TB4-11935

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada Refugee Appeal Division Commission de l'immigration et du statut de réfugié du Canada Section d'appel des réfugiés RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-11935 Private Proceeding / Huis clos Reasons and decision ? Motifs et décision Person(s) who is(are) the subject of the appeal XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX Personne(s) en cause Appeal considered / heard at Toronto, Ontario Appel instruit à Date of decision March 4, 2015 Date de la décision Panel David Lowe Tribunal Counsel for the person(s) who is(are)the subject of the appeal Maureen Silcoff Barrister and Solicitor Conseil(s) du (de la/des) personne(s) en cause Designated Representative(s) N/A Représentant(e)(s) désigné(e)(s) Counsel for the Minister N/A Conseil du ministre REASONS FOR DECISION [1] XXXXXXXXXXXXX (the Appellant), a citizen of Colombia, appeals a decision of the Refugee Protection Division (RPD) denying his claim for refugee protection. He has submitted no new evidence in support of his appeal. The Refugee Appeal Division (RAD) takes notice that although there were six claimants listed in the Reasons and Decision on this matter, the Appellant is the only one being dealt with herein as the other claimants (of the original claim) were admitted to Canada as exceptions to the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) and are therefore prohibited from access to the RAD. The Appellant asks the RAD to find that the Appellant is a person in need of protection, or in the alternative, to send this matter back to the RPD for a new hearing by a different Member. In the Appellant's statement (RAD Rule 3 (3)(D)), the Appellant requests an oral hearing pursuant to Section 110(6) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). Determination [2] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. Background [3] The Appellant alleged before the RPD that as a small business person in Cartagena, Colombia, he had suffered extortion and the hands of a criminal group called Los Rastrojos, beginning in August of 2011. The Appellant's daughter had been threatened at school. The Appellant relocated his family to Bogota in January of 2013. [4] In Bogota, the Appellant alleges his home was broken into, their passports and visas stolen and a threatening note left behind by Los Rastrojos. Later, the Appellant was robbed at gunpoint. [5] The Appellant reported to the police, the fiscalia and the Attorney General's office before leaving Colombia. The Appellant fled to the USA and then to Canada where he made his claim. [6] The Appellant's application for refugee protection was heard on October 9, 2014 and a negative decision rendered on November 5, 2014. The RPD found that the Appellant failed to rebut the existence of state protection in Colombia. The RPD found that the Appellant was not a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RPD found that the risk faced by the Appellant was a generalized risk faced by a large segment of the population and therefore is not considered to be personalized. [7] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in failing to assess the claim based on the Appellant being a victim of crime. [8] The Appellant submits that the RPD erred in assessing the state protection issue. The RPD's Findings [9] The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to assess the claim on the basis that the Appellant is a victim of crime. The Appellant argues that had the RPD assessed the claim properly, the RPD would have seen clearly that the Appellant was personally targeted and was not facing a generalized risk. [10] The RAD has listened to the audio recording of the hearing and has read all submissions accordingly. The RPD did have issues with the credibility of the claim based largely on the timing and content of the Appellant's reports to police and other authorities. The RPD questioned why the Appellant would suffer extortion for seventeen months before deciding to report the crime to the police. Further, the RPD questioned why the Appellant would report to the police only two days before he was set to relocate from Cartagena to Bogota, which in effect made the police investigation into the crime moot. The Appellant testified that he attended the police about the extortion for the very first time on January XXX, 2013. He testified that the police took a report and opened an investigation. The Appellant told the police that he wanted immediate protection, which is understandable; however; this is not a reasonable request considering the police had not even a moment to investigate the legitimacy of the alleged crime. It is reasonable to presume that personal protection might be offered once a police department knows there is a need; however, not having an opportunity to conduct even a basic investigation, it would be unreasonable to expect "personal protection" from the police or other state authorities. The police did offer him personal and immediate