Your Shoes Inc. v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Company

Your Shoes Inc. v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Company Court Supreme Court Date 2009-01-06 Citation 2009 NSSC 5 Docket 239293 Judge/Registrar/Adjudicator Scanlan, J. Edward (Honourable Justice) (SC) Document Type Decision Decision Content IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: Your Shoes Inc. v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Company, 2009 NSSC 5 Date: 20090106 Docket: 239293 Registry: Truro Between: Your Shoes Incorporated Plaintiff v. Portage La Prairie Mutual Insurance Company Defendant DECISION Judge: The Honourable Justice J. E. Scanlan Heard: May 9-15, 2008, in Truro, Nova Scotia Final Written Submissions: December 11, 2008 Counsel: Gary Richard, Solicitor for the Plaintiff Jean McKenna, Solicitor for the Defendant By the Court: [1] On February 22, 2004 there was a major fire on Provost Street, New Glasgow. Many properties, including the plaintiff’s retail shoe outlet were damaged by fire, smoke and water. The plaintiff’s business was located immediately adjacent to the premises that burned. There was substantial smoke and water damage to the interior of the plaintiff’s structure, including much of the merchandise he had on display. The plaintiff’s shoe store operated as a rack outlet, meaning the vast majority of the inventory was on display as opposed to being stored in boxes. There were approximately 1700 pairs of shoes exposed to the smoke and/or water. [2] In this case the plaintiff claims against his insurer pursuant to an insurance policy. He is asking for compensation for damaged inventory, loss of profits and interruption in business. There are a number of issues that arise including interpretation of the insurance policy, application of co-insurance clause, the duty on the insured to mitigate losses and the burden on the insured to prove his claim and to show those losses are insurable losses within the meaning of the insurance policy. The failure of the plaintiff to prove many aspects of the claim looms large in the final results of this decision. [3] As I review the plaintiff’s post trial brief, it is clear the plaintiff and plaintiff counsel did not necessarily understand the terms of the insurance policy. Plaintiff counsel blamed the lack of understanding on the wording of the policy. He used very strong language to characterize the policy wording saying for example the policy wording was: “Tortured, inelegant, circular or reflexive. Text that “seems graphically or visually disconnected”. Unfathomable, grammatically and semantically. The policy was described as dazzlingly. The language is opaque and fortuitously attenuated. Plaintiff’s counsel also described the policy as “profoundly ambiguous”. [4] I agree with the comments of the defendant in the post trial brief at page 15 when they say: Certainly, it is clear that neither Mr. Richard, nor Mr. Stone grasp the meaning of the policy nor did they seek independent advice on its interpretation. [5] While neither Mr. Stone nor Mr. Richard seemed to grasp the meaning of many provisions within the policy, Defence counsel suggests that similar or identical wording has been in place world wide for many, many years in relation to these types of policies. I am not satisfied that is such a dazzlingly abstruse document as the plaintiff suggests. As pointed out in the defendant’s brief this policy is not somehow unique. Cases suggest that at least portions of the policy have been considered previously by the Courts for many, many years. [6] I am satisfied many of the plaintiff’s difficulties in this case have been the result of Mr. Stone’s rather relaxed or cavalier attitude towards his duties under the insurance policy. Mr. Stone is the principal for the plaintiff. Mr. Stone stated in evidence that he basically left the running of the shoe outlet to his “girls”. He knew little of the day to day operations including the accounting. Even at trial he was not able to speak to the financial statements which were in fact integrated financial statements for the damaged outlet and another shoe outlet operated by the plaintiff directly across the street. Mr. Stone was not able to offer the court any assistance in terms of explaining the financial statements as related to the insured premises. He gave no evidence to assist this Court in understanding what his operating losses may have been as a result of the fire and the consequential business interruption. The best that he could do in evidence and even in post trial submissions is to say there must have been a loss of income or wealth as a result of the fire and interruption of business. [7] Another example of Mr. Stone’s approach relates to mitigation of losses after the fire. The defendant, as arranged by the insurance adjuster and Mr. Stone, had engaged a cleaning company working with Mr. Stone’s staff to remove and store the shoes from the damaged retail outlet. They separated shoes damaged by water. The defendant accepted those wet shoes as a complete loss and was prepared to pay the wholesale cost of those shoes. The remaining shoes were treated through an ozone process in an attempt to remove the smoke odour. This process was repeated after it was acknowledged there was some residual smoke odour after the initial ozonisations. The plaintiff refused to take the shoes back from the cleaning company