TIDAL LAGOON (SWANSEA BAY) PLC v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY

TIDAL LAGOON (SWANSEA BAY) PLC v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR BUSINESS, ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL STRATEGY

Requirement 2 in the DCO constitutes an 'other period' specified within the meaning of section 154(1)(b) of the Planning Act 2008, displacing the default period. The definition of 'commence' in article 2(1) modifies the material operations required to trigger the applicable time period. The Company’s failure to undertake the necessary material operations within Requirement 2 meant the DCO ceased to have effect when the time limit expired.

Parties
Claimant/appellant: Tidal Lagoon (Swansea Bay) PLC; 1st Defendant/respondent: Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy; 2nd Defendant/respondent: Welsh Ministers; 3rd Defendant/respondent: The Council of the City and County of Swansea
Jurisdiction
England and Wales
Judgment Date
01 December 2022
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Court of Appeal Judgment
Outcome
Appeal dismissed
Legal Topics
Development Consent Orders, Statutory Interpretation, Infrastructure Planning, Compulsory Acquisition
Administrative Law Planning Law Development Consent Orders Statutory Interpretation Infrastructure Planning Compulsory Acquisition

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Parties

Tidal Lagoon (Swansea Bay) PLC

Claimant/appellant

Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy

1st Defendant/respondent

Welsh Ministers

2nd Defendant/respondent

The Council of the City and County of Swansea

3rd Defendant/respondent

Procedural Posture

Civil Appeal / Court of Appeal Judgment

Legal Issues

  1. 1 Whether Requirement 2 and the definition of 'commence' in the DCO modify or exclude sections 154 and 155 of the Planning Act 2008
  2. 2 Whether two separate time periods exist for 'beginning' and 'commencing' development under the DCO and the Planning Act 2008
  3. 3 Whether the DCO ceased to have effect due to failure to commence development within the specified period

Ratio Decidendi

Requirement 2 in the DCO constitutes an 'other period' specified within the meaning of section 154(1)(b) of the Planning Act 2008, displacing the default period. The definition of 'commence' in article 2(1) modifies the material operations required to trigger the applicable time period. The Company’s failure to undertake the necessary material operations within Requirement 2 meant the DCO ceased to have effect when the time limit expired.

Court Disposition

Appeal dismissed

Orders

  • The Company’s construction is rejected.
  • The Company was not entitled to the declarations sought.