protection, however, advising him that he would have to pay the cost. The alternative suggested by police was for the Appellant to relocate. The Appellant disclosed a copy of the police report,1 translated, made on January XXX, 2013 which, on page 57, the Appellant wrote in his report that he was being forced to flee Cartagena. The Appellant relocated to Bogota only two days later on January XXX, 2013. It is unclear to the RAD as to whether the Appellant had planned to relocate prior to his visit to the police or as a result of the visit. The fact is that in his report to the police, the Appellant does clearly say on page 57 that he was being forced to flee from Cartagena. This suggests to the RAD that the plan to leave had been made prior to the claimant deciding to make a report. The RAD finds that the Appellant failed to access state protection in this instance for the following reasons. [11] The Appellant further argues that the RPD's assessment of state protection was based on the agent of harm being Los Rastrojos; however, the RPD had found credibility issues with the claim of the Appellant being a victim of Los Rastrojos. As the RPD seemed to believe that the Appellant was a victim of crime but not of Los Rastrojos, the RPD should have assessed state protection based on the Appellant being a victim of non-organized criminal activity. Analysis Role of the RAD [12] Counsel has made some submissions in regard to the role that the RAD plays in the review of an RPD decision. The RAD finds that the recent Federal Court decision, in Huruglica,2 provides the RAD with guidance in relation to the appropriate standard that must be applied by a specialized tribunal such as the RAD to decisions of a first-level administrative tribunal. Justice Phelan states in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the foregoing decision: [54] Having concluded that the RAD erred in reviewing the RPD's decision on the standard of reasonableness, I have further concluded that for the reasons above, the RAD is required to conduct a hybrid appeal. It must review all aspects of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the claimant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. Where its assessment departs from that of the RPD, the RAD must substitute its own decision. [55] In conducting its assessment, it can recognize and respect the conclusion of the RPD on such issues as credibility and/or where the RPD enjoys a particular advantage in reaching such a conclusion but it is not restricted, as an appellate court is, to intervening on facts only where there is an "overriding and palpable error." [13] Accordingly, the RAD will conduct its own assessment of the RPD's decision and come to an independent assessment of whether the Appellant is a Convention refugee or a person in need of protection. The RAD will recognize and respect the credibility findings of the RPD or to other findings where the RPD has a particular advantage in reaching its conclusions. The RAD will conduct its own assessment of the state protection issue as it is a determinative issue and one that the Appellant has raised in this appeal. Request for Oral Hearing [14] The Appellant, in his statement presented in accordance to the requirements of RAD, has requested an oral hearing in accordance to Section 110(6) of the IRPA. However, that section requires new documentary evidence to have been received and allowed by the RAD. Further, that evidence must meet all three requirements under Section 110(6), meaning that the evidence must raise a serious issue with respect to the credibility of the person who is the subject of the appeal AND that evidence must be central to the decision with respect to the refugee protection claim AND that evidence, if accepted, would justify allowing or rejecting the refugee protection claim. [15] There has been no new evidence presented in this appeal. Therefore, the RAD does not have the authority to grant the request of the Appellant. The application for an oral hearing is denied. State Protection [16] The RAD, in assessing the issue of state protection, is guided by the jurisprudence from the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal and the Federal Court. The courts have established a number of principles relating to state protection and the RAD will apply those principles to the appeal at hand. [17] There is a presumption that, except in situations where the state is in complete breakdown, the state is capable of protecting its citizens. The presumption that a state is capable of protecting its citizens underscores the principle that international protection comes into play only when a refugee claimant has no other recourse available. Having canvassed the country conditions documents,3 the RAD finds that Colombia is a democracy in effective control of its territory and has in place a functioning security force to uphold the laws and constitution of the country. [18] To rebut the presumption of state protection, a claimant must provide "clear and convincing" confirmation