or to make arrangements for their resale. He did that without doing a thorough inspection and without making any meaningful effort to see what could be done to salvage some value out of the cleaned inventory. [8] After the trial was completed but before this decision the parties cooperated in a sale of the remaining inventory and $20,186.00 net of taxes and expenses was recovered. This was about 4 ½ years after the fire. At trial the plaintiff was suggesting there was little or no salvage value even after the shoes were cleaned the second time. [9] The defendant offered an expert witness in relation to the cleaning. Mr. Duncan McGregor Murray of Clean Air Centre. Mr. Murray spoke of a chemical process, referring to the ozonisations process as oxygen on steroids wherein the shoes would have been chemically treated in a chemical process so as to remove the smell of smoke. Mr. Murray suggested in his evidence that some four and one-half years later there was no odour of smoke from the shoes. He readily admitted that all the ozonisations process would do is to speed up the natural process whereby smoke odour would have eventually disappeared in any event. For him to now speak as to what the shoes smelled like at the time of completion of the second ozonisations process is impossible. As he had indicated in his evidence, in the four and one half years since the fire, the smoke odour would have dissipated naturally. Unless he was present to verify as to whether there was any odour at the completion of the second ozonisations process, he could not speak as to whether or not the shoes were smoke free in terms of odour at the time of completion of the second treatment. [10] About the only conclusion the Court derived from Mr. Murray’s evidence was to confirm that ozonisations was in fact a chemical process and that it is not clear what impact the chemical process of ozonisations would have had on the various components in the shoes. This simply confirmed to the Court there was some justification in one manufacturer refusing to honour warranties on shoes that were subject to an ozonisations process. In summary Mr. Murray’s evidence was more helpful to the plaintiff than it was to the defendant. [11] Up to the date of trial the shoes remained in the possession of the cleaning company. Mr. Stone offered up a number of reasons as to why he was refusing to take the shoes. Mr. Stone said, for example, that they still smelled of smoke, even though it is not clear he made any appreciable effort to verify that fact. He also said he could not have a fire sale in the New Glasgow area because he lacked the proper premises and that it would compete with another shoe outlet he had in New Glasgow. Eventually he said the inventory was nearly worthless and he wanted compensation as a total loss for the entire inventory even suggesting that maybe the best way to dispose of the inventory was to donate the shoes to charity. [12] The fact that $20,186.00 was recovered so many years after the fire speaks to the lack of effort by the plaintiff in terms of mitigation. I am satisfied the plaintiff was unreasonable in refusing to take the shoes back from the salvage/cleaning company and make an effort to realize as much as possible through a fire sale of one sort or another. [13] The plaintiff also suggested the shoe inventory was worth substantially less, within just a few weeks of the fire, because of style and market obsolescence. I note that obsolescence is not something which is covered under the terms of the policy. The evidence of the plaintiff and two witnesses who had experience in the retail and wholesale shoe business was that the shoe market was very style conscious, especially in women’s lines. Most of the damaged shoes were women’s shoes. All plaintiff witnesses testified the shoes would be deeply discounted within a few weeks of the fire and the loss of the market opportunity for even a few weeks would severely impact what the plaintiff could sell the shoes for if he were to take possession and try to sell them several weeks after the fire. [14] There is another problem with the plaintiff’s position in addition to the issue related to the plaintiff’s failure to take steps to mitigate his losses through a fire sale of one sort or another. It appears that when the fire occurred many of the shoes were already deeply discounted. They were at or near cost, or soon to be at or near cost in terms of sticker price. The defendant was offering replacement cost, less any coinsurance penalty. If the plaintiff had properly mitigated his losses it is unlikely there would have been any loss other than the coinsurance penalty. In other words the replacement cost as offered by the defendant may well have exceeded the amount the plaintiff could have recovered through normal retail sales. [15] The plaintiff also stated that one of the impacts the fire would have had on the eventual sale price was the fact that the warranty was void on at least part of the inventory as a result of both the fire damage and the chemical treatment process sustained during the ozone process. The Court acknowledges that at least with the Cougar shoes the ozone treatment process voided the warranty. This information was specifically relayed to the plaintiff by that manufacturer. I cannot accept the defendant’s position on the issue of warranties that the Court should only consider the Cougar shoes