CPL Mechanical & Pipe Installation Specialists Ltd v DURR Industries Incorporated [2001] EWCA Civ 89 (29 January, 2001)

CPL Mechanical & Pipe Installation Specialists Ltd v DURR Industries Incorporated [2001] EWCA Civ 89 (29 January, 2001)

The judge exercised her discretion correctly under CPR 13.3 by refusing to set aside the default judgment due to CPL's inexcusable delay, notwithstanding that CPL had a real prospect of defending part of the counterclaim and that Durr suffered no substantial prejudice. The existence of a second scope of works document, not argued before the judge, did not justify reopening the judgment.

Citation
[2001] EWCA Civ 89
Parties
Claimant/applicant: CPL Mechanical & Pipe Installation Specialists Limited (In Liquidation); Defendant/respondent: Durr Industries Incorporated
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Application for Permission to Appeal From Order Refusing to Set Aside Default Judgment
Outcome
Permission to appeal refused
Legal Topics
Default Judgment, Setting Aside Judgment, Delay in Application, Real Prospect of Success, Discretion Under CPR 13.3

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Parties

CPL Mechanical & Pipe Installation Specialists Limited (In Liquidation)

Claimant/applicant

Durr Industries Incorporated

Defendant/respondent

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Application for Permission to Appeal From Order Refusing to Set Aside Default Judgment

  1. 1 Whether the court should grant permission to appeal against refusal to set aside default judgment on a counterclaim
  2. 2 Whether delay in applying to set aside default judgment is fatal even if part of the defence has real prospect of success
  3. 3 Whether the existence of a second, inconsistent contractual document justifies reopening the judgment

Ratio Decidendi

The judge exercised her discretion correctly under CPR 13.3 by refusing to set aside the default judgment due to CPL's inexcusable delay, notwithstanding that CPL had a real prospect of defending part of the counterclaim and that Durr suffered no substantial prejudice. The existence of a second scope of works document, not argued before the judge, did not justify reopening the judgment.

Court Disposition

Permission to appeal refused

Orders

  • Application for permission to appeal refused
  • Application for permission to rely on further evidence refused