of the state's inability to protect its citizens.4 A claimant who alleges that state protection is inadequate must persuade the RAD that the evidence establishes that state protection is in fact, inadequate. The evidence that state protection is inadequate must not only be reliable and probative, it must also satisfy the RAD, on a balance of probabilities, that state protection is inadequate.5 Where a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authority in place and makes serious efforts to protect its citizens, the mere fact that the state's efforts are not always successful will not rebut the presumption of state protection.6 A claimant cannot rebut the presumption of state protection in a functioning democracy by asserting only a subjective reluctance to engage the state.7 Doubting the effectiveness of the protection offered by the state when one has not really tested it does not rebut the existence of a presumption of state protection.8 [19] Refugee protection is meant to be a form of surrogate protection to be invoked in those situations where the refugee claimant has unsuccessfully sought the protection of their home state. The onus is on the claimant to approach the state for protection in situations where state protection might be reasonably forthcoming.9 To qualify for refugee status, a claimant must satisfy the Board that he or she sought, but was unable to obtain, protection from their home state, or alternatively, that their home state, on an objective basis, could not be expected to provide protection.10 In the absence of a compelling explanation, a failure to pursue state protection opportunities within the home state will usually be fatal to a refugee claim, at least where the state is a functioning democracy with a willingness and the apparatus necessary to provide a measure of protection to its citizens.11 [20] A claimant's burden of proof is directly proportional to the level of democracy in the state in question: the more democratic the state's institutions, the more the claimant must have done to exhaust all courses of action open to them.12 In a functioning democracy, a claimant will have a heavy burden when attempting to show that he should not have been required to exhaust all of the recourses available to him domestically before claiming refugee status.13 The documentary evidence14 before the RAD indicates that Colombia is a democracy, and there are free and fair elections. There is a relatively independent and impartial judiciary. Therefore, in countries such as Colombia, the claimant must do more than merely show that he went to see members of the police force and that those efforts were unsuccessful. A claimant must show that he has taken all reasonable steps in the circumstances to seek protection, taking into account the context of the country of origin, the steps taken and the claimant's interactions with the authorities.15 Local failures by authorities to provide protection do not mean that the state as a whole fails to protect its citizens, unless the failures form part of a broader pattern of the state's inability or refusal to provide protection.16 No government is expected to guarantee perfect protection to all of its citizens at all times, and the fact that a state is not always successful in protecting its citizens, is not enough to justify a claim, especially where a state is in effective control of its territory, has military, police and civil authorities in place and is making serious efforts to protect its citizens.17 Less than perfect protection is not a basis to determine that a state is either unwilling or unable to offer reasonable protection.18 [21] While the state's efforts are relevant to an assessment of state protection, they are not determinative or sufficient. The efforts must have actually translated into adequate state protection at the operational level ("operational adequacy") (Lopez,19 Park,20 Jaroslav,21 Velazquez,22 Williams,23 E.Y.M.V.,24 Koky,25 Molnar26). [22] In determining whether protection is adequate, it is important to analyze not merely whether a legislative and procedural framework for protection exists, but also whether the state, through the police or other authorities, is able and willing to effectively implement that framework (Elcock,27 Torres,28 Wisdom-Hall29). [23] In view of these principles, the RAD finds that the Appellant has not provided clear and convincing evidence that, on a balance of probabilities, state protection in Colombia is inadequate. In this particular case, the Appellant was questioned by the RPD with respect to state protection in Colombia and his efforts to obtain it. [24] The Appellant testified that he was first extorted by the people he identified as being members of Los Rastrojos in Mid-August of 2011. The Appellant testified that he did not seek protection from the police until January XXX of 2013, almost 17 months later and then, only two days before he moved his family from Cartagena to Bogota. The Appellant filed a statement with the local police