to be lacking warranty. I am satisfied that it would be totally inappropriate for an insurer to require an insured to somehow represent to his customers that these were anything other than a fire sale product. To do otherwise would be to mislead the consumer and it could expose the plaintiff to other liabilities. That approach may also damage the plaintiff’s reputation in the retail shoe business. Having said that, I am satisfied there was still a salvage value as is evidenced by the fact that in excess of $20,000.00 was obtained in a fire sale of the inventory four and one-half years after the fire. [16] Throughout his evidence Mr. Stone questioned the integrity of the insurer. For example, he suggested that the insurers could have been selective in the shoes that they picked to bring to Court and that perhaps not all shoes or boots were in the same condition as those tendered into evidence. There is nothing to suggest selectivity in picking the shoes. In fact the evidence indicates otherwise. They were purely random sampling of shoes to bring to Court. There was no observable damage in terms of the shoes although, as correctly pointed out by Mr. Stone, some of the packing and labelling was not as it would have been prior to the cleaning. I have to return again to the fact there was in excess of $20,000.00 . recovered four and one half years after the fire. It was unreasonable for Mr. Stone to take the position that the inventory was worthless. [17] Mr. Stone also questioned the integrity of the adjuster in his questioning of Mr. Stone after the fire in relation to store fixtures. He suggested the adjuster was basically setting him up by having Mr. Stone place values on store fixtures so the coinsurance clause would come into effect and minimize the payout under the policy. I find nothing to suggest the adjuster in any way acted improperly in his dealings with the plaintiff. [18] Coinsurance: The defendant suggests that the plaintiff was under insured and the co-insurance provisions in the policy would reduce the plaintiff’s claim. The plaintiff filed a proof of loss (exhibit #1), volume 1, tab 4, page 209, signed by Mr. Stone on June 25, 2004. It shows a claim for merchandise and lease holds in the amount of $97,195.77. The proof of loss did not include a break-down in terms of cost of fixtures but obviously would have included a substantial cost for fixtures. Mr. Stone had earlier produced for the insurer an inventory of fixtures at the request of Mr. Skinner (exhibit #1, volume 1, tab 4, page 171-172). The total value assigned to the fixtures by Mr. Stone was $22,150.00. Mr. Stone suggests that Mr. Skinner lured Mr. Stone into generating replacement cost values for display racks but now says they had no value and that they were accumulated over his years in the retail business. He essentially argues they should be valued at zero dollars. Mr. Stone now suggests that Mr. Skinner simply asked what it would cost him to rebuild the display racks. He said his response was “$1,000.00, whatever...”. A rack would be worth about $800.00, a Cougar rack would be worth about $600.00 ($800.00 for example in his listing). [19] Mr. Stone said had he known the consequences of the co-insurance clause, he would not have valued the fixtures as he did. The fact of the matter is this was a replacement cost insurance policy. The Court would expect that were it not for the co-insurance clause Mr. Stone would now be asking that the fixtures be replaced , or that he be compensated at the replacement value for those fixtures as opposed to now arguing they were essentially worthless leftover display cases. The Court accepts that Mr. Stone initially valued these items at $22,150.00. Mr. Skinner added a further twenty percent to the fixture value based on an off the cuff statement by Mr. Stone that they may have been undervalued by as much as 20% . I am, however, satisfied the fixture value of $22,150.00 is the appropriate value. At the end of the day Mr. Skinner concluded the total value of the contents was $105,000.00 and the plaintiff would be required to maintain insurance of 90 percent of that amount ($94,500.00). [20] One problem with this $105,000.00 figure is that a number of items in the store were not included in the inventory. Ms. Jennifer Feit, who had worked for Mr. Stone at the time, identified the goods described in the inventory. It is clear the inventory included a number of handbags. In addition there were a number of pairs of shoes in boxes in the damaged outlet. These were described as “Wolverines”, referring to the brand name. They were removed from the store to another outlet operated by the plaintiff. This was done with the consent and agreement of the insurance adjuster. They were not damaged as much because they were still in sealed boxes. There was no smoke damage and he was able to sell them. I find nothing wrong in terms of Mr. Stone’s removal of those shoes. He did it openly and with the consent of the insurance representative. I attributed no wrongdoing to Mr. Stone because of that action. I simply note that it would have affected the co-insurance had the handbags and recovered shoes been included in the inventory. In addition there was no value attributed to the cash registers, calculators, microwave, etc. It is not possible based on the evidence to attribute any value to those items. Certainly they would have had a replacement