Swift v Secretary of State for Justice

Swift v Secretary of State for Justice

The two-year cohabitation requirement in section 1(3)(b) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is a proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of confining claims to relationships of permanence and dependence; Parliament is entitled to a wide margin of discretion in this area of social and economic policy, and the distinction is justified.

Parties
Appellant/claimant: Laurie Swift; Respondent/defendant: Secretary of State for Justice
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
18 March 2013
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court, Queen’s Bench Division
Outcome
Appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Compatibility of Fatal Accidents Act With European Convention on Human Rights, Discrimination Based on Cohabitation Duration, Loss of Dependency Claims, Bereavement Damages
Human Rights Tort Law Family Law Compatibility of Fatal Accidents Act With European Convention on Human Rights Discrimination Based on Cohabitation Duration Loss of Dependency Claims Bereavement Damages

Case Brief

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Parties

Laurie Swift

Appellant/claimant

Secretary of State for Justice

Respondent/defendant

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Appeal From High Court, Queen’s Bench Division

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether section 1(3)(b) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is incompatible with article 14 in conjunction with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
  2. 2 Whether the two-year cohabitation requirement unjustifiably discriminates against claimants
  3. 3 Whether the legislative distinction is objectively justified

Ratio Decidendi

The two-year cohabitation requirement in section 1(3)(b) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is a proportionate means of pursuing the legitimate aim of confining claims to relationships of permanence and dependence; Parliament is entitled to a wide margin of discretion in this area of social and economic policy, and the distinction is justified.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed

Orders

  • Section 1(3)(b) of the Fatal Accidents Act 1976 is not incompatible with article 14 in conjunction with article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
  • No change to the statutory requirement for two-year cohabitation