and left the area within 48 hours. The police advised the Appellant that they would open an investigation into his problem. The Appellant told the police that he needed immediate protection (personal protection) which was not something the police can provide without cause, and that cause would naturally only be determined through an investigation which takes time. The Appellant was not willing to give the police the time and instead fled the city. The Appellant did not go beyond the local police department. For example, the Appellant could have attended the Dirección de Antisecuestro y Antiextorsión de la Policía Nacional (Anti-kidnapping and Anti-extortion Directorate) or the GAULA (Grupos de Acción Unificada por la Libertad Personal).30 Both of these government organizations specialize in extortion and kidnapping crimes against the person. These are the "higher authorities" to which the Appellant could have and should have gone for protection when, in his mind, the local pólice failed him. The RAD finds that the Appellant did not do all that he could have done to access the protection available to him. [25] In May 2013, the Appellant's home was burgled resulting in the loss of the Appellant's passport and visa. The Appellant testified that a threatening note was left behind by Los Rastrojos. The Appellant testified that he did report the loss of the passports on May XXX, 2013 however he failed to report the threatening note left behind. On May 29, 2013, the Appellant was robbed at gunpoint by two men on a motorcycle who identified themselves as members of Los Rastrojos. The Appellant did not provide a copy of the note which he claims the Los Rastrojos left behind. The Appellant did not report the burglary or the armed robbery against him and his family which occurred on May 29, 2014 until almost four months later, on October XXX, 2013. The Appellant left Colombia only a few days after filing these very late police reports. By leaving Colombia so soon after filing the police reports, it would be very improbable that a proper police investigation would proceed with no plaintiff available. Once again, the RAD finds that the Appellant failed to do all that he could to access the state protection available to him. [26] An Appellant must show that he has taken all reasonable steps in the circumstances to seek protection, taking into account the context of the country of origin, the steps taken and the Appellant's interactions with the authorities (Peralta31). In this case, the Appellant did not even approach police for many months in the Cartagena crimes, and then he fled the city before the police had an opportunity to investigate. The Appellant testified that he did have a file number and a copy of that police report but he never bothered to follow up on the promised investigation. The Appellant then, after relocating to Bogota, with a different phone number according to the Appellant's evidence (police reports of January XXX, 2013 and October XXX, 2013 - different telephone contact numbers), is the victim of a burglary and then an armed robbery, yet still does not seek protection of the police until such time as he was obviously prepared to leave the country. The RAD notes that the police should not have to be pestered in order for them to do their job; however, it is evident to the RAD that this Appellant showed very little diligence in pursuing protection, unlike in Hernandez Montoya.32 [27] The RPD was not obliged to prove that the state can offer the Appellant effective protection, rather, the Appellant bears the legal burden of rebutting the presumption that state protection exists by adducing clear and convincing evidence which satisfies the RPD on a balance of probabilities (Kaleja33). The same principle applies at the RAD. The Appellant argues that the RPD failed to assess the claim from the perspective of non-targeted crime against the Appellant when the RPD decided that the Appellant was not a victim of Los Rastrojos or BACRIM while recognizing that the Appellant was a victim of crime. [28] The RAD understands that an analysis of whether a refugee protection claimant has rebutted the presumption of adequate state protection must be undertaken in a contextual manner, including by taking account of the profile of the alleged agent of persecution. In this case, however, it makes little difference if the RPD had conducted its analysis on the basis that the Appellant was a victim of crime generally or a victim of Los Rastrojos specifically. The Appellant has simply failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in either case. [29] The RAD finds that state protection does exist in Colombia but, equally important, the RAD finds that the Appellant has failed to vigorously pursue the protection available to him by his inaction, waiting several months to report his incidents and then failing to follow up and further by moving out of Colombia just days after reporting the armed robbery and the burglary, thereby removing any chance that the authorities would