cost. [21] Even after trial, in the post-trial brief, the insurer suggests that a 29.5 percent co-insurance penalty is not unreasonable. I refer again to the fact the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his losses. The defendant was and apparently still is prepared to accept the figures by the plaintiff in terms of the inventory in the store and the wholesale cost. [22] In view of the total lack of evidence in relation to inventory which was not accounted for, including the calculators, handbags, microwave oven, cash register, etc., and the Wolverines shoes which were removed with the consent of Mr. Skinner, the concession in the post-trial brief that a 29.5 percent co-insurance penalty appears to be a very reasonable concession. I again refer to the fact the burden is on the plaintiff to prove his damages. In many aspects there was a complete lack of evidence in terms of the value of some of the inventory so that in the absence of that concession by the defendant, it would have been impossible to ascertain a proper co-insurance penalty. Had that happened the burden on the plaintiff would not have been satisfied and in many aspects the claim would have failed. [23] There is one additional adjustment to be made before the coinsurance penalty is fixed. That is the result of the seasonal increase of inventory as permitted in the policy. The defendant accepted throughout the value of the water damaged shoes at the plaintiff’s invoice costs (replacement costs) was $9,148.78 and the value of the remaining shoes was $66,049.99. A total shoe value of $75,195.77. As noted above this did not include the handbags, Wolverines, and fixtures such as the adding machine and microwave, etc. The plaintiff’s limit of insurance was $70,000.00, however, there was a provision in the policy which allowed for a “seasonal automatic increase”. The provision states that the limit of the insurance automatically increases by 25 percent for seasonal variations. [24] In this case I accept the evidence of Mr. Stone that the seasonal increase in inventory was the result of him having received his winter stock which was “an expensive stock” as compared to other seasons. A difficulty that Mr. Stone encountered was the winter season was very late in arriving that year so he continued to have an increased seasonal variation for a substantially longer period of time because of late onset of snow and cold weather. I am satisfied the seasonal automatic increase should apply so that Mr. Stone’s inventory was insured for an additional 25 percent of the $70,000.00 or $17,500.00. That $17,500.00 amount should be used for the purpose of calculating the co-insurance. The result is that Mr. Stone was under insured by $7,000.00 and not the $24,500.00 as suggested by the defendants. The rate is 7.5% not 29.5% as suggested by the defendant. I further adjusted for items removed. For example the hand bags and Wolverine Shoes in the way the defendant suggests is not unreasonable so as to invoke a co-insurance penalty of eight percent. I calculate the losses as follows: Wet Shoes - $9,148.78, less co-insurance penalty - 8%($731.90), proven loss is $8,416.88. The value of shoes remaining - $66,046.99, less co-insurance penalty of eight percent - $5,283.76, proven loss is $60,763.23, less recovery on salvage, $20,186.00 - $40,577.23. Fixtures in the amount of $22,150.00 less a co-insurance penalty of 8% ($1,772.00) - $20,378.00. The policy included a $500.00 deductible and that shall be subtracted from any payment. [25] I have used the salvage figure of $20,186.00 even though it was obtained from a sale four and one-half years after the fire. The defendant suggests that there is no way of ascertaining what the salvage recovery would have been had Mr. Stone realized on the remaining inventory earlier. The evidence satisfies me there would have been a loss as a result of the fire damage and the fact that the shoes could no longer be sold without identifying them as fire damaged. The only evidence before me is the evidence of one other shoe retailer and Mr. Stone. They were suggesting there was going to be a deep discounting in the immediate future if the fire had not occurred when it did. If I were to accept their evidence as a whole, basically the inventory would have been almost worthless by the time the cleaning process was complete. Mr. Stone would have been left perhaps donating the shoes to charity. I do not accept the shoes were worthless as is evidenced from the recovery at the eventual sale. Having said that the only yard stick that I have in terms of the salvage value after the cleaning process is the amount recovered some four and one half years later as referred to above. There is no evidence that the recovery would have been any greater if the sale occurred earlier. The end result is there is a loss of $105,000.00 less salvage of $20,186.00. As noted this does not include the shoes as removed, the cash registers etc, not included in equipment and the handbags as removed. Business Interruption Insurance [26] I repeat some of my finding here as it relates to business interruption losses. In this case the plaintiff argued at the time of the fire many of the shoes were displayed at the wholesale price because of reductions in the retail sticker price. The plaintiff, through Mr. Stone, has stated it had been a mild winter and much of the winter stock was slow in selling that