

ENGLAND AND WALES / JUDGMENT

Domestic & General Group Limited & Ors v Premier Protect Holdings Limited & Ors

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NCN: [2025] EWHC 2339 (KB) IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE (KING'S BENCH DIVISION) Royal Courts of Justice Strand London Ref. QB-2021-000136 Before THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE LAVENDER IN THE MATTER OF

(1) DOMESTIC & GENERAL GROUP LIMITED

(2) DOMESTIC & GENERAL INSURANCE PLC

(3) DOMESTIC & GENERAL SERVICES LIMITED (Claimants/Applicants)

- v -

(1) PREMIER PROTECT HOLDINGS LIMITED (In Liquidation)

(2) ABDELHAK AKAYOUR

(3) APEX ASSURE LIMITED (In Liquidation)

(4) BELAL ALI

(5) HOME PROTECT 365 LIMITED

(6) PREMIER PROTECT 365 SL

(7) HICHAM ALAMI

(8) RACHID EL HADDOUCHI

(9) UK SERVICE PLAN LIMITED

(10) MOHAMED ANOIR DHIMI

(11) MOHAMMED ZAKRIA KHAN (Defendants/Respondents) NICHOLAS GOODFELLOW appeared on behalf of the Claimants/Applicants JOSHUA HITCHENS appeared on behalf of the Second Defendant/Respondent HELEN PUGH appeared on behalf of the Fourth Defendant/Respondent MICHAEL UBEROI appeared on behalf of the Tenth Defendant/Respondent APPROVED JUDGMENT 26th JUNE 2025

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