De Sousa v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 183 (06 February 2006)

De Sousa v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 183 (06 February 2006)

The adjudicator and tribunal erred in law by misapplying the burden of proof regarding the father's political activities and the identity of those who threatened the appellant, and by failing to consider material evidence of threats against the appellant. On the accepted facts, the only reasonable conclusion was that the appellant was a refugee at the time she left Cabinda. The question of safe return to Luanda was not properly addressed in light of her refugee status and personal circumstances.

Citation
[2006] EWCA Civ 183
Parties
Claimant/appellant: De Sousa; Defendant/respondent: Secretary of State for the Home Department
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
06 February 2006
Procedural Posture
Asylum Appeal / Appeal From Immigration Appeal Tribunal to Court of Appeal
Outcome
Appeal allowed
Legal Topics
Asylum, Refugee Status, Internal Relocation, Article 3 ECHR, Burden of Proof
Immigration Law Human Rights Law Asylum Refugee Status Internal Relocation Article 3 ECHR Burden of Proof

Case Brief

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Parties

De Sousa

Claimant/appellant

Secretary of State for the Home Department

Defendant/respondent

Procedural Posture

Asylum Appeal / Appeal From Immigration Appeal Tribunal to Court of Appeal

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether the appellant was a refugee at the time she left Angola under the Refugee Convention
  2. 2 Whether the appellant could be safely returned to Luanda, Angola, without breach of Article 3 ECHR

Ratio Decidendi

The adjudicator and tribunal erred in law by misapplying the burden of proof regarding the father's political activities and the identity of those who threatened the appellant, and by failing to consider material evidence of threats against the appellant. On the accepted facts, the only reasonable conclusion was that the appellant was a refugee at the time she left Cabinda. The question of safe return to Luanda was not properly addressed in light of her refugee status and personal circumstances.

Court Disposition

Appeal allowed

Orders

  • Matter remitted to the Immigration Appeal Tribunal for reconsideration