year. In fact he had or was about to reduce sticker prices on almost all of the shoes. There were expert witnesses called by the defendant, both of whom testified that in the shoe industry obsolescence is a major concern and that there are very substantial reduction in sticker prices in a matter of weeks as the season progresses. A lot of that evidence indicated that, in terms of real value, the inventory would have been substantially less than wholesale cost. As I had indicated above, that evidence is relevant to the issue of what the eventual profits on sales might be. The pending deep discounts lead me to believe that there may have been more profits in the insurance than there would be in the sale of the shoes. That evidence is relevant to the issue of business interruption losses. [27] On the issue of business interruption losses the plaintiff took the same relaxed approach to proving his losses as he did to the salvage efforts. Even though the financial statements for his two shoe operations were integrated he made no effort to separate the outlets for purposes of showing business interruption losses. Mr Stone referred to the fact he was not taking money from the shoe stores for himself but that the outlets “contributed to his wealth” by contribution to overhead in terms of his real property holdings he owned and used for the stores. In terms of evidence there was nothing to show what the losses were for those real properties. [28] Plaintiff counsel simply argued that there must be a business interruption loss as there was that loss of contribution to Mr. Stones wealth. There are two problems with that approach. First as noted above in terms of the retail shoe business, I am convinced in this case there was more profit in the insurance coverage using replacement cost than there would have been through the sale of the shoes. The deep discounts that were imminent. There was no evidence the outlet ever operated at a profit and as such, at least based on the evidence before me, shutting down the outlet saved the plaintiff money. The second problem is that I can only assume that the real property was covered by a separate policy or at least was an insurable entity separate from the shoe outlet. As such, if it is that stream of income Mr. Stone is complaining about losing, it relates to his real property holdings. That is not something which was insured under the policy now before the court. [29] There is no question that this insurance policy deals with a number of potentially complex issues and it is not a simple document. Having said that, I am not satisfied it is impossible to read the various sections of the insurance policy. In fact even the policy itself in relation to the business interruption section, paragraph 2(c) provides $1,000.00 for auditor fees in assisting and preparing a claim for business interruption losses. [30] Mr. Stone did not avail himself of that assistance. It is a type of coverage that is universally in existence. I dare suggest that virtually every insurance law text acknowledges the existence of a co-insurance clause in one form or another. [31] In Proper Damage Claims Under Commercial Insurance Policies, (Richard Krempulec, Q.C., Canada Law Books), it is noted: Co-insurance means that the insured must take out sufficient insurance as required by the co-insurance clause to ensure the percentage value of the property required by that clause. If the insured does not insure the building to that value, the insured becomes an insurer for the difference between the amount for which the building ought to have been insured and the amount for which it was insured. The value as to which amount the building should be insured under the provisions of the co-insurance clause should specify whether the building should be valued at an actual cash value basis, on a replacement costs basis, or on some other basis. There is nothing unique in the co-insurance clause in this policy. [32] I refer to the policy itself and the way the policy refers to for calculating business interruption losses. I return to a comment that I made previously and that is the burden is on the plaintiff to prove its claim. In this case the plaintiff, Your Shoes Incorporated, was operated by Mr. Stone and Mr. Stone also operated Solely Shoes and Down Town Shoes. A review of Mr. Stone’s financial statements shows that it is impossible to distinguish between the revenues attributed to Solely Shoes and the revenues attributed to Down Town Shoes. This lack of distinction presents a significant obstacle to determining what Mr. Stone’s losses may or may not have been as a result of this fire. Basically, the position of the plaintiff through counsel can be summed up as being one where the plaintiff is suggesting that intuitively if the plaintiff’s business was shut down there must have been resulting loss. There is little by way of evidence that would allow this Court to do anything other than guess as to what the losses may have been. [33] Based on the financial statements presented to the Court it would appear that the Down Town Shoes and Solely Shoes operations were continuously operating at a loss, at least in so far as there is a history available. It is not clear, because of the fact the records were intertwined for both operations, as to whether or not the fire damaged premises was operating at a loss or a profit. The Down Town Shoes location was selling