have to investigate these crimes. The RAD notes that the National Documentation Package (NDP) clearly shows that state efforts have been quite effective in battling the criminal groups such as Los Rastrojos. As related by the RPD in its Reasons, in paragraph 27, authorities in Colombia arrested nearly 3,000 members of these criminal gangs in 2011 alone. The government has taken measures to arrest and prosecute those within their own ranks who have been tied to these criminal groups. The RPD in its Reasons, in paragraph 28, correctly quotes the NDP34showing that Los Rastrojos has been fractured and is on the verge of collapse. [30] The Appellant argues that the RPD ignored evidence that the BACRIM are now a major threat. It is not required of the RPD to write on every piece of evidence disclosed. The RPD has dealt with the issue of the serious threat posed by the BACRIM and Colombia's fight against them in the Reasons and Decision.35 The RAD finds that the RPD did not ignore the evidence. [31] The Appellant argued also that the RPD relied on evidence which it misconstrued, evidence found in the NDP36which suggests that the BACRIM is evolving into a strong criminal franchise. It is true that this document says this; however, what the Appellant failed to mention is that the document specifically speaks to a group known as Urabenos not Los Rastrojos, which is the group that, according to the Appellant, was persecuting him. The RAD disagrees with the Appellant and finds that the RPD did not misconstrue or ignore evidence. Disposition [32] The RAD has found that the RPD did not err in its assessment of state protection or by failing to assess the Appellant as a victim of crime. The RAD finds that the issue before it was whether adequate state protection is and would be available to the claimant in his home country of Colombia should he return. While states are presumed to be capable of protecting their nationals, it is open, according to the law, for the Appellant to rebut the presumption of protection with clear and convincing evidence that adequate protection would not reasonably be forthcoming. I find, on the evidence, that the Appellant has not rebutted that presumption. [33] The panel finds that the Appellant has failed to rebut the presumption of state protection in this particular case. CONCLUSION [34] Pursuant to Section 111(1)(a) of the IRPA, the RAD confirms the decision of the RPD that the Appellant is neither a Convention refugee nor a person in need of protection. This appeal is dismissed. (signed) "David Lowe" David Lowe March 4, 2015 Date 1 Appellant's Record, Tab 4, pages 55-58. 2 Huruglica, Bujar v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6362-13), Phelan, August 22, 2014, 2014 FC 799. 3 RPD's Record, National Documentation Package for Colombia (NDP), 30 April 2014, Item 1.5, Colombia, The World Fact Book 2014. US C.I.A., 27 March 2014. 4 Canada (Attorney General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 103 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 20 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85. 5 Flores Carrillo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2008] 4 F.C.R. 636 (F.C.A.). 6 M.E.I. v. Villafranca, Ignacio (F.C.A., no. A-69-90), Hugessen, Marceau, Décary, December 18, 1992. Reported: Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.), at 133. 7 Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. 8 Ramirez, Leticia Lizet Del Rio v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1301-08), Lagacé, October 31, 2008; 2008 FC 1214. 9 Ward, at 725. 10 Hinzman, Jeremy v. M.C.I. and Hughey, Brandon David v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., nos. A-182-06; A-185-06), Décary, Sexton, Evans, April 30, 2007; 2007 FCA 171. 11 Camacho, Jane Egre Sonia v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4300-06), Barnes, August 10, 2007; 2007 FC 830. 12 M.C.I. v. Kadenko, Ninal (F.C.A., no. A-388-95), Hugessen, Décary, Chevalier, October 15, 1996. Reported: Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Kadenko (1996), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 532 (F.C.A.), at 536. 13 Hinzman, Jeremy v. M.C.I. and Hughey, Brandon David v. M.C.I. (F.C.A., nos. A-182-06; A-185-06), Décary, Sexton, Evans, April 30, 2007; 2007 FCA 171, para. 46. 14 RPD's Record, NDP, Item 2.1, Colombia, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013, US DOS, 27 February 2014. 15 Peralta, Gloria Del Carmen v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-5451-01), Heneghan, September 20, 2002; 2002 FCT 989. 16 Zhuravlvev v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2000] 4 F.C. 3 (T.D.). 17 Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) v. Villafranca (1992), 18 Imm. L.R. (2d) 130 (F.C.A.). 18 Milev, Dane v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-1125-95), MacKay, June 28, 1996. 