Division for redetermination by a differently-constituted panel. This appeal is allowed. (signed) "Edward Bosveld" Edward Bosveld June 24, 2014 Date 1 Guideline 4: Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, Guideline Issued by the Chairperson Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act, IRB, Ottawa, November 25, 1996, as continued in effect by the Chairperson on June 28, 2002, under the authority found in section 159(1)(h) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. 2 IRPA, Sections 110(3) and 110(6). 3 Khosa, para. 89. 4 Iyamuremye v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 494 (2014-05-26), para. 39. 5 IRPA, Section 3(2)(e). 6 Newton v. Criminal Trial Lawyers' Association, 2010 ABCA 399, para. 80. 7 Iyamuremye, para 1. 8 Iyamuremye, paras. 39-40. 9 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 SCC 62 (December 15, 2011) para. 12. 10 Dunsmuir, para. 47; in Khosa, para 4, the "range of reasonable outcomes." 11 Dunsmuir, para. 47; Iyamuremye, para 3. 12 Iyamuremye, para. 2. 13 Dunsmuir, para. 50. 14 Khosa, para. 90. 15 Dunsmuir, para. 50. 16 Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, at para. 129. 17 Geza, Kozak v. M.C.I. and Smajda, Sandor v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., nos. A-419-04, A-420-04), Evans, Décary, Sharlow, March 27, 2006; 2006 FCA 124, at para. 53 18 Maritime Broadcasting System Limited v. Canadian Media Guild, 2014 FCA 59, at paras. 48-63. 19 Farkas v. M.C.I., 2014 FC 542, para. 12. 20 Shuaib, Mohammed Muritala v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6405-12), Snider, June 4, 2013; 2013 FC 596. 21 Appellant's Record, p. 188, Transcript. 22 RPD's Record, p. 140, Affidavit. 23 RPD's Record, p. 136, Submissions. 24 RPD's Record, p. 241, Submissions of the Minister. 25 Nagulesan, Pratharsan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6816-03), Gauthier, October 7, 2004; 2004 FC 1382, FCJ No. 1690, at para 17; Ahanin, Parviz v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2554-11), Russell, February 8, 2012; 2012 FC 180, FCJ No. 188, at para 37. 26 RPD's Reasons, para. 34. 27 See, for example, Iqbal, Azra v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3350-12), Noël, November 20, 2012; 2012 FC 1338, at para. 35. 28 RPD's Reasons, para. 22. 29 RPD's Reasons, para. 25. 30 Shahin v. M.C.I., 2012 FC 423. 31 Radji v. Canada (M.C.I.) 2007 FC 100. 32 Lubana, Rajwant Kaur v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2936-02), Martineau, February 3, 2003; 2003 FCT 116, para. 11, citing Attakora, Benjamin v. M.E.I. (1989), 99 N.R. 168 (F.C.A.), at para. 9; and Takhar, Sukhjeevan Singh v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1961-98), Evans, February 19, 1999, [1999] F.C.J. No. 240, at para. 14 (QL) (T.D.). 33 Valtchev, Rousko v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-4497-99), Muldoon, July 6, 2001; 2001 FCT 776, 208 FTR 267, para. 7. 34 Numbi, Gaston Kipa v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-92-12), Boivin, August 30, 2012; 2012 FC 1037, at 19. 35 Miral, Stefnie Dinisha v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-3392-97), Muldoon, February 12, 1999. 36 RPD's Reasons, para. 35. 37 Leung v. M.E.I., (1994) 81 F.T.R. 303, paras. 14-16. 38 Appellant's Record, p. 33, Basis of Claim form, Question 2(h). 39 RPD's Record, p. 27, National Documentation Package (NDP) for Nigeria (3 May, 2013), Item 12.9, Social Attitudes Toward Religious Intermarriage. 40 Ibid., Item 12.1, International Religious Freedom Report, Section I. 41 RPD's Reasons, para. 48, (emphasis added). 42 Adjei, Joseph v. M.E.I., [1989] 2 F.C. 680; (1989), 7 Imm. L.R. (2d) 169 (C.A.). 43 Li, Yi Mei v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., no. A-31-04), Rothstein, Noël, Malone, January 5, 2005; 2005 FCA 1, [2005] 3 FCR 239, at para 14. 44 Estrada Lugo, Regina v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1166-09), O'Keefe, February 18, 2010; 2010 FC 170, 2010 FC 170, para. 35. 45 RPD's Record, p. 137, Written Submissions. 46 RPD's Record, p. 241, Submissions of the Minister, paras, 4-7. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (February 7, 2014) Disponible en français RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-03355