lower priced rack shoes as compared to the Solely Shoes operation which sold a better grade of shoes. In addition, the Solely Shoes outlet was operating with about half the square footage of Down Town Shoes. There never was a breakdown of the inventory between the two operations. Mr. Stone was not able to offer any assistance to the Court on direct or cross-examination in relation to the earnings for the company. [34] The defendant took an approach which is reflective of the terms of the policy in relation to business interruption loss. The defendant suggested the measure of recovery was limited to the loss of gross profits due to a reduction in turnover as well as the increase in costs of working. From this amount there was to be a deduction for non-continuing, standing charges. [35] Ms. Hiltz, on behalf of the defendant, stated in effect that in order to determine the reduction in turnover the rate of gross profit must first be determined. Ms. Hiltz explained that in order to find the rate it is necessary to take gross profits of $98,798.00 from Mr. Stone’s 2003/2004 financial statements and divide that by the annual turnover of $256,942.00 (total cost of goods). This produces a rate of gross profit of 38.5 percent which Ms. Hiltz rounded up to 39 percent. She then applied the percentage to previous years sales for the comparable period of time during which Down Town Shoes ceased operation entirely. Again that was taken from Mr. Stone’s ledgers. That figure is $11,054.00 in sales at a 39 percent rate of gross profit. The result would be $4,311.06. From this Ms. Hiltz deducted the non-continuing expenses such as rent on the premises which were no longer occupied during that period, repairs, and utilities. [36] The difficulty at this point, however, is that as Ms. Hiltz testified the financial statements reflect both Soley Shoes and Down Town Shoes. It is actually impossible to determine what standing charges should have been deducted from the $4,311.06. The result is the plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proving his entitlement under the policy. Only the plaintiff had the ability to break out the detailed expenses including rent, office expense, depreciation, repairs, maintenance, taxes, utilities, wages, etc., in relation to the 169 Provost Street operation. The Plaintiff did not attempt to adduce that evidence. [37] Mr. Stone made it clear that throughout the years he operated both Solely Shoes and Down Town Shoes, he did not take any money out of those operations. As argued by his counsel in post-trial brief the shoe operations, although not having cash available to distribute to Mr. Stone, resulted in a contribution to this wealth indirectly because Mr. Stone owned the premises where the shoe retail outlets were located. The paid rent for those operations, “contributed to his wealth”. Mr. Richard argued that loss of contribution to wealth should be considered in calculating the business interruption losses. [38] It would be inappropriate for the Court to take this approach as suggested by Plaintiff Counsel. It would appear that once all is said and done, from an operational point of view, the fire and insurance proceeds may have reduced the operational losses for the plaintiff. The shoes that were offered for sale by Down Town Shoes would have been subject to ever deeper discounting. Mr. Stone would not have recovered anything close to his cost on the remaining inventory. The fact the insurance company was prepared, subject to the co-insurance clause, to pay Mr. Stone for the shoes, at cost, would appear for Down Town Shoes to be its best hope at turning a profit for the year in question. [39] I accept the plaintiff’s assertion that when he opened another retail shoe outlet across the street from the damaged premises it was a smaller operation and not really a resumption of normal operations. The difficulty I have in the present case is that I cannot ascertain, based on the evidence, what business interruption losses were incurred as a result of the fire. [40] At page 12 of the defendant’s post-trial brief they offer two different calculations as possibly being correct calculations of business interruption losses. I understand them to be offering one of those two amounts as a business interruption loss. Based on the lower offer I would award an amount of $1,785.16 as set out in the defendant’s brief. That is based only on their representation that it would be an appropriate amount. In the absence of such an admission I could not calculate business interruption losses because of the total lack of evidence on that point. The co-insurance clause does not apply to business interruption losses. [41] The defendant will be entitled to deduct from any payment to the Plaintiff all expenses in relation to storage of the salvage items beginning six months after the original loss. [42] As noted in the defendant’s brief, the defendant is responsible for other charges of S. Allen and Sons, including ozoning, and the fees for Sid’s Construction and Central Amusement invoice, for the cleaning of the Juke box. I understand the defendant’s have already reimbursed the plaintiff for the cost of the plaintiff’s employees removing and separating the water damaged shoes. These various costs do not appear to be in dispute. [43] I have not addressed the issue of costs. I would ask that counsel make submissions on this issue. J. 01/06/09