19 In Lopez, Jeronimo Ocampo v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-1748-10), Hughes, November 23, 2010; 2010 FC 1176, the Court stated: "Here the Member found that Mexico "is making serious and genuine efforts" to address the problem. That is not the test. What must be considered is the actual effectiveness of the protection." 20 In Park, Insun v. M.C.I. (F.C., IMM-1944-10), O'Keefe, December 9, 2010; 2010 FC 1269, the Court stated, at para. 56: "This Court has held that democracy and legislation alone does not ensure adequate state protection and the Board is required to consider any practical or operational inadequacies of state protection." 21 In Jaroslav, Spacil v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3214-10), Kelen, May 31, 2011; 2011 FC 634, the Court stated: "Serious efforts by the state to provide protection are relevant to, but not determinative of, the question of whether protection is adequate. No standard of perfection is required. In Beharry, Estardai v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3470-10), Mactavish, February 1, 2011, 2011 FC 111, Madam Justice Mactavish held at paragraph 9 with respect to state protection that the proper focus is not on the efforts made by the government to combat crime, but the efforts which have 'actually translated into adequate state protection'. Similarly, Mr. Justice O'Keefe held in Gilvaja, Geycel Areli Torez v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-638-08), O'Keefe, June 11, 2009, 2009 FC 598 at para. 39 that the Board ought not to look at whether serious efforts have been made to protect the citizens, but whether at the operational level the protection has been applied." 22 Velazquez, Rafael Sotelo v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-6581-10), Near, June 27, 2011; 2011 FC 775. 23 Williams, Mishka Matika v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-735-11), O'Reilly, October 6, 2011; 2011 FC 1134. 24 Varela, Evelin Yolani Meza v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1915-11), Mosley, November 25, 2011, 2011 FC 1364. 25 In Koky, Milan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2577-11), Russell, December 2, 2011; 2011 FC 1407, the Court stated: "In my view, then, the RPD has committed an error of law in its conclusion that 'serious efforts' equates to adequate state protection. ... it is not enough that a government is willing to provide protection and is making efforts to do so. In order for state protection to be present, the efforts made must adequately protect citizens in practice." The Court also noted that the RPD did "not examine the issue of whether, in light of its serious efforts, the Czech government has in fact been able to provide a level of protection that is adequate to the threats faced" by the claimants. See also Tomlinson, Sandy Tee v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-8742-11), Mactavish, June 28, 2012; 2012 FC 822. In Cina, Milan v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-1773-10), Kelen, May 31, 2011; 2011 FC 635, the Court noted that although the RPD did refer to the "serious efforts" of the Czech government to combat discrimination against Roma, the reasons demonstrate that the RPD was providing details of those efforts as part of a broader description of the adequacy of state protection. In Kis, Beata v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-5314-11), Near, May 18, 2012; 2012 FC 606, the Court held that the RPD did not apply the incorrect test for state protection. The RPD conducted a reasonable assessment of the various programs put in place to address the ongoing challenges facing the Roma in Hungary before finding that these demonstrated "serious and genuine efforts" and that state protection was adequate. 26 In Molnar, Geza .v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-3925-12), Gagné, March 22, 2013; 2013 FC 296, the Court stated that the operational adequacy of state protection is best determined in light of the most recent evidence put before the RPD, rather than through generalities based on evidence emanating from state authorities about legislative and procedural measures that the government has, or has attempted to, put in place. 27 Elcock (Milkson), Joan Theresa v. M.C.I. (F.C.T.D., no. IMM-2985-98), Gibson, September 20, 1999. 28 Torres, Betsabe Del Carmen Balmaceda v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2009-04), Pinard, May 10, 2005; 2005 FC 660. 29 Wisdom-Hall, Tanesha v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4581-07), Hughes, May 28, 2008; 2008 FC 685. 30 RPD's Record, NDP, Item 10.2, COL104012.E. 31 Supra, footnote 15, Peralta. 32 Hernandez Montoya, Olga v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-2781-13), LeBlanc, August 20, 2014; 2014 FC 808. 33Kaleja, Michal v. M.C.I. (F.C., no. IMM-4106-10), Near, June 9, 2011, 2011 FC 668. 34 RPD's Record, NDP, Item 7.7. 35 Appellant's Record, RPD Decision and Reasons, para. 25, "greatest security threat to the country". 36 Supra, footnote 34. --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------------------ RAD.25.02 (June 23, 2014) RAD File No. / N° de dossier de la